Most social scientists writing on mobility in Thai society have agreed on the fact that the rate of upward social mobility in Thailand was (is) high. This statement, however, has seldom been supported by quantitative data.

But Evers' and Silcock's and Evers' recent articles on social stratification and social mobility in Thailand are different. These authors offer quantitative data which, they claim, support the proposition that, following the consolidation of a bureaucratic élite in the expanding urban centre of Bangkok, mobility has declined between certain strata of Thai society.

Unfortunately, this claim is not substantiated by the facts. Evers' conclusions were based on the survey of a small and not very representative sample. He recognizes that the conclusions drawn from the analysis of this sample can only be 'to a limited extent applicable to the total bureaucratic élite'. Titaya Suvanayata's work reveals how limited this extent actually is. Evers found that of three categories of civil servants (those who entered the bureaucracy before 1932, those who entered during the period 1933—1945 and those who entered after the Second World War) 26%, 63% and 93% respectively had studied abroad. For these very same categories Titaya, who used a much bigger and less skewed sample of 578 special grade officers, gives percentages of 31, 40 and 60.

There is, however, another and more serious deficiency in Evers' data. In his 1966-article he comes to the conclusion that before 1932 more people from a non-bureaucratic background entered the bureaucracy than after that date. This conclusion was based on an investigation of his sample of 64 higher civil servants. In this sample all people had similar service rank but different numbers of service years. Evers divided the sample into those recruited before 1932 and those recruited after, and then compared these two groups in terms of their social origins i.e. in terms of those who did or did not have a father in the bureaucracy. But he apparently overlooked the fact that younger people, recruited in the post-1932 years, may have reached high positions relatively soon due to quick promotion because of their bureaucratic background; or, alternatively, that the pre-1932 group contained more people of non-bureaucratic origin because the greater seniority of these people compensated for their lack of a bureaucratic background. In either case the differences in the sample between these groups did not warrant the conclusion that before 1932 more people from a non-bureaucratic origin were recruited to the civil service than after.

It was only in a later article — written in cooperation with Silcock — that Evers tacitly acknowledged this fault of his earlier paper.

In view of this, and in view of the small size of his sample, it is difficult to accept Evers' assertion that in spite of everything 'the differences are probably large

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2 Titaya Suvanayata, Social Sciences and Thai Executive, stencilled manuscript (Bangkok, Thammasat University, 1964).

3 Titaya (op. cit. p. 4) actually claims that his population covered very nearly all the special grade officers in the civil service, excluding police officers. However, according to information given to me by the Comptroller General's department, there were in 1965 1,214 special grade officers.

enough to warrant the conclusion that social mobility has declined after 1932'. Though it is very well possible that social mobility has declined since 1932, this can not be concluded from Evers' scanty evidence.

**MODES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY**

One reason for the fact that the discussion on social mobility in Thailand has not yielded many positive results thus far is that most authors have insisted on talking about the *rate* of social mobility. This necessitates reliable quantitative data which is something rather hard to come by in a country like Thailand.

Yet it does not seem impossible to say something meaningful about social mobility in Thailand, provided attention is centered not on the rate but on what Ralph Turner calls the 'mode' of mobility. In his paper on the various modes, in Britain and the U.S.A., of social ascent through education, Turner distinguishes to 'modes' of social mobility viz. 'sponsored mobility', found in societies where élite recruits 'are chosen by the established élite or their agents', and 'contest mobility', referring to mobility where 'élite status is the prize in an open contest and is taken by the aspirants' own efforts'.

Turner explains the differences between sponsored and contest mobility mainly through the presence, or absence, of an *established élite*. In order to make a comparison between Britain and the U.S.A. he operates with a very simple diadic model of society viz. élite - masses.

The question is now whether it is possible to use the same simple diadic model when attempting to apply Turner's concepts to traditional (and modern) Thai society.

Directing attention, for the moment, to another Oriental society, Weber's information on traditional Chinese education, is better understood when a triadic (ruler - bureaucratic élite-populace) rather than a diadic (élite-masses) model of traditional Chinese society is kept in mind.

Weber describes the 'credentials' of the Chinese literati as follows: 'Puns, euphemisms, allusions to classical quotations, and a refined and purely literary intellectualty ...'. This description corresponds exactly with Turner's view of élite credentials, requiring 'the trained discrimination of the élite for their recognition', in societies where sponsored mobility prevails.

But did the Chinese education and examination system promote social homogeneity among the élite, which is, according to Turner, one of the main 'functions' of education in a society with sponsored mobility? The

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6 The word model here 'refers to a set of assumptions which are used to circumcribe and insulate a number of interrelated processes which can then be treated as though, for certain purposes, they constituted an autonomous area of reality' (P. S. Cohen, *Modern Social Theory*, (London, 1968), p. 16).

answer is that it did this, but that it also did the exact opposite. Weber asserts that the use of the examination system to the emperor was that it promoted a competitive struggle for prebends and offices amongst candidates, which prevented them joining together to form a feudal office nobility.

The 'anomaly' here can be explained by the fact that Turner's concept of sponsored mobility is related to his diadic model of (British) society, whereas in traditional China we deal with a society having a powerstructure more adequately represented by a triadic model.

If we turn now our attention to traditional Thai society it becomes clear that here also, for analysis of 'matters of basic orientation and policy, a triadic rather than a diadic model of society is called for. The power of the Thai king was neither unlimited nor undivided. Though many institutions — the harem, the sakiti na system leading to an extreme atomisation of the social order, and the royal taboos — were conducive to the King's power, Siffin's judgment that the Thai kings 'lacked the instrumentalities necessary to an effective absolutism' seems well founded.

If then we accept a triadic model (ruler-bureaucratic élite - populace) of Thai society as point of departure for our analysis of the mode(s) of upward social mobility in this society, we can retain Turner's concept of sponsored mobility, to be sure, but not without adding something to it.

In traditional Chinese society, for example, the ruler was interested in a future official's (potential) contributions to certain organisation goals (those of the imperial bureaucracy) rather than in his 'élite credentials'. In other words, if we define 'achievement' as the 'actual or potential contributions to organization goals', the ruler was interested in a future official's achievement. The organization goal, from the point of view of the ruler, was identical with the bureaucracy's 'manifest functions', related to its formal or overt structure and its initial purpose. The élite

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8 I must emphasize here that this triadic 'power model' is not supposed to be a model of the 'class structure' of traditional Thai society. Obviously the latter concept is much more inclusive.


10 See the account of Jeremias van Vliet, an agent of the Dutch East India Company in Ayuthaya, on the precautionary measures taken by king Prasat T'ong (± 1640) against his highest dignitaries. (J. van Vliet, 'Historical Account of Siam in the 17th Century', Selected Articles from the Siam Society Journal, Vol. VII (Bangkok, 1959), p. 90).


12 This explains why in many traditional Asian societies the rulers often appointed people of 'low birth' or foreigners to important positions without any regard for the customary élite credentials (See N. Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe (London, 1965), p. 61. Also S. Andreski, Elements of Comparative Sociology, (London, 1964), p. 240 and K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, (New Haven 1957), p. 346). Thailand provides a good example with the career of Constantine Phaulkon, the Greek cabin boy who became one of king Narai's most important advisers.
of ranking officials, however, was interested in a (future) official's participation in the élite culture which defined their identity and served to perpetuate them as a group. In other words, the élite was interested in the future official's 'attainment' — if attainment is defined as the acquisition of élite attributes not indicative in themselves of any contribution to the goals of the employing organization (i.e. of achievement). Thus the ruler's and the élite's interests in sponsored mobility, in the manipulation of the future official's ascent from above, were based on different aims. In accordance with these different aims I will break up the concept into 'achievement-oriented' and 'attainment-oriented' sponsored mobility.

Having arrived at these concepts one of the main propositions of this paper, regarding the prevalent modes of upward social mobility during the last century of Thai history, can now be formulated. **Achievement-oriented sponsored mobility prevailed from the time of the 'Chakri reformation' (± 1870) onwards until the 'revolution' of 1932; after 1932 attainment-oriented sponsored mobility became more important, while many present-day aspects of upward social mobility in Thai society can be adequately indicated by the concept of contest-mobility.** It is hoped to make this thesis credible in the succeeding pages.

**THE 'CHAKRI-REFORMATION'**

Following the Bowring Treaty with Great Britain, in 1855, Thailand came increasingly under the impact of the West. The changes stemming from this which led to a modernization of the bureaucratic apparatus, necessitating the use of Western skills and knowledge, have been called 'the Chakri-reformation'.

Traditionally the bureaucracy was an exploitative system, mainly serving the aggregation of interests of which it was comprised. The Chakri-reformation has been described by Siffin as the transformation from a system maintenance into a goal attainment bureaucracy, with an increasing distinction between 'public' and 'private' spheres. This transformation, mainly the work of king Chulalongkorn and some of his closest advisers (e.g. Prince Damrong), led to the introduction of achievement norms into the bureaucracy. Ability and experience became more important for promotion and advancement. The Ministry of the Interior began to base its decisions concerning recruitment and promotion to an increasing extent on the outcome of examinations. It is to be expected that this heightened interest in achievement-oriented sponsored mobility emanated mainly from the king. The king's interest in 'achievement', I argued above, could be assumed for those traditional Asian societies where the power structure approximated the simple

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13 The conceptual distinction between 'achievement' and 'attainment', and their application to two different periods in Thai history, I owe to Siffin.
triadic model: ruler — bureaucratic élite — populance. What was new however was the kind of achievement which interested king Chulalongkorn. Achievement could no longer be identical with accomplishment in the expression of 'total and ingenious servility' (Wittfogel) when the organization goals changed, and necessitated the sort of knowledge acquired only in 'modern' Western-type educational institutions. Hence it is not astonishing that it was king Chulalongkorn who tried to establish a modern educational system, and encountered, in doing so, great resistance from the entrenched bureaucracy.¹⁴

The king tried to introduce secular education into the royal monasteries from 1875 onwards, but by 1883 only one such monastery school had been established. A Western-type secondary school (Samuel McFarland's), which was established in 1879 at the invitation of the king, had to close temporarily in 1883 and permanently in 1892 because of the resistance of senior bureaucrats. When Prince Damrong, the king's closest cooperator in educational (and other) reforms, resigned from the education office in 1892, other ministers took this chance to erase many of his earlier measures.¹⁵

Another innovation by the king was the 'king's scholarship' for study abroad, 'which was open to everyone however humble'.¹⁶ It was characteristic for the king's interest in those who were not yet entrenched in the bureaucracy that he only sent young men abroad. Phra Sarasas reproaches him for this as Thailand 'lost much priceless time waiting for those young men . . .'

King Chulalongkorn's reforms established principles of recruitment and promotion which were not to be abolished during the reigns of the last absolute kings, Rama VI and Rama VII.¹⁷ However, these kings tried to combine two rather incompatible policies by leaving their nearest relatives in entrenched positions at the top of the bureaucracy, while at the same time basing the advancement of 'homenes novi' on achievement.

¹⁴ See the letter written in 1880 by the American consul in Bangkok regarding the resistance against educational reforms (Quoted in D. K. Wyatt, 'Samuel McFarland and Early Educational Modernization in Thailand, 1877-1895' in Felicitation Volumes of South East Asian Studies Presented to His Highness Prince Dhaninivat, (Bangkok, 1965), p. 11).

¹⁵ See D. K. Wyatt, op.cit.

¹⁶ Chula Chakrabongse, The Twain Have Met; or An Eastern Prince Came West, (London, 1956), p. 58. Prince Chula relates how his father, who was sent to the Imperial Court in St. Petersburg in 1898 for an education, was accompanied by one of these poor scholarship boys. The Russians thought him to be the 'illegitimate son' of king Chulalongkorn and treated him accordingly (Ibid. p. 58, 59).

¹⁷ During king Vachiravudh's reign (1910-1925) this king's preference for male friends of pleasing physical appearance caused 'achievement' to regain a pre-Chulalongkorn connotation. However, his successor, king Prajadhipokh, reinstated the principles of the Chakri-reformation in the first Comprehensive Civil Service Act (1928).
THE 'REVOLUTION' OF 1932

Significantly, the group mainly responsible for the 'revolution' of 1932, which did away with the absolute power of the kings and removed royalty from the top positions of state, consisted, apart from some disgruntled senior army officers, mainly of junior civil servants, most of whom had been educated abroad.

The problem is now how the power-model, used in the analysis of king Chulalongkorn's educational reforms, can be adapted for the period after 1932. To solve this problem relations between the cabinet (the highest executive after 1932) and the bureaucracy should be discussed. Did members of the cabinet owe their position to a completely non-bureaucratic, political career or were they, in fact, members of the bureaucratic apparatus who had arrived at the top? And was there, or was there not, something of a competitive relationship between the bureaucratic apparatus and the cabinet as a whole?

Cabinet members are legally officials — albeit 'political officials'. Both Wilson and Riggs, checking on the background of the men who held cabinet seats between 1932 and 1958, found that the great majority had begun their career in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, for a quarter of a century after 1932 there was hardly any competitive struggle between the bureaucratic apparatus and politicians as a group.

Thus it would appear that, for the purposes of our analysis, the power structure in Thai society during this time can be more adequately represented by a diadic (i.e. bureaucratic élite - populace) rather than by a triadic model.

What consequence did this change in the power structure have for the prevalent mode of social mobility and for education in Thailand, in terms of the concepts developed earlier in this paper? Siffin judges that the withdrawal of external authority (i.e. that of the kings), led to a decrease in the bureaucracy's concern with rationality and productivity. Access to rank, which had been largely a matter of 'achievement', became once again a matter of 'attainment'.

SCHOLARSHIPS

For one aspect of educational policy viz. the award of scholarships, this change in bureaucratic orientation seems to have had definite results. The available data corroborate the assumption that, until recently, contrary to what happened in king Chulalongkorn's time, a great majority

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18 The Civil Service Act lists eight categories of civil servants, one of which consists of 'political officials holding political posts'. Among them are ministers, their secretaries and assistant-secretaries (Civil Service Act 1954, Title 2 section 23 jo. Title 5 section 106).
of Thai government scholarships went to those who had already served as civil servants and earned the approval of their superiors. The implication seems to be clear: many of those who wanted to reach higher positions in the civil service via a foreign education, had first to manage to get themselves recruited to the civil service. What now was the way to recruitment?

Most future civil servants enter the bureaucracy at either one of two levels: the fourth or the third class, and recruitment takes place via competitive entrance examinations. A detailed study of these examinations has shown that they 'are of little value as predictors of technical competence' and that they resemble an 'investiture rite'. The entrance examinations are utterly irrelevant as regards the measurement of the kind of knowledge, which would be functional in a contribution to those organization goals not based on the self-interest of the bureaucratic elite and external to the apparatus itself.

This particular orientation towards the use of examinations, fitting into the pattern of what I called attainment-oriented sponsored mobility, can also be looked at in terms of Havighurst's distinction between the functional and symbolic values of education. According to him, education has a functional value when it is used directly and a symbolic value when it is used indirectly e.g. as a status symbol. It can be said that education has very much a symbolic value for the Thai bureaucracy.

A United States Operations Mission's report on manpower problems states that the 'real problem is that no distinction is made between a university degree obtained in ancient history say and one obtained in nuclear physics or petro-chemistry'. A report by the International Bank Mission states: 'Government agencies needing technically trained people accordingly put in a request stated in terms of university degrees, not in terms of the functions to be performed and the training and experience needed'.

EDUCATIONAL SELECTION

How now is educational selection influenced by this emphasis on attainment? This question is best answered by looking at a trait of the selection system which is readily accessible to even the foreign observer viz. the location of 'selection points'.

From statistics on enrolment it is clear that, though the biggest decreases in enrolment take place from Pratom 4 to Pratom 5 and from Matayom

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21 'Selection points' I call those points in the successive gradelevels where the greatest number of pupils in the shortest time are barred by deliberate selection from continuing in the 'academic stream' i.e. the stream leading to higher education.
Suksa 3 to Matayom Suksa 4 (i.e. from grade-levels 4 to 5 and 10 to 11), 'serious' academic selection only starts in Matayom Suksa 4 and Matayom Suksa 5 or what used to be called the pre-University years. The lack of academic selection in the lower secondary has to be explained. As stated previously, it is only possible to enter the Thai civil service at two classes: the fourth and the third. The fourth is accessible to those who have passed Matayom Suksa 3 and a competitive entrance examination. As the number of vacancies is (was) far smaller than the number of candidates, selection is possible (and necessary). In principle, this selection could take place in 2 different manners: (a) selection in and through the educational system (b) selection through competitive entrance examinations set by the bureaucracy itself. In practice, it takes the form of the latter. By letting the educational system produce many potential candidates for the civil service and by selecting among these candidates itself, the bureaucratic élite serves two aims directly related to its own interests viz. (1) keeping alive the illusion of a 'fair chance for all' (through a lack of selection in the lower secondary) to which ideal it has paid lip service ever since the 'revolution' of 1932 and (2) selecting, nevertheless, for its own apparatus, the kind of people it wants. The fact that the bureaucracy uses an examination to select people for entrance to the fourth class of the civil service, can largely be explained from the desire to use a method which seems to guarantee a certain measure of objectivity. In fact, a great deal of the selection takes place before the examinations ever begin.

The great decrease in enrolment after Matayom Suksa 3 should be explained from the fact that finishing this grade-level provides the lowest qualification for entering the civil service at the lowest level, and is also the minimum required for clerks in most private companies. To continue studying in Matayom Suksa 4 and 5 does not have any advantages (as far as entering the civil service is concerned), if one does not plan to go on to University. The academic selection for the Universities is hard, compared with the almost total lack of selection in the lower secondary, and scholarships are few in number and meagre in allowance.

However, the question is now why the government, until very recently, had not attempted to create those facilities for higher education, which

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22 In the present-day Thai educational system there are seven grade-levels for primary education and five for secondary education. The former are called Pratom and the latter Matayom Suksa grades.

23 The Thai Civil Service is divided into four classes plus a so called 'special class' (chan piset). The fourth class is the lowest.

24 Explaining institutionalized features of education from the self interest of the bureaucratic apparatus might be thought to show too clearly functionalism's Achilles heel i.e. its penchant for teleological explanations. However, it is not suggested here that the bureaucracy, in full aware of its own interests, deliberately gave this form to educational selection. What is suggested is that the present selection system concords with bureaucratic interest.

would result in less rigorous selection among the 'output' of secondary education and among those who go on to University. Why does the bureaucracy, a great employer of graduates, leave an important part of their selection to educational institutions instead of taking care of the entire selection itself, as in the case of those who enter the bureaucracy at the lowest (i.e. the fourth) level? Selection within the educational system must of necessity be 'academic selection'. Thus, even though academic selection can be partly social selection, it can have only a very partial reference to the attainment values of the bureaucracy.

If we want to answer the above question within the terms of our particular conceptual framework, we must refer to the strong symbolic value of education in Thai society. A degree is a credential of the bureaucratic élite — the value of this symbol would greatly decrease if the Universities turned out many more graduates than the number which can find employment within the bureaucracy.

Why, however, does the bureaucracy have élite credentials (i.e. academic degrees) which are only to a limited extent compatible with selection based on 'attainment'? The answer here is that even in the Thai bureaucracy a certain professionalism is nowadays required. To put it simply a Thai government engineer might be able to adopt 'the right kind of attitude' toward his superiors, but this will not help him very much if the bridges he designs have the habit of collapsing. However great the emphasis on the symbolic value of education, its functional value cannot be entirely ignored. And 'functional education' can hardly be provided 'on the job'. In other words: to fill its higher ranks the bureaucracy remains partly dependent on academic selection in and through higher education. Therefore degrees remain a necessary concomitant of higher bureaucratic ranks and, that again, is an incentive for the bureaucracy to keep the output of graduates limited to the number it can employ.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE — A MOBILITY IMPEDIMENT

Some of the inroads of the bureaucracy's attainment orientation (and the attitude towards selection which this implies) can be traced however in Thai education.

Evers has pointed to the role of English in this respect. A reasonable knowledge of English is required to obtain the highly coveted scholar-

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26 In order to gain University-entrance students must pass the upper secondary final examination as well as a University entrance examination. In 1966 and 1967 the numbers of examinees in the upper secondary were 18,000 and 18,269 respectively, the numbers of those who passed 7,795 and 11,653 ('Bangkok Post' 11th May 1967 and 'Bangkok World' 22nd May 1967. For earlier data see Statistical Yearbook 1964, p. 125). In 1965 and 1967 19,240 and 23,227 examinees respectively participated in the University entrance examinations and 6,435 resp. 8,739 passed ('Bangkok World' 25th March 1965 and 'Bangkok Post' 29th May 1967).

27 The ratio of graduates to admissions, each year, suggests that about 45% of all students who enter Universities, eventually graduate.
ships for study abroad, which provide opportunities for acquiring a prestigious foreign degree. This, thinks Evers, gives members of the westernized bureaucratic élite a far better chance than those who have not been 'socialized into families where a knowledge of English and western behaviour patterns is common'.

My own observations on this point agree, to a certain extent, with those of Evers. It seems that English is often used to throw up obstacles in the way of those who have never been in a position to gain adequate command of the language. A foreign lecturer in the University of Chiangmai told me that in his subject — one of the sciences — all the examination questions were set in English. The students could answer in Thai if they wished. The person who corrected the paper was Thai. This lecturer thought that setting these questions in English was very 'unfair' as knowledge of English now influenced the mark for science. A Thai lecturer in the Department of History told me that it was up to the lecturer whether he wanted to set his examinations in English or not. Often, he said, it was only 'to show off' their foreign education that lecturers set their examinations in English.

Yet it can be doubted whether the progeny of the bureaucratic élite acquires a knowledge of English in the course of family life, as Evers implicitly states. The fact that children of the 'westernized bureaucratic élite' have access to the better (often private) schools seems to be much more important here. By law, private schools can only demand a maximum fee of 750 baht (approximately $36,—) per annum. It is common knowledge however, that the better ones obtain considerably higher sums through demanding 'key-money', which has to be paid in order for a pupil to gain entrance. In addition to this all kinds of extra-contributions are regularly required from the parents to finance new books, buildings and equipment.

However, the fact that entrance to these schools is largely a question of money ensures that not only the bureaucratic élite but also the (mainly Chinese) business élite avails itself of these educational opportunities. This brings me to a discussion of some present trends in the relation between education and social mobility in Thailand.

**BUREAUCRACY'S PRESENT POSITION**

Thus far I have been talking about movement into the bureaucracy as if this constituted the only possible form of upward social mobility in Thailand. Several arguments justified this. Upward mobility to the other possible élites, viz. the higher ranks of the Buddhist monkhood and successful Chinese businessmen, could be left out of consideration as both these groups were educated, if at all, within their own educational systems, an analysis of which I did not attempt. As far as the Buddhist priesthood is concerned this is still largely true. However, now that large numbers of (Thai and Chinese) people in
business and the professions receive an academic education, the question should be posed whether in the Thai social hierarchy the bureaucracy still remains undisturbed at the top.

The opinion of Evers on this question is that the bureaucracy is the nucleus of a developing 'overall social-class system' in urban Thailand, though in his later article he also assigns this role to the 'army power élite' and to the 'Chinese business élite'. Apparently, the question in how far the comparative status of bureaucratic and business élites has changed during the last decades did not occur to Evers. This explains how he could see in the data he gave on the 'consolidation' of the bureaucratic élite (the reliability of which was discussed in the first part of this paper) a refutation of Lipset's and Bendix' claim that 'social mobility is an integral and continuing aspect of the process of urbanization, industrialization and bureaucratization'.

Applying Weber's concepts of class and status group to data collected during interviews in Chiangmai with a sample of university graduates and with almost all the members of the most 'select' local club (the Rotary club) — the results of which I hope to publish elsewhere — I came to the tentative conclusion that the importance of the principle of social stratification based on class situation (i.e. market position) is increasing in Chiangmai and that — with certain restrictions — this conclusion can probably be extended to Bangkok society as well.

What this entails for the relative status of civil servants, whose position is (was) mainly based on status honour, can be most aptly, if crudely, summarized by quoting one of my interviewees, a judge in the Chiangmai Court: 'Thirty years ago there was a saying: 'Ten merchants are not equal to one who is supported by the Phraya', but nowadays the situation is changing. The salary of civil servants is not by far equal to that of businessmen. They can't purchase big cars, houses, television etc.'

**CONTEST MOBILITY**

What now are the consequences of this for the relation between education and social mobility?

Recent economic growth in Thailand has stemmed mainly from the private sector. It would be difficult for Evers to maintain that the (mainly Chinese) business élite is outside Thai society proper and that therefore the question regarding the change in its relative status is not relevant. Firstly, there are numerous people of Chinese origin in the bureaucracy; secondly, the business élite is no longer exclusively Chinese; thirdly a sociological model which left out about 10% of the population would be inadequate for most purposes of analysis. Finally, Evers himself explicitly involves the business élite in his remarks on the growing of an overall class system, (H. D. Evers and T. H. Silcock, op. cit.).

The chance to acquire wealth through government industry or the 'protection' of Chinese business is (was) limited to the highest ranking civil servants.

The influence of these developments on education can not be predicted with any precision. However, it seems likely that, as these small scale industries have hardly any need for graduates, the importance of a University degree, as far as earning power is concerned, will decrease. The decreasing correlation then between education and income may make education a less dominant factor in social mobility, if my assumption of the growing importance of the principle of stratification according to market situation is correct. In this respect the situation might become more similar to that prevailing in some western countries. However, several tendencies are working in the opposite direction. In the first place: there are signs that amongst graduates there is a growing interest in obtaining employment in private industry and business. In the second place: when large scale industry and big business assume greater importance in Thailand, the complexity of technical and managerial matters will probably require a renewed insistence on higher educational qualifications for many of the top functions.

Meanwhile, the increasing importance of the non-governmental labour market makes power models which do not account for the interaction of governmental and non-governmental groups, less applicable to the explanation of institutionalized features of education. Also, the simple power model 'bureaucracy — populace' from which I delineated the post-1932 pattern of attainment-oriented sponsored mobility, was based on the fact that highest executive and bureaucracy were identical. However, since Sarit Thanarat's coup d'état in 1957 the military has emerged as a task-setting power external to the bureaucracy. The renewed emphasis on achievement this has created, together with the fact that two Prime Ministers since 1957 (and also the 'strong man' of the present government: General Prapart Charusathien) have not had

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33 In April 1967 the 'Bangkok Post' stated: 'Jobs with private companies this year for the first time in modern history seem to be more appealing to local graduates than the more secure, but lower paying jobs with the government'. Dr. Kamphaeng Balangkura, the Secretary General of the National Education Council said: 'Many men feel they cannot earn enough money working as a Government official'... 'Not only aren't graduates... from local colleges and universities applying for government positions in large numbers as was the case until recently but some government employees are quitting and joining private firms'. (Bangkok Post', 27th April 1967).
34 See for information on Sarit Thanarat's 'capacity to cut through delays arising from seniority...' T. H. Silcock, ed., op.cit. p. 21.
an academic degree, has contributed to the increasing emphasis on the functional value of education and the decreasing importance of academic degrees as status symbols.

It would in the present situation be somewhat irrelevant to outline any pattern of sponsored mobility. If we wanted to use Turner's concepts for the present era the term 'contest mobility' would seem to be increasingly applicable, provided this concept is taken for what it is i.e. an 'ideal type'. Turner used this concept to indicate the pattern of upward social mobility prevailing in societies where mobility does not take the form of recruitment by one single and established elite. If my remarks in the previous paragraphs were correct, social mobility in Thai society is, indeed, losing this particular form to an increasing degree.

EEN SOCIOMETRISCH ONDERZOEK NAAR DE ETNISCHE FACTOR BIJ DE KEUZE VAN KLASGENOTEN OP ENKELE SCHOLEN IN SURINAME *


door C. C. S. OEDAYRAISINGH VARMA

INLEIDING

De Surinaamse maatschappij wordt door vele schrijvers als een plurale of gesegmenteerde samenleving getypeerd. Zeer in het algemeen wordt hieronder een maatschappij verstaan, bestaande uit verschillende etnische groepen, wonend binnen één staatsverband. In de koloniale periode nam de Nederlandse groep de dominante positie in en vormde het Nederlandse gezag het bindende element.

Na de emancipatie van de slaven in 1863 was de cultuurpolitiek van het gouvernement erop gericht de bevolking van Suriname te assimileren aan de Nederlandse cultuur. Met dit doel voor ogen werd al in 1876 de algemene leerplicht in Suriname ingevoerd. Deze assimilatiepolitiek was in eerste instantie vooral gericht op de Creoolse bevolkingsgroep; bij de in de tweede helft van de 19e eeuw en in de 20e eeuw geïmmigreerde Hindostanen en Javanen werd deze cultuurpolitiek niet konsekwent doorgevoerd. Dat heeft mede geleid tot de omstandigheid, dat de Creolen in sterkere mate zijn beïnvloed door de Westerse cultuur dan de Hindostanen en Javanen.

* Dit onderzoek vond plaats in het kader van een leeronderzoek dat na het kandidaatsexamen voor studenten in de culturele antropologie en de sociologie van de niet-Westere volken te Leiden verplicht is. Het onderzoek stond onder supervisie van prof. dr. R. A. J. van Lier en prof. dr. J. D. Speckmann. De stage werd gesubsidieerd door Wotro (Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek van de Tropen). De uitwerking werd geleid door prof. dr. J. D. Speckmann.