National development and language diversity*

by JONATHAN POOL **

I

New, non-Western, and/or developing nations are often said to have language problems, different from,¹ or more frequent or important than,² those of old, Western, and/or developed nations. Reasons given for these contrasts include the effects of social and political variables on language problems³ and vice versa.⁴

A much discussed language problem is diversity, which may mean the number of different languages spoken in a given area but may have other meanings which will be mentioned below. Language diversity of one sort or another is held to cause the retardation of development, both political and economic. Language diversity, it is claimed, aggravates political sectionalism;⁵ hinders inter-group cooperation,⁶ national unity,⁷ and regional multinational cooperation;⁸ impedes political enculturation,⁹ political support for the authorities and the regime,¹⁰ and political participation;¹¹ and holds down governmental effectiveness¹² and political stability.¹³ Similarly it is said that language diversity slows economic development, by, for example, braking occupational mobility,¹⁴ reducing the number of people available for mobilization into the modern sector of the economy,¹⁵ decreasing effi-

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¹ Neustuphny; Passin; Ferguson (b) 13. But see also Rustow 97.
² Passin 453-4; Ornstein. See also Fishman (a) for a distinction between new and old developing nations' problems.
³ E.g. Deutsch 2.
⁴ Grimshaw 197-8.
⁵ Fishman (c) 63-4; Sutherlin 66. But for a warning against attributing sectional language conflict to linguistic differences entirely see Pfeffer.
⁶ Kloss (a) 75.
⁷ Haugen (a) 928; Emerson 133-4; Hertzler 179-81; Deutsch 129-30; Friedrich 559, 572; Richter 10. But see also ibid. 12; Deutsch 18-9, 97.
⁸ Harries 428.
⁹ Fishman (c) 63-4; Verba 532.
¹⁰ Deutsch 4; Machiavelli 10-3.
¹¹ Stewart (a) 40; Sutherlin 65-6; Valdman 314.
¹² Sutherlin 65.
¹³ ibid.; Kloss (b) 8; Rustow 87. But see also ibid. 90-1.
¹⁴ Das Gupta & Gumperz 154-6. But see also Deutsch 101ff.
¹⁵ Valdman 314. But see also Deutsch 118.
ciency, and preventing the diffusion of innovative techniques. The literature also contains assertions that political or economic underdevelopment, in addition to or instead of being a result of language diversity, is one of its causes. Various kinds of development, it is claimed, give prestige and mobility to certain arenas of life and certain social groups, and thus to the languages prevalent in these arenas and groups. Outsiders then learn these high-status languages, and their spread reduces the level of language diversity (if suitably defined). A society not undergoing much development is thus largely without this cause of the decrease of language diversity. Underdevelopment is also claimed to maintain language diversity by isolating members of different language groups from communication with each other; when economic development (or any cause) brings them into contact, for example in cities and work places, they tend to learn a common language readily.

The true relation between language diversity and development (if these terms can be defined so as to give rise to a relation) has evident implications for developmental and linguistic planning. If the assertions outlined above are false, i.e. if there is no relation between development and language diversity, then goals in each domain can be pursued independently. But if language diversity contributes to underdevelopment (or vice versa), then language unification may be a necessary part (or an inevitable result) of successful development planning in a linguistically heterogeneous society. In this case there arises the problem that, in contrast with the notion of 'development', which by connotation if not by definition is accepted as a desirable and plannable goal, language unification is opposed by many; planned language unification is further subject to numerous doubts about the empirical practicability, on the one hand, and the morality, on the other, of language planning itself.

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16 Fishman (c) 61; Sadler (a) 3-4.
17 Gumperz 88. Several of these and other arguments can be found in Kelman.
18 E.g. Hertzler 178-9; Fishman (b) 46-7.
19 Tauli 20; Kloss (b) 15-6; Stewart (a) 41; Fishman (b) 46; Kloss (a) 77; Wurm 348; Prator 474; Deutsch 158-9.
20 Diebold 30; Tocqueville II: 71-2; Stewart (a) 38, 47; Ferguson (a) 6; Togan 39, 47-8, 59, 62-3, 71; Deutsch 41-4, 118-20. But see also ibid. 125.
21 Cf. Neustupný.
22 See Haugen (c) 52, 59.
23 Commonly mentioned problems include the difficulty of impossibility of finding a policy for which enough mass or elite support can be gathered, the intractability of language to manipulation, the scarcity of needed resources and expertise, conflicting goals, undesirable side-effects, and moral objections to the use of coercion to change language.
II

Regardless of how the planner answers questions about the value or the difficulty of planned language unification, he must estimate the relevance, if any, of language diversity to development. His current ability to make such an estimate, however, is almost nil. Hypotheses about the relations between these two phenomena, such as the assertions summarized in Section I, are not always formulated with enough precision to be tested, and are seldom subjected to thorough testing even when this is in principle possible. The major problems with these hypotheses can be summarized under the headings of concept definition, relation specification, information acquisition, information loss, and causal inference.

Concept definition — The two concepts under examination are 'language diversity' and 'development'. To enter into hypotheses these (as any) concepts must be defined such that their presence or absence, rank order, amount of change, or absolute value can be established by observation. To enter into successful hypotheses, the concepts (as defined) must denote properties which are in fact associated with each other. Different scholars have proposed that language diversity be defined in terms of the number of languages (varieties, mutually unintelligible varieties, dialects, etc.) spoken in a given area (by more than x% of the population), in terms of the percentage of the population not speaking the most widely spoken language (natively, in the home, as a second language, etc.), in terms of the official (regional, educational, etc.) language(s) (number of them, percentage of the population speaking none of them, etc.), in terms of the distances (linguistic, attitudinal, ideological, etc.) between one language or variety and another, or as a function of several of these or other variables. Development has similarly been defined economically, politically, or with other emphases; in terms of gross output (gross national product [GNP], per capita GNP, political capability, channel capacity, etc.) or its pattern of allocation (income distribution, differentiation, secularization, participation, etc.); and as a state (level of attainment), a rate (of change), or a change of rate.

Relation specification — If the two properties, once defined, are found to be statistically associated, we do not thereby know that one causes the other.

24 Fishman (c) 55; Ferguson (b) 11; Richter 5-6.
25 E.g. Russett et al. 132-7; Fishman (c) 67-8.
26 Stewart (b) 20-1; Passin 449-50; Das Gupta & Gumperz 155-6.
27 Stewart (b) 22; Haugen (c) 55; Fishman (b) 44-5.
28 Fishman (c) 67-8; Ferguson (a) 1-2; Kloss (a) 72-7; Rustow 97-2, 102. See Greenberg, also Sadler (b), for a variety of definitions.
29 Almond & Powell 190-212; Easton 119-27; Eisenstadt 43.
30 Ibid.; Lerner 50-1.
The relation between the two (let us call them A and B) can be genuine (A affects B or B affects A), but may also be spurious (S affects A and B, i.e. A and B have one or more common causes). If genuine, the relation can be in one, the other, or both of the two directions, and can have different chains of intervening variables (e.g. A affects I, I affects J, J affects B). In the case at hand, hypotheses have been proposed that link development with language unification through intervening variables of communication, education, cleavage, etc. Spurious relations have also been asserted, with the common cause(s) being forms of nationalism, democratization, revolution, independence, education, social mobilization, etc. In addition to telling us the kind of relation it is asserting, a hypothesis should specify the boundary conditions within which the relation is claimed to hold (age of nation, degree of coercion employed in assimilation, etc.).

Information acquisition — Choosing definitions and specifying relations are often impossible or useless, however, because of the paucity of existing information. While there are certain variables in the realm of economic development for which data allow comparisons across nations and across time, the political data are less complete and the linguistic ones still less so. Many countries' censuses do not ask questions on language, and those that do so ask different questions from each other, almost always omit such obviously important information as second-language knowledge, and sometimes change their definitions from one census to the next.

Information loss — While some students of sociolinguistic problems admirably employ demographers' techniques to extract more information from censuses than they appear on the surface to contain, the more common pattern is to waste what data we do have by failing to examine them until they have been compressed into a single index, most often a correlation coefficient, or until the entire range of variation along each variable has been reduced to a few categories or even a dichotomy.

Causal inference — In view of the aforementioned problems, statements of causal relations between language diversity and national development run the risk of being meaningless (concepts not defined), unsatisfying (relations

\[31\] Neustupny 288-9
\[32\] Das Gupta & Gumperz 152-3; Stewart (b) 15; Heyd 14; Coleman 36-7; McDavid 17; Sutherlin 66.
\[33\] Haugen (a) 928-9; Haugen (c) 63; Das Gupta 17-8; Bowers 396; Tauli 122; Haugen (b) 115; Passin 453.
\[34\] Fishman (a); Passin 451; Easton 249-50; Deutsch 118-20.
\[35\] Lieberson (a) 139-40.
\[36\] Ibid. 136-8, 144-50.
\[37\] E.g. Kloss (a) 81; Banks & Textor.
and conditions not specified), or unsupported (data not adequate). Often, however, it is recognized that causal hypotheses can not be proposed except as tentative guesses lacking convincing confirmation. Attention is then devoted to careful factual description and generalization which will hopefully provide the data with which hypotheses will be generated and tested in the future.

III

The frontier of current speculation about the relations between language diversity and national development is probably to be found in the work of Joshua A. Fishman. In a recent article38 he has compiled descriptive generalizations and offered tentative hypotheses about these relations, based on two catalogs of national-level aggregate and global indicators, the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators39 and A Cross-Polity Survey.40

— Fishman receives the decided impression that linguistic homogeneity is currently related to many more of the 'good' and 'desirable' characteristics of polities than is linguistic heterogeneity. Linguistically homogeneous polities are usually economically more developed, educationally more advanced, politically more modernized, and ideologically-politically more tranquil and stable.41 —

He also notes that 'many of the reported differences between linguistically homogeneous and heterogeneous polities also appear to be differences between rich and poor polities...' (and he controls for one and then the other of these kinds of variables to see which accounts for more of the other variations associated with both).42 Concerning the causal relation between language diversity and development, he says that the usual explanation gives developmental processes as causes of increased linguistic (and other) homogenization, but that language diversity may also hinder (while language unity helps) development.43

Fishman rightly criticizes the definitions underlying many of the (especially

38 Fishman (c).
39 Russett et al.
40 Banks & Textor.
41 Fishman (c) 60.
42 Ibid. 61-4.
43 Ibid. 60-1. The authors of the World Handbook, taking the opposite view of which direction of causation is more obvious, say, 'Very possibly this is in part a causal relationship — countries of diverse linguistic composition face a special hurdle in development — but the relationship between linguistic diversity and development is so complex, including the power of economic development to
linguistic) data available for the two source volumes, regrets the incompleteness of the data even where definitions are good, challenges the use of dichotomization in the Survey and of correlation coefficients in the Handbook, and suggests remedies for these defects. He accordingly remains tentative in his inference of causal relations between language diversity and development, confining himself mainly to description. Yet what descriptions and inferences he does make are unfortunately based largely on the less reliable and less salvageable data in the Cross-Polity Survey. These data are presented in irreversibly categorized (grouped) form, while Handbook data are presented as ratio scales, i.e. with a particular value for each country on each variable. The Handbook makes considerable use of rate-of-change data, and even its static figures would be useful in creating time-series files, while neither of these statements can be made about the Survey.

IV
Thus, although Fishman's complaints, which are indeed just, mostly require the generation or collection of new data for their redress, one improvement that can already be made is to rescue existing data of the Handbook type from information loss. To see how this might be done, let us consider two of the most widely measured language-diversity and development variables: the size of the largest native-language community in a country as a proportion of the population, on the one hand, and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, on the other. Rather than aiming directly at a hypothesis that would link these two variables causally, let us first seek only to describe their joint distribution, but to do so in the way most useful for later formulation of hypotheses. We are resigned for now to the fact that varying census questions, artificial exchange rates, and missing hard data make figures for both variables quite low in reliability. What we wish to do is to correct information loss that occurs beyond the point of initial data collection.

In the Handbook this loss takes two forms: the omission of units (countries) and the summarization of the association between the variables. In the first type of loss, the number of countries is limited to 58, less than half of the universe, because hard data on one or another of the two variables in question are unavailable for the remaining countries. Yet the inclusion of

force assimilation to the dominant (or even sometimes a minority) language, that the question demands further inquiry.' Russett et al. 290.

44 Perhaps because the Handbook was not yet published in final form: Fishman (c) 54.

45 Russett et al. 133.
the best available estimates for the latter group of countries would probably not increase the error margin above where it has already been raised by the conflicting definitions on which even the 'hard' data are based. The second type of information loss occurs when the joint distribution of the two variables is described,\(^4\) not in detail, but in the summary form of a correlation coefficient (0.47). An infinite number of different distributions could have given rise to this same index. Indeed, it gives even less predictive power than generalizations arising from the Survey.\(^4\) For even if we treat each variable as having only two values, 'high' and 'low', there are still four extreme generalizations any one or more of which could be true compatibly with the given correlation:

1a If high language diversity, then low economic development
1b If high economic development, then low language diversity
2a If low language diversity, then high economic development
2b If low economic development, then high language diversity

It can easily be shown that Generalizations 1a and 1b imply each other, and likewise 2a and 2b. But 1 (a or b) allows low development with low diversity and excludes high development with high diversity, while Generalization 2 (a or b) allows a high-high and excludes a low-low combination. Thus to the extent that we are viewing both variables as dichotomies, we have two pure-type generalizations, 1 and 2. If the first is true, only high development with high diversity is excluded; if the second is true, only low development with low diversity is excluded; and if both are true, both these combinations are

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1 is true

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1 & 2 are true

(0 = cell empty; ? = cell may be empty; + = cell non-empty)

\(^4\) Ibid. 275, 277, 290.

\(^4\) 'Banks and Textor report that linguistically homogeneous polities tend to have at least a 'medium' per capita gross national product (at least 300 U.S. dollars per year) . . . . Linguistically heterogeneous polities . . . . tend to have 'low' or 'very low' per capita gross national product . . . .' Fishman (c) 56.
excluded (see Table). A choice among these three alternatives would be only a first approximation, of course.

Thus our 'information retrieval' should begin with the addition of data omitted from the Handbook, continue by discovering which of our three generalization-alternatives best describes the relationship between the two variables, and conclude with a more precise description of the relationship than any of the three alternatives provides. The first operation, the addition of data, has been facilitated by the publication of a recent article of Dankwart A. Rostow, whose language figures, while questionable in some cases, I have accepted except where more recent or apparently more reliable ones are available. Data on gross domestic product per capita are less of a problem; they are taken from Deutsch (supplemented in a few cases by other sources) so that they cover approximately the time when the language information was collected (early 1960's). Using these sources, it has been possible to expand the population from 58 to 133 countries.

For the second operation, the data thus acquired are presented together in the form of a scatter plot, showing the joint distribution of the two variables without any information loss (see Figure). It is clear from a glance at the

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48 Rustow 94-6. Most of these figures are based on Bruk, and many of the latter's statistics are estimates (because of the absence of census or sample data). Furthermore, Bruk's nationality figures are not all based on native language or second language.

49 Sources for other language figures: Bel. — Tabouret-Keller 110; Bol. — Tipologia 100-1; Burma — Kunstadter 87-9; Bul., Ger. (DR), Ger. (FR), Nor., & Swed. — Tokarev & Cebokssarov I: 34; Camb. — Kunstadter 867; Cey. — Guseva et al. 28-30; China (PR) — Roberts 112; Guy-Nath. 221-2, Smith 6 and 8; Iran — U.S. Army 86; Kor. (PR) & Kor. (R) — Cebokssarov et al. I: 35; Laos — Kunstadter 255-7; Malys. — Noss 143-4; Maur's — Russett et al. 136; Peru — Tipologia 109; Thai. — Noss 201; V-N (DR) — Kunstadter 693-4; V-N (R) ibid. 696-700. See Noss for different figures on Burma; Camb., & V-N (R).

50 The Handbook (like the Survey) uses gross national product, which differs slightly from gross domestic product: see Deutsch 261. GDP/capita values (for 1962) are from Deutsch 262-70, except where missing, i.e.: Kor. (PR) & V-N (DR) — Russett et al. 157 (GNP/capita, 1957); Kuw., M'wi, Malays., Mong., N.G., Rho., Tanz., Trin., & Zamb. — Ernst 192-3 (per capita national income, 1962-4).

51 According to Rustow's criteria, every independent country with more than 100,000 people and every dependency with more than a million people is included in the Figure if data are available (N = 133). Variances are approximately standardized in the Figure by subjecting the economic variable to a logarithmic transformation, such that each unit of vertical distance represents an equal proportionate, rather than absolute, change, The Handbook presents scatter plots for several other pairs of variables: Russett et al. 304-10, 327-31. Cf. also graphic methods for describing a similar kind of relation at the individual (intra-national) level, and reasons given, in Deutsch 137, 139-42.
Figure (cf. the Table) that the first alternative (the truth of Generalization 1) is the best approximation of the three to the true relationship between GDP per capita and proportional size of the largest native-language community. If we dichotomize each variable at the midpoint of the range of variation actually exhibited, the upper left cell (bounded by dotted lines) is nearly empty.

Having gone beyond a single index to three patterns possibly responsible for it and having discovered which one of them in fact best fits the (expanded) data, let us now go to the third step and see what information would allow us to say more about the joint distribution than we have done with this first approximation. There are three ways in which we could proceed.

First, we could describe the distribution more precisely. We can say, for example, that all the countries are excluded from a triangle (bounded by Line I) in the upper left one-fifth of the rectangle which is created by the ranges of variation of the two variables. The complete emptiness of this corner means, in a descriptive sense, that a country can have any degree of language uniformity or fragmentation and still be underdeveloped; and a country whose entire population, more or less, speaks the same language can be anywhere from very rich to very poor. But a country that is linguisti-
cally highly heterogeneous is always underdeveloped, and a country that is
developed always has considerable language uniformity. Language uniformity,
then, is a necessary but not sufficient condition of economic develop-
ment, and economic development is a sufficient but not necessary condition
of language uniformity. Going beyond this generalization, we can determine
the actual rate of occurrence of particular combinations of economic develop-
ment and language diversity, by defining Line I and measuring the frequen-
cies in various parts of the space under it.52

Secondly, we could examine the effects of changing the definition of one or
another of the two variables, along lines suggested in Section II. As one
example, it seems that a somewhat stronger association would hold if
language diversity were defined as 'percentage of population able to speak
the most widely spoken language' instead of the size of the largest community
of native speakers. In this case the excluded triangle would expand at least
to Line II,53 since under this definition of language diversity Belgium would
move over to 60%54 and Canada to 80%.55 The excluded triangle would
probably be larger still, but the necessary data on Switzerland and South
Africa are unavailable.56 In fact, so few countries collect statistics on second-
language knowledge that it is at present impossible to employ that definition
in multinational comparative work.

Thirdly, we could define the distribution more complexly, recognizing that
the relation between the two variables under consideration is open to in-

52 If \( G = \frac{GDP}{capita} \), \( L \) = the absolute size of the largest native-language
community, and \( P = \) population, than the equation for Line I is
\[
\log_{10} G = 10 \frac{L}{P} + 5.
\]

Line I might also have been placed through South Africa and Congo (Kinshasa),
with no substantial change in the area of the empty triangle. It would be possible
(and popular) to standardize both variables precisely (cf. note 51), define and
apply a measure of deviation from random association (i.e. non-association), and
calculate the statistical significance of the observed distribution's deviation. But
the imprecision of our raw data, the irrelevance of the degree of deviation from
randomness to our aim of predicting a value on one variable from a value on
the other, and the doubtful meaningfulness of statistical significance when applied
to an entire population (see e.g. Morrison & Henkel) call into question the use-
fulness of these operations here.

53 And only one country (South-Africa) would remain in the upper-left rect-
tangular cell.

54 Russett et al. 135. This datum is from 1947.

55 Ibid.

56 On the absence of these data for Switzerland, see Meli 19; for a good analysis
of what data do exist, see McRae.
fluences of outside variables. We could attempt to locate the most important boundary conditions and specify their effects. The use of a scatter plot makes it possible to compare countries that are the same on one variable but different on the other (e.g. Rwanda and Burundi, Korea and Japan), and to look for culturally, regionally, or otherwise distributed variables that might explain deviant cases and increase the present low predictability of one variable from the other. In view of the limits placed on the first approach by the unreliability of the data, and on the second by the scarcity of more refined data, this third tack may well be the most profitable one for now. It is important to remember that what has been begun here is only a limited form of information recovery. Its immediate result has been no more than one or two descriptive generalizations more precise than those offered by the Handbook or by Fishman, and the preceding suggestions for further work can at best lead to still more improved descriptions. These, however, are not convertible into advice for a development-minded language planner or a language-minded development planner. For our statements are descriptive and static: they describe what is, rather than predicting what would be under other conditions, and they deal with states rather than rates. The planner needs predictive, dynamic hypotheses: good guesses about how a country's value on one variable would change if he changed its value on the other. Knowledge of this kind does not and can not follow logically from static description.

V

In spite of this warning, it may be objected that the Figure does indeed suggest something about the role of language in development, something that has important implications for language policy. Specifically, the relationship pictured in the Figure brings to mind a statement of Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication: 67

— Assimilation in language or culture involves the learning of many new habits, and the unlearning of many old ones — habits, in both cases, which often interlock and reinforce each other. Such learning as a rule is slow; its changes are counted in decades and generations.

The growth of an economy or a technology, on the other hand, may be much more rapid; transportation systems and markets can grow very quickly; workers or immigrants may be recruited and imported within a few years, or sometimes even months. Much of this economic or technological development may force people into new and inescapable con-

67 Deutsch 125-6.
tacts with each other as workers, customers, and neighbours-contacts far narrower, perhaps, than the range of human relations that can be communicated within one culture; but contacts far wider than the relations which can be communicated in the absence of a common culture to outsiders. Linguistically and culturally, then, members of each group are outsiders for the other. Yet technological and economic processes are forcing them together, into acute recognition of their differences and their common, mutual experience of strangeness, and more conspicuous differentiation and conflict may result. —

An empirically similar, though normatively different, statement is made by Fishman,68 whose analysis of the separate effects of economic and linguistic variables on other characteristics — strongly suggests that the simultaneous pursuit of the advantages of higher economic status coupled with the protection or maintenance of valued cultural-linguistic differences is not a will-o'-the-wisp. —

What Deutsch treats as a real danger and Fishman sees as a real promise is that a country might move from the lower left corner to the upper left corner of our Figure and remain there. The relation which we have observed might seem to show that this is impossible, and that a planner who insists on preserving cultural-linguistic pluralism had better be ready to sacrifice economic progress. The Figure may appear to demonstrate that development either requires or brings about second-language learning (Line II) followed closely by native-language change (Line I), so that no country is ever caught at any one time in the upper left corner. Thus the Figure may be viewed as confirming Greenberg's expectation 69 that — the increase of communication that goes with greater economic productivity and more extensive political organization will lead typically to the spread of a lingua franca, whether indigenous or imported, resulting in widespread bilingualism and the ultimate disappearance of all except a single dominant language. —

Other possible mechanisms of this effect, universal education and the growth of inequalities in prestige among languages, have been mentioned earlier in this paper. Whatever the intervening variable(s) might be, this relation, which denies even the notion of a stably auxiliary national language,60 would if true

58 Fishman (c) 64.
59 Greenberg 110. Cf. the concern about the rapid change of native language of immigrant Canadians: see Canada I: 22-7.
60 The implications of the statements cited here for the question of an auxiliary international language may also merit consideration.
challenge both Deutsch's fear of, and Fishman's hope for, development with diversity.

Our data are not, however, sufficient to demonstrate the truth of this relation, as has been explained at the end of Section IV. Although it is a common practice to infer causal relations from cross-sectional comparative data such as ours, the inference is supported only when there is additional information, or when we make assumptions on which the inference can depend. In this case, we must know or assume that some of the countries currently in the upper right corner were once in the lower left corner.\(^{61}\) In this event we could say that the Deutsch and Fishman phenomenon has had a chance to happen but — in its extreme form of economic development with no homogenization at all — has never happened. To conclude that a milder version of the effect, such as the slow homogenization described by Deutsch, has never happened, we would further need a series of snapshots of the changing scatter plot at suitable time intervals. Even then, however, the fact that something has never happened does not necessarily support the claim that it will not happen in the future. Any characteristic that distinguishes those countries now in the lower left corner from those that used to be there may be made a boundary condition in a hypothesis predicting economic development without the need for linguistic unity; then history, while unable to confirm the hypothesis, will be equally unable to provide an exception.\(^{62}\)

The Figure alone thus does not refute Deutsch and Fishman. But it also offers no support for their view. We have seen, in fact, that at the extremities of linguistic diversity there is at present not a single country able to serve as a model (or living proof of the danger) of economic-development-sans-assimilation-in-language. This fact should make us at least skeptical enough of claims for development with diversity that we ask to see the evidence in favor of those claims. Even if the evidence confirms the possibility of this combination, the obverse of what was said above applies: the fact that something has once happened (and is thus possible) does not necessarily mean that it will happen in the future. Indeed the absence of a contemporary model may itself discourage planners and politicians from attempting to bring about the combination in question, and thus perpetuate its absence.

\(^{61}\) This is doubted by Fishman (c) 61.

\(^{62}\) The extent to which hypotheses require no boundary conditions of this kind in order to be confirmed may be a measure of the utility of studying the early development of the developed countries to make predictions about currently developing ones.
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