Replication through reconceptualisation; progressiveness and conservatism and the relation between social class and premarital sexual permissiveness
door C. P. Middendorp

1 Introduction
A few years ago, an empirical generalization by Reiss (1965, 1967) was replicated by way of secondary analysis (Middendorp et al., 1970). Reiss had found that the relationship between premarital sexual permissiveness (PSP) and social class is not the same for liberals and conservatives. In both a student sample and a national cross-sectional sample from the U.S.-population, the relationship between PSP and social class was found to be negative for conservatives, but positive for liberals (Reiss 1965: 750-751).
No evidence in favor of this generalization was found in the replication however, but those results were criticized by Reiss (1970). In the present study Reiss' finding is replicated again, after reconceptualisation of the liberalism-conservatism construct.
The generalisation seems interesting for two reasons. In the first place it seems that the variable of social class has been somewhat neglected in American research into liberalism-conservatism.
Kelly and Chambliss (1966: 382) conclude, for example, 'But if (social class and ethnic background, CPM) are in fact the kinds of sociological variables that determine the behavior of man, then we should use them. Concepts like status consistency, status congruency, status crystallization and status integration unquestionably have a more sophisticated sound to them. But if we sacrifice substantive usefulness for sophisticated appearance, then our contribution to knowledge will be meager indeed'.
Secondly, there is a body of research and theory touched upon in our original criticism (Middendorp et al., op cit., 371) which could provide a rationale for Reiss' finding in terms of the greater (consistency of belief systems) for upper-class people compared to the lower-classes (and for leaders or the political elite versus followers or the politically inactive; cf. McClosky, et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Campbell et al., 1960). PSP may be regarded as an aspect of at least one type of liberalism-conservatism (e.g. the non-economic type, (cf. Smith, 1948 abcd; Lipset, 1966, O'Kane, 1970). For non-economic liberalism, then, the upper classes, being more consistent, would show more extreme liberal and conservative positions, with which their more extreme positions regarding PSP would be congruent; Reiss' generalisation would then follow. If we accept the position that the upper classes would be more consistent in their over-all liberal-conservative positions (including economic and non-economic types), then Reiss' generalisation would follow too, though perhaps less strongly so, especially in case the various liberal-conservative dimensions would not be completely independent from each other. In any case, since the generalization seems not at all unpausible in the light of the 'consistency' theory, a further replication seems justified: the original evidence and theory are weak (Middendorp et
al., op cit., 370-371) but the finding can be explained in terms of a well-known body of theory.

A more final replication is certainly more useful than simply to respond to (and reject most of) Reiss' criticism of the original one.

2 Procedures

2.1 Measurement of social class and premarital sexual permissiveness

The data are based on a representative cross-sectional sample from the Dutch population. The study was carried out in 1970.

PSP was measured by way of a strong six-item Guttman scale (H = .53, Rep = .92, I = .43; Mokken, 1970) with items partly taken from Reiss (1965).

Social class was measured by way of a 4-category index based on educational level, occupation and income. In addition, a measure for subjective social class or class identification was used.

2.2 Reconceptualisation of progressiveness-conservatism

The concepts of progressiveness and conservatism have not yet been assessed empirically in satisfactory ways. Without going here into a systematic criticism of earlier approaches it will be outlined which procedures have been followed in the present study.

At first it was tried to find one or more criteria for the assessment of this (apparent) antithesis. To develop such criteria, conservatism as a body of ideas (or an ideology; see note 6) was studied as it arose in Europe in the late 18th and early 19th century as a reaction to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.

Classical European conservatives were studied as well as (more modern) English conservatives and American 'New Conservatives', which manifested themselves especially in the fifties and early sixties. Of course, analytical studies and critics of conservatism were considered, too.

Finally, a model of conservatism as an ideology was constructed.

This 'model' of abstract ideological statements and of 'ideal type' nature was subsequently used as a starting point for the empirical assessment of progressive-conservative dimensions. First, it was operationalized 'directly' into 37 bipolar abstract 'ideological' items. Second, central values were derived from it which served as criteria for the subsequent construction of attitude scales in the fields of politics, religion, marriage and family life, and sex. The values were the ones of freedom and equality.

Thus, attitude scales were constructed in such a way that for every single item involved, a rationale could be set up by which it could be presented as to indicate an aspect or application of the values of freedom, equality or
both, in a specific field of study. That both values have been identified as underlying the domain of the progressive-conservative ideological controversy is not surprising. This controversy has often been described in terms of these values.\(^8\) In applying both values however, a distinction between the economic and the non-economic field has not always been made clear. It may be posited that in economics equality refers to 'equality of life chances', including opportunity, income and property. To realize this value of freedom should be limited (cf. Rawls, 1972).

In non-economic fields, however, equality refers to behavior which should be regarded 'of equal value' as long as the 'freedoms' or 'life chances' of others are not diminished by it. So, here too, though in a different way, equality refers to an optimization of equal freedom for all.

It was hypothesized that the attitudes brought together in this way would be related in a structured way, manifesting one or more underlying progressive-conservative dimensions.\(^9\) Of course, it was expected that any structure would correspond somehow to the postulated underlying values and their somewhat differential application to various fields (see also Rokeach, 1968). The same was hypothesized for the domain of abstract ideological statements (the 'directly' operationalized model of progressiveness-conservatism) (cf. Naes, 1956).

2.3 Analysis; assessment of progressive-conservative dimensions

The set of bi-polar abstract ideological items\(^{10}\) was factor-analyzed (Jöreskog, 1966) and rotated orthogonally by way of the varimax-procedure (Kaiser, 1958). The four-factor solution was found best. Three factors indicated progressive-conservative dimensions. They may be interpreted as indicating the conservative, liberal (in the classical European sense, not in the modern-social or American sense!) and socialist ideologies, as they have been prevalent in Europe since the 19th century. A few notes on the interpretation of the structure may be added here.\(^{11}\)

Kerlinger (1967, 1972) points out that social attitudes are essentially dual rather than bi-polar in nature, i.e. that there are separate, relatively independent basic attitudes of liberalism and conservatism, rather than one bi-polar liberal-conservative dimension. This is explained in terms of attitude-referents. It is maintained that in Western society there are basically two ideologies: liberalism and conservatism, and that, for reasons of the complexity of reality, most people make a choice as to which attitudinal (ideological) referents are criterial to them: the liberal or the conservative set. The theory was most convincingly confirmed when instead of items, the referents of items themselves were used as stimuli (Kerlinger, 1972).
It is recognized by the author that such referents are naturally of an abstract nature (1972: 627). So, the theory may be correct on an abstract, ideological level.

However, the frame of reference and the data are American. In Europe, apart from the fact that liberalism and conservatism have a different meaning, there is the additional ideology of socialism.

Thus, the interpretation of the factor-structure in terms of relatively independent factors indicating the three basic European ideological dimensions (rather than the two basic American ones) tends to confirm Kerlinger’s rationale, although instead of referents of attitudes, bi-polar items were used. It may be, then, that the level of abstraction rather than the forms of the stimuli is decisive.  

In order to assess progressive-conservative dimensions possibly underlying attitudinal positions, 24 attitude scales were constructed according to procedures outlined above (see appendix).

Most scales are medium or strong Guttman-scales (Mokken, op cit.); six are weak ones; only one is based on correlation. Examples of scales are: attitude to social welfare laws, equality of income status and property and a number of scales on government interference in the fields of education, tax policy, the distribution of incomes etc.; democratic attitudes, political freedom of expression, internationalism, authoritarian parent-child relationship, conventional male-female roles, moral ‘libertarianism’ and tolerance towards homosexuals.

Those 24 scales together with the three abstract-ideological scales, an authoritarianism scale (a shortened version of the classical F-scale; Adorno et al., 1950) and two single items on government policy were intercorrelated, factor-analysed, and the factors rotated (Jöreskog, op. cit.; Kaiser, op. cit.). Two main factors and one secondary one were found. The first factor may be labelled libertarianism-traditionalism (LITR) or, in American terminology 'non-economic liberalism-conservatism', with the conservatism-ideology scale, all family-life and sex-scales and all non-economic political scales loading highly. (i.e. > .40)

The second factor may be labelled socialism, economic liberalism-conservatism or left-right (assuming that the latter terms, in a European context, mainly refer to politico-economics). The socialism-ideology scale is loading highly on it, as well as, with a double loading, a scale on democratic attitudes. Further, all scales on welfare and government interference as well as trade-union policy and equality of income, etc. This factor will be labelled left-right (LERI).

It may be noted that both major dimensions seem to reflect the two values posited as underlying the domain of progressive-conservative attitudes, as
well as their differential application to the economic as non-economic fields. Both dimensions may be referred to as meta-attitudinal, 'value-ideological' or simply as 'ideological'.

A third factor may be labelled authoritarianism (AUTH) with high loadings for the shortened F-scale, conventional male-female roles and aid to developing countries and double-loadings with LITR of e.g. authoritarian parent-child relationship and internationalism. It may be noted that two abstract ideological dimensions validate the interpretation of the broader value-structure and vice versa: conservative ideology and LITR; socialist ideology and LERI. AUTH is not validated by an abstract ideological dimension of e.g. fascism (this is a typical matter for further research) nor is the general liberal ideology reflected in the 'value-ideological' structure.

A further interpretation of this constellation is outside the scope of this paper.

3 Results of replication

We are now in the position to re-test Reiss' generalization regarding the relationships between social class and PSP for progressives and conservatives in a number of ways: two indicators of social class are available: objective and subjective social class (the latter variable is of course included for exploratory reasons); three dimensions of progressiveness-conservatism on an 'abstract-ideological' level: liberalism, conservatism and socialism; and four dimensions of progressiveness-conservatism at a 'meta-attitudinal' or even 'value-ideological' level: libertarianism-traditionalism (LITR), left-right (LERI), authoritarianism (AUTH), and orthodoxy (ORTH). The intercorrelations of all dimensions are presented in table 1.15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>soc.</th>
<th>lib.</th>
<th>LITR</th>
<th>LERI</th>
<th>AUTH</th>
<th>ORTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conservatism</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>socialism</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITR</td>
<td></td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td></td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LERI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All correlations are Tau-beta's (Kendall, 1948) Scale scores have been re-coded to 10-point scales. The scale-labels indicate the high values along the continua, or indicate values ranging from low to high: libertarianism, traditionalism (LITR) implies high values for 'traditionalists' etc.
It can be observed that both abstract-ideologically and on the value-ideological level, the two basic dimensions (conservatism and socialism; LITR and LERI) are moderately correlated (-.28 and .30 respectively). The rather isolated position of the classical European liberalism scale (opposition to government intervention) may also be noted: it is only positively related to conservative ideology. Further interpretations of the matrix are again outside the scope of this paper. Reiss’ generalization has been retested in 14 ways. Results are presented in table 2.

Table 2
Relationship between social class and PSP for progressives versus conservatives, along various dimensions

A Abstract-ideological dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>conservatism cons./non-cons.</th>
<th>socialism soc./non-soc.</th>
<th>liberalism lib./non-lib.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>obj. soc. class</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subj. soc. class</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expected relation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B Value-ideological dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LITR lib/trad.</th>
<th>LERI left/right</th>
<th>AUTH auth/non-auth</th>
<th>ORTH orth/heterod.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>obj. soc. class</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subj. soc. class</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expected relation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: correlations are Tau-beta (Kendall, op cit)
1 dichotomisation near median
2 expectation according to Reiss. The classical-liberal ideological position of general non state interference is interpreted as conservative (see Table I)

At a glance it can be seen that in none of the 14 tests there is the slightest support for it.
The relationship between social class and PSP is indeed essentially zero (.02 for objective, -.03 for subjective social class) but the relationship remains zero for the several progressive-conservative sub-groups. Moreover where the correlation rises somewhat above zero, it is in the opposite direction as would have been predicted on the basis of Reiss’ generalization.

4 Extension
It was hypothesized that since the upper classes would show more consistent belief systems along progressive-conservative continua, more extreme pro-
gressives and conservatives would be found there as compared to middle and lower classes. The relationships between social class and progressive-conservative dimensions would then at best be rather weak, like the one between social class and PSP.

There is indeed a tendency that among the upper-classes there is more variation in attitudes and opinions. For abstract ideological dimensions of progressiveness-conservatism, the relationship to social class is indeed practically zero (see table 3).

Table 3
The relationship between social class and progressive-conservative dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>abstract ideological dimensions</th>
<th>value-ideological dimensions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONS.</td>
<td>SOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objective social class</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjective social class</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: correlations are Tau-beta's (Kendall, op cit)

It can be observed in table 3, however, that on the value-ideological level, the relationships, though not very high, are much stronger.

As so often found in literature, they are clearly opposed as to non-economic conservatism (LITR, AUTH, ORTH) versus economic conservatism (LERI): the upper and middle classes are more libertarian, non-authoritarian and heterodox than the lower classes, but more rightist in the socioeconomic sense.

Further, 'class-consciousness' seems to increase somewhat the relationship between social class and left-wing attitudes and to decrease the relationship with other, non-economic dimensions.

It may now be argued that in testing Reiss' generalization an over-all measure of progressiveness-conservatism is in fact the proper index to distinguish general liberals (e.g. progressives) from general conservatives (Reiss, 1965: 750).

Such an index would be more clearly independent of social class. And moreover, the tendency for upper and middle class people to show more variation in attitudes could be strengthened, thus increasing the likelihood for Reiss' generalization to be confirmed.

Two general indicators for progressiveness-conservatism were constructed. On the abstract-ideological level the conservatism and socialism dimensions,
as constituting the main ones, were combined. On the value level LITR and LERI were combined. Relations of both indices to social class (both subjective and objective) are indeed essentially zero. After dichotomisation near the median, Reiss’ generalization was tested again. Results are presented in table 4. They are all negative again.

Table 4
The relationship between social class and PSP for 'general' progressives and conservatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>abstract ideological</th>
<th>value-ideological</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>progressive</td>
<td>conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>objective social class</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>subjective social class</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 dichotomisation near median
2 coefficients; Tau-beta's (Kendall, op cit)

5 Discussion
An essential goal of many forms of replication is to re-test a generalisation with improved measuring instruments. In the original replication (Middendorp et al., op cit.) this goal was only partly reached. In the present replication this goal was reached almost completely.

Replication seemed interesting, because a rationale could be set up from which the generalization could be derived in ways more satisfactory than Reiss' original reasoning (Middendorp et al., op cit., 371).

It has been noted that there is evidence indeed that upper and middle class people are more consistent in their attitudes along progressive-conservative dimensions than lower-class people. PSP is a constituent part of one of such basic dimensions: LITR. Still, even for progressives as opposed to conservatives, on that dimension, the relationship between social class and PSP remains essentially zero.

Social class is rather strongly related to LITR as a whole, however. This position of PSP within the LITR-dimension is not unique.

Of the fifteen sub-scales in the LITR-dimension, only three are related to social class at the same level as the total scale: authoritarian parent-child relationship, conventional male-female roles and internationalism. Three others are related somewhat lower (at the level of .15): family-traditionalism, tolerance towards homosexuals and aid to developing countries. Apart from democratic attitudes and government interference for non-economic welfare which have double-loadings on both the LITR and LERI dimensions (since those dimensions are related to social class in opposite
ways, one might expect the sub-scales to be unrelated to social class! Three other sub-scales are unrelated: tolerance regarding controversial TV-programmes, conservative ideology (see Table 3) and PSP.

Obviously, the relationship between social class and LITR is caused mainly by the 5 sub-scales loading highly or moderately on the third factor in the three factor solution: authoritarianism (the only exception is a moderate relationship with family traditionalism). Thus, the conservatism (or rather: traditionalism) of the working class in fact constitutes working class authoritarianism. (Lipset, 1966; see also critics like Miller and Riesman, 1961; Lipsitz, 1965).

It should immediately be noted, however, that this authoritarianism cannot be interpreted as simply implying an anti-democratic attitude. There are, no doubt, items in AUTH-sub-scales implying a non- or anti-democratic orientation, but in specific terms (when asked, as in the democratic attitudes scale, whether e.g. the influence of workers in industry, students in university, voters in local government, should increase) there is no relation to social class. Obviously, the attitude towards democracy is not a simple one and may not even be a uni-dimensional phenomenon. It may also be that again more abstract items elicit different responses than specific ones. Generally, it seems that the very concept of authoritarianism badly needs reevaluation and re-conceptualization.

It has been shown in Table 3 that social class is more strongly related to AUTH (-.30) than to LITR (-.22). It can further be shown that of the three class-indicators, educational level is most strongly related to both LITR (-.33) and AUTH (-.40), and income most weakly so (-.17 and -.24 respectively). Educational level is weakly related to PSP as well (.10); income and social class generally are not.

I will not go on here, however, to try and find determinants of PSP. I would rather like to point out a solution to a dilemma social research is confronted with, today.

It concerns the level of abstraction at which variables are most fruitfully conceptualized for the construction of theories: should we concentrate on highly abstract constructs, like the LITR and LERI dimensions identified in the present study, or should we start building up theories on less abstract, specific attitudes?

This dilemma is relatively new and still rather elitist. Due to lack of funds and available technology, most social research, until five or ten years ago, had to concentrate on low-level constructs (at least at the operational level) and limited designs. Results have been, among other things, the present existence of a host of trait-names and attitude scales.22

Now that there are at least less technological boundaries and now that some
researchers have larger funds available for larger research projects, I believe that social research should aim at the much-needed integration of the host of research findings and concepts. Among other things the broader dimensions underlying the great variety of attitudes and traits should be identified (see Rokeach, op cit.), After all, the labels used in popular language and e.g. in political debate, often refer to such general concepts. By properly assessing them empirically, their meaning may well be enlightened, especially when their relations to other basic variables in the social structure or personality are put into causal networks. The era of 'fact-finding' and 'lower-range' theory of empirical research, as opposed to the abstract 'higher order' theories and conceptualizations of the 'theorists', may now be definitely terminated.

Accordingly, the increasing computer-facilities which are available to the social scientist today should have consequences for procedures of theory construction, especially when large data sets and large cross-sectional samples are available. A shift from purely deductive to inductive-deductive procedures of theory construction may be especially necessary and fruitful at this stage (see e.g. Merton, 1954; Lenski, 1966; Riley et al., 1954).

In conclusion, rather than concentrate on determinants of relatively low-level constructs like PSP, theories should now be built first around such high-level constructs like progressiveness-conservatism which might integrate the host of both more specific attitudes and empirical findings regarding them.

There is no necessity for staying at such abstract levels, of course. It has been shown that although abstract concepts may be based firmly on extensive (i.e. statistical) evidence (Galtung, 1967), sub-scales may still show substantial variation in their relations to other crucial variables in a design, i.e. they might take positions in causal networks or theoretical domains at variance with the position of the general construct of which they form a constituent part.

A primary researcher may indeed not be in a position to analyse his data on all levels. However, this may be a task for secondary analysis (cf. Hyman, 1972). Large data sets including many variables are and should be made available through data-archives. Thus, data archives may democratize research by making rich data widely available at small cost.

Apart from replication, this seems to be a major route towards continuity in social research. In secondary analyses, data sets may not only be approached from completely different theoretical angles. Theories may also be refined by analyses on specific aspects of the more general concepts they were built on.

Thus, subsequent analyses on determinants of PSP may be put into the
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proper perspective of research into general progressive-conservative dimensions.

Notes
1 Reiss (1965: 750, note 18) is aware of the evidence in literature as to the multidimensionality of liberalism-conservatism, but still goes on to identify some 'underlying qualities' as 'liberal in a general sense' and continues to speak of 'general liberality' (op cit., 755). In his description he aims at distinguishing 'the working man' 'who favors the welfare state only because of self-interest' from the working man who favors the welfare state because 'it fits his liberal orientation'. This distinction is not uncommon in American literature (cf. Campbell et al.; op. cit., 203-209; Parry, 1948; for a rather adequate reply to such positions, see Smith, 1948d, 789).

2 The project has been made possible by Grant 50-5 of the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (ZWO). Fieldwork was carried out by Makrotest NV, Amsterdam. The sample (N = 1927) is highly representative for the Dutch population aged 17-70 (see Middendorp, 1973; appendix 2). Analyses have been carried out at the Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam. I thank Hans van Vliet and Frank van Dijk for their cooperation. In designing the questionnaire, data from other Dutch surveys have been used, e.g. studies by the Geïllustreerde Pers N.V., Amsterdam, NOVUM BV, Haarlem, the Foundation for the Advancement of Research on Minority Groups, Amsterdam and from Hoogerwerf (1964), all made available through the Steinmetz Archives, Amsterdam. Field work of those studies, with the exception of Hoogerwerf, op cit., has been carried out by Interact BV, Dongen.

3 Five items refer to norms for a girl's sexual behavior: whether she should remain a virgin until marriage, whether heavy petting is allowed if she cares for or is in love with the boy and the same for full sexual relations if she cares for the boy or if she does not particularly care for him. The other item refers to sexual intercourse of people willing to marry each other. So two items are taken from the original 3-items PSP-scale (Middendorp et al., op. cit., 372, note 2) and four are taken from Reiss' (1965) scales.

4 There is considerable terminological confusion in the area of ideologies and social and political philosophy. In Europe, liberalism and conservatism have a different meaning than in the U.S.A. The labels could certainly not be used to indicate a possible antithesis. Therefore, in the present study, the fundamental antithesis in the field of ideologies is indicated by the concepts of progressiveness and conservatism. This matter will be gone into further in a forthcoming thesis.

5 Literature on conservatism is extensive. Only a few studies will be mentioned here. Of the classical conservatives Burke (1790) is most prominent. English conservatism is discussed by Hailsham, 1959; Hearnshaw, 1933: White, 1950. The American New Conservatism by Kirk, 1954; Viereck, 1962; Rossiter, 1962. Analytical studies of importance are Mannheim, 1953 (1927); Huntington, 1957; Kendall and Carey, 1964. Critics, often from the American liberal side, include Schlesinger, 1953; Horowitz, 1956; Freund, 1955; Spitz, 1964. Again,
there are many others. In empirical research, the study by McClosky, 1958, should be mentioned.

6 Here concepts are introduced which often arouse debate as to their meaning: 'model' and 'ideology'. Again, in the context of the present article, this matter cannot be gone into further. On ideology, see e.g. Barth, 1945; Huntington, op. cit.; Minar, 1961; Naes, 1956.

7 For a discussion on 'ideal types' see Rogers, 1969; Hendricks and Breckenridge Peters, 1973.

8 See e.g. Lichtmann, 1970; Mannheim, op. cit., 105 and 1930, 182; Kendall and Carey, op. cit., 420; Barth, op. cit., 21, 26; Rossiter, op. cit., 24, 35, 293; Mühlenfeld, 1952, 43-69, 90; Huntington, op. cit., 472, note 34; Horowitz, op. cit., 2; Brown, 1955, 2, 6, 7; Lewis, 1953, 636; Smith, 1968, 276; Hallowell, 1946, 73-74.

9 In assessing broad, value-oriented dimensions, unidimensional attitude scales were considered as the proper level of measurement.

I agree with Kerlinger (1959, 116; 1967, 28) that the dimensionality of an attitudinal domain should be assessed by way of factor-analysis before any measurement of attitudes should be engaged in.

But I maintain that such a procedure essentially applies to limited 'attitudinal' domains: sets of items in a limited field of study, in which a few attitudes may be expected to underly various opinions. Contrary to Kerlinger, I believe that such attitudes, once identified by way of factor-analysis, may well be measured subsequently by way of Guttman-scales. These may be brought together (from various fields) and interrelated so as to assess underlying broad dimensions of a higher order. This procedure has been followed.

It is felt that one should not try to assess broad value-oriented dimensions by interrelating single opinions (e.g. items) to avoid unreliability and item-specificity.

10 It is generally advised that abstractly formulated items should be presented in bi-polar format to non-sophisticated samples (Berkowitz and Wolkon, 1964). There is also abundant evidence that people's reactions to such abstract (ideological) items may often be quite different from, and even opposed to, their reactions to simplistic and concrete items (e.g. Free and Cantril, 1967; Mann, 1970; Prothro and Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969). This was another major reason why progressiveness-conservatism was conceptualized and measured on an abstract ideological level as well as on a (meta) attitudinal level.

11 The factor-solution will be published elsewhere.

12 This matter needs further discussion, but it may be noted here, that in constructing the bi-polar items, it was found much easier and natural to formulate the classical liberal, socialist and conservative poles, than to formulate opposites.

13 Attitude scales indicating religious progressiveness and conservatism were not included in the basic design because it was felt that religious attitudes would only be relevant to people belonging to a church or religious community. For these people (62 % of the sample) five religious progressive-conservative scales were constructed. All scales loaded highly on one factor. The scale scores where combined into the orthodoxy (ORTH) dimension. Scale labels and characteristics are given below.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>label</th>
<th>number of items</th>
<th>H-coefficient (Mokken; op. cit.)</th>
<th>evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>politico-religious conservatism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orthodoxy (referring to doctrine elements)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conformism to church rules attitude towards pillarization (verzuiling)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 This factor includes the PSP-scale, which was eliminated for the present purposes, however, as well as the extra-marital sexual permissiveness scale.

15 Other, rather low loadings on the third factor enhance confidence in its interpretation in terms of authoritarianism: scales on tolerance towards criminals and homosexuals, conservative ideology, moral libertarianism and political freedom of expression load .33, .34, .38, .32 and .35 respectively. (The last three scales have not been included in the measurement of AUTH. The first two have been included for theoretical reasons). Scales on political tolerance and democratic attitudes only load .28 each (the factor-structure will be published elsewhere). It may be noted that AUTH proves to be a sub-dimension of LITR: in the 2-factor solution all its sub-scales are loading highly on the LITR dimension; in the 3-factor solution, there are 4 double loadings with LITR. It will be gone elsewhere into the irony of the fact that so much research has been focussed on what constitutes only a sub-dimension of the progressive-conservative domain.

16 Although all dimensions have been identified by way of factor-analysis, they have not been measured on the basis of factor-scores. The three ideological scales have been measured by simply adding scores on highly loading (> .40) items; LITR, LERI and AUTH have been measured by a weighed summation of attitude scale scores based on factor-loadings and scaleranges; ORTH has been measured by weighing for scale range only. It is clear that a number of correlations are inflated (especially LITR and AUTH) because of overlapping subscales.

17 Data are available upon request.

18 For evidence on the inverse relationship of social class to economic versus non-economic liberalism-conservatism, see Smith, 1948; Lipset op. cit.; Lenski, 1961; Kelley and Chambiss, op. cit.

19 The sensitivity of LERI to class-consciousness (here in the very superficial sense of the ability and willingness to assign oneself to a social class) is noted in the work of Centers, 1949; McKenzie, and Silver, 1968; Runciman, 1966; and Nordlinger, 1967. Note, however, that at low levels of class-consciousness, the relationship with LERI remains low. The relationship is even weaker regarding socialism as an abstract ideology. The opposite tendency of a weaker relationship of subjective social class to non-economic conservatism dimensions, as compared to objective social class, seems less well known but is consistent with the fact that, of course, non-economic conservatism acts as a clouding variable regarding the relationship between social class and LERI:
when the former relationship to social class becomes weaker, the latter one may become stronger.

20 Such constructions of general indices is very much at variance with the notion that no constructs should be developed of which parts or elements maintain different positions in causal networks, i.e. are differently related to important variables in theoretical domains (Cf Stinchcombe, 1973a, b). The types of progressive-conservative dimensions distinguished have varying or even opposed relationships to at least one important structural variable in such a theoretical domain: social class. Others are e.g. age and political party preference.

21 Of course, generally, constructs based on interrelated sub-scales have stronger relationships to other variables (e.g. in a theoretical domain) than each of those constituent sub-scales alone. This is another reason to start building up theories around such general concepts rather than around specific ones, as will be argued below.

22 See, e.g. Robinson et al., 1968; Robinson and Shaver, 1969; Bonjean et al., 1967; Shaw and Wright, 1967.

23 Procedures outlined by Galtung (1967; 78-79) as being extensive seem exactly to be aiming, in terms of Stinchcombe (op cit), at the identification of variables in theoretical domains, e.g. those items or sub-scales should or may be combined into one construct which are likely to occupy similar positions in causal networks. We have seen that this may never be perfectly realized however. Elements of higher-level constructs may occupy different positions in causal networks.

Appendix

A survey of scales and 2 single items involved in the basic factor-analytic design (apart from 3 abstract-ideological dimensions and the shortened classical F-scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale-tabell</th>
<th>Number of Items</th>
<th>H-values</th>
<th>Evaluation (Mokken, op. cit.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 attitude to social welfare laws</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 equality; income, status, property</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>medium (near str.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 equality; income, property; by government interference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 government aid to education</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 government: egalitarian income policy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 government tax policy; higher incomes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 idem, lower incomes, indirect taxes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 government: direct economic participation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 social welfare policy (non-directly economic)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>weak (near medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 trade-union policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 item on government policy for equal chances
12 item on government spending
13 democratic attitudes 6 44 medium
14 political freedom of expression 6 41 medium
15 aid to developing countries 3 54 strong
16 internationalism 5 42 medium
17 political tolerance 2 94 strong
18 authoritarian parent-child relationship 5 41 medium
19 conventional male-female roles 4 38 weak (near medium)
20 family-traditionalism 8 39 weak (near medium)
21 moral libertarianism 4 36 weak
22 tolerance controversial TV-programs 2 33 weak
23 tolerance criminals 3 45 medium
24 tolerance homosexuals 4 72 strong
25 premarital sexual permissiveness 6 53 strong
26 extra-marital sexual permissiveness 2 2

1 In terms of one polar scale-position
2 Correlation (product-moment) = .32

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