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Being a Barbarian
Lucian and Otherness in the Second Sophistic

The cities of the Roman Empire were filled with people from many different backgrounds. The author Lucian was originally from Samosata in Syria, but he spent much of his life in hubs like Athens, Rome, and Ephesus. In his writings he uses humor to challenge common stereotypes about Syrians and other “barbarians.” Yet, if we take a closer look at Lucian’s language it becomes clear that even he could not fully escape the xenophobia embedded in (ancient) everyday speech.

Introduction

“These Romans are crazy,” says Obelix time and again in the popular French comic series *Astérix*. Obelix, Asterix’ sidekick, is a Gaul living in the only village in Gallia that has been able to resist Julius Caesar. In *Astérix* time has stopped in 50 BCE. Obelix’ oft-repeated phrase encapsulates one of the most provocative features of the comic: the books depict the Romans through the eyes of the Gauls, instead of the other way around. As a result, in *Astérix* the Romans are on display as barbarians with strange customs, while in ancient literary sources the Gauls typically play that part.

The Romans are not the only barbarians in *Astérix*, but the subversion of the barbarian paradigm applies only to the Gauls. The otherness of Goths, Vikings, Egyptians, and Normans is emphasized by jokes about their language and by attributing outlandish practices to them – in some cases the very same practices that ancient authors attributed to the Gauls. Another, even more troubling instance of “othering” in the comics is the depiction of black pirates and slaves. In both groups the black characters have gorilla-like features and highly stereotypical accents.

Within the comic *Astérix*, then, we can discern three approaches to barbarians. First, the Gauls who have had to play the part of barbarians so
many times are here given the opposite role: the reader sees the world through their eyes. Second, instead of the Gauls now the Romans are presented as barbarians, alongside Goths, Vikings, Egyptians, and Normans. Thirdly, under the influence of the racist stereotypes common in twentieth century Europe, the comic depicts black characters as the ultimate barbarians: stupid and animal-like. This is imagery that nowadays many readers are uncomfortable with.

The second century CE author Lucian of Samosata, like the authors of Astérix, René Goscinny and Albert Uderzo, created an imaginative world populated by many different peoples: from Romans to Scythians and from Greeks to Hyperboreans. Lucian, again like Goscinny and Uderzo, frequently subverts the common fault lines between barbarians and non-barbarians by writing pieces from the perspective of the former. In several works the audience is invited to watch the world through Scythian eyes, and in many Lucianic pieces the protagonist is a Syrian. Based on the latter, and on the transmission of Samosata as his birthplace, it is generally assumed that Lucian was from Syria. Scholars have heralded Lucian for his subversions of barbarian stereotypes, which they connect to his own background.

In this paper I suggest that the position of barbarians in Lucian’s corpus is in fact more complicated. Although in his explicit discussions of barbarians Lucian emphasizes their intelligence and learning, there are also frequent examples of brief and casual stereotyping. We can, therefore, divide up Lucian’s depiction of barbarians into three categories as well: first, Syrians, like the Gauls in Astérix, are always presented as complex figures with agency; second, non-Syrian barbarians play positive, interesting roles in explicit discussions of them; third, in casual, often proverbial, references non-Syrian barbarians play stereotypical and denigrating roles.

It is not my purpose to indict Lucian for stereotypical representations of the peoples living on Rome’s frontiers. The best we can do, as scholars, is to not let such stereotypes go unnoticed, and to investigate their roots and implications. In this piece, then, I attempt to illustrate the pervasiveness and power of popular clichés about the differences between barbarians and non-barbarians in ancient discourse. Even Lucian, who purposefully ridicules barbarian-stereotyping elsewhere, cannot help but repeat these motifs. In what follows I first sketch the background to the barbarian non-barbarian dichotomy in the second century CE. Second, I discuss some examples of Lucian’s subversions of the familiar models for representing barbarians.
Thirdly, I will consider passages where Lucian rehearses familiar stereotypes about barbarians.

Which barbarians?

In Greek literature the term barbarian started out as a qualification about language: in the *Iliad* the Carians are *barbarophonoi* because they do not speak Greek, or do not speak it well. Over time barbarians came to be understood as different not only in terms of language but also on account of their un-Greek way of life. Scholars agree that in the development of the term barbarian the Persian Wars of the fifth century BCE played an important role. In this conflict most of the Greek-speaking communities came under the same, Persian threat, and as a result they organized the world into two categories: Greeks on one side, and Persians, i.e. barbarians, on the other. Because the Persian Empire encompassed so many different foreign peoples – Egyptians, Phrygians, Thracians, etc. – the term “barbarian” referred not just to Persians but to all non-Greeks, and it became an oppositional concept central to Greek self-understanding. The dichotomy between Greeks and barbarians as it occurred in literature and art was far from neutral. The barbarian served as a negative mirror image, and could be variously depicted as cowardly, perfidious, slavish, unintelligent, impious, extravagant, effeminate, rude et cetera.

Most scholarship about ethnicity and the ancients has concentrated on negative representations of barbarians, attributing high levels of xenophobia and ethnocentrism to ancient Greek and Roman societies. Erich Gruen has recently tried to correct this view, by arguing that more often than not the ancients showed positive attitudes towards people of other ethnicities. They did not define themselves in opposition to others, but rather by adapting to and even incorporating the alien. Gruen has come under criticism, however, for painting a too rosy picture of ancient attitudes towards foreigners. Whether or not ancient societies were generally xenophobic or predominantly open to outsiders may ultimately be in the eye of the beholder, but at the very least the literary and iconographical sources show that distinctions between insiders and barbarians mattered a great deal to the ancients. Stereotypical depictions of barbarians were common, and, when used, served the purpose of reaffirming the distinction between “us” and “them.”

By the second century CE, the period during which Lucian was active, a
lot had changed: the fact that now Greeks and barbarians lived under Roman rule complicated the dichotomy that arose from the time of the Persian Wars. Lucian himself embodies this complexity, as he wrote in Greek, was born in Syria, and probably worked in the Roman imperial administration. A remarkable feature of Lucian’s generation, furthermore, is its preoccupation with the Greek past. In the first and second centuries CE the Second Sophistic movement dominated cultural life. This movement consisted of travelling orators who declaimed and often also taught in the urban centers of the Empire. Its best-known representatives are Aelius Aristides and Dio Chrysostom. Second Sophistic literature harkens back to the Greek past by referencing earlier authors like Homer, Sophocles, and Xenophon, by bringing historical settings (classical Athens) and figures (Pericles, Socrates) back to life, and by using classical Attic Greek even though it was no longer in use in everyday life, where the koine dialect was used instead.

Given the Second Sophistics preoccupation with classical Greece one might expect that they would import the Greek-barbarian dichotomy from this period. In part this is what happened, especially since the Persian Wars were a very popular topic at the time. Yet, also outside of this particular context the neat distinction between brave, virtuous Greeks and savage barbarians was often repeated. Sometimes the Romans were inserted as a tertium quid: Aelius Aristides in his fourteenth oration, In praise of Rome, distinguishes between Greeks, barbarians, and Romans. Finally – and this is a tendency we will see in Lucian too – sometimes authors distinguished groups within the traditional categories, based on their education and sophistication or, to use the Greek term encompassing both, their paideia. In this scenario one’s cultural identity no longer depends on birth and blood alone, making it possible to become Greek. Being Greek or being barbarian is then a matter of degree, not an absolute category, and, as a consequence, the authors of the Second Sophistic engaged in fierce competition with one another over who was the “Greekest.”

A Syrian speaks up

In two of his comic dialogues Lucian presents a Syrian character greatly resembling him. Bis accusatus (Twice Accused) describes the trial brought against an unnamed Syrian by two plaintiffs. Oratory personified accuses him of abandoning her to write dialogues instead. Dialogue personified accuses him of writing funny instead of serious dialogues. Initially the piece
dresses the Syrian in barbarian stereotypes. The god Hermes, who serves as a court clerk, says that the defendant does not need a name, because he is just a “Syrian orator” (Bis acc. 14). Oratory describes the Syrian as “speaking a barbarian language” and “all but wearing a caftan in the Syrian style” (Bis acc. 27). After his eloquent and skillful defense, however, the court acquits the Syrian on both charges. The barbarian has shown himself to be the “Greekest” by flawlessly displaying his skills in Greek legal oratory.

In Piscator (Fisherman) a group of philosophers sues a Syrian named Parrhesiades (which means “free-speaker”) for slander. The charge refers to a piece by Lucian titled Vitrum auctio (Lives for sale) in which philosophers are ridiculed and sold to the highest bidder. When asked, during the court examination, where he is from, Parrhesiades responds: “I am a Syrian from the Euphrates. What does it matter? I know that some of my accusers are no less barbarian by birth than I, but in their character and culture (paideia) they are nothing like men from Soli, Cyprus, Babylon, or Stagira.” The Syrian, again, is acquitted of the charge. He shows the truth of his own statement through his clever defense: in spite of being from Syria his paideia is excellent.

The two fictional trials of Bis accusatus and Piscator challenge negative stereotypes about one particular group of barbarians, namely the Syrians – a term that at the time was used indiscriminately of various peoples inhabiting regions west of the Euphrates. The Syrian protagonist destroys the notion that they would be unintelligent or unsophisticated through his performance. Where you were born or what you wear does not matter anymore if you have successfully steeped yourself in paideia. In Lucian’s works one Syrian can even charge another Syrian with being an uneducated barbarian for collecting books without reading them, or for allegedly using a neologism not part of the Attic dialect. These quarrels illustrate that in Lucian being barbarian, in this case Syrian, or Greek is a matter of degree, and that cultural identities can be asserted and contested.

Just like it is no coincidence that Goscinny and Uderzo elevate the Gauls, their claimed ancestors, it is easy to understand why Lucian was invested in undermining simplistic stereotypes about Syrians. Yet, the author attempts to do the same for other groups typically portrayed as barbarian. One such group are the Scythians. These nomadic inhabitants of a large region north of the Black Sea had been quintessential barbarians ever since Herodotus’ lengthy ethnographic account of them in the fourth book of the Histories. No fewer than three Lucianic pieces seek to change this image.

In Toxaris a Scythian and a Greek tell each other stories of friendship
among their respective peoples, in order to determine who are the better friends. The Scythian, Toxaris, says that Scythians outdo the Greeks, who only talk about friendship, in actually practicing it (Tox. 9). He has come to Athens for his education (Tox. 57), and as a result he is able to convince his Greek interlocutor to become his friend, even though the competition remains undecided (Tox. 63). Scythia contrasts a noble born but uneducated Scythian with an educated (Hellenized) but poor Scythian: in this way it subverts the claims to innate virtue of both lineage (genos) and ethnicity (ethnos). In Anacharsis, finally, the mythic Scythian sage of that name argues with Solon over the worth of Greek athletics. To see this central institution of Greek paideia through the mocking eyes of Anacharsis is not only very funny, but also temporarily challenges the superiority of Greek culture. Lucian presents the Scythians, like the Syrians, as complicated individuals, not stereotypical characters, who can be worthy representatives of Greek paideia, or even make fun of one of its pillars.

Several Lucianic dialogues challenge xenophobia as such, rather than focusing on specific groups. The best example is Deorum Concilium (Council of the gods), featuring a debate between the gods about who can be part of the pantheon and who cannot. Momus, the god of blame, complains that Olympus has become too full. He blames the crowding primarily on “new,” foreign gods like Dionysus. He moves a motion in the assembly of the gods that reads: “Many foreigners, not only Greeks but also barbarians, not at all worthy of joining our state have fraudulently obtained citizenship somehow and become gods, they have filled up the heaven so that our symposium is overcrowded with a noisy, polyglot rabble, and we are running out of ambrosia and nectar.” Momus sounds strikingly similar to modern day politicians, when they complain about immigrants using up social welfare. Actually, though, Lucian ridicules Momus and his views. First, Momus’ name means “blame”: his complaining merely confirms his unpleasant character. Second, the gods that Momus believes should be cast out of heaven were by no means “new” in the second century CE, and they were all far more popular among worshippers than he was. Momus, then, comes across as a jealous figure, who does not understand that the ancient pantheon was always susceptible to outside influence and change. Underneath the discussion about who gets to be a god is the question of who gets to be a citizen: the terminology describing foreign gods in Deorum Concilium was typically used of foreign people. The ridiculous portrait of Momus pokes fun at xenophobic fears not just among gods, but also among humans.
Washing Ethiopians

So far we have seen that Lucian’s works went against the grain by refusing to perpetuate stereotypical descriptions of barbarians. Instead of generalizing about ethnic groups, he showed how different Scythians and Syrians could be from one another, and that they could compete with any Greek or Roman in terms of education or virtue. Lucian even ridicules those who do hold negative views of foreigners. Understandably, scholars have viewed Lucian as an early beacon of tolerance. Suzanne Saïd, for instance, writes: “In Lucian’s world the impenetrable border between cultures no longer exists […]”31 However, even though his explicit discussions of ethnicity indeed challenge prejudices, his use of certain idioms betrays that even Lucian participated in implicit, casual ‘othering’ through language.

Let me begin with some examples of brief stereotypical characterizations of the Scythians. In a conversation between two prostitutes a suitor is described as being rough “like a Scythian.”32 One Syrian slandering another calls him “more famous for being uneducated than a Scythian.”33 In a description of a rowdy drinking party one philosopher is described negatively as being “shifty like a Scythian,”34 and Lucian rehearses the cliché that Scythians were cannibals no fewer than three times.35 These casual, proverbial remarks show how entrenched the image of the Scythian as stereotypical barbarian was in the Greek vernacular. Another striking feature of Lucian’s language is that frequently several foreign peoples are lumped together as mutually indistinguishable barbarians, be they Thracians, Persians, Celts, Lybians, Indians or Scythians.36 This, again, has the effect of underlining the otherness of foreigners: it suggests that barbarians, in their alleged lack of civilization, are as much like one another as they are different from “us,” and that there is no need to know anything about the possible distinctions among them.

From the Scythians I move to my final example, the Ethiopians. In the Iliad Zeus and the other gods famously go to the Ethiopians for a twelve-day feast (Il. 1.423). Herodotus provided the ancients with a description of their customs and characteristics: the Ethiopians were part of Xerxes’ army during the second Persian invasion of Greece (7.69). There has been great interest in ancient attitudes towards the Ethiopians because of the ongoing debate on whether or not the ancients had a notion of race.37 A relevant saying used by Lucian has surprisingly escaped the notice of scholars working on this issue. It occurs in the invective, already mentioned above, of one Syrian
against another for collecting books without reading them. At the very end of the piece the speaker resigns himself to the fact that the ignorant book collector will not change. He says: “I know that I have spoken in vain, and, as the saying goes, am trying to wash an Ethiopian white.” The saying occurs in one other ancient author, and survived into the modern period in several languages. At the very least this phrase reduces Ethiopians to their skin color, and it implicitly suggests that this skin color is undesirable and needs to be washed away.

There is a sharp contrast between this (proto-)racist proverb and the way in which the skin color of the Ethiopians figures in Lucian’s piece *Hermotimus*. In this piece about Hermotimus’ quest for the best philosophical doctrine, the protagonist is upbraided for making statements about philosophy after examining just one philosophical school. To explain this error the character Lycinus tells Hermotimus to imagine that an Ethiopian who had never travelled abroad might state in the Ethiopian assembly that only black-skinned people exist on earth. Lycinus asks: “Would they believe him? Or would some Ethiopian elder remark, ‘How do you know, you overconfident man? You have never been abroad, nor have you seen how things are among other peoples’.” Hermotimus agrees that the elder’s question would be justified.

Even though Lycinus brings up the Ethiopians merely to make a philosophical point, it is remarkable that Lucian forces his audience to reflect on differences in skin color from an *Ethiopian* perspective. The pattern that we observed in representations of the Scythians is repeated: the short phrase about washing Ethiopians was denigrating, while the longer discussion in *Hermotimus* breaks the traditional, “othering” mold, as it forces “us,” Greeks and Romans, to see the world through “their” eyes.

**Conclusion**

Distinctions between barbarians and non-barbarians were important to the ancients, and played a large role in how Greeks and Romans defined themselves. Looking at barbarians in the Second Sophistic is particularly worthwhile because with Greeks and barbarians now being subject to the Romans the traditional dichotomy needed to be renegotiated. Lucian, from his own position as a Syrian barbarian, works hard to challenge traditional stereotypical accounts of Syrians, Scythians, and even Ethiopians. At the same
time, however, he inadvertently sprinkles his texts with proverbs and sayings that perpetuate the very stereotypes he wants to subvert. These lapses do not necessarily undermine the inclusive elements of Lucian’s writing, nor do they show that the author secretly is a xenophobe after all. Rather, they illustrate the central role vernacular language plays in sustaining xenophobic attitudes. Lucian probably repeats “othering” phrases and sayings because they are so familiar to him that they seem harmless, and the audience would – most likely – hardly have noticed them either. Yet, especially if they are barely perceptible, denigrating idioms can foster negative sentiments towards “the other,” because they tacitly confirm the inherited, deep-rooted notion that foreigners are different. Only by noticing the “dumb Scythians” hidden in everyday language can one begin to make the distance between “us” and “them” smaller.

Notes
3. Nonetheless, in the two most recent books – not done by Goscinny and Uderzo – from 2013 (Asterix and the Picts) and 2015 (Asterix and the Missing Scroll) the new authors have chosen not to update the depiction of African characters.
5. E.g., Suzanne Saïd, “Lucien ethnographe,” in Actes du colloque international de Lyon organisé au Centre d’études romaines et gallo-romaines, les 30 septembre-1er


11. I follow Gruen (2010) in using the language of alterity in this piece, e.g., “other,” “othering,” and “otherness,” pace Isaac (2004: 4) who rejects this vocabulary on the grounds that it has become too expansive. Ancient historians derived this vocabulary from post-colonial theory, in particular Edward Said (Orientalism, New York: Pantheon, 1978) and Gayatri Spivak (“The Rani of Sirmur: An Essay in Reading the Archives,” History and Theory 24.3, 1985: 247-272), and in essence it expresses the idea that the imperial discourse of the dominant (colonizing) subjects distances and denigrates the colonized, or “others,” through stereotypical characterization and representation.

12. Ewen Bowie (“Greeks and their past in the Second Sophistic,” P&P 46, (1970): 3-41) was the first to comment on the focus on the past in the Second Sophistic. Since then several authors have elaborated, with modifications, his claims, most notably Graham Anderson, The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (New York: Routledge, 1993); Tim Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Lawrence Kim, Homer Between History and Fiction in Imperial Greek Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Being a Barbarian


14. E.g., Aristid., 1.14-15, 63; D. Chr. 12.11, 33, 50.


17. Pisc. 19. Soli was the birthplace of the philosopher Chrysippus, and Aristotle was from Stagira; both are among the plaintiffs. No philosophers from Cyprus or Babylon are mentioned in the piece.


21. This happens in the piece Adversus Indoctum (Against the ignorant book collector), cf. ibid. 147-152.

22. Assuming that in Pseudologista (Mistaken critic) the audience is meant to identify the first person speaker, on some level, with Lucian. On this piece as satire see Tom Hawkins, Iambic Poetics in the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 220-256.


26. See also the opening of *Juppiter Tragoedus* (Zeus rants), where Hermes complains about foreign gods who do not speak Greek and who are given decadent gold statues by their worshippers.


29. Momus, himself the personification of blame and critique, criticizes other divinities that are personified virtues (i.e., Virtue or Chance), *Deor. Conc.* 13. The lack of evidence for Momus cult suggests that if he received any worship it was not widespread.

30. E.g., *xenioi*, which means ‘foreigners’, *metoikoi* which means “resident aliens,” i.e. “metics.” James Oliver (“The actuality of Lucian’s Assembly of the Gods,” *AJPh* 101.3, (1980): 304-313) connects the piece to a specific legal controversy about citizenship in Athens in the second century CE when Marcus Aurelius changed the requirements for membership in the important Areopagus council twice. I find this connection persuasive, but it does not exhaust the meaning of the piece, which also makes a larger argument about human and divine foreigners.

31. Saïd (1994: 165): “En fait, dans le monde de Lucien, il n’existe plus de frontière étanche entre les cultures (…).” In similar vein several scholars emphasize how Lucian continually challenges and subverts the cultural boundaries of his day, see e.g., Elsner 2001; Richter 2011: 147-176; Andrade 2013: 261-313.

32. *Dialogi Meretricii* (Dialogues of the courtesans) 10.4.

33. *Pseudologistes* (Mistaken critic) 2, on this piece see note 22.


37. See note 8 for recent bibliography on this issue.


39. Diogenes the Cynic, Fragment 385 Giannantoni, cf., Maria Spyridonidou-Skarsouli,