Jilt Jorritsma

Angst und Dasein

The Tragedy of Oswald Spengler's Irrational Understanding of History

For most historians, the name Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) carries a ludicrous connotation. Spengler's methodological quest to capture the essence of the past by means of direct experience may now seem futile and absurd, but if it is seen against the background of his time his intentions appear to have been understandable. Spengler sought to find a new approach towards reality, one that lay outside the rational patterns of cause and effect. But in doing so, he ultimately subjugated the past into a stark and mechanized comprehension of history. Herein lies the tragedy of Oswald Spengler.

Philosophers are despots who have no armies to command, so they subjugate the world by locking it into a system of thought.

- Robert Musil¹

Introduction

Imagine having to travel through the astonishing depths of history, confronted with the ominous chaos of randomness and an alienating sensation of uncertainty. As you stand before the chasms of time, a mysterious guide offers you his hand; a bald-headed man whose unmoved starkness is intensified by the monotonous sound of his voice, and 'whose eyes gleam with a glistening spark of madness.' His name is Oswald Spengler, writer of the historical opus *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (translated as *The Decline of the West*).

This is how Johan Huizinga portrayed his contemporary German

colleague. However fascinating and enchanting Spengler's morphology of history may have been, Huizinga was never capable of seeing past the underlying sense of madness that seemed to be the foundation upon which Spengler's work was built. When Spengler visited the Netherlands to enlighten the Dutch people with his ideas in 1935, Huizinga was among the many people in the audience who visited the lecture at the University of Leiden. Afterwards, Huizinga had to admit to his friend and fellow historian, Menno ter Braak, that he couldn't help keeping a grievous smile from his face. Hearing Spengler speak, he wrote, was like 'watching an acrobat in a circus'.³ Der Untergang des Abendlandes was dismissed by Huizinga as 'a gruesome violation of history.4 Ter Braak, who was also present at the occasion, was even more destructive in his description of the event. Not only did he call Spengler the opposite of a brilliant speaker, he also questioned his colleague's reliability as a historian. 'This man is no historian,' he argued, 'he merely wants to dictate the laws of history'. In order to do so, Spengler relied on just one source: his own fantasies, which he tried to transform into a historical method. According to Ter Braak, Spengler's work and his intentions to achieve a certain level of truth should therefore be seriously put to doubt.⁵

Criticizing Spengler was not just reserved for historians living in the Low Countries. In his home country too, Spengler's views on history lay under heavy fire. The German historian Friedrich Meinecke, for instance, devoted an entire essay to Spengler, dismissing his ideas as a relapse in the spirit of the philosophy of history. In the eyes of Meinecke, Spengler's use of the past – assessing its general laws and identifying its transcending design – ignored any kind of respect towards history as it had been taught by the Rankean school.⁶

However, when the first volume of Spengler's *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* came out in 1918 it was an instant bestseller.⁷ Many people appeared to have no problem at all in accepting the hand offered to them by Spengler and letting him guide them through the past. In a time when traditional European values transformed in a tremendous manner, Oswald Spengler sought to define a new approach to historical reality in order to recover man's distorted connection with the world around him.⁸

Nowadays, Spengler's magnum opus has sadly become underestimated. The holistic style of history-writing employed by Spengler is no longer in fashion; it is dismissed as unscientific. Detail-oriented specialists have taken over, making Spengler one of the last historians of his kind. Spengler's work is founded on the idea that historical events obey the life cycle, and

that they repeat themselves in recurring shapes; enabling the historian to identify, compare and predict the uniform patterns as they arise out of past cultures. This idea may now seem absurd, but I believe that it is exactly this absurdity, which Huizinga identified as a form of madness, that forms the key to understanding Spengler's perception of history. In his quest to hunt down the logic of history, Spengler was confronted with the illogical actions, events and works of art produced by mankind. His work must therefore be seen as a struggle between his goal to come to a rational understanding of the past – by discovering its universal laws – and his conviction that it was not rational thought, but the irrational primal feelings, the blind *'Wille zur Macht'*, that dominated the human existence.

This struggle was not only present in the historical works of Spengler, but permeated European society as a whole at the end of the nineteenth-and in the beginning of the twentieth century. By grasping Spengler as a product of his historical environment, I will examine the way in which his conception of the irrational side of mankind's psyche steers his understanding of history and the world around him. I have decided to focus mainly on the first volume of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, for it is in this book that Spengler explores his method of the irrational approach towards history. This approach – which enables him to blur the distinction between subject and object, between himself and the world – is truly surprising and original in his work. It poses questions and problems that are still relevant for historians today.

Oswald Spengler: The Embodiment of Tragedy

Oswald Arnold Gottfried Spengler was born on May 29 1880 in Blankenburg, a small town at the north foot of the Harz Mountains – a region which was immortalized by Goethe in his famous tragedy of *Faust*. ¹¹ After he completed his *Abitur*, Spengler entered the University of Halle where he devoted himself to mathematics and the natural sciences. When his father died in 1901, Oswald transferred to the University of Munich in order to pursue a teaching career in the natural sciences. In the fall of 1902, he went to the University of Berlin, only to return to Halle later that year for the concluding semesters. During this time his doubts whether to focus himself on the humanities or the natural sciences increased. When his thesis on the philosophy of Heraclitus (*Der Metaphysische Grundgedanke der Heraklitischen Philosophie*) passed the oral examination after having been turned down the first time, Spengler

received his Ph.D. and passed his state teacher's examination in the natural sciences. He was then only twenty-four years of age. 12

Looking at photographs of Spengler, one sees a rigid, serious-looking young man who had grown old at a very young age. Setting eyes on the robust character of his face and his completely bald head, one would guess that Spengler was some kind of military official; a man of action, rather than a man of thought. But looks may deceive. Underneath an armor of certainty, there lay an insecure and fragile man whose deepest anxiety permeated the whole of his existence. We get a sense of this anxiety and its impact on his everyday life from Spengler's autobiographical fragment entitled *Eis Heauton*: 'When I look back upon my life, there is but one feeling that has controlled everything: *Angst. Angst* for the future, *Angst* for relatives, *Angst* for people, for sleep, for authorities, for thunder, for war, *Angst, Angst*'. Not a month went by during which he did not think about committing suicide. It seemed as if the tender-minded part of his personality was always struggling with his tough-

minded will to act.¹⁶ His thoughts became a barricade from which he could not free himself, and he envied everyone around him who had no trouble to do so: 'I envy everyone, who lives,' and 'when I am confronted with the opportunity to truly live, I merely shy away from it'¹⁶

Spengler's sense of Angst, which is perhaps best translated with the English 'anxiety', should be distinguished from the more common feeling of fear. Whereas fear is experienced when a threat to our life is recognized, Angst is a transcendent emotion that drives us to swamp ourselves



Oswald Spengler (1880-1936).

in the insignificance of existence; it makes us inescapably aware of the pressures that accompany the essence of our being and confronts us with the unbearable anguish of life. According to the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung, a contemporary of Spengler, this anxiety is most likely to occur when the unconscious urges of the mind are excluded from life by repressions, or are misunderstood and depreciated by a self-sufficient conscious outlook. So, suppressing whatever is not approved by our consciousness may lead to a state of mind that is marked by anxiety. This seems to have been exactly the case with Spengler. His urge to live actively, to experience the world in all its integrity, was oppressed by the pondering rationale of his consciousness. He found himself disconnected from life, from the world around him, and this hatched in him a smothering feeling of despair.

Spengler was thus fundamentally bound between the two overpowerings of Apollo and Dionysus. His Apollonian rationale weighed him down like a ball and chain, fueling his anxiety, crippling his actions and it manifested an inner asymmetry within him. Spengler cursed his self-conscious personality. He longed to live, to experience the world and to transcend his own suffocating frame of reference; to follow Dionysus. Whether he would experience joy or pain, he did not care. He merely wanted to feel: 'It is not the absence of happiness that I miss; I would have been grateful for every great misfortune that would have struck me, if it would merely mean to have lived.19 In this sentence there is a strong sense of amor fati; a longing for danger and hazardous situations. The possibility to come into contact with the chaotic environment of life and death arose when World War I broke out. However, due to Spengler's disturbed mental state and his poor physical condition, he was turned down by the army several times.²⁰ In a letter to his friend, Hans Klöres, Spengler expressed his desire to go to war: 'I myself am, because of my neurasthenia, unable to comply with my inner responsibility, and to go as a volunteer. But I envy those who can, and who therefore get to experience the War. 21 His willingness to actively participate in life was obstructed once again.

Jung believed that in order for man to get rid of his anxiety, he had to come in touch with the unconscious side of his mind and try to understand and assimilate its contents. What is perhaps most striking is that Jung founded this idea on the concept of *enantiodromia*, which he derived from the philosophy of Heraclitus – the same Heraclitus on whom Spengler wrote his thesis. Heraclitus was among the first of those who became aware of the side of man that has always been acting unnoticed within us. ²² *Enantiodromia*

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is essentially the idea that the superabundance of any force inevitably produces its opposite. Jung used it particularly to refer to the unconscious acting against the wishes of the conscious mind: 'when an extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in time an equally powerful counterposition is built up, which first inhibits the conscious performance and subsequently breaks through the conscious control'.

Indeed, as the tensions in Spengler's mind built up, he more and more tried to lift the conscious burden that weighed upon his shoulders. He abandoned his educational background in the natural sciences in order to pursue a literary career in Munich. However, he did not know exactly what he wanted to write about. His ideas for short stories, plays, and novels, never became more than mere sketches. Except for a few short stories that are complete, there exist only fragments of Spengler's literary ambitions. All of his literary works reflect the uncertainties that troubled his mind at that time, and they all seemed to have one common theme: the idea that 'an artist cannot fulfill his creative potentialities in a decaying culture'.²⁴ Spengler became fascinated with the primitive man; the man who merely acted upon his instincts, and who was not yet harassed by the numbing volition of his consciousness. This idea made him resent modern society - in which the primitive was depicted as apelike, clumsy, and stupid - and the civilized man living in the city - who takes pride in having outgrown his primitive heritage. Spengler agreed with Rousseau that civilization destroyed simplicity, virtue, and sound instincts in man.²⁵ Through the subjective intuitions of man, inherited from his primitive ancestors, he sought to understand, and connect with, the world around him. It shaped Spengler's conception of history which he explored in the first volume of Der Untergang des Abendlandes.

An Inward Experience of History

'Goethe gave me my method', Spengler writes in the preface of the revised edition of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, 'Nietzsche my questioning faculty'. Goethe and Nietzsche were of great importance for Spengler during the three year process of writing the manuscript of his book. With Nietzsche, Spengler shared the conviction that human existence was not commanded by the intellect, but by primal feelings, urges and irrational desires. Living life was therefore more powerful than understanding life:

'We no longer believe in the power that reason holds over life. We feel that it is life itself that controls reason.' For Spengler, 'Leben' became the prime notion by which he attacked the modern, rational and positivistic view of the world. Inspired by this philosophy of life, he believed that the irrational forces of life were the only means through which one could penetrate the world, its history, and its underlying truths. However, in order to achieve such a result, Spengler needed a method which allowed him to comprehend the hidden meanings of the world through the use of these irrational forces. It was Goethe who showed him the way.

According to Spengler, Goethe was capable of achieving an inward certainty of the world around him; a certainty that reveals itself only to an eye perfectly free from prepossessions. Such an eye was Goethe's.²⁹ For Goethe, the world-as-mechanism stood opposed to the world-as-organism, dead nature to living nature, Gesetz (Form) to Gestalt (Law). 'Sympathy, observation, comparison, immediate and inward certainty, intellectual flair - these were the means whereby he was enabled to approach the secrets of the phenomenal world in motion.' In the eyes of Spengler, these were the true 'means of historical research, precisely these and no others'. Seen from this angle, Spengler wrote, history offers possibilities far beyond the ambitions of all previous research. It is no longer understood in terms of causality, it is no longer occupied with the mere arranging of facts from the past so far as these were known. Instead, by following Goethe, Spengler believed that he was capable of transcending the boundaries of the present in order to reconstruct long-vanished and unknown epochs, even whole cultures of the past, by means of morphological connections.³¹ In this way one could seize the absolute image of history as it exists outside the human consciousness. The true historian, Spengler argues, must therefore be like the artist: with his inner eyes he must penetrate the world of becoming; a world that can only be experienced by living, and can only be felt with a deep wordless understanding.32

Two Ways to Grasp the World

In the eyes of Spengler, there were thus two ways to understand and give meaning to the world. The first way is the immediate apprehension of things in their entirety and intertwinement; the comprehension of the nature and form of things; the perceiving of things in their time, in their eternal movement and in their tragic fate. It is the same way by which primeval man,

the child, and the artist grasp the world. Spengler calls this the *Physiognomic* morphology of the world. The second, *Systematic*, way to apprehend the world is represented by the civilized, matured culture: looking at things independently; analyzing, measuring, calculating, systemizing, and resolving all of its secrets by means of causality. Unto of these two worldviews Spengler derived the distinction between *Dasein* and *Wachsein*; between the emotional (unconscious) and the rational (conscious) side of man. *Dasein* stands for life as an *Erlebnis*, as an irrational experience outside conscious control. *Wachsein* additionally, reflects the human consciousness, the ability to think and to capture the world in terms of cause-and-effect. Spengler favored the active man, who intuitively acts upon his instincts without any form of self-reflection: 'the active man is a complete human'.

In the modernizing world in which he lived, Spengler felt that people were trapped in the realm of Wachsein and that they had lost the direct contact with the underlying meaning of things. The systematic, causal way to view the world had forced itself and its methods on the people living in modern European society. The subject had been removed too far from the object. Causality, according to Spengler, leads to destruction, for it requires one to distinguish and to dissect. He who comprehends the world not physiognomically but systematically, by the methods of causal experience, 'must necessarily in the end come to believe that every living thing can be understood by reference to cause and effect – that there is no inner secret and no inner directedness.³⁶ He, on the other hand, who like Goethe, 'lets the impressions of the world about him work merely upon his senses, absorbs these impressions as a whole, feels the become in its becoming; the stiff mask of causality is lifted by mere ceasing to think. 37 Spengler's approach to the reality of the world and its history is one that is direct, emotional and wordless. It lies outside the domain of language, because: 'Language itself is a causal structure. It mechanizes while it explains'. 38 Language and experience, in this way, are each other's mortal enemies. Direct experience exists only where there is no language, and it works the same the other way around; language is there when there is no experience. Or, as Frank Ankersmit has put it in his Sublime Historical Experience, 'language is the shield protecting us against the terrors of a direct contact with the world as conveyed by experience.³⁹

By focusing on the immediate understanding of history through the direct experience of the past, Spengler's method comes close to Nietzsche's

notion of Rausch and Huizinga's Historical Sensation. Nietzsche's Rausch is best described as a moment of enrapture and of being carried away by the intensity of experience: 'The determinations of space and time have changed; immense distances are grasped within one single overview and become only now perceivable.40 This feeling of Rausch is also present in Johan Huizinga's conception of the historical sensation; a direct contact with the past, 'accompanied by the absolute conviction of complete authenticity and truth, which can be provoked by either a line from a chronicle, by an engraving, or a few sounds from an old song. Huizinga speaks of an ekstasis, 'an experience of truth that is given to the human being.'41 This description of the historical sensation bears some similarities with Spengler's notion of Schicksal: 'Schiksal is the word for an inner certainty that is not describable,' it 'can be imparted only by the artist through a portrait, a tragedy, and music'. 42 Both Schicksal and the historical sensation are based on the conception that there is an inner knowing of the past that can be triggered by an object in the present.

It is interesting to see that both Huizinga and Spengler, almost at the same time, tried to develop an approach to history that expresses the most intimate and direct experience one can have with reality. The main difference being that Huizinga's sensation allowed him to understand and experience a certain period of history, whereas Spengler sought to comprehend history as a whole. Spengler's morphological method was based on the idea that all great creations and forms in religion, politics, social life, economy and science appear, fulfill themselves, and die down contemporaneously in all the cultures throughout the past. The inner structure of one culture corresponds with that of all the others. 43 Every culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man; each has its childhood, youth, manhood and old age. A culture is born when a great soul awakens out of the 'urseelenhaften Zustande' of childish humanity. It then detaches itself, and blooms on the soil of a landscape to which it remains bound, like a plant. The culture dies when this soul has actualized the full sum of its possibilities in the shape of its peoples, languages, arts, and sciences. Then, it reverts into the protosoul. The culture suddenly hardens; it mortifies, breaks down and becomes Civilization: 'This is the purport of all declines in history'.44

Madness or Genius?

'By wanting to decipher history by means of the mystic, Spengler has created

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a historical world of thought that is absurd.' With these words Huizinga concludes his treatment of Der Untergang des Abendlandes. 'Spengler has failed, he argues, 'because he wanted to connect two worlds of thought that could only have been bridged by a rainbow.'45 Huizinga's words seem rather harsh. True, the meta-historical conclusion reached by Spengler in the first volume of his magnum opus - the idea that all cultures evolve like organisms – appears to hold little value. However, Spengler's effort to fill the gap that was left after the rational, positivistic approach towards the study of history had been discarded should not be undervalued. Spengler was by no means the first historian who showed that the positivist, causal explanatory models taken from the natural sciences did not suit the historical sciences at all. Historians such as Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert and Simmel had already set out the contradictions between the Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften. They showed that in history, causal explanations are of less importance and value than in the natural sciences. 46 Against the supremacy of the rational, positivist worldview, many philosophers offered a more emotional experience of the world. With notions such as 'Lebensgefühl', 'Einfühlung', 'intuition', 'Erlebnis', and 'Anschauung', these philosophers of history sought to comprehend reality in a more direct and intense manner.⁴⁷ Spengler elaborated on this idea. He replaced the understanding of reality through causality with an understanding through Schicksal. And by doing so, he opened up the historical world of thought to an unconscious experiencing of reality. Just like Huizinga, he sought to resolve the separation of subject and object; of the observer in the present and the observed past. In a time when long trusted truths and values ceased to hold, Spengler offered his readers a new approach to connect with the world around them. Perhaps this is the reason why Der Untergang des Abendlandes was such a success.

Conclusion

Oswald Spengler sought to understand the world and its history through the subjective intuitions of man, which were inherited from his primitive ancestors. It became the founding principle of his magnum opus. He longed for a direct understanding of history free from rational patterns of cause and effect. But in doing so, he subjugated his beloved history in an explanatory model. He erased its randomness, and created rational patterns in order to enable himself to predict the future of history. As a way of *enantiodramia*, Spengler became his own best enemy. His passionate superabundance of

the irrational side of the past, ultimately led to its opposite; a mechanized comprehension of history, controlled by an external force and therefore overloaded with inertia. Spengler failed to cut himself loose from his *Angst*; he did not succeed in burning all notions of the rational world in the wakefulness of *Dasein*. By pursuing the direct experience of life in himself and in the past, he created a historical system that lies outside the range of life. That is the tragedy of Oswald Spengler.

Noten

1. R. Musil, *De man zonder eigenschappen* [1930-1943], vert. I. Lesener (Uitgeverij Areopagus, 2002), 326.

- 2. J. Huizinga, "Twee worstelaars met den engel (bespreking van Oswald Spengler's 'Der Untergang des Abendlandes' en H. G. Wells' 'The Outline of History')" [1921], in: J. Huizinga, *Verzamelde werken IV: Cultuurgeschiedenis II*, ed. L. Brummel et al. (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., 1949), 447.
- J. Huizinga, "Brief aan Menno ter Braak" [Leiden: March 12, 1935]: http://www.mennoterbraak.nl/tekst/braa002brie25_01/braa002brie25_01_0005.php (consulted on 7-2-2015).
- 4. Huizinga, "Twee worstelaars met den engel", 443.
- 5. M. ter Braak, "Oswald Spengler spreekt" [1935], in: M. ter Braak, *Verzameld werk. Deel 4*, ed. M. Crevel, H. A. Gomperts and G. H. 's Gravesande (Amsterdam: G. A. van Oorschot, 1951), 565-567.
- F. Meinecke, "Über Spenglers Geschichtsbetrachtung," in F. Meinecke, Zur Theorie und Philosophie der Geschichte, ed. E. Kessel (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler Verlag, 1959), 194.
- 7. F. W. Lantink, Oswald Spengler oder die 'zweite Romantik': Der Untergang des Abendlandes, ein intellektueler Roman zwischen Geschichte, Literatur und Politik (Haarlem: MultiPrint, 1995), 15.
- 8. F. Boterman, Oswald Spengler en Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Cultuurpessimist en politiek activist (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1992), 76.
- 9. K. P. Fischer, *History and Prophecy: Oswald Spengler and the Decline of the West* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1989), 2.
- F. Boterman, "Kultur versus Civilisation: Oswald Spengler en Nietzsche," in: In de ban van Nietzsche, ed. H. Ester and M. Evers (Bedel: Uitgeverij DAMON, 2003), 166.
- 11. Fischer, 24.
- 12. Idem, 33-35.
- 13. 'Wenn ich mein Leben betrachte, ist es ein Gefühl, das alles, alles beherrscht hat: Angst. Angst vor der Zukunft, Angst vor Verwandten, Angst vor Menschen, vorm Schlaf, vor Behörden, vor Gewitter, vor Krieg, Angst, Angst'; O. Spengler, cited in

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- A. M. Koktanek, Oswald Spengler in seiner Zeit (München: Beck, 1968), 13.
- 14. Idem, 15.
- 15. Fischer, 40.
- 16. 'Ich beneide jeden, der lebt [...] wo mir die Möglichkeit nahetrat, wirklich zu leben, da zog ich mich zurück'; Spengler, cited in Koktanek, 1.
- 17. M. Warnock, Existentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 56-57.
- 18. C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* [1933], trans. W. S. Dell and C. F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovich, 1933), 17-18.
- 'Es ist nicht Glück, das mir gefehlt hat; ich ware für jedes große Unglück dankbar, das mich getroffen hätte, wenn es nur Leben gewesen wäre'; Spengler, cited in Koktanek,
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- 20. Fischer, 38.
- 21. 'Ich selbst bin durch meine Nervenschwäche nicht vor der innere Pflicht gestellt, als Freiwilliger mitzugehen. Aber ich beneide die Leute, die das können und deshalb den Krieg erleben' uit: O. Spengler, "Brief an Hans Klöres (München, 25.10.1914)," in: Oswald Spengler. Briefe 1913-1936, ed. M. Schröter and A. M. Koktanek (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1963), 31.
- 22. P. Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life: On Anthropotechnics [2009], trans. W. Hoban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 164.
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- 24. Fischer, 37-8.
- 25. Idem, 122.
- O. Spengler, The Decline of the West vol. 1: Form and Actuality [1918], trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), XIV.
- 27. 'Wir glauben nicht mehr an die Macht der Vernunft über das Leben. Wir fühlen, daβ das Leben die Vernunft beherrscht': Spengler, cited in Boterman, 'Kultur versus Zivilisation', 166.
- 28. Boterman, "Kultur versus Zivilization", 168.
- O. Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. Erster Band: Gestalt und Wirklichkeit [1918] (München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1920), 35.
- 30. 'Nachfühlen, Anschauen, Vergleichen, die unmittelbare Gewißheit, die exakte sinnliche Phantasie das waren seine Mittel, den Geheimnissen der bewegten Erscheinung nahe zu kommen. Das sind die Mittel der Geschichtsforschung überhaupt. Es gibt keine andern'; Ibidem.
- 31. Idem, 163.
- 32. Idem, 81.
- 33. Idem, 144-145.
- 34. Huizinga, "Twee worstelaars met den engel", 446.
- 35. 'Der Tätige ist ein ganzer Mensch'; Spengler cited in: Boterman, Oswald Spengler, 79-81.
- 36. '[...] wird mit Notwendigkeit die ganze Summe des Daseins aus der Perspektive von

- *Ursache und Wirkung übersehen, ohne inneres Gerichtetsein, ohne Geheimnis*' uit: Spengler, *UdA*, 166.
- 37. '[...] in gewissen Augenblicken seines Daseins, die Umwelt als ein Lebendiges anschaut, das Gewordene als Werden nachfühlt, die Weltmaske der Kausalität lüftet, für den ist die Zeit plötzlich kein Rätsel mehr': Ibidem.
- 38. 'Die Sprache selbst is von kausaler Struktur. Sie mechanisiert, indem sie erklärt'; Idem, 165-166.
- 39. F. R. Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 7.
- 40. F. Nietzsche, cited and translated by Ankersmit, 121.
- 41. J. Huizinga, "De taak der cultuurgeschiedenis", in J. Huizinga, *Verzamelde werken VII: Geschiedwetenschap, hedendaagse cultuur*, ed. L. Brummel et al. (Haarlem: H. D. Tjeek Willink & Zoon N. V., 1950), 71-72.
- 42. 'Schicksal ist das Wort für eine nicht zu beschreibende innere Gewiβheit. [...] Man teilt die Idee eines Schicksals nur als Künstler mit, durch ein Porträt, durch eine Tragödie, durch Musik' uit: Spengler, UdA, 164.
- 43. Idem, 162.
- 44. 'Dies ist der Sinn aller Untergänge in der Geschichte' uit: Idem, 153-154.
- 45. Huizinga, "Twee worstelaars met den engel", 469.
- 46. Idem, 459.
- 47. Boterman, Oswald Spengler, 69.