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On the Dangers of Ignoring Apocalyptic Icebergs, Y1K and Y2K

Conventional historians tend to ignore apocalyptic millennial movements as historical forces, by dismissing any significance of evidence for apocalyptic beliefs in the sources. They thus minimize both the presence of apocalyptic movements, and, perhaps more significantly, the apocalyptic *dimension* of other movements whose historical importance they openly acknowledge. Critiquing the techniques that medieval historians have used for dismissing the notion of an “apocalyptic year 1000,” we can perhaps better assess the evidence when we turn our attention to contemporary apocalyptic movements. Since the early twenty-first 21st century has seen the growth of at least two powerful, empirically-based apocalyptic phenomena, global warming, and global Jihad,¹ it may be appropriate to start paying attention identifying and assessing evidence of activity inspired by apocalyptic beliefs. In examining the evidence for the year 1000, I focus on an unusual form of “active transformational” (non-violent) apocalyptic millennialism, the “Peace of God” or *Pax Dei* in France; for the contemporary situation, I focus on global Jihad, an active and often violent endeavor to spread Dar al Islam to the entire world. Since “active cataclysmic” apocalyptic movements (i.e., “destroying the world to save it”) constitute the most dangerous of all apocalyptic beliefs, underestimating its potential could have tragic consequences.

Apocalyptic and Millennialism: Two different aspects of the same belief system

Those unfamiliar with the phenomenon of apocalyptic expectations often confuse the advent of the year AD 1000, or 2000 CE, with millennialism. The term millennialism actually refers to a period of collective salvation *in history*; in the most famous (and possibly most influential) case, Christian millennialism based on the Book of Revelation, a thousand years long, hence the name. But the messianic period can be longer or shorter, and the even thousand years can “begin” at any time. The advent of chronological millennial milestones (1000, 2000, 6000) or other “big date” (1260, 1500, 1840, 2012) can work as an *apocalyptic* trigger that inspires an *imminent expectation* of a final cosmic culmination to human history. In turn, that apocalyptic expectation might be either of “heaven on earth” (*millennium*), or of the end of the world in its entirety (*eschaton*).² The following study will look at apocalyptic issues surrounding the turn of both the first Christian millennium (1000) in Western Europe, and the second, global millennium in (2000).

Apocalyptic believers see themselves at the center of the culminating moment in world (salvation) history. Many anticipate scenarios marked by vast paroxysms of destruction (“cataclysmic apocalyptic”). Most of these believers attribute the central role in bringing about the destruction to God (through *revelation*) or nature (comets). In other words, these believers are *passive* observers/survivors. A smaller but more dangerous group believe that they themselves are the agents of this destruction (*active*), an option made more plausible by the development of nuclear weapons. The most dangerous believers in human history are *active cataclysmic* zealots who believe they must “destroy the world to save it.”³ Especially when they gain power, they have proven capable of committing mega-death on a scale of tens of millions!⁴ One can understand why, historically, the guardians of order tried, often ruthlessly, to “nip” these movements in the bud.

Such apocalyptic movements prove difficult for historians to both detect and analyze. Since the participants in such movements have until now *always* proven wrong, often rapidly disappointed, few movements retain the beliefs that launched them once they return of “normal time.” From “sect” to “church” involves cleaning up the apocalyptic past. This “rewriting” history means that our documentation underplays the historical role of these mistaken beliefs. Later historians and observers tend to compound the problem. We know even better than the people in the past, how utterly

wrong predictions of apocalypse and millennium have proven, and that retrospective knowledge shapes our own dismissive attitude towards those foolish enough to have believed, or now to believe, in such silly things.

And yet, this double layer of contemporary and historical anti-“apocalyptic” prejudice can lead to significant misreadings of the record. For well over a century, modern historians have held that after Augustine’s condemnation of millennial beliefs in the early fifth century, they disappeared from Latin Christendom for the next eight centuries, until Joachim of Fiore in the twelfth century. And indeed, the written medium – where Augustine’s influence was greatest, and on which we historians depend for our information – was so hostile during these long centuries, that historians treat the scattered explicit mentions of apocalyptic and millennial beliefs as so much flotsam and jetsam of a ship that Augustine sank back in Late Antiquity. They thus tell a tale in which apocalyptic and millennial beliefs played no role in Western history during those centuries, in which, for example, the imperial coronation of Charlemagne took place on Christmas 801, rather than 6000 *Annus Mundi*; and the year 1000 was a year like any other, since “almost no one at the time even knew it was 1000.”⁵

In actuality, there were (and are) two distinct discourses where such beliefs are concerned: an *apocalyptic* one – *roosters* crowing about the dawning of “The Day” – and an *anti-apocalyptic* one – *owls* hooting that the night is still long and that the roosters endanger those they prematurely awaken. Owls fear and despise roosters, and they never forget the humiliation of apocalyptic moments when the roosters took over. Owls also dominate the public sphere (and the surviving written record) most of the time, and the documents reflect their predispositions.⁶

Thus, historians who treat the few cases where texts mention millennial stirrings as “transparent” on a reality where such stirrings are few, replicate the skew of the documentation in its hostile relationship to a spoken (oral) reality. More likely, these rare cases that make it into a hostile medium represent reluctant admissions of the presence of roosters these authors should and most often do not acknowledge. These literary traces represent, therefore, so many tips of icebergs of a much larger *oral apocalyptic discourse*, animatedly acted out “beneath” the surface of our texts.⁷ These two opposed ways of reading the historical record have significant implications, and, in the present and going forward, our ability to deal with such potentially fruitful, but also volatile movements.

One of the more striking links between 1000 and 2000 as apocalyptic dates lies not in any historical similarities, but in historiographical ones. In both cases, the exegetical elites, the information professionals who inform the larger public, have opted for a dismissive discourse that may misread the apocalyptic record dramatically. It produces the “no apocalyptic year 1000,” even as historians debate the nature of a profound cultural “mutation” right around that time, a transformation that set Western Europe on its Promethean path through the next millennium.⁸ And it produces a discourse of denial about apocalyptic millennial activity at the passage of 2000, even as perhaps largest *active cataclysmic* apocalyptic movement in global history takes shape before our unseeing eyes. It is one thing to have one’s reconstruction of a past period sink on the sharp edges of an unseen millennial activity that lay below the texts – who can contradict? It is quite another when one sails contemporary society through such laden waters.

Arguing against the Christian apocalypse (Y1K)

By 1900, a dismissive school of medievalists had determined that the advent and passage of the year 1000 had no apocalyptic significance. The *desire* to so conclude seems to have, in many cases, driven them to minimize the evidence in a wide range of approaches. Below, I list briefly some of the ways these historians (mis)handled and interpret their evidence.⁹

- **Take silence to mean indifference:** Argue that if those who produced the texts don’t talk about apocalyptic (much), then they (and everyone else) must not have been interested in it. Any suggestion that a discourse might have been suppressed elicits cries of “conspiracy theory.”¹⁰
- **Conceal anomalies:** Having insisted there is no evidence of awareness of 1000, they suppress contradictory evidence. Louis Halphen’s edition of the *Annales andegavensis* put the highlighted entry: “1000 years since the birth of Christ”, in the footnotes as an error, rather than in the text.¹¹ And Ferdinand Lot declared the most vivid and extensive text on the millennium of the Passion (1033), a forgery that only existed on the moon when it was in the Paris Bibliothèque nationale.¹²
- **Protect people from the “disgrace” of apocalyptic belief:** Some get indignant over the “insult to the men of that age to suggest they believed it was the end

of the world.”¹³ Others concede that the peace assemblies might have had a millennial dimension, but not the bishops who assembled them. Indeed, noted Focillon, “the builders of the West [were] only slightly affected by the errors of the masses...”¹⁴

- ***Cognitive egocentrism and projecting our own mentality:*** Translate into familiar terms the behavior of people who lived then, projecting our mindset on them (*cognitive egocentrism*); assume that they were Augustinians like us, and did not “read” their present apocalyptically: Glaber could not have meant what he wrote, since it violated Augustine’s injunctions.¹⁵ If Christians had believed the end was near, “why bother going to missionize [sic!]?”¹⁶
- ***Splitting off and containing the apocalyptic, false dichotomies:*** Find differences and reify them as “profound,” thus splitting off problematic apocalyptic material from other contemporary phenomena: neither heretics nor apostolics have *anything* to do with apocalyptic.¹⁷ Set up false dichotomies, when the choices are not mutually exclusive: court intrigues, *not* religious controversies, led to the first burning of heretics in 1022.¹⁸ “Year 1000: Fear of the End of the World or Deepening of the Faith?”¹⁹
- ***Ridicule and marginalization of dissident voices:*** Heap contempt on both the roosters, and on historians who pay attention to them: Bauthier, “Glaber the gyrovague, psychotic”; Lot: “Michelet’s rantings... arouse in us nothing but disgust...”. Exclude as much as possible dissenting opinion; dismiss arguments about a consensus of silence as conspiracy theory.²⁰

In fact, priests in every church (virtually all) that used Bedan Easter Tables knew what year it was AD, and at least a dozen contemporaries explicitly noted the advent or passage of a thousand years since the life of Christ, some explicitly in an apocalyptic framework. On the contrary, as some historians have more recently argued, Christian inhabitants of Europe believed that an omniscient and omnipotent God was about to appear – at millennium-long-last – and afflict humankind with the cataclysmic punishments, and, reward the good either in heaven (eschatology) or on earth (millennialism).²¹ Comets, outbreaks of “holy fire,” earthquake, or even rumor of visions in the sky, spread passive cataclysmic expectations throughout the population, consistently provoking vast collective gatherings of penitence.²²

This penitential tendency fed a strong current of pilgrimage in Western Europe, some “local” (e.g., Sainte Foi de Conques), some international (the Road to Compostella begins to take shape at this time), while some led to collective waves of pilgrims making their way to Jerusalem, especially massive at the millennium of the Passion (1033, 1064, and 1096).²³ These apocalyptic pilgrims wanted to be in Jerusalem to witness the rapture of the saints and the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem. And the world and life they left behind, they imagined it would become a devastated land of smoke and ashes and mega-death, an image with which we still contend to this day.

In some cases, however, we find *active cataclysmic* variants, when the visions of destruction that accompany the “victory of the saints,” the conspiracies of evil followers of Antichrist, the orgies of violence at Armageddon, boil over into murderous campaigns of coercive purity against “the apocalyptic other.” So when, for example, in 1009, the Caliph of Cairo, himself a messianic figure (and hence to his enemies an “Antichrist”), destroyed the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, Western passive mutated into active cataclysmic apocalyptic. The rumor that the Jews had encouraged Al Hakim to destroy “the Temple” spread far and wide, leading to the first European exterminationist attacks on Jewish communities.²⁴ In short order the first persecution of Christian “heretics” began in earnest.²⁵

But the most novel and unusually widespread apocalyptic development in this period was the emergence of an *active transformative* movement, “the first mass religious movement of the Middle Ages,” according to Erdmann, in fact the first mass “peace movement” in recorded history. Here zealots believed that by atoning, forgiving, and embracing one’s fellow man, one entered into a covenant of peace with God, and create a “Peace of God” on earth.²⁶ This movement gained such traction that, at the millennium of the Passion, even as waves of pilgrims hit the road to Jerusalem, so did many bishops urge their faithful to hold peace assemblies: oaths were exchanged, an end to private justice (homicide) declared, and all the people, gathered by the hundreds and thousands in large open fields to which the relics had been brought, rejoiced and raised their palms skyward and shouted, “Peace, peace, peace!”²⁷

These kinds of events did not occur often (or ever before). The world of lords and peasants that prevailed in Carolingian Europe violently discouraged peasants from taking *any* initiatives, certainly any that infringed on their prerogatives.²⁸ Peasants rarely revolted; those who defended themselves got slaughtered, and peaceful protesters got their hands and

feet cut off.²⁹ Most commoners lived lives tethered to the soil they tilled, to the communities in which they lived, and at the mercy of the lords against whose swords they had no defense. In such a world, few if any, pick up and leave – either for a permanent pilgrimage to distant shores, or to massive peace assemblies, where lords swore oaths renouncing their “license to kill.”³⁰ Only a vast millennial wave could inspire such mass, insubordinate behavior, not only by the popular classes, but joined by members of both the scribal and the fighting elites.³¹

According to the most articulate witness to this peace movement, Radulfus Glaber, the world went from four terrible years of famine in which even the aristocracy starved, to pivoting in the millennium of the Passion (1033), into a peaceful society so fruitful that everyone ate well year after year.³² But soon enough, the powerful violated their oaths and resumed their old rapacious ways. Matters rapidly returned to their “normal” patterns: war, vengeance, plunder.

While some historians dismiss the peace assemblies as ephemeral anomalies, and the “apocalyptic year 1000” as an invention of modern, “romantic” historians,³³ historians attentive to the impact of brief but powerful apocalyptic moments on the societies in which they occur, see this wave of enthusiasm as signaling a new direction for Western civilization, the beginning of a millennium-long period of brilliant and expansive development on every plane of European society.³⁴ Here, for the first time, we see the bottom-up ferment of Western culture, the strength and creativity of the *demos* which, despite the fear, hostility, and persecution it provoked among some elites, transformed the West from a self-impoverishing culture, subject to periodic invasion, into the most expansive, productive and creative society the world has ever known.³⁵

The peace movement may have failed to bring the millennium, but it set in motion the major developments of revolutions to come – the “papal” “reform” (really an ecclesiastical revolution), the rural and urban communes, the crusades, the apostolic life with its popular heresies and new religious orders, the pilgrimages with their spectacular architectural achievements, the agricultural and commercial revolutions, the wandering students and scholars and the universities they populated.³⁶ If one wants to understand the dynamics that explain where the West came from,³⁷ there is no better place to start than the apocalyptic mutation of the millennial generation, 1000-1033.³⁸

Muslim apocalyptic expectations at the second Christian millennium (2000)

At the advent of the year 2000, most eyes were on either Christian apocalyptic expectations (Rapture prophecies) or technology-induced ones (Y2K). Instead, the apocalyptic movement that gained the most momentum from the passage of the second Christian millennium, occurred in one of the least likely places, the Muslim world.³⁹ Most of the Islamic groups that participate in this apocalyptic millennial discourse are fired by a vision of the future in which the whole world either converts to Islam, accepts submission to Islam – *Dar al Islam*, which is the realm of submission –, or otherwise gets killed.⁴⁰ Some believe that this messianic turn will take place non-violently, through *Da'wa*, the “summons” to join the faith or submit. “We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through *Da'wa*,” declared the “moderate” Yussuf al Qaradawi.⁴¹ Others, however, believe that only through massive violence could this submission happen.⁴² I refer to those who strive (*jahada*) to realize this Muslim world conquest in our day, *regardless of how they think it will happen*, as “global Jihadis.”

This apocalyptic millennial fervor has been growing in Islam since the Muslim century mark in 1400 Annus Hegira (1979 CE), the year Khoumeini took power in Iran.⁴³ At the approach of 2000, however, a number of apocalyptic calculators, especially in proximity to the great apocalyptic enemy, Israel, began to predict the appearance of the Dajjal in 2000.⁴⁴ Given that this apocalyptic literature not only depicted ferociously cataclysmic scenarios, but in many cases, *active* ones where jihadis are the instrument of destruction, one would have thought such stirrings worthy of some scrutiny. And yet, until quite recently, the standard Western response has been to dismiss reports of a jihadi goal of global conquest as either absurd or paranoid.⁴⁵ And, indeed, in 1400/1979 global Jihadis constituted only a marginal phenomenon even in the Muslim world, where Muslim “owls”, both religious and “secular”, opposed it. *A fortiori* did Westerners mock the mere mention of Islamic desires for world conquest.

But all things large start out small, and apocalyptic Islam has grown significantly over the last generation. In 1409/1989, as Westerners celebrated the fall of the Soviet Union and the “end of [war-torn] history”, both Sun’ni and Shi’i global jihadis had what to brag about: Khoumeini’s extension of Sharia world-wide with his death fatwa against Salmon Rushdie for blasphemy, and Bin Laden’s chasing the Soviets out of Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Global

jihad gained another powerful boost world-wide at the turn of 2000, with the media success of the Al Aqsa Intifada, and the spectacular 9-11 attacks.

In assessing how far these radical beliefs have spread in the current Islamic world of approximately 1.5 billion, it may help to consider them as apocalyptic beliefs. The following analysis offers not a conclusion about the current state of Islam and Muslim beliefs in the world today: few know enough to even offer an opinion on so huge an issue, and the situation is under considerable flux. The following discussion then, does not seek to characterize “Islam”, nor even the state of “Islam” in various parts of the world today, nor “Muslims”, nor the thinking of Muslims around that same world. I seek here to explore a certain set of specifically Muslim apocalyptic beliefs about the “the Day” that involve the conviction that in *this* generation *Dar al Islam* will cover the entire globe. This discussion, then, is less about the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, than about the difference between roosters and owls, whether they are Muslims or not.

Above all *owls* have difficulty imagining the *rooster’s* sense of time and sacred history. For them, the convulsions of globalization, especially painful for the Muslim world, mark the final sign(s) and tribulations before Islam’s ultimate victory. For them, the fifteenth century, or the year 2000, marks the onset of this long-awaited and earth-shattering event, now happening “in our day”, the global victory of Islam. To them, Westerners, with all their dazzling, global technology, are the Messiah’s donkey, the vehicle for (their version of) Islam’s global triumph.

Owls also have difficulty appreciating the “fit” between apocalyptic beliefs and communications revolutions. Were we to have a collection of all the first “flyers” and broadsheets, the ephemera, of the first century of printing, I suspect most historians, familiar with the contents of *incunabula*, would be surprised by the prominence of apocalyptic beliefs in those now lost texts. Today, jihadis consistently demonstrate great talent and imagination in communicating apocalyptic memes on the world-wide web, a medium to which we Westerners, the target culture, have given life. If Rome because of its roads and widespread dominion was a *praeparatio evangelii* for Christianity, then to jihadis, the West, with its cyberspace and globalization, is the *praeparatio caliphatae*.

Perhaps the most disturbing and important aspect of looking at current Islamist activity from this angle, is that current Islamic apocalyptic imagination focuses with great intensity on active cataclysmic scenarios.⁴⁷

When modern-day Salafis (companions of the prophet) go back to be with Muhammad, they do not join a miracle-working messiah who turns the other cheek, but a warrior who punishes unbelievers.⁴⁸ The more apocalyptic among them, the roosters, become *mujahideen* (jihadis), while the slightly less apocalyptic await further signs and engage in *Da'wa*.⁴⁹ The potential for violence here is enormous. The issue is as difficult and contentious as it is important. The following offers an exegetical and methodological consideration of millennialism that may help us gain clarity.

Assessing the apocalyptic the scope of a millennial movement

One of the more striking characteristics of Western efforts to assess a resurgent Islam in the 21st century, is the pervasiveness of a dismissive rhetoric similar to the medievalists who presented the “vast” majority of Christians in 1000 as uninterested in apocalyptic themes. Thus Western specialists of Islam characterize the “vast majority” of Muslims as moderates, committed to peace (and even democracy), with only a “tiny fraction” of violent jihadis.⁵⁰ Below I offer a brief catalogue of the ways dominant voices in the secular public sphere have treated the evidence of apocalyptic activities in Islam around 2000.⁵¹ I hope the remarkable similarities between 1000 and 2000 serve to engage analytic minds.

Arguing against the Muslim apocalypse (Y2K)

One encounters an uncanny replication of these techniques and maneuvers when one considers how contemporary information professionals currently report the evidence of apocalyptic Islam. Despite the vast differences between the two periods and the two movements, the modern field replicates in many ways the efforts to marginalize and, when necessary, suppress evidence or awareness of apocalyptic beliefs. This time, however, we have access to the margins – the modern versions of the “mad heretic” Leutard are on the internet; indeed they have their own sites. Thus we can test the iceberg hypothesis that beneath the surface of formal (textual) discourse, where apocalyptic rarely (openly) appears, lies a mountain of apocalyptic conversation. Thus, in a way that we cannot “control” the information of historians of the year 1000, we can inquire about the reliability of the information professionals today.

Concealing anomalies

At the first outbreak of violent Jihad against the West in the 21st century – the “Al Aqsa Intifada”, New York Times senior reporter William Orme investigated Israeli claims that the Palestinians engaged in genocidal incitement. He gave only one concrete example:

Israelis cite as one egregious example a televised sermon that defended the killing of the two soldiers. “Whether Likud or Labor, Jews are Jews,” proclaimed Sheik Ahmad Abu Halabaya in a live broadcast from a Gaza City mosque the day after the killings.⁵²

Orme left out the continuation of the sermon:

They must be butchered and must be killed... It is forbidden to have mercy in your hearts for the Jews in any place and in any land. Make war on them any place that you find yourself. Any place that you meet them, kill them.⁵³

Some, perhaps aware of the role incitement played in the genocidal campaign against the Tutsis the previous decade, might consider this “news fit to print”. But Orme was not alone finding such matters “news *unfit* to print”. Like Halphen and Lot, journalists apparently feel they need to shelter their readers from certain evidence.

Thanks to the internet, however, we in the 21st century can check what lies below, at the margins, of the public discourse. And the internet evidence available in this case confirms the iceberg hypothesis. The genocidal sermon that Orme felt unfit for print, in actuality, represents just one example of a vast industry of hatred and incitement to genocide that characterizes the most aggressive forms of jihadi Islam the world over.⁵⁴ The long dormant but now widely popular apocalyptic *hadith* reads:

The Day will not come until the Muslims rise up and kill the Jews, and the Jews will hide behind trees and rocks and the rocks and trees will call out, “Oh Muslim, O Servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me, come kill him”.

As one journalist noted to me, “that’s not apocalyptic, *everyone* uses it”. But neither he nor most of his colleagues inform their readers of such matters.

Most recently, a Muslim woman butchered a teacher in Albi for “mistreating” her daughter in front of a class of five year olds. The press studiously avoided mentioning her name (Rachida), her Moroccan origins, and, obviously, that this murder occurred during Ramadan, insisting instead that she was a psychotic paranoid individual.⁵⁵ But her paranoia is not

individual; it reflects a strongly-rooted sub-culture about which the French public is fully misinformed by most of their information professionals.⁵⁶

Projecting secular principles onto profoundly religious believers

The modern Islamic version of Christian apostolic movements is Salafism: believers who want to live as did the first disciples. Unlike Christian apostolics, who returned to a period when Christianity held no power (equivalent to the first Meccan period in Islam), and when its teachings were radically pacifist (active-transformative/passive-cataclysmic apocalyptic), Salafis embrace a time when Muslims ruled and Muhammad led military jihads against infidels (active cataclysmic). While some Salafis may be peaceful under conditions of severe military inferiority, what happens when they, like Muhammad, find themselves in an improved military position? What prevents them from shifting from passive to active cataclysmic apocalyptic?⁵⁷

Instead of considering this issue, the Western cognitive ego-centrist readily imagines that “they” are like “us.” Jytte Klausen contrasts Salafis with jihadis: peaceful versus violent radical Islam. “The connection between Salafism and Jihadism – the ideology of Al Qaeda and aligned groups – is slim,” she asserts. “Many Salafis reject the political project... [and] focus on living righteous lives and observ[ing] the laws of the countries where they reside.” In her account, the bad, irredentist jihadis, exist “at the far end of the political spectrum”, and even radical Islamists accept the secular principle of separation of church and state.⁵⁸

Indeed a powerful “orthodoxy” has seized control of the public sphere, banning even the suggestion that Islam might have a violent, extremist side. President Obama’s Counter-terrorism advisor, John Brennan has denounced calling men like Bin Laden “jihadis”.

Nor do we describe our enemy as 'jihadists' or 'Islamists' because jihad is a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam, meaning to purify oneself or one's community, and there is nothing holy or legitimate or Islamic about murdering innocent men, women and children.⁵⁹

High-ranking administration officials, including the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, made similar remarks about the “moderation” and the “secular” nature of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring, remarks that were not merely diplomatic, but actually

informed foreign policy.⁶⁰

Ridicule and marginalizing dissenting voices

There are books and articles that treat the dangers of global jihad. Many are in the footnotes of this article. But they register on the Western political spectrum as the works of extremists, “right-wing”, “clash-of-civilization” war-mongers, and appropriately marginalized as alarmist and proto-fascist.⁶¹ Those warning of Muslim apocalyptic death cults do not give academic talks at MESA (Middle East Studies Association), do not participate in the dialogues and round tables that academic centers organize, do not get much exposure from the mainstream media. Indeed, the consensus that marginalizes dissenting voices on global jihad has so strong a grip, that many readers take it for granted: if the dominant discourse among academics considers this unworthy of attention, then we can probably safely ignore it.

And when the consensus gets challenged by someone speaking critically of Islam, they become the object of campaigns of exclusion, recently illustrated by Brandeis University’s revocation of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s honorary degree.⁶² With progressive figures consistently bowing to complaints from “Muslim rights” groups about Islamophobia, it becomes difficult to discuss the problem intelligently.⁶³ The readers for two university presses advised against publishing David Cook’s *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature* (2005), since they deemed its extensive documentation of Muslim hate speech as itself “hate speech.”⁶⁴ The concern of Western progressives about not insulting Muslims, the ferocity of their attacks on those who do criticize Islam, suggests how little confidence they have in the ability of even “moderate” Muslims to handle the most elementary criticism.

Splitting off and “containing” the apocalyptic phenomenon

When their attention is drawn to apocalyptic tropes and behavior, non-specialists have a tendency to split off the most extravagant elements – prophecies about armies of ETs hidden under the Bermuda Triangle, with tunnels to Jerusalem – from the more widespread, but perhaps not explicitly apocalyptic elements. Thus an observer can dismiss the apocalyptic phenomena that Cook brings to the reader’s attention, questioning whether anyone really “takes seriously these fantastic scenarios, [this] kind of comic

book apologetic”.⁶⁵ One might then be tempted to dismiss the phenomenon as a popular but insubstantial fad (“Chariots of Fire”).

But when one looks at the most worrisome, violent, triumphalist, tropes, they are popular among not only commoners but elites; and they have made the greatest inroads into the Muslim public sphere, especially since 2000. That, however, blinds us to the way global conspiracy theories, blood libels and genocidal preaching feed an active cataclysmic apocalyptic scenarios, and produce things like cults of suicide martyrs, or sadistic and murderous hostage taking. These tropes surfaced six months after the London 7-7 suicide attacks, at a demonstration protesting the “Muhammad Cartoons”. Signs promised Europe its own Holocaust, and Jihadi speakers promised to rape Danish women when they conquered that land. Police prevented observers from taking pictures of a man wearing a (presumably mock) suicide vest.

Cognitive egocentrism: On misreading the other side

The problem, from a millennial perspective, is that a word that means one thing to Westerners, may have a radically different meaning to jihadis.⁶⁶ After the suicide attacks in London on July 7, 2005, Steven Sackur of the BBC’s ‘Hardtalk’ found out just what “innocent civilian” means to a radical Muslim like British born Anjem Choudary:

Look, at the end of the day innocent people, when we say ‘innocent people’ we mean Muslims. As far as non-Muslims are concerned, they have not accepted Islam and as far as we are concerned that is a crime against God... if you are a Muslim then you’re innocent in the eyes of God. If you’re a non-Muslim then you’re guilty of not believing in God.⁶⁷

Thus, when a jihadi like Sheikh Omar Bakri condemns the killing of innocent civilians, he does not thereby condemn the killing of civilian infidels. The President of the US’s recent insistence that ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is “not Islamic... because no religion calls for the killing of innocent people,” illustrates well the dialogue of the deaf at work here.

How much of our dialogue operates in the framework of this kind of (un-exposed) projection of a Western take on matters? Jihad, “innocents”, ‘terrorism’, “peace”, “resistance”, “occupation”, “defensive” – all these terms that we use to understand our current situation may have radically different resonance in our ears from those of true believers. How much of a Muslim

radical's mind is inaccessible to a secular Westerner, in the same way that the rooster's mind is inaccessible to the owl?

Conclusion

These beliefs, however specific to a particular strain of Islamic discourse, also correspond closely with movements found the world over, and in a wide range of cultures, that are inspired by imminent expectations of the perfection of this world. It is not an effort to understand or characterize "Islam", but rather how these apocalyptic beliefs, and the millennial movements they inspire, have spread within Islam.

In 2011, one of the few close observers of Muslim apocalyptic on the global scene today noted:

The producers, distributors, and manipulators of this very widely read literature serve as trustees of an immense fund of symbolic capital that in recent times [i.e. before 1400/1979] has nonetheless only sparingly been put to use... [O]ne notes the mark left on Islamic history by revolutionary movements that more or less skillfully took advantage of a millenarian dynamic... An appeal to the imminence of the apocalypse would provide... an instrument of recruitment, a framework for interpreting future developments, and a way of refashioning and consolidating its own identity. In combination, these things could have far-reaching and deadly consequences.⁶⁸

These matters bear close attention.

It is one thing for medieval historians to dramatically misread 1000 (or, for that matter, the millennial coronation of Charlemagne in 6000 *Annus Mundi*).⁶⁹ Confident that any traces of apocalypticism in the textual record constitute mere flotsam and jetsam, medievalists can sail their ships of historiographical reconstruction into the hidden icebergs of apocalyptic discourse without noticing when they hit them, or when their reconstruction has begun to leak in earnest. As long as no contemporary can naysay them, as long as most historians agree, a strong academic consensus can emerge that takes a tendentious written record at face value. No one can *prove* that this narrative vessel sank on an unseen iceberg, that this picture of the past misses a key part of the story? For that matter, so what if we got the origins of our civilization wrong? The emperor's new clothes is, after

all, a children's story. Freedom of speech, of dissent, would presumably guarantee that academics would never fall prey to such a folly.⁷⁰

But if we make the same errors in appraising active-cataclysmic apocalyptic Islam at the dawn of the first global millennium, then we run serious risks. When our exegetical schemes hit an extant iceberg of violent apocalyptic discourse whose magnitude we dramatically underestimate, whole civilizations can sink.⁷¹ Would one not want to serve one's generation better than to be part of a particularly dangerous act of collective denial reminiscent of the Emperor's New Clothes? After all, Hans Christian Andersen does not tell us in the end whether, when people acknowledged that the emperor was naked, they laughed or they cried. In this case, there is no question what the response will be when the shingles fall from our eyes.

Would it not be a tragic irony if future historians wrote the history of the modern West in terms of two unnoticed millennial movements, one at its origins in Y1K and one at its demise in the wake of Y2K? Especially when some of the lessons of the turn of Y1K might help deal with the crises of the turn of Y2K.

Notes

1. For the sake of clarity, I use the term jihad, as defined by the *Encyclopedia of Islam*: "In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the jihad consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defense." This definition does not correspond to the range of apologetic definitions that have become popular in the West since 9-11: jihad as "inner spiritual struggle" or jihad as "purely defensive warfare." Part of the purpose of this article is to document the problematic nature of this widely accepted apologetic by Western scholars. See discussion in David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), chap. 1. I use "global Jihad" to refer to those contemporary Muslims who believe that *the time has now arrived* (i.e., apocalyptic expectations of imminence) when the entire world will become part of *Dar al Islam* (the realm of submission [to Allah], millennial goal). Those and who struggle (jihad) to assure that triumph, whether violently or not, I consider (and I believe they consider themselves) *mujahideen*, jihadi warriors.
2. All the terminology here is explicated at greater length in Landes, *Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience* (New York: Oxford, 2011).
3. Robert Jay Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New Global Terrorism* (New York: Henry Holt, 1999).

On the Dangers of Ignoring Apocalyptic Icebergs, Y1K and Y2K

4. Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chaps. 7 (Taiping, 20-35 million), 11 (Communism, 100+ million) and 12 (Nazism, 30-40 million). Estimates for deaths resulting from Soviet and Maoist efforts to complete the “revolution” range from 70 to over 100 million dead, Jean-Louis Panné et al., *The Black Book of Communism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
5. Landes, “Lest the Millennium be Fulfilled: Apocalyptic Expectations and the Pattern of Western Chronography, 100-800 CE,” *The Use and Abuse of Eschatology in the Middle Ages*, ed. W. Verbeke, D. Verhelst, and A. Welkenhuysen (Katholieke U., Leuven, 1988), 137-211; Landes, “The Historiographical Fear of an Apocalyptic Year 1000: Augustinian History Medieval and Modern,” *Speculum* 75 (2000), 98-106. See also, Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chap. 3.
6. Landes, *Heaven*, chap. 2.
7. Landes, *Heaven*, chap. 3.
8. R.I. Moore, *The First European Revolution: 970-1215* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); David Landes, *Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor* (New York: WW Norton, 1998).
9. All examples here are found with full references in Landes, “The Historiographical Fear of an Apocalyptic Year 1000.”
10. Sylvain Gouguenheim, *Les fausses terreurs de l’an mil: Peur de la fin du monde ou approfondissement de la foi?* (Paris, Picard, 2000).
11. Louis Halphen left the arresting notation for the year 968: “Mille anni a nativitate Christi” [1000 years since the birth of Christ] out of the text of the both the Annals of Saint Flor and of Vendome, and put that text in a footnote where he dismissed it as a mistake. Only the most diligent researcher would notice this entry, which directly contradicts the widespread assertion that contemporaries had not interest in the year 1000: Halphen, *Recueil d’annales angevines et vendomoises* (Paris, 1903), p. 58 n. 2; p. 116 n. 6).
12. Ferdinand Lot, dismisses the most striking claim of an apocalyptic year 1000 by Radulfus Glaber (*Historiarum*, 2.11) as a forgery, since “no manuscript on earth contains it,” even though the manuscript with that passage was available to Lot in Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 6190, fol. 31.
13. To suggest that a whole generation believed the end of the world was nigh would be “unjust, indeed an outrage to human dignity.” Plaine, “Les prétendues terreurs de l’an mille,” *Revue des questions historiques* 13 (1873): 164.
14. Anna Trumbore Jones, *Noble Lord, Good Shepherd: Episcopal Power and Piety in Aquitaine, 877-1050* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 99-103. Henri Focillon (considered a pro-apocalyptic year 1000 historian), *The Year 1000* (New York, Ungar, 1969), p. 71f.
15. Gouguenheim, *Les fausses terreurs*, 170.
16. Plaine (Prétendues terreurs,” p. 165), who as a man of the cloth should know better than most the central role of proselytizing in the apocalyptic scenario: either preach to everyone *so that* Jesus will return, or preach to everyone *before* Jesus returns.
17. R.I. Moore, “The Birth of Popular Heresy: A Millennial Phenomenon?” *The Journal of Religious History*, 24, 1 (2000): 8-25.

18. Robert-Henri Bautier, "L'hérésie d'Orléans et le mouvement intellectuel au début du XIe siècle," *Enseignement et vie intellectuelle, IXe-XVIe siècles: Actes du 95e Congrès des sociétés savantes* (Reims, 1970), Section philologique et historique (Paris, 1975), 1:63-88.
19. Subtitle of Goughenheim's book, *Les fausses terreurs*.
20. *Ibid*, p. 201.
21. *The Year 1000: Religious and Social Response to the Turning of the First Millennium*, ed. Michael Frassetto (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); *The Apocalyptic Year 1000: Studies in the Mutation of European Culture*, essays edited by R. Landes, Andrew Gow, and D. Van Meter (Oxford University Press, 2003).
22. For one of many examples, see the account of the response to signs and wonders seen in the heavens in the year 1000 in Roubaix (*Acta Sanctorum, Augustii VI*, col. 0587D); in the case of the *sacer ignis*, it led to one of the most "millennial" of Peace Assemblies in 994 in Limoges (Landes, *Relics, Apocalypse, and the Deceits of History: Ademar of Chabannes* [Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995], pp. 29-31). More generally, Landes, "Millenarismus absconditus: L'historiographie augustinienne et l'An Mil," *Le Moyen Age* 98:3-4 (1992): 355-77.
23. Landes, *Relics*, Part IV; Jay Rubenstein, *Armies of Heaven: The First Crusade and the Quest for Apocalypse* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 1-17.
24. Landes, "The Massacres of 1010: On the Origins of Popular Anti-Jewish Violence in Western Europe," in *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought*, ed. Jeremy Cohen (Wolfenbüttel: Wolfenbüttler Mittelalterlichen-Studien, 1996), 79-112.
25. Landes, "Birth of Popular Heresy"; R.I. Moore, *The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Authority and Deviance in Western Europe 950-1250* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).
26. Perhaps the best example of this attitude comes from those following the *vita apostolica*, in its orthodox forms represented by the great wave of monastic reform (e.g., Cluny), and in its heterodox, even heretical forms, represented by the sudden appearance of non- or anti-clerical communities, rapidly denounced by ecclesiastics as heresies, Richard Landes, "The Birth of Popular Heresy: A Millennial Phenomenon," *Journal of Religious History* 24 (2000): 26-43.
27. Landes, "Can the Church be Desperate, Warriors be Pacifist, and Commoners Ridiculously Optimistic? On the Historian's Imagination and the Peace of God" in *Center and Periphery: Studies on Power in the Medieval World in Honor of William Chester Jordan*, ed. Katherine L. Jansen, G. Geltner and Anne E. Lester (Leiden, 2013), pp. 79-92.
28. See Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 54-61, where he describes the ethos of the warrior aristocracy before the Peace Movement as "*plunder and distribute*."
29. The duke cut the hands and feet off of the emissaries of this peasant initiative. See most recently, Bernard Gowers, "996 and all that: the Norman peasants' revolt

- reconsidered,” *Early Medieval Europe*, 21:1 (2013): 71–98, especially p. 74.
30. Gerald of Aurillac, the first non-royal aristocratic saint was credited with saintly behavior for *allowing* his peasants to leave (rather than punishing the lord, his underling, for oppressing them), *Vita Geraldi prolixior*, I.24. According to a new study, this text was composed in the early 11th century by none other than Ademar of Chabannes: Matthew Kuefler, *The Making and Unmaking of a Saint: Hagiography and Memory in the Cult of Gerald of Aurillac* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). On the “license to kill,” see Warren C. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 69–96.
 31. On the phenomenon of *transformative* apocalyptic, see Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chap. 1; on the Peace of God as a transformative apocalyptic movement, see Landes, “Can the Church be Desperate?”. For a parallel some eight centuries later, see the “Night of August 4” 1789, during the French Revolution, Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, 253–55.
 32. Glaber, *Historiarum libri quinque*, ed. and trans. John France (Oxford, 1989), IV.5.15, p. 196.
 33. Dominique Barthélemy, *L’an mil et la paix de Dieu: La France chrétienne et féodale, 980–1060* (Paris: Picard, 1999); Gouguenheim, *Les fausses terreurs de l’an mil*.
 34. For example, Adriaan Bredero, *Christendom and Christianity in the Middle Ages* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 105–29; Jan Dhondt and Michel Rouche, *Le haut moyen âge* (Paris, Bordas, 1968), 253ff.
 35. Landes, “Economic Development and Demotic Religiosity: Reflections on the Eleventh-Century Takeoff,” *History in the Comic Mode: The New Medieval Cultural History*, ed. Rachel Fulton and Bruce Holsinger (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 101–16.
 36. See, for example, Harold Berman, *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Rachel Fulton, *From Judgment to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, 800–1200* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).
 37. Unfortunately, in the current post-modern scene, such questions are considered Eurocentric, and while I share reservations about some aspects of Western imperialism, it is worth noting that it was the West that produced the ideology of anti-imperialism, anti-slavery and democracy. See David Landes, *Wealth and Poverty of Nations*.
 38. On the “millennial generation” see Landes, *Relics, Apocalypse, and the Deceits of History*, part IV; and Fulton, *From Judgment to Passion*, chapter 2. On the implications for social and economic transformation, see Landes, “Economic Development and Demotic Religiosity.”
 39. The following discussion is based on the following works on the apocalyptic dimension of Islam in the current period: Timothy Furnish, *Holiest Wars: Islamic Mahdis, Their Jihads, and Osama bin Laden* (New York: Praeger, 2005); Laurent Murawiec, *The Mind of Jihad* (New York: Oxford, 2006); David Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008); Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chap. 14; Jean Pierre Filiu, *Apocalypse in*

- Islam* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011).
40. E.g., Raymond Ibrahim, *The Al Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway, 2007), p. 42.
 41. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Speech as Muslim Arab Youth Association, Toledo Ohio, 1995; <http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/167>. On Da'wa, a term most Westerners do not know, see David Bukay, "Islamic Da'wah for Dummies," *American Center for Democracy*, March 5, 2014; <http://acdemocracy.org/islamic-dawah-for-dummies/>. See also, McCarthy, *The Grand Jihad*, chap. 5. On Qaradawi's alleged "moderation", see Ana Belén Soage, "Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaradawi: A Moderate Voice from the Muslim World?," *Religion Compass* 4:9 (2010): 563–575.
 42. "I do not renounce my fight against the West which assassinated the prophet Muhammad [sic]. We Muslims should kill every last one of you," a Tunisian on trial in France for a bombing that killed thirteen people in 1985 told the court, Ali Fouad Salah, *Le Monde*, April 4, 1992; see also NYT: "Trial of Accused Mastermind In Bombings Begins in Paris," <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/01/30/world/trial-of-accused-mastermind-in-bombings-begins-in-paris.html>. Despite being a Sunni, Salah was inspired by the Shiite Khoumeini's success in Iran. Examples of the violent, active cataclysmic variant of world domination in Islam could be multiplied at will. See below.
 43. Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, pp. 445–450; Filiu, *Apocalyptic Islam*, pp. 69–79.
 44. Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic*, chap. 2.
 45. One NPR commentator dismissed anyone who did not realize Israel "was here to stay" (e.g., the entire membership of Hamas) as a bunch of two-digiters (i.e., IQ below 100). A fortiori, the Jihadi goal of destroying Western civilization seems madly unrealistic.
 46. On the range of mega-historical responses to the fall of the Soviet Union, cf. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History*, with Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*. On Khoumeini's *fatwa* against Rushdie in 1989 and its global consequences, including the Danish Cartoon affair in 2005, see Paul Marshall and Nina Shea, *Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes are Choking Freedom Worldwide* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 10. On Bin Laden's self-perception as the slayer of the Soviet Union, see his interviews in *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 450, 109.
 47. In our day, when jihadis have taken power (Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan, Gaza, Northern Nigeria, major parts of Syria and Iraq), contrary to the commonly held belief that once in power, terrorists grow tame, jihadis have not moderated. On the contrary, they not only continue their attacks on infidels, but enforce their domestic dominion with extensive recourse to violence against Muslim dissidents.
 48. While this observation seems somewhat self-evident, it may strike some readers as an invidious comparison between Christianity and Islam (assuming that pacifism is preferable to belligerence). One need merely compare the Christian notion of martyrdom during the first millennium of Christian history – allowing your persecutor to kill you to bear *witness* to your faith, versus the Muslim notion, already delineated in the Qur'an, of dying while killing as many of

- your enemy as possible. See e.g., Qur'an, 9:111; Cook, *Martyrdom in Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chap. 2; Asaf Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), chap. 4. For the first appearance of a Christian martyr surrounded by the bodies of his slain enemies, see *The Song of Roland* (ca. 1100): Landes, "Roland, Suicide Martyr," *The Augean Stables*, September 11, 2011: <http://www.theaugeanstables.com/2011/09/06/on-the-tenth-anniversary-of-9-11-roland-suicide-martyr/>.
49. Jules Kepel, "The Origins and Development of the Jihadist Movement: From Anti-Communism to Terrorism," *Asian Affairs*, 34:2 (July 2003): 91-108.
 50. Among the countless examples, Fawaz Gerges, "Understanding the Many Faces of Islamism and Jihadism," *Nieman Reports*, Summer 2007; <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/100207/Understanding-the-Many-Faces-of-Islamism-and-Jihadism.aspx>. This appears to be the official position of the current US administration (see below nn. 59, 66).
 51. Elsewhere I treat the more distressing tale of how some radical "progressives" have not only ignored this dimension of Muslim thought, but actually allied with the Jihadis: Landes, "Fatal Attraction: The shared antichrist of the Global Progressive Left and Jihad" in *The Case Against Academic Boycotts Of Israel*, ed. Cary Nelson and Gabriel Brahm (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2014), chap. 20.
 52. William Orme, "A Parallel Mideast Battle: Is It News or Incitement?" October 24, 2000; <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/24/world/a-parallel-mideast-battle-is-it-news-or-incitement.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
 53. PA TV, October 13, 2000; <http://www.pmw.org.il/tv%20part6.html>
 54. See both Palestinian Media Watch (www.palwatch.com) and MEMRI (www.memri.com) for extensive translations into Western languages of the pervasive paranoid and violent tropes that circulate in the Arab and Muslim mainstream media.
 55. "Albi: une enseignante poignardée à mort par la mère d'un élève," *Le Figaro*, 4 juillet, 2014; <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2014/07/04/97001-20140704FILWWW00112-albi-une-enseignante-poignardee-a-mort-par-la-mere-d-un-eleve.php>; Damien Gale, "Pupil's mother charged with murdering French schoolteacher who was stabbed to death in front of pupils aged five and six," *The Daily Mail*, July 7, 2014; <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2683005/Pupils-mother-charged-murdering-French-schoolteacher-stabbed-death-pupils-aged-five-six.html#ixzz3Htj0ZBPm>. Jihadis embrace Ramadan as "a month of holy war and death for Allah," Riu Kais, "Qaedat al-Jihad claims responsibility for Burgas attack," *Ynet*, July 21, 2012; <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4258440,00.html>. This inverted reading of the normally peaceful and reflective Ramadan, has spread and intensified in the 21st century (the French riots in 2005 started during Ramadan), see Soren Kern, "Ramadan Wrap-up 2013," *Gatestone*, August 8, 2013; <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3922/europe-ramadan>.
 56. « Mais son geste reste le produit d'un environnement social et culturel qui demeure

- une réalité. Chercher à l'occulter augure d'autres drames, » Ivan Rioufol, « Retour sur le meurtre de l'institutrice d'Albi », *Le Figaro*, July 7, 2014; <http://blog.lefigaro.fr/rioufol/2014/07/lassassinat-vendredi-matin-de.html>. The sub-culture in question has turned the deliberate murderer of Jewish school-girls into a culture hero on facebook and in rap (« France: le rappeur Booba fait "l'apologie de Mohamed Merah" », I24 News, March 9, 2014 ; <http://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/international/europe/140309-france-le-rappeur-booba-fait-l-apologie-de-mohamed-merah>); for more general reflections on this sub-culture, see Robert Menard, « Un mode de vie halal », *Boulevard Voltaire*, November 12, 2012 : <http://www.bvoltaire.fr/robertmenard/un-mode-de-vie-halal,3415>).
57. Reuven Paz, "Hotwiring the Apocalypse: Jihadi Salafi Attitude towards Hizballah and Iran," *PRISM*, 4:4 (2006); http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_4_vol_4_-_Hotwiring_the_apocalypse.pdf.
 58. Jytte Klausen, *The Cartoons that Shook the World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 84.
 59. John Brennan, "Speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies," May 26, 2010; http://csis.org/files/attachments/100526_csis-brennan.pdf. Since making these remarks, Brennan has become the head of the CIA. In a similar vein, see Carla Power, "Five Reasons Why Boko Haram is Un-Islamic," *Time Magazine*, May 15, 2014; <http://time.com/99929/boko-haram-is-un-islamic/>.
 60. John Rossomando, "Cables Show State Department Disregarded Muslim Brotherhood Threat," *IPT News*, January 8, 2013; <http://www.investigativeproject.org/3877/opposition-leader-obama-administration-downplayed>.
 61. Matt Carr called Bat Ye'or's *Eurabia* (2005), "ridiculous," and "the source of right-wing conspiracy theory": "You are now entering Eurabia." *Race & Class* 48:1 (2006): 1–22. The mainstream, even conservative Economist dismissed Eurabia as alarmist and anti-Muslim in a editorial: "Tales from Eurabia," *Economist*, June 22, 2006; <http://www.economist.com/node/7086222>; fished at *The Augean Stables*, <http://www.theaugestables.com/2006/06/25/whos-afraid-of-eurabia-fisking-the-economist/>.
 62. On the Ali affair, see Richard Pérez-Peña and Tanzina Vega, "Brandeis Cancels Plan to Give Honorary Degree to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Critic of Islam," *NYT*, April 8, 2014. For an example from Spain, see Soeren Kern, "Spain to Deport Pakistani Refugee for Criticizing Islam," *Gatestone Institute*, June 6, 2014; <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4344/imran-firasat-spain>.
 63. Marshall and Shea, *Silenced*.
 64. Communication from author.
 65. Daniel Martin Varisco, *Contemporary Islam*, 4 (2010): 353-355.
 66. On the Jihadi oxymoron "innocent infidel," see Daniel Pipes, "Can Infidels be Innocents?" *Lion's Den*, August 7, 2005; [ww.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/08/can-infidels-be-innocents](http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/08/can-infidels-be-innocents).
 67. BBC's *Hard Talk* with Steven Sackur, August 10, 2005; <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maHSOB2RFm4>.
 68. Filiu, *Apocalypse in Islam*, p. 198.

69. I.e., from the creation, according to the Septuagint count as developed by Eusebius. I recently gave a talk in Paris at a conference on “Charlemagne after Charlemagne,” and asked the audience of some 50 medievalists (Charlemagne experts) who among them knew that Charlemagne was crowned on the first day of the year 6000. Aside from people who knew my work, virtually no one had, twenty years after major articles in English, Spanish and German had been published on the subject. Not only did they not know about their own millennial past, but they had no clue to the active cataclysmic movement in their midst, which would rear its ugly head only a few weeks later on July 13, 2014 (see below, n. 71).
70. See Landes, *Heaven on Earth*, chap. 3.
71. On July 13, 2014, a crowd of Muslims, furious at the news reported of Israeli strikes in Gaza, went from shouting “Death to the Jews” in Place de la Bastille to attacking a synagogue filled with Jews on rue de la Roquette. Veronique Chemla, “Des « Blacks, Blancs, Beurs » antisémites attaquent les Juifs à Paris,” July 15, 2014; <http://www.veroniquechemla.info/2014/07/des-blacks-blancs-beurs-antisemites.html>. For a good example of media denial in which the Jewish defenders of the synagogue are blamed for provoking the otherwise peaceful crowd, see Jacques-Marie Bourget, “Affrontements rue de la Roquette : la vérité est toujours la première victime d’un conflit,” *Le Nouvel Observateur*, July 16, 2014; <http://leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/1224259-affrontements-rue-de-la-roquette-la-verite-est-toujours-la-premiere-victime-d-un-conflit.html>, written by the co-author of *J’ai chosé le Hamas* (Paris, 2009). On the violence this last summer, the denial of the French intelligentsia, and the long pedigree of that combination of violence and denial, see Robert Wistrich, “Summer in Paris,” *Mosaic*, October 2014; <http://mosaicmagazine.com/essay/2014/10/summer-in-paris/>. On the role of a misinforming Western press in strengthening Jihadis in the West, see Landes, “The Biggest Winner in the Lose-Lose ‘Operation Protective Edge,’” *The American Interest*, September 4, 2014; <http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/09/04/the-biggest-winner-in-the-lose-lose-operation-protective-edge/>.