All nation states, especially emergent ones, to various degrees strive to maintain a hegemonic narrative about the past that vindicates the status quo. From time to time, such narratives come under challenge from ‘revisionist’ historians. Liberal, secure polities can tolerate revisionist dissent. But insecure political systems can resort to censorship and even repression of historians. Nowhere was this more true than in the former Soviet Union. Under Stalin in particular, a draconian system of censorship coupled with lethal repression cowed historical thought and the profession, reducing historians to little more than court scribes.
All nation states seek to legitimate themselves by constructing a hegemonic narrative about the past; usually one that celebrates national achievements that vindicate the present order. But from time to time such narratives are challenged by ‘revisionist’ historians, resulting in a more or less continual contest between dominant and subaltern narratives. In liberal polities, such contests are tolerated, contained and even encouraged. But in fraught political circumstances, especially in developing, emerging, nation states with precarious political hegemony, historical revisionism can be censored and even repressed. Nowhere has a hegemonic historical narrative been as deliberately constructed and ruthlessly enforced as in the former Soviet Union, especially in the Stalin period (1930-1953). Censorship was at the heart of control of Soviet historical writing, although at the height of Stalinist terror (1937-1938), suppression of written history was extended to repression of historians. Fear of retribution, exile or even execution undoubtedly brought the infant Soviet historical profession to heel. In its wake, it created generations of historians who were reluctant to challenge the official Marxist-Leninist paradigm codified in Stalin’s 1938 ‘Short Course’ History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, well after his death in 1953. But it was not just fear that tamed the historians; self-censorship on the one hand and party-political loyalty on the other too played their part.

From censorship to surveillance

Stalin did not invent censorship. It is at least as old as the written word. Censorship, traditionally understood as state or institutional ‘control over the content and forms’ of information and the mechanisms for implementing it, in the Soviet era became ‘one of the practices of cultural regulation’ in which cultural producers were themselves embedded. The Tsarist autocracy was already well versed in the craft of censorship, which was honed in the course of the First World War. The Russian autocracy, like all other European combatant states, radically transformed military censorship, primarily of epistolary correspondence, into popular surveillance to keep abreast of and to mould wartime public opinion. The autocracy’s pervasive censorship foreshadowed Soviet surveillance to come.

Soviet censorship certainly preceded Stalin, and it outlived him. In the Soviet Union, the very fact of censorship itself was a state secret. ‘Glavlit’, the abbreviation for the Main Directorate for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literatury i izdatel’stv), was established on 6
June 1922, just as the Bolsheviks’ New Economic Policy was liberalizing economic relations. A half century on, censorship was relaxed considerably in the name of ‘glasnost’ (‘openness’) under the last Communist Party General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev. Glavlit itself was finally abolished after six decades in 1991 by decree of Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007). In short, institutionalised censorship on an unprecedented scale and scope died with the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union.

Five years before Glavlit came into being, and three days after the Bolshevik seizure of power, on 10 November 1917 the first Soviet decree allowing press censorship was issued. The outbreak of civil war in July 1918 saw the introduction of military and political censorship by the Revolutionary Military Committee (Revvoensovet), covering not only print media but also telephone and telegraphic communications. The end of the civil war in 1921, however, did not reduce censorship. Under a veritable state of siege from birth, internationally from hostile Western powers and domestically from desperate people and a struggling economy, the Bolsheviks transferred responsibility for political censorship from the Revvoensovet to the political police, the VChK (Emergency Commission) – forerunners of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and the KGB (Committee for State Security).

But it was Glavlit, under the aegis of the press department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party that became the pivotal instrument of censorship. Its rationale was explicitly political:

‘Comrades! At the present time the printed word acquires enormous significance, simultaneously a powerful influence on the mood of various groups of the populace in the Republic, both in our hands and in those of our opponents. The particular conditions of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia, the presence of significant groups of émigrés and the strengthening of the material resources of our opponents within the Republic due to the new economic policy [NEP], has created a favourable atmosphere for them to speak out against us in the press. Censorship is for us a weapon with which to resist the corrupting influence of bourgeois ideology.’

Censorship was not an objective of the Bolshevik program; rather it was justified as born of necessity to protect a vulnerable, fledgling revolution under siege materially and ideologically. Glavlit explicitly pursued a dual-track approach to censorship: firstly, an ‘administrative-legal’ approach, including fines, prosecuting or even closing hostile publishing houses;
secondly, a ‘skilful, ideological’ approach, entailing ‘pressure and influence’ on editors, including appointing ‘appropriate people and removal of the unacceptable’. Like the revolution, Glavlit’s reach was extensive. It aimed to have ‘meticulous surveillance’ over multifarious publishing houses, private or state, and ‘detailed information’ of their publishing programs, management, and their ‘connections with public and political groupings, both in Russia and abroad’.7

Pursuing policies of both pre-emptive and post-publication censorship that actually went beyond its formal remit, Glavlit from day one was at the heart of Soviet control of cultural and intellectual life.8 However, in the 1920s, Glavlit’s increasingly intrusive censorship sat uneasily with a vigorous cultural revolution, not least in literature and historical writing, leading to clashes with some of the more liberal Bolshevik leaders who, while espousing a class approach to knowledge and its production, repudiated the imposition of a party line in relation to literary and intellectual life. Prophetic warnings were expressed as early as 1920 by the famous People’s Commissar of Education (literally in Russian, ‘Commissar of Enlightenment’), Anatoly Lunacharsky (1875-1933), who constantly found himself at loggerheads with then Glavlit chief Pavel Lebedev-Poliansky (1882-1948). Lunacharsky warned of a ‘boorish police regime [derzhimorda] satisfied only with bullying, petty tyranny and giving orders...threatening to transform the strong proletarian state into a police despotism [arakcheevshchina].’9 The derzhimorda came to pass in the 1930s under Stalin and his successors.

‘Archive rats’

Stalin made a virtue out of what the Bolsheviks saw as necessity. And he took it to new heights, intent on eliminating ‘ambiguity’ and ‘heterodoxy’ among the intelligentsia;10 if need be, by eliminating heterodox intellectuals. Historians in particular, given their role in illuminating the Soviet past, were in Stalin’s sights as he embellished his role in the revolution to bolster his growing power. Already, in 1928-1929, after the defeat of Leon Trotsky’s (1879-1940) Left Opposition, the Institute of Party History (Istpart) and the Institute of History respectively were merged with the Lenin Institute and the Communist Academy. Joseph Stalin had already moved to expunge the names of oppositionist Bolsheviks from published documents, such as those of the Military-Revolutionary Committee that had led the armed insurrection in October 1917. Stalin’s re-writing of Soviet party history,
which would elevate him as the demiurge of the revolution and discredit his opponents, was underway.\textsuperscript{11} The relatively pluralist, golden age of cultural, academic, and intellectual life of the 1920s, dominated in the field of history by the Marxist ‘school’ of M. N. Pokrovsky (1868-1932), was in terminal decline. The consolidation of Stalin’s rule was accompanied by the resurrection of the pre-revolutionary, ‘national school’ of historians, who had depicted the autocracy as the driving force in Russian history, at the expense of Pokrovsky’s Marxists for whom social class was key.\textsuperscript{12}

Stalin’s drive to subordinate knowledge-producers to party and state, in which he was emerging as the \textit{deus ex machina}, was reflected in a new ‘charter’ for Glavlit adopted on 6 June 1931. This radically extended Glavlit’s reach, ‘further stretching the nature of censorship beyond its traditional definitions’.\textsuperscript{13} At the heart of it was the ‘\textit{perechen}’, a ‘state secret’ list of banned authors and publications.\textsuperscript{14} Censorship was reinforced by intimidation. In a menacing admonition that same year to the editorial board of the journal \textit{Proletarskaya revoliutsiya} (Proletarian Revolution), Stalin personally demanded that scholarship, history in particular, should be imbued with ‘\textit{partiinost}’ (party spirit); it should be nothing less than ‘party scholarship’.\textsuperscript{15} Compliance with Stalinist \textit{partiinost} went well beyond Lenin’s injunction that historians should adopt a class perspective; it meant that the communist party should be the sole guardian of historical truth; ‘deeds’, not documents unearthed by ‘archive rats’, should be the only test for communist party history in particular.\textsuperscript{16} Henceforth, scholarship had a purely instrumental function; anything else was simply ‘rotten liberalism’. Historians, in the military argot of Soviet social science, were reduced to mere conscripts on the ‘historical front’. They were required to maintain ‘class vigilance’ against ‘Trotskyites and all other falsifiers of the history of our Party.’\textsuperscript{17} Stalin had declared war on historical scholarship. The ensuing draconian tutelage stunted, distorted and scarred Soviet historiography and intellectual life overall for more than half a century.

Historians themselves were complicit in the degradation of their own profession. Meetings of historians held prior to the publication of Stalin’s letter endorsed the campaign against ‘rotten liberalism’. One of Pokrovsky’s leading students, A.M. Pankratova (1897-1957), sent him a copy of Stalin’s letter hailing \textit{partiinost}: ‘Now the entire historical community is being “straightened out”’\textsuperscript{18}. It certainly was. Stalin’s letter was but a prelude to the decimation of the Pokrovsky school (he himself died in 1932), the imposition of party sanctioned orthodoxy, and a ruthless \textit{auto-da-fé} and
terror that would engulf historians and the intelligentsia as a whole. Fear would bring those that survived to heel.

In the immediate aftermath of the furore, and in the wake of the 1931 show trials against so-called ‘White Guarders’ and ‘Wreckers’ (respectively, those who fought ‘The Reds’ in the 1918-1920 Civil War and those accused of ‘wrecking’ Soviet industrialisation), the Soviet historian S.A. Piontkovsky (1891-1937), soon to be executed in Stalin’s terror – unleashed in 1937 – noted in his diary that ‘dozens of university teachers were sacked and expelled from the Party’, even ‘attempting suicide and going mad’. It was an omen of the ‘symphony of madness and terror’ to come, in the words of communist party loyalist Yevgeniya Ginzburg (1904-1977), arrested by the NKVD in February 1937 and condemned to ten years imprisonment, having been accused of ‘collaborating with enemies of the people’. Her accuser was Yemelyan Yaroslavsky (1878-1943), Stalin’s rabidly anti-Trotskyist party historian.²⁰

A maelstrom of terror engulfed the intellectual elite. In March 1936 the deputy director of the newly established Institute of History, Nikolai N. Vanag (1899-1937), and the Dean of History at the prestigious Moscow State University, Grigory Fridlyand (1897-1937), had both found themselves accused of being members of a ‘counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation’. A lecture in October by Professor Andrei Shestakov (1877-1941), ‘Methods of Wrecking on the Historical Front’, in which he criticized Pokrovsky and called for ‘enemies of the people’ to be ‘annihilated’, sealed their fate.²¹ Vanag and Fridlyand were both shot: 8 March 1937.²² They were not alone. Historians, particularly younger, party historians, were prominent among the some 700,000 executed in 1937-38. But having cowed the historians physically, Stalin prepared to straightjacket the survivors mentally.

The ‘Short Course’-paradigm

A month before the paroxysm of the purges officially ended, in November 1938 Stalin’s *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course* was published. Chiefly authored by Yaroslavsky, it crystallized the subordination of historiography and the historians to the Stalinist political system. Hailed as ‘the encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism’ by Stalin’s henchman Lazar Kaganovich (1893–1991), the *Short Course* was the codified culmination of the merciless campaign unleashed against the historians in 1931 by Stalin’s letter to the editors of *Proletarskaya revoliutsiya*. A special resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee declared the *Short Course* the ‘only, official guide’ to Marxism-Leninism and party history. The resolution proclaimed an ‘end to the arbitrariness and confusion’ and ‘superficiality of different opinions’ that prevailed in previous textbooks. Stalin himself was lauded by the *Short Course* as the sole successor to Lenin as a Marxist theoretician; everybody else was relegated to the dustbin of history as ‘foreign bourgeois agents’, ‘spies’, ‘wreckers’, ‘diversionists’ or ‘assassins’. Just as the party had a monopoly of political power, so the *Short Course* established its monopoly over historiography. It fettered historical thinking and crippled the historical profession for the next fifty years; few historians, if any, dared to challenge its writ.24

Archives and libraries

It was not just the historians who feared Stalin; he feared them, knowing the ‘importance of historical education in shaping historical consciousness and as an ideological guarantee.’ Stalin’s fear of and contempt for historians was captured in his vicious term ‘archive rats’. Accordingly, draconian control of historical thinking and consciousness was accompanied by strict supervision of the raw materials for historical research: archives. On 1 June 1918 by decree all Soviet archives had come under state control. But in April 1938 the NKVD took over all archival administration; the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which took over the NKVD’s role, did not relinquish its grip until 1960. Archives were off limits to historians, and documents falsified or destroyed. Not for nothing did Stalin’s nemesis, Trotsky, speak of the ‘Stalin school of falsification’.26

A corollary to police control of archives was strict supervision of libraries. As early as July 1923, Inotdel, a department of Glavlit, had issued a ‘top secret’ circular of foreign publications ‘hostile’ to ‘Soviet power’ that
were to be banned. Simultaneously, a secret Department for Special Storage (spetskhran) for banned Soviet and foreign publications was established in what was to become the Lenin Library, in Moscow (1925-1992). Further regulations in 1926 specified spetskhran’s special functions and highly restricted access. Rightly called a ‘library in the library’, spetskhran’s holdings grew rapidly in the 1930s with Stalin’s terror. Glavlit listed 651 authors whose writings were removed from open access; particularly publications with ‘political defects’ by, or which referred to, illustrious ‘enemies of the people’ such as Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938), Grigory Zinoviev (1883-1936), or Trotsky.27

Not content with erasing his political opponents and their writings in the 1930s, Stalin returned to the anti-intellectual fray in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s hard fought triumph over German fascism in the ‘Great Patriotic War, 1941-45’. Riding the ensuing wave of celebratory Russian chauvinism, Stalin unleashed his campaign against ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ in 1949. Intended to forestall the emergence of opposition engendered by popular post-war expectations and exposure of masses of soldiers to the non-Soviet world, the ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ campaign was inherently anti-Semitic. Jewish historians in particular were the targets of a campaign that brought them and the profession as a whole finally to its knees. In the words of the dissenting, Jewish, Soviet historian Mikhail Gefter (1918-1995), these were ‘terrible years, that witnessed the murder and suicide of historical thought. Stalinism was already in its death agony that naturally took its toll on history. The atmosphere was sinister’. With the connivance of historians that accepted Stalin’s dictatorial Short Course approach to history, the campaign saw the expulsion of hitherto leading historians of both party and non-party history and their replacement by ‘servile incompetents’ in the words of historian Yefim Gorodetsky (1897-1993), who was both a proponent and then victim of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign.28

Confronting censorship

Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) denunciation of Stalin’s ‘cult of the personality’ at the March 1956 Twentieth Party Congress not only sent shock waves through the international communist movement; it also undoubtedly opened a breathing space for Soviet historians. For many who had either embraced Stalin's deterministic
Short Course approach to the Soviet past or who had hidden the views for fear of the consequences, the Twentieth Congress was, in Gefter’s words, a ‘dizzying gasp of freedom’; in the words of one of the few women revisionist historians, Lyudmila Danilova (1923–2012), it was a veritable ‘second October Revolution’ which unleashed a ‘wave’ of discussions among historians.29

Nevertheless, historians’ hopes were soon dashed as Khrushchev’s leadership faltered, especially in the face of upheavals in Poland and Hungary in autumn 1956 that erupted in the wake of the denunciation. The communist party leadership not only retreated from seriously engaging with the Stalin phenomenon, it baulked at allowing historians to do the same. Nevertheless, during the Khrushchev ‘thaw’, given further impetus by the 1961 Twenty-Second Party Congress, until his ousting in October 1964, some historians refused to relinquish their determination to really grapple with the Soviet past. To a certain extent, this was facilitated by the relaxation of controls over archives, of censorship and, not least, the demise of the Short Course as the bible of Soviet history and historical method. But constraints on all these fronts remained. The promised ‘democratization’ of the archives, for instance, proclaimed in formal resolutions, was thwarted by reclassifying entire archives as ‘secret’ or by shredding them. And the vice-like grip of the communist-party apparatus on the archives remained, even after the Ministry Internal Affairs relinquished its grasp in 1960. Even during the relatively liberal Khrushchev-decade, historians still laboured under the Stalinist deterministic, economistic, teleological view of history, which weighed on the thinking of the revisionist historians of the 1960s. With the onset of the Brezhnev ascendancy in October 1964, the harsh prescriptive, supervisory culture of Soviet historiography and daunting political environment, momentarily relaxed under Khrushchev, was once more reinforced.

A host of institutions caged and reinforced the official Marxist-Leninist historical paradigm. Textbooks, including a new party history handbook, outlined officially sanctioned perspectives on the past. Collective works were encouraged at the expense of individual monographs. Editorials in party and academic journals signalled the priorities and boundaries of research. Party committees within historical institutions ensured these boundaries were adhered to. If they were not, the Argus-eyed Department of Science under the Central Committee was there to police them. The prohibition on independent published houses and the continued secret surveillance
by Glavlit, which authorised every publication, put serious constraints on historical scholarship.

Under Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982), to challenge the hegemonic Marxist-Leninist historical paradigm no longer threatened forced labour or death, but it could mean communist party condemnation and expulsion, academic isolation and bans on publications; threats that were real deterrents to even the bravest scholars, many of whom had lived and breathed party life and had risked life and limb for the Soviet system in the 1941-1945 ‘Great Patriotic War’. Such an intimidating environment necessarily bred self-censorship and ‘double-thinking’: saying one thing in public, another in private. For those few historians who were intrepid enough to resist the neo-Stalinist tide under Brezhnev, the consequences could be devastating. The experiences of the revisionist historian of agricultural collectivisation, Victor Danilov (1925-2004), and the revisionist historian of the Great Patriotic War, Aleksandr Nekrich (1920–1993), are instructive in this regard.

‘The device of omission’

The very day that Khrushchev was ousted, Danilov, who in 1958 had been appointed head of a five person ‘Group on the History of the Soviet Peasantry and the Organisation of Collective Farms’ in the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Soviet History, was summoned to the office of the Institute Deputy Director, Aleksei Shtrakhov (1908-1981). ‘Here we have somebody who is grieving today!’ exclaimed the ‘inveterate Stalinist’ Trakov. Danilov knew instantly that it was the end of his group’s path breaking study: *The Collectivisation of Agriculture in the USSR 1927-1932*, preliminary page proofs of which had been submitted to the publishers just six days earlier. He was ordered to withdraw the proofs of this massive 798-page tome.

The product of six years work, Danilov’s *Collectivisation of Agriculture* was a study of the most catastrophic experience inflicted on the Soviet peasantry by Stalin in the wake of his ‘Great Turn’ decreed in 1929. Determined to ‘eliminate the *kulaks* [rich peasants] as a class’, the consequences were the destruction of the existing private and communal farming, the exile and deaths of millions of so-called rich, capitalist *kulaks*, and mass starvation of the peasantry, especially in the Ukraine, nowadays controversially known as the *Holodomor*. Danilov’s revisionist
history did not take issue with collectivisation let alone its catastrophic human consequences. And it remained firmly within the conventional Marxist-Leninist framework, accepting the need for collectivised agriculture as socialist. But it did challenge the enforced implementation of collectivisation, based on the Danilov’s view that it was premature in the absence of the necessary industrial prerequisites for collectivised agriculture, above all tractors; instead there were mainly wooden ploughs. This criticism of collectivisation was unacceptable in the Brezhnev-years.

Once the proofs were withdrawn from the press, Danilov’s book was subjected to searching criticism and censorship. The proofs were amended after intensive discussion in the Central Committee’s Department of Science in 1965-1966. The publisher’s editor produced an amended second set of proofs in early 1966 in an attempt to make the book more politically palatable, because ultimately the publisher, along with author, bore responsibility for the work that would be presented to Glavlit for approval. Despite the substantial revisions, Danilov’s book was never published. A similar fate befell an article summarising the fruits of Danilov’s research published under his name in 1965 in the Soviet Historical Encyclopaedia; the article was subject to heavy pre-publication censorship. Despite this, Danilov was subject to party public censure for falsely dwelling on the mistakes in collectivisation. The upshot of this prolonged harassment and censorship was Danilov’s dismissal in April 1969 as head of a research sector that had replaced his now defunct group. He would spend the next decade and a half in the academic wilderness until the onset of perestroika and glasnost in the mid-1980s.32

A similar, if not worse, fate befell Nekrich, author of the revisionist June 22, 1941, published in October 1965. Nekrich’s book fell foul of a
campaign to resurrect Stalin’s reputation as a wartime leader, which had been savaged by Khrushchev in his attack on the ‘cult of the personality’. Nekrich essentially followed Khrushchev’s line: Stalin’s ‘mistakes’ were directly responsible for the rout of the Red Army by Axis forces following their undeclared attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941. Stalin had dismissed all the warnings as attempts by Britain to provoke war between the Soviet Union and Germany. Nekrich’s book had run the gauntlet of five different censors, including the KGB, which alone had actually opposed publication. Nevertheless, Glavlit instigated an inquisition that saw Nekrich and his book subject to relentless accusations and interrogation, including by the Communist Party Control Commission, from February 1966 through to June 1967, which resulted in the ultimate ignominies: expulsion from the party and finally emigration to the USA in 1967.\textsuperscript{33}

The revisionist historians of the 1960s were not defeated without a fight – least of all with the all-pervasive censorship. Within the Institute of History, through the ‘democratic’ Communist Party Committee lead by the revisionists, and in articles that were themselves censored, they took up the fight against what they called the ‘\textit{figura umol’chaniya}’ [device of omission], by which they meant ‘leaving the truth unsaid’. In the case of Soviet history this meant silence concerning leading Bolsheviks such as Trotsky and Zinoviev; the abandonment of the New Economic Policy [NEP] in favour forced collectivisation; and the initial disasters in the Great Patriotic War. Glavlit was targeted as the driving force of the \textit{figura umol’chaniya}: erasing the names of leading Bolshevik anti-Stalinists and depriving academic bodies of the right to authorise publications, thereby demeaning historians as scholars.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Postscript: Glasnost’ and after}

The onset of \textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost} under party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, short-lived as it was, vindicated the revisionist historians who in the 1960s had taken up the cudgels against the fear, censorship and self-censorship that had for so long reduced Soviet historians to little more than subservient court scribes. Nekrich’s cry for Soviet historians to ‘forsake fear’ had been answered.\textsuperscript{35} And with the demise of the Soviet Union, Glavlit was consigned to the ‘rubbish can of history’, to invoke Trotsky’s expression.\textsuperscript{36} However, Soviet censorship, we should remember, was an extreme case of political power surveilling, intimidating, and thereby determining
historical research and writing. No historiography exists in a political vacuum, even in the most liberal, uncensored, scholarly environments. All political systems have their mechanisms of regulating cultural production, including historical writing; censorship, intimidation, and repression are the most crude of them. In President Putin’s post-Soviet Russia, the reinstatement of a hegemonic, sacralised, state-sanctioned, triumphalist narrative of victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War, 1941-45’ constrains historical thinking. To challenge it is to blaspheme; but few Russian historians would dare or even want to do so.

Notes

4. Peter Holquist, "Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work”: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context”, The Journal of Modern History, 69 3, (Sept. 1997), 415-450, esp. 432. Holquist, 419, 421, 435 note 52, sharply distinguishes censorship, ‘the control of content’, from surveillance, ‘the collection of information’, in order to manage, shape and ‘transform’ the ‘population’s collective mood’. In making this distinction, he rightly notes that Soviet censorship was ‘activist’; it ‘did not just seek to prevent harmful information from “infecting” the population; censorship equally sought to receive the proper information necessary for their political development.’ Superb as Holquist’s analysis is, he treats the early Bolshevik regime as if it simply sought to replicate the techniques of governance of its political and military rivals. But the Bolshevik revolution was sui generis in the sense that it aimed to construct a different kind of state resting on popular power. Circumstances, however, dictated otherwise, culminating in Stalin’s ultra repressive, surveillance state.
5. Goriaeva (ed.), Istoriia, 8.
21. Litvin, Writing History, 13-14; note that the dates given by Litvin differ from those in footnote 20.
24. Markwick, Rewriting History, 42.
29. Markwick, Rewriting History, 38, 49.
30. Goriaeva (ed.), Istoriiia, 11; Litvin, Writing History, 25-6: An example of ‘double-thinking’ was S.S. Dmitriev (1906–91), a professor of history at Moscow State University who also lectured at the Communist Party Komsomol [youth organization] school. Dmitriev’s diaries revealed that he felt ‘the revolution is
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long past’ but he never published or uttered a critical word.


37. See Plamper, ‘Abolishing Ambiguity’, 527: ‘Censorship can be seen as one of the many “practices of cultural regulation,” a broadly defined rubric that is meant to accommodate market forces in the capitalist West, too.’