ETHNIC CRISIS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM:

A BACKGROUND TO THE COMMUNAL VIOLENCE OF SRI LANKA

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The fact is that the problems of Sri Lanka's multi-communal society are linked with her social and economic progress and these in turn underpin constitution and government as well as patterns of political conduct and behaviour.¹

The ethnic composition of Sri Lanka's 15 million inhabitants can be broken down into 6 distinct groups comprising 71.9 per cent Sinhalese, 20.5 per cent Tamil, 6.6 per cent Muslim and 7 per cent others. The Sinhalese and Tamil populations can be further sub-divided into 42.2 per cent Low Country and 28.8 per cent Kandyan Sinhalese alongside 11.0 per cent Sri Lanka Tamils and 10.6 per cent Estate Tamils (Population Census 1971). Over the years this complex multi-ethnic composition has given rise to periods of communal tension and increasingly less sporadic open conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil population. This culminated in the country's most severe outbreak of inter-communal violence during the months of July and August 1983 with a death toll somewhere between 400 (official estimate) and 1,000 (World Council of Churches estimate) with Tamil claims of up to 2,000 alongside the large numbers made homeless in the rioting.²

The significance of this event lies in the fact that it represents a rapid deterioration in relations between the two communities following the previous expressions of ethnic conflict of 1958, 1977 and 1981. The result of this latest outbreak has been to further alienate and radicalise the Tamil community, in turn prompting a more repressive and chauvinistic response from the State which has implications far beyond the limits of ethnic conflict which itself has become decidedly political in the Tamil demand for Eelam. Indeed it is argued here that a crucial part of the explanation for this renewed violence and the more radical reaction this has caused on both sides can be found by viewing the problem as stemming from recent Sinhalese political policy rather than any Tamil response.
An examination of the background to the conflict may highlight the connection between ethnic issues and political objectives that have characterised post-Independence politics. The Indigenous Tamils of the north and east received and took advantage of a good educational infrastructure that helped propel them into administrative positions under the Colonial Government while the Estate Tamils were brought by the British to the plantations as indentured labourers under conditions of extreme hardship and poverty. Agitation for constitutional reform after the turn of the century was conducted by the Sinhalese and Tamil elite which led to the formation of the Ceylon National Congress presided over by a Tamil, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam. After resigning from the Congress in protest over the introduction of ethnic representation, the Tamil leaders boycotted the 1931 elections fearing the implications of universal suffrage. D.S. Senanayake as the Sinhalese leader recognised the importance of the majority Sinhalese vote and emphasised communalism by forming amongst other things a pan-Sinhala board of ministers. Tamil demands to distort ‘national weightage’ in political representation were rejected by the Soulbury Commission of 1944–1945 which secured the ‘democratic’ right of Sinhalese majority representation, heralding a period of increased ethnic confrontation designed to manipulate the majority vote.

Early post-Independence ethnic legislation revolved around the powerless Estate Tamil population. The 1948 and 1949 Citizenship Acts disenfranchised the majority of this community as stateless persons. Intervention by the Indian government led to the signing of the Srimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 granting 300,000 Estate Tamils Sri Lankan citizenship and a further 525,000 Indian citizenship later revised upwards in 1974 to account for the remaining 150,000. By 1974, however, less than half those to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship had actually been registered although over 700,000 had applied. In the absence of a true national Independence movement, elements within the early post-Independence United National Party (UNP) Government soon realised the desirability of exploiting Sinhala-Buddhist demands on the grounds of political expediency. The newly formed Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), under S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s leadership, fought the 1956 election with linguistic demands for ‘Sinhala only’ and a resurgence of Buddhism. After winning the election, the Official Language Act was passed declaring Sinhalese to be the only state language. This was seen by the Tamil community, and in particular by the Sri Lankan Tamil element, as a provocative and discriminating act which then led to an attempted pact with S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, leader of the Tamil Federal Party, aborted under mounting pressure from Sinhalese hard-liners including the Buddhist Sangha and J.R. Jayewardene of the UNP. The first open conflict between the two communities occurred in 1958 as a direct result of that growth in ‘political communalism’. Thereafter the Tamils began to experience discrimination over education and employment. Although the class nature of both Sinhalese dominated political parties is fairly evident, the Tamil leadership in the Federal Party displayed a strong reactionary response up to 1965 in voting against much of the progressive legislation of the centre-left SLFP Government. Ethnic tension, however, subsided during the 1960s and the decade saw a greater preoccupa-
A major change in the nature of Sri Lankan politics came about in 1970 when Mrs. Bandaranaike’s SLFP was voted into office with a two thirds majority. This event saw the beginning of a new phase of political control. Whilst in opposition from 1965, the SLFP had been vociferous in airing anti-Tamil propaganda. Schwarz argues that once in power after 1970 the new United Front Government, with a mandate to provide a new constitution, brought inter-communal tensions to a new crisis point. He illustrates this by reference to the Kodiswaran case where a Tamil officer of the executive clerical service sued the government over the *Official Language Act* of 1956 claiming it transgressed Section 29 of the Constitution. The exact issue that had brought this about was the direction that a Tamil public servant should pass a proficiency test in Sinhala to secure any annual increments in pay. The plea was upheld but later set aside on appeal to the Supreme Court. An appeal by Kodiswaran to the Privy Council in Britain directed the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutional issue. The Government intervened, abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and disposing of the case. It then enacted the new 1972 Constitution doing away with the former safeguards for minorities. The new constitution officially upheld the Buddhist religion and the Sinhala language. Given the former lack of class interest between the Tamils, represented by the newly formed Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) essentially representing the Indigenous Tamil community, and the other left parties, there was little hope for any serious obstruction to the ‘constitutional enthronement of the Buddhist-Sinhala hegemony’. Another important incident occurred at this time further strengthening the authoritarian and chauvinistic character of the Government. A large number of discontented youths organised a coordinated attack on the security forces in an armed insurrection against the State. The prompt suppression of this uprising by the Government led to the declaration of a State of Emergency. The outcome of this and other events saw the gradual and continuing decline in support for the Marxist parties, particularly the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), although the left-based Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) emerged from its revolutionary stance associated with the insurrection as a more formal left party.

With the new constitution the Government received an extended lease of life of two years without having to resort to parliamentary elections. This marks the beginning of an anti-democratic tendency which, as will be seen below, is to manifest itself again with a new government after 1977. The economic issues provide a crucial means of explaining these political developments which in turn are inextricably linked to the Government’s policy of responding to and dealing with the ethnic problem. Financially the Government had inherited a massive foreign debt and although it publicly criticised dependence on short-term borrowing it was itself forced to resort to foreign capital loans, despite trying to reduce expenditure on welfare programmes and curtail inflation. With enormous balance of payments deficits and a looming economic crisis the Government felt it necessary to adopt a forceful public image. In the industrial sector Government policy revolved around attempts to improve the operation of the State-owned industries, which had proliferated since the introduction of the nationalisation campaign after 1956.
when the number of public corporations rose from 12 to 24 between 1958-1970. The Government invested heavily in this sector throughout their post 1970 term but critics have argued that this simply had the effect of increasing the opportunities for the Government to exercise considerable powers of patronage and nepotism in order to gain greater control over the reins of economic as well as political power. These industries continued to suffer from under-utilisation of capacity and inefficient management resulting in poor labour relations despite efforts to improve performance. Ponnambalam argues that this period saw a steep rise in inflation and declining real wage levels, rising unemployment from 14 per cent in 1969 to 20 per cent by 1975 and the prospering of a new professional middle income group with a smaller category of 'super wealthy' dependent on exports and generous tax concessions. The Government did succeed in dislodging the former semi-feudal classes by implementing land reform, rent restrictions and capital levies, with a decline in this group's share of total income. In the agricultural sector large productivity gains had been made since the early 1950s with a 250 per cent productivity increase between 1970-1977/1978. More significant from a political standpoint was the Government's gradual replacement of democratically elected agricultural officers or representatives by State appointees. The reorganisation of the Co-operative Movement in the 1970s is a striking example of increased state interference at the expense of local participation where 9 members on each of the 15 member boards of directors were government appointed resulting in increased political favouritism and corruption. This same trend occurred in the evolution of Cultivation Committees, Agricultural Productivity Committees and Divisional Development Councils. By the time the elections were held in 1977 the country was viewed by many to be almost bankrupt with unemployment running at 24 per cent in a stagnant economy.

Presiding over these changing economic conditions was an administration that had been built upon fundamental class contradictions. The bourgeoisie which owed much of its new-found wealth to the policies of the administration was at the same time in conflict with certain elements in the ruling party. Drieberg has argued that as a catch-all party the SLFP was subject to conflicting interests which did little for national unity. In such a climate one issue was guaranteed to command the support of the majority of the electorate and this was the ethnic cause. Discrimination in the field of education and employment became widely established. With the possibility of communal riots on campus the authorities drew up a standardisation programme which in reality worked against Tamil admissions. In some departments between 1970-1974 admissions fell by as much as half. Schwarz argues that nothing aroused deeper despair among the Tamil population than educational discrimination made worse by a corresponding reduction in Tamil recruitment to government service. It is no surprise therefore that by 1976 the TULF embraced the concept of Eelam and the demand for separatism. After the events of the 1971 insurrection the Jaffna peninsula had been subjected to what virtually amounted to an army of occupation and this in itself had caused enormous resentment. The policies of the government succee-
ded in arousing ethnic tension to a point where open violence broke out soon after the defeat of the Government at the 1977 elections, the first major outbreak since 1958 and the first time Tamils of Indian origin were the subject of intimidation. It was this situation that the UNP Government inherited in 1977 where ethnic issues had been exploited by politicians in an attempt to win and retain the support of the majority of the electorate and to help disguise some of the problems resulting from an economic policy which had led to a deterioration in living standards for a large section of the community. Simultaneously the United Front Government had implemented political initiatives that in turn created an increasingly authoritarian environment for the more effective manipulation of the ethnic problem and a particular way of dealing with it that only served to inflame communal relations still further. Although the UNP Government embraced a different economic strategy, it is argued below that the same trend to political authoritarianism and expediency has led to the creation of an environment in which the communal problem has been more easily exploited with sufficient incentive. Once again this had the effect of bringing about a further deterioration in communal relations to a point where many believe there can no longer be any negotiated settlement.

Ironically it was this UNP Government that received substantial electoral support from many Tamil moderates in 1977 and in recognising communal problems granted protective measures to the Tamils in the new Republican Constitution of 1978. As Manor mentions, these amounted to the upgrading of the Tamil language to a National Language but not the Official Language, their ability to benefit from the new electoral system of proportional representation and the granting of regional autonomy through new District Development Councils. In practice, this turned out to mean little and the measures were largely blocked and diluted. 25 Despite this fact, an analysis of 1982 presidential voting patterns by Moore shows that some Tamils maintained confidence in these initiatives while others, namely the Sri Lankan Tamils of Jaffna, expressed dissatisfaction over the behaviour of the security forces in the north. The Sinhalese vote displayed some disapproval of the Government's ethnic policy. 26

A number of important economic changes were initiated by the Government in a policy aimed at achieving high levels of growth. The main components of this policy consisted of measures to encourage foreign investment and tourism, the lifting of exchange and import controls and the floating of the rupee. The implementation of this strategy allowed for additional investment through international loans and assistance which have helped to complete the Mahaweli development project and the setting up of a new Free Trade Zone. Exports have been encouraged through this latter scheme which allows for 100 per cent foreign ownership and considerable tax exemptions with a severe curtailment on all labour laws. It has been widely publicised by the Government that the zone offers some of the cheapest skilled and semi-skilled labour in Asia. A greater Colombo Economic Commission has been set up to encourage foreign investment through joint equity participation. In many respects these priorities have led to the creation of an alternative growth orientated sector within the older unreformed economy. Over-
all growth has been considerable with G.N.P. reaching 8.2 per cent in 1978, 6.2 per cent in 1979 and 5.5 per cent in 1980 and regular agricultural production increases which stood at 7.3 per cent in 1980. In order to sustain this level of growth there has been rising inflation and a large budget deficit which has caused the Government to severely curtail public expenditure particularly on welfare, despite the implementation of a rationalised food assistance programme. In July 1984 the Government announced the possibility of abolishing all food stamps to those earning under RS 300 per month with the exception of the Sangha and those receiving public assistance. All this had a detrimental effect on the poorer urban groups and the vast numbers of public servants whose salaries have failed to keep up with inflation. Labour unrest has been dealt with harshly. When in July 1980 a general strike was called the Government declared an emergency, dismissed all public servants on strike and froze trade union funds. Simultaneously there has been a vast influx of imported consumer goods with a new entrepreneurial elite able to take full advantage of the benefits. A new sense of prosperity in the country has been successfully created, but popular aspirations have been rising considerably faster than they can be met, which in turn has created much disillusionment and antagonism. This has been manipulated inwards on to the communal issue and in turn communal violence has fed off this aggression.

Soon after the 1977 elections the Government embarked on a programme of political reform that critics argue has fundamentally changed the character of the country’s democratic tradition. Although these reforms and the ensuing ethnic conflict have been the subject of a recent study by Manor et al., it will be useful to mention the salient points in relation to the argument. The new 1978 Constitution establishing electoral reform and an executive presidency at the time appeared to be a compromise of democracy and authority despite the curtailment of union activity and the granting of parliamentary powers to pass retrospective legislation. The implications of electoral reform have been studied by Oberst who argues that proportional representation will create difficulties for the leftist parties by necessitating coalitions if they are not to risk continual electoral defeat. It soon became apparent that a drift towards authoritarianism was inevitable as the Government enacted a series of Constitutional amendments. F.D. Bandaranaike has examined the various amendments pointing out their anti-democratic nature. He argues that the first ensured the disenfranchisement of the opposition leader by preventing any means of effectively overcoming the ruling of the Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry. The second granted any defecting M.P. the right to appeal through the Courts or a select Committee. Since the latter is bound to contain a Government majority it biases the security of MPs’ seats and assists those defecting into the Government.

The effects of the third and fourth amendments which resulted in the Presidential elections and the Referendum of 1982 have been analysed by de Silva(1984), Athulathmudali (1984) and Samarakone(1984). The Government’s justification for holding the Referendum in place of parliamentary elections, which was to result in the extension of life of the Government until 1989,
was based upon the threat of an impending naxalite uprising and a pragmatic decision to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of a Parliamentary election while recognising the need to respect democratic traditions. This view is not altogether held by de Silva who, having analysed the Presidential elections, turns to the Referendum which he concludes was essentially a means by which the Government was able to extend its own lease of life and historic majority in a period marked by considerable Governmental modification of the democratic process. The actual conduct of the Referendum has been examined by Samarakone and the Civil Rights Movement who provide corroborating evidence pointing to the blatant illegality surrounding much of the event. The Civil Rights Movement of Sri Lanka has reported on the run-up to the Referendum emphasising the continuance of a state of emergency, the banning of opposition newspapers and the sealing of presses, detentions and the illegal display of posters. It has further emphasised a high level of voter intimidation, harassment, impersonation and police disregard for infringements of the law.

This changing political climate characterised by the State sanctioning of illegal and intimidating action has served to strengthen the powers of the administration and protect its economic policy. Political violence is by no means a new phenomenon in the country. Obeyesekere argues that this ‘institutionalised violence’ or ‘political thuggery’, although commonplace since the 1960s, has flourished under the present Government. Local party bosses or MPs make use of thugs to further their own political ends while at the same time the police, as the only institution empowered to control illegal activity, is itself in the MPs’ hands. Obeyesekere views the most disturbing trend to be the formation of the Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya (JSS) as the largest ‘union’ in the country presided over by C. Mathew, the former Minister of Industries. This union has been active in promoting a Sinhalese-Buddhist ideology through intimidation and thuggery rather than stressing working class solidarity. The most significant perpetrations of thug violence widely reported as linked to the JSS were the burning of Jaffna library containing valuable Tamil manuscripts in 1981 and the intimidation of Supreme Court judges in 1982 who had ruled unfavourably in a case against the State.

It is hardly surprising that, under these economic and political conditions, the ethnic problem once again became the focus of attention. Many communal incidents occurred up to July 1983, often for reasons of political opportunism in an environment that tolerated and encouraged such activity. The heavy presence of the security forces in the north and east contributed to this lawlessness. Meyer has drawn attention to incidents provoked by or involving the security forces in early 1983. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979, despite its powerful provisions, failed to dampen the activities of Tamil terrorist groups that had sprung up in response to the political impasse between the two communities. The TULF itself, having boycotted the 1982 elections, was feeling increasingly alienated and had adopted a radical stance. Tension increased as propaganda exploiting Sinhalese nationalistic sentiments became rife. The worst communal violence the country has ever experienced broke out on 24th July 1983. It is now widely accepted that mobile gangs possessing electoral lists carried out the systematic attack on Tamil business and re-
sidences which resulted in a final death toll estimated at circa 1,000 people. The armed forces did little to intervene and in some cases encouraged the breaking of the curfew by locally organised gangs occasionally participating in the violence themselves. It has since been alleged that a number of senior Government officials were active in promoting some of the violence which the Government later claimed was part of a left-wing plot to undermine the State.

In response to this new surge of violence, the main left-wing Marxist parties were banned and separatism has been constitutionally outlawed, with all MPs being forced to swear an oath to this effect. The situation in the Tamil dominated north has further deteriorated with a virtual collapse of the main public utilities, including hospitals, and continued bloodshed as the ill-disciplined army continues to mount a campaign of reprisals in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya and Mallaitivu in response to increased terrorist activity. There are now five Tamil guerilla groups with an estimated strength of 2,000 men, a figure which has swelled significantly since the July 1983 attacks on the Tamil community. The present stalemate is likely to continue as long as the security forces continue to behave as an army of occupation and the Government continues to promote the colonisation of the northern territory with Sinhalese settlers armed and backed by the Government. After Tamil attacks on Dollar and Kent settlement farms in Mullaitivu in November 1984 the Government’s response has simply been to announce a new 30,000 person Sinhalese settlement scheme in the Wanni area. Meanwhile Sinhalese-Buddhist propaganda continues to be spread throughout the country by the clergy represented by Ven.P. Chandananda, the Mahanayake of the Malwatte order, and elements within the Government. Both groups, espousing an ideology based on his historic myth, have taken to placing full advertisement supplements in the national press. Even more provocative, they have circulated copies of Hansard Parliamentary Debates on the Sixth Amendment enacting comprehensive sanctions against separatism, along with Archaeology department maps outlining the Tamil destruction of Buddhist shrines, to many village temples in the hope of arousing public sentiment in the countryside. The result has been to effect a major psychological change in the majority of the non-guerilla Tamil population marked by deep depression and uncertainty. The broader implications of the Sinhalese response to the ethnic problem can be seen in terms of a new ‘legitimate’ state authoritarianism justified on the grounds of national security.

NOTES

in British Ceylon, 1832-1978” in Modern Ceylon Studies 1 (1970, 1) 115-146.
5 A. J. Wilson, Politics, 48.
8 J. Manor, Sri Lanka, 9.
9 This as Ibidem points out has been a common opposition tactic.
11 Section 29 contained safeguards for Ministries.
13 C. W. F., Conflict, 8.
17 Ibidem, 131-132.
20 Ibidem, 505-528.
28 1980 inflation levels reached between 30-40 per cent. Times.
30 J. Manor, ed. Sri Lanka, 10.
31 Ibidem, 131-132.
32 This was set up to investigate alleged abuses of power by the former U. F. Government.
38 This ideology is based on historical myth surrounding the establishment of the Sinhalese – Buddhist nation and the messianic task of the present day Sinhalese to protect this tradition at whatever cost. The Ramils in this regard, should be likened to the non-indigenous Malays without certain alienable rights of citizenship.
42 Eye-witness accounts noted by the author in a provincial centre.
44 Ibidem, 39.
46 Witnessed by the author while on fieldwork in Kurunegala district 1984.
48 For an account of these implications see E. Nissan, “Some thoughts on Sinhalese justifications for the violence” in J. Manor, *Sri Lanka*.

Abbreviations:
C. J. H. S. S. Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies
C. W. F. Christian Workers Fellowship
F. E. E. R. *Far Eastern Economic Review*