Introduction

‘What I do,’ Charles Tilly told Paul Scheffer in a recent interview (NRC-Handelsblad, June 13, 1993), ‘constitutes an implicit critique of the existing division of labour in the social sciences, which lags forty years behind the times.’

The division of labour Tilly was referring to is the one between historical sociology and history in which, roughly speaking, historians collect facts and sociologists generalize, while both sides steer clear of each others’s methods. However implicit the critique on this state of affairs embodied by Tilly’s work may be, it is certainly formidable. Tilly devotes his energy to both theory formation and painstaking archival research; his work demonstrates the possibilities of a genuinely historical sociology in which phenomena such as state formation and revolutions are historicized, i.e. embedded in time and place and not forced into general laws, much less procrustean teleologies.

In this respect, the concept of social mechanisms has gradually become central to Tilly’s thinking. As he told his audience on May 18 of this year, at the first session of his seminar at the Onderzoeksschool Sociale Wetenschap Amsterdam, ‘great social regularities do not occur at the level of whole structures, full sequences, or total processes, but in the detailed social mechanisms that generate structures, sequences, and processes.’ In other words, historical sociologists had better stop trying to establish theories of revolutions which fit all of them from Glorious to Russian and beyond, and which assume that - irrespective of time and place - there is such a thing as ‘the’ revolution which will burst out in a specific set of circumstances and follow standard sequen-

* The interview was held on May 31, 1993 in Amsterdam.
ces. Theories of this kind are bound to smooth out historical contingencies, whereas historical sociological theory should work with, not against, what Fernand Braudel called 'l'étonnante richesse du concret.' This does not mean a retreat into a postmodern nihilist position where we already congratulate ourselves if we succeed in establishing one model per observation! The search for social regularities continues, but, Tilly warns, they should be looked for elsewhere: not in sequences of events, but in the social mechanisms that generate those sequences: they are the true locus of regularity in social life. Wars resemble each other only superficially, but principles of logistics can be recognized everywhere. We do not need a 'Law of Revolutions' so much as insight into the mechanisms of claim-making or cliquism. While working in this vein, any closer historical look at this specific war and that particular revolution can only deepen the insight. In Tilly’s new deal between historical sociology and history, actual historical observation directly informs sociological theory - it no longer is regarded as a nuisance that only ties down theory formation with its Lilliputian contingencies. Contingencies have begun to matter.¹

Implicitly or explicitly, the search for social mechanisms permeates Tilly’s work over the whole range of subjects he tackles. Thus, in his work on collective action, popular contention and revolutions, the notion of contentious repertoires has gradually become central. This notion of repertoire is part of Tilly’s wider belief that collective contention is never a blind explosion of mass discontent, but a methodical process led by militant minorities. Contentious repertoires are sets of action repertoires which are, as it were, scripted in advance. People never just run amok; they make specific claims based on perceived rights and they follow the 'script’ for - as the case may be - a public demonstration, a taxation populaire or a labour strike. Repertoires can change over time. The most important empirical finding in The Conten-tious French (1986a) concerns the fact that, in the nineteenth century, the French shed the collective action repertoires that they had been using for two centuries and adopted the repertoire they still use today. Pre-1850 field invasions and tax revolts were gradually replaced by strikes and 'social movements’. In the older repertoire, the actions were

¹ See further: As Sociology Meets History (1981a) and Big Structures, Large Processes, and Huge Comparisons (1986).
aimed at local opponents, whereas the new forms of action addressed themselves to supralocal opponents, especially national authorities. This shift in action repertoires corresponded to the concentration of capital and to the shift of power towards the national state; for this reason, local powerholders and patrons became less and less important, because the decisions that affected ordinary people were made at a higher level.

In Tilly’s major work on the formation of European states since AD 990 (1990a), the accent lies on states’ waging of war and preparation for war: ‘States make wars, and wars make states’ is the operating principle (as we will see in the interview, Tilly refuses to call it a ‘law’ of state formation in general). From AD 990 onward, major mobilizations for war provided the chief occasions on which states expanded. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries especially, Europe became more bellicose and the mercenary armies at the disposal of states grew into big business; state budgets, taxes, and debts rose accordingly. This necessitated the creation of a fiscal apparatus geared to wrest resources from the population. However, the appropriation of resources was not just a coercive process but involved serious bargaining, especially with regard to the ruling and possessing classes who were in most cases co-opted into the state apparatus. This bargaining aspect became even more important from the late eighteenth century onwards, when the era of mercenary armies ended and that of the nation-in-arms began. This changed the relationship between war-making and civilian politics, for states’ new reliance on mass conscription made them more and more answerable to popular (and bourgeois) demands for increased intervention outside the realm of coercion and war. As a result, during the nineteenth century the state increasingly turned to civilian activities. In contemporary European states, the proportion of the state budget spent on military expenditure is dwarfed by the proportion spent on social services and other nonmilitary pursuits; however, this should not obscure the fact that at the outset and all through early modern times, European states were regular ‘war machines’ - no more, no less.

Tilly has also contributed a few powerful notions to the study of migration - a third field of inquiry, which is more exclusively ‘social’ and less ‘political’ than the other two. His typology of migrations
(1978c) has influenced quite a few scholars. Rather than on the amount of movement to and from a geographic entity or on 'stadia of acculturation' of migrants into the 'host society,' Tilly's emphasis is on how people migrate: which circuits they follow and what kind of networks (kin, compatriot, colleague) they are embedded in. The actual tales of peoples' movements, as he told the Onderzoeksschool at the May seminar, 'refute grand stage schemes of immigration.'

All in all, one could say that, over the years, Tilly's work has become more and less ambitious at the same time. On the one hand, he has become more aware of the limitations and dangers of 'grand schemes' and broad generalizations, and has turned instead to modest operating mechanisms and historically contingent principles: compare for instance From Mobilization to Revolution (1978a) to his later work on collective action. On the other hand, he has applied this more modest theoretical program to ever bigger questions: from a detailed study of counterrevolutionary movements in one region during the French revolution (The Vendée, 1964), through four centuries of popular struggle in France (The Contentious French, 1986a) to European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (1993a).

The broad contours of Tilly's work sketched in this introduction also form the basis for the following interview, which is divided into three topics: explanation in historical sociology; changing repertoires of contention; and Tilly's view on recent political developments, particularly the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the rise of ethnic nationalism.

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Explanation in Historical Sociology

In 'Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons' (1984a) you attack a number of what you call 'pernicious postulates' which we have inherited from 19th-century social thinking. One of these is that the aim of sociology should be to find universal patterns, stages, and sequences, and necessary and sufficient conditions of social phenomena, which somehow possess an essential nature. Examples of such theories are the various attempts to develop 'A Theory of Revolutions', or 'A theory of Modernization.' In contrast you advocate a more historical approach, which aims at statements 'attached to specific areas and parts of the world, specifying causes involving variation from one instance to another within their time-place limits' (1984a, 60). Yet, you refuse to succumb to a postmodernist position, in which generalization of any kind is seen as both impossible and undesirable. Could you tell us how you think one can navigate between the Scylla of universal models and the Charybdis of postmodernism?

Well, I think it is actually fairly easy. In fact, we have numerous examples of other sciences who have done it, and the surprising thing is that people in history and sociology seem to think that the only form of generalization is Newtonian physics. If you look at the examples of biology, or geology, you discover fields in which no one claims that there are great clumps of structure that are the same, that the sequences are the same. What they claim is that they can identify causal mechanisms that under varying initial conditions produce very different outcomes, but in a coherent way that you can explain through the invocation of these very general causal mechanisms. I think, as a matter of fact, that the postmodern view - however helpful in requiring realists like me to clarify the premises of our thinking - is on the wrong track entirely, because we are beginning to see very general causes of social situations, of social processes, and beginning to recognize that the attempt to line up situations as if they were all the same is just a terrible error. When I wrote Big Structures, I only saw maybe a third of the problem. I have been thinking about it ever since, and the more I think about it, the more, for example, I think about the nature of revolutions, the more I realize that we have a wonderful
opportunity in our own time, which some people are beginning to realize, to shift to causal analyses on a very general level.

So what you state is that social mechanisms are the real locus of generalization in social life. Witness the mechanism of states making wars, and wars making states. Where would you locate that in relation to this dichotomy? This is not as we understand you a theory about causal laws.

If there is a general proposition in what I say, it is that the relationship among an activity, the set of agents that control the means that might make that activity possible, and the bargaining that goes on between the agents of the activity and those who hold the resources, produce an unexpected set of structures that themselves constrain the next round of action. In that sense the argument I am making has a lot in common with Anthony Giddens’s idea of ‘structuration’. But even so, to call that a general model is to be very very grand. These are very general social mechanisms which lay down social structure: that people resist the extraction of resources from their social routines, and as they resist that extraction of resources from their social routines they set costs for others who are trying to get those resources for them. From that ensue processes of struggle, bargaining, and so forth. I don’t regard as a law the idea that war generates states: it happens to be true in the European experience, it happens to be something that you could reasonably say about the period since AD 1000. I have to admit I wasn’t yet clear about that when I was writing Coercion, Capital, and European States (1990a), and I think I have conflated the two. At times, I said, yes that is the law, all states everywhere have grown up this way. And I think now that was a mistake: what is reasonable to say is that in the European experience over these 1000 years, most of the time war making generates these consequences. Why did it generate these consequences? Because the causal mechanism lies in the bargaining that comes out of resistance to release the resources that are already committed to other ends. Now you could draw a model if you wanted to, which would be

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extractor, holder, consequence - but that is not the interesting part. The general cause lies in that struggle over control over wanted resources.

This relationship between war making and state making, then, can be seen as a historically contingent law. But that does not yet sufficiently clarify the nature of the difference between laws and causal mechanisms. Our question is whether in your view it is possible to discover mechanisms which do have a universal application.

Yes, I think it is possible, first of all to make the distinction, and second to identify very powerful generalizations at the level of causal mechanisms. Let’s take the first. Our usual notion of law is covering law, that is a set of statements that we apply to a whole class of situations in which there are invariant relationships among elements. Under covering law doctrines, to explain something is to submit it to a covering law. That this sequence always occurs, that this conjunction always occurs, etc. I am very dubious about covering law accounts. It strikes me that covering law accounts require the recurrence of the same situations. I think it is perfectly possible to have, what people like Callinicos call productive causes, that is causes which are not only constantly conjoined with an effect, but for which we can provide the story by which they produce that effect. Crudely put: if people resist, they actually constrain those who are drawing something from them - and that is a productive cause. If we want to call it a law, that’s fine, except that we know it’s a law not by producing a large set of generalizations, but by showing that we could anticipate the effect of some particular instance. That is, we say, if you give me a set of initial circumstances and the presence of this particular element, I will show you what is likely to have happened. Conversely, you can show me a set of effects and I can show you the presence of these productive causes.

But isn’t that precisely what laws are about? Isn’t that the same as saying, well, I know the temperature, I know the pressure, so I know when water will start to boil under these conditions?

No, because that statement itself does not have any productive cause in it. That is precisely the distinction I want to make, between universally conjoint conditions, and an account that says this microbe enters this cell, turns on this particular mechanism within the cell, and that changes the way the cell duplicates itself, and so forth. As I see it we need a distinction between universal conjunctions - which can have long sequences - on the one hand, and causal stories, in which there is in fact a productive relationship, such that A changes the conditions for B, B changes the conditions for C, and so on. If you then want to say that’s a law, fine. At the end I won’t object, but the way people have commonly used law, covering law accounts, is very different from that. It is typical for covering law statements to operate at the level of large chunks of history and social structure, and for then to say every time that the following circumstances are present the following consequence occurs. There is a qualitative intellectual difference between two lines of reasoning. On the one hand, the one that lets laws operate at the level of ‘the’ social movement, ‘the’ political system, ‘the’ revolution, ‘the’ organization: ‘bureaucratic organizations’ have the following nineteen properties, or something like that, which is the typical form of covering law statements. But, on the other hand, there is the reasoning which says: no, bureaucratic organizations don’t have any properties except those we impute to them by definition, but we can see a whole set of causal processes operating within them that produce the effects. It’s at the level of how people get work done in organizations that we are likely to be able to make causal statements about what actually causes organizations to run, rather than at the level of saying: organizations that are strongly embedded in their environment have the following other properties.

Another pernicious postulate that you criticize is the idea of individual mental events being the basic elements in causal explanations of social behaviour. As an alternative you then propose to take relationships rather than individuals and their intentions as the basic units of analysis. But is it really possible to arrive at a truly causal explanation that doesn’t ultimately refer to the intentions and strategic calculations of the individuals and groups involved in the process to be explained, even if we do admit that there is no direct link between individual intentions and collective outcomes, and that intentions are themselves
the result of previous interactions? Where does intention come into the picture?

Let me say a couple of things in preface, and then answer the question directly. In preface, let’s remember that no individual ever acts as an individual. An individual is just as much a social construction as anything else. In fact, in many respects organizations operate more coherently than individuals. The individual is a construction in some sense and all that ever acts is a portion of what we hypothesize to be the individual. That’s the first ground-clearing statement. The second ground-clearing statement is that intentions are relevant. One of the things we would like to know about a dyad is what definitions people are working with at either end of that dyad. That’s one of a number of conditions that constrain how the dyad will operate. As I work on repertoires I see increasingly the importance of shared visions of the future as a constraint on the way people act in the present. So, it is not that intentions are irrelevant. My doctrine is not a behaviourist doctrine that says we can derive everything from the nerve endings, or something like that.

With those two ground-clearing statements, I see no reason why we can’t have causal statements about the kinds of intentions that people generate for themselves. You can ask yourself: Why is it that people construct for themselves this story about what’s happening to them right now? - which is about as close as we get to intentions in any case. By and large what we have in mind when we talk about intentions is the story that people would tell themselves if they were given an opportunity to be self-conscious about their state of reflection at the point of a certain action. I think that is a legitimate object of social explanation, and what’s more I think that to the extent that people do reconstruct the state of action it is a constraint, so it is part of the story we want to tell. But is seems to be only part, or one of the stories. Let’s look at interactions. What’s marvellous about dealing with humans and not ants, is that humans are so good at reconstructing their intentions in the course of interaction. Reinterpreting them, reconstructing them, drawing on new emotions, new tensions and so forth. And that’s a dynamic process, that’s a process that goes on in interpersonal relationships very dramatically. So one of the things we most want to
have is an account of how it is that the sheer process of social interaction produces new intentions.

OK, another aside, and then back to the main course. This is the problem with rational action accounts. They are very nice because they provide us with a fairly simple calculus for a wide variety of situations. But the problem with rational action accounts as they appear in game theory, as they appear in neo-classical economics, as they appear in James Coleman’s huge compendium\(^5\), is that they assume just what the story I was telling a minute ago denies, and that is that preferences, identities, and resources are given in advance and fixed for the course of the action you are trying to account for. This is the continuing debate I have with Michael Hechter, who is certainly one of the most intelligent advocates of a rational choice approach to social phenomena.\(^6\) In social life there are only few circumstances in which we can reasonably suppose that the choices are known and their outcomes are reasonable to estimate, information is cheap, preferences, utilities, or interests are fixed, resources are known and the identities of the players are known. That those are all fixed and that they are fixed for the entire course of the action. Now there are games that we play in which this state of things is a reasonable approximation, but most of social life doesn’t operate this way. All of these things are under constant negotiation, and we ought to be analysing that renegotiation of identities and interests.

This leads right back to the main point: there is a causal analysis of intentions there, no question about it, but the idea that the intentions are prior to the action is what I would resist very strongly. You know they exist there, then the action occurs - well, that is just not my idea of how social action occurs.

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I am much impressed with Bill Gamson’s recent book in which he discusses the frames in which people carry on political conversations.\(^7\) I think it is true that we have most of the time available to us a limited number of frames in which we carry on discussions of various subjects. We don’t have to agree, Gamson’s doctrine is not that we all agree on these things: you can disagree within the same frame. You can say something is really an environmental question and then you can disagree about what the relative importance of different elements is, or how serious it is. But to define something as really an economic question is to place the discussion in a certain frame and to exclude a large number of alternatives. I think that most of our conversing with life takes this form. We lay down a provisional frame - this is mostly a social act, even if we seem to be doing it individually, we are incorporating other people’s opinions and influences, we are anticipating responses and so forth - and we carry on a negotiation, a discussion within that frame. Now, that process is one that generates new intentions in some sense but also constrains intentions. It is that interplay that’s worth analysing.

Now for a question which may particularly interest the readers of the 'Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift'. In the light of these issues, what is your opinion of Elias’s theory of civilization? Does his emphasis on the process character of social change correspond to your emphasis on causal mechanisms, and do you consider his focus on interdependence as a good example of the interactionist analysis you advocate?

Well, I am not an expert on Elias, but here’s my impression. Elias was brilliant when it came to detecting the standardizing effects on etiquette and social style of the great courts of Europe, especially that of Louis XIV. But his history had two serious defects, at least. One of them was that it had a kind of teleology in it. In the Civilizing Process\(^8\) - which is all I have read, so there’s a lot of stuff about figurational sociology which is apparently somewhere else, that I have never read, and people


keep telling me that that is the better stuff - what I find is first of all a strong if not very well articulated teleology, which says that the civilizing process had to happen in some sense. It is teleological in the sense that later events explain earlier events, that the end explains the process. The second thing is that it is like many other unilinear histories - some of them teleological and some not - in that it ignores all the counterhistories. It seems to me to be a very selective history, that imagines that everything that has happened since the 17th century is civilizing. Now I don’t want to cartoon Elias, but it seems to me that, for example, to notice that people stop killing each other on the streets is important, but it’s also important to notice that states started killing their own citizens and the citizens of other states to a degree unheard of before the 17th century. I don’t see how you can write a history of violence since 1600 which does not have at least two panels: one of which is to recognize that in Western Europe, as Elias does, states deprived their citizens of the means of private violence, by and large. That’s true and it is important. The other thing is that European states developed a capacity to kill people that no states had previously enjoyed, and the rate of killing in war went up century by century, over that time. So the 20th century is from the point of view of deaths in war the most brutal century in human history. Now this is a dramatic example, but it seems to me much more generally that the Civilizing Process selects from the story those portions which best fit it. In that respect, I hate to say it, Elias looks a lot like Foucault.

Changing Repertoires of Contention

You are presently working on a book on collective action in Great Britain between 1750 and 1840, and you will understand that we are very curious about it. What would interest us especially is to what extent the results of this research confirm what you found for France in ‘The Contentious French’ (1986a), and to what extent it provides new insights, or forces you to reconsider conclusions and generalizations made on the basis of the French case?

That’s a good question, and somehow I am less prepared for it than I am for your earlier questions. I am unclear in my own mind how much
of my change of position as I write this book is a consequence of differences between Great Britain and France, and how much is a consequence of the evolution in my own thinking, and I cannot quite pull these apart. Let me give it to you globally and then make a small effort to distinguish between what has happened to my own thinking and differences between the two countries that made me rethink what I had to say about France. As compared with my work on France, my work on Great Britain pays much more attention to the internal logic of contention itself, to the accumulated history of contention. In The Contentious French, the change of contentious repertoires looks like an almost automatic response to changes in structural conditions. The state grows more powerful, the economy capitalizes, and people adapt to that. It is a little more subtle than that, but still that’s the story. And there really isn’t much internal history to the struggle itself. I do not mean to say that I denied it had an internal history, but I did not regard it as very important. But as I look at the British experience, I see the enormous role of invention, of cumulative historical experience. What I see is people acting within a shared memory of how they, or other people, struggled before - what rights and privileges they had, what wrongs they suffered, and so forth. And I see people manoeuvring, pushing the edges, often led by what I would call political entrepreneurs. These are reformers to radicals, people like John Wilkes, Lord George Gordon, Tom Paine (people who figure in E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class⁹), who are enormously important in defining what is possible. At any given point in time you have a limited vision of what is possible, but you also have people pushing at the edge of what is possible, people who will say, what if we did this, what if we tried that, let us get together in this way, and so on. Most of this happening within the limits of existing repertoires of contention, or just at the edge. Still testing, one way or another, and anticipating the response of the others. This is happening at multiple levels; which is consistent with my own limited experience as a social movement activist.¹⁰ When I think of it I ask myself, how could I


¹⁰ At the University of Delaware, where Tilly taught from 1956 to 1962, he occasionally helped plan civil-rights actions like sit-ins, occasionally took part in a
have forgotten that when I was analysing the French experience? I guess the answer is I forgot about it because we did not get very far (laughs) - we did not cause the revolution or transform the government or seize power or anything. That was part of the pathos of the work that I was doing then: it is all very noble but it does not make much difference.

What I see in the British case is that it does make a difference. The police are also calculating that way, the lords are calculating that way... There are in fact a whole series of strategic actors who are operating within an accumulation of experience and defining what is possible in that accumulation of experience. And all of them are somehow manoeuvring at the edges, seeking advantages. The net effect of that is something none of them anticipate - it is unintended consequences all the way. Nonetheless it is real, and the consequence is that forms of action that were previously quite feasible become unfeasible. Forms of action that were previously inconceivable, illegal, forms of engagement you could get killed in, become feasible, standard. The thing that impresses me extraordinarily about the British system is how rapidly a successful innovation spreads. It is as if everybody was watching! This is something which is supposed to only have happened in the 1960s: The whole world is watching! It is as if already in 1780 the whole world, at least, the whole world of Great Britain, were watching: an innovation gets adopted very rapidly by others. There are some mysteries here. I am still trying to figure out how this world of precedent operates. How can it be that the authorities do not simply say, FORGET IT! How is it that they pay so much attention to precedent? It is not just British conservatism, it is something else. Empirically it is clear that when a group of people has established a way of acting that

civil-rights demonstration, and tried unsuccessfully to hire black professionals at the university. At Harvard (1963-1966) his work on housing and racial segregation again brought him to the edge of the civil-rights movement, although chiefly as a consultant on housing matters. At Toronto (1966-1968) he joined demonstrations against the American involvement in Vietnam and against recruiters for Dow Chemical. At Michigan (1969-1984) he had many students who were social-movement activists, helped run teach-ins, agitated against secret research, and occasionally joined (or even helped organize) demonstrations, chiefly against the Vietnam War.

previously was unacceptable, they come to a sort of pact with the authorities about that. That way of acting has a powerful precedent for others.

The biggest difference with *The Contentious French* lies in the recognition that the internal experience of contention is coherent and it is cultural - in the sense that it generates and rests on shared understandings. Shared understandings which include *and* exclude: there are many things that are technically possible with the available resources, and that people never think of. Which incidentally is one of the strongest critiques of the rational action approach to such analyses.

I did have some sense of this notion of a coherent and cumulative and culturally embedded history of contention. When forced to talk about it generally, I said such a thing was happening, in the general language of *The Contentious French* and other books on France. So what I am saying now does not constitute an utter refutation of what I was saying before. Nonetheless, the main story I had told before was a story in which structural changes were inexorable - had the last word - and people reacted to them; and I just cannot make that compatible with the story of Great Britain. Right now I am not in a good position to say how much of this is learning something about Great Britain, and how much is learning something about collective action that I just did not recognize as I was doing these big chunks of French experience. But I am going to have an opportunity to do that because one of my next books will be called *Making Claims* and it will centre on a comparison of British and French experience. I will attempt in that book to subordinate the British and French and maybe some other experiences to a common set of questions in order to account for the variation - to see if I can follow through on the programme that I have given you in answer to your questions.

It is a very different kind of history that I am writing now. Yet I do not think it refutes the French history. Let me give you one example. My late friend Edward Thompson was a great man, but in some sense he was so influential that he falsified the analysis of popular collective action between 1780 and 1820 in the sense that through his book on *The Making of the English Working Class*, he made everybody think that the problem was a problem of class formation. Even those who did
not believe in it, like Gareth Stedman Jones\textsuperscript{12}, felt they had to reply to Edward Thompson. Now although much of what he says is brilliant and right - some is brilliant and not right, some is right and not brilliant, it’s a fourfold table (laughs) - in the Thompson story, there really is no state: it is amazing. The state figures as an instrument of the ruling classes who are really quite vague. Who are they? Are they landlords, are they capitalists, are they in one big conspiracy? One of the strongest lessons of my analysis is that the expansion of the state and particularly of the fiscal power of the state, the British state, during the Napoleonic Wars, transformed national politics in two senses. One, it meant that for every locality in Britain, the decisions of national powerholders were more important than they had ever been before. That part, at least its equivalent, I talked about in \textit{The Contentious French} and other books on France. The second is - and this does \textit{not} occur in France - a shift from the King and his ministers to Parliament. This shows up in my data in an extraordinary way. I have done a network analysis of who makes claims, who receives claims, who are the object of claims and what are the modes of those claims. If you look at the period of my data, the period from 1758 to 1834, it is unambiguous that first of all, national objects of claims increase enormously in salience. Now that much I expected more or less. But, second, there is a remarkable shift away from the King and ministers toward Parliament, which really becomes the centre of the whole system of claim-making just as it becomes the centre of political power. The mechanism is fairly straightforward (although nobody quite realized what was happening, even Pitt who was at the very middle of this process): because of the enormous increase in taxation that occurred in the 1790s - and because Parliament for centuries before had acquired power over wartime taxation - Parliament’s power to pass money bills was shifting the power to make decisions about everything in the country to Parliament. And popular politics responded to that. Thus, by the 1830s, the centrality of the British system has greatly increased, and Parliament has become its central node.

Does that mean that the shift-towards-Parliament should be shifted a century? Conventional research states that this shift occurred at the end of the seventeenth century whereas actually the main locus of claim-making was, at that time, still placed very firmly with the King and his ministers and remained so until the end of the eighteenth century.

If you could afford to do the kind of dense research that I am doing over a longer period of time, say from 1600 to 1850, I think you would discover fluctuations in this regard, although the one I mentioned would be by far the largest and most definitive fluctuation. One would find that at the arrival of good Dutch William III, parliamentary power did increase; but George III, who became King in 1760, was able to corrupt that system to some extent by means of patronage. In any case, what you have is a rise in parliamentary power from 1660 to the 1690s; then a sort of settlement and then an increasing patronage politics which lasts from 1760 to the 1790s; then a new rise of Parliament to heights that it had never acquired before, simply because the costs of war. One of the things that Patrick O'Brien has established, is that the tax power of the British state was greater than that of the French state in the same period.13 (This is partly because the British had learned from the Dutch: 1689 is not incidental in this regard; they had benefited from the commercial contacts with the Netherlands and acquired a fiscal system which was quite efficient and was able to tap resources in a way that the French fiscal system could only dream of).

So my view of what is at issue here has changed in a number of ways and I am looking forward now to finishing this book and then undertaking a comparative one of which the centre will be a comparison between British and French paths to national popular politics - although I hope to be able to talk about the Netherlands, within my limited knowledge, and to talk about other parts of Europe.

Could one say that you have actually grown more loyal to your idea of 'repertoires of contention' than you were in your French history?

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Yes. In 1978, I published *From Mobilization to Revolution* which I had written largely as a set of instructions to a group of research assistants who were working on the British study which I began loosely in 1974 and seriously in 1975. It took ten years to collect the data. It was a big study: at the maximum I had fifty research assistants. The idea of repertoire appeared in *The Contentious French*, largely as a by-product of my work on Great Britain; and I realized only later that it had not fully permeated that book, because the main frame of that book had been set before I really ever had the idea of repertoire; and the main frame of that book is much more faithful to the work of George Rudé and Eric Hobsbawm, where there is a structural change and then people adapt to it.\(^\text{14}\)

Speaking of repertoires of contention, a notion which occupies such a central place in your work on collective action, your claim is that after 1850 we have a relatively constant repertoire, which replaced an older which existed roughly before 1850. Now, in Europe students of the so-called ‘new social movements’ have often claimed that these movements represent a new political paradigm, characterized by, among other things, loose, grassroots organizational forms, expressive action forms, and a relative absence of rigid ideologies. Do you think the new social movements can be seen as heralds of a new major repertoire shift? And do you agree with the claim of proponents of the ‘new social movements’ concept that we see similar tendencies in the recent East European revolutionary movements, which were also loosely organized, non-ideological, and expressive?

Well, as often, there are two fronts. Since you are putting me on record on this, let me put myself on record as saying the following. I want to answer in three parts. First, everything that Alberto Melucci or Alain

Touraine\textsuperscript{15} say about new social movements, you could also say about Chartism in its early phases, or about any number of other challenges that occurred in the 19th century. It is always true that there is loose grassroots organization, that there is diffuse ideology, that social movements are not bureaucratized from the top, are unclear about whether they challenge political power, that they create communities, etc. That has been true for a long time, it’s just true of some phases of social movements and not so true of other phases of social movements. It is not obvious to me that there is something special about the period since 1968 in that regard - I just can’t see it.

Second, if you take the gross forms of social movements, they don’t really look very different from the ones that preceded them. What do they do most of the time? They do the same things as their predecessors, although they do them with innovations, with some new style, new beliefs, and so forth.

The third thing I would want to say is: Of course, the world is changing, the situation is changing. No one in 1848 dreamed of demanding equal compensation for male and female jobs, dreamed of homosexual rights as a national public issue, dreamed of guaranteeing life styles. It is not that the issues stay forever the same. The issues change, but it is a great confusion to think that the issues themselves define the political form. This is something we would never imagine saying for elections. For elections, we have no problem recognizing that new issues arise in elections, and we don’t say these are no longer the old elections. Well, if you regard the social movement as a more or less established but evolving means of doing politics which became available in the 19th century at some point, then you should not be surprised that the forms have some continuity, they evolve in some way through struggle with authorities, but that the issues are volatile, because that’s the way politics works, and that’s in particular the way parliamentary politics works.

Now, whether the Eastern Europeans are inventing or adopting social movement politics is a wonderful question, and I think the answer is probably one third yes, and two thirds no. Yes, because other people

were watching it was possible to have things like demonstrations, it
came too risky for authorities to intervene when people started doing
something like what they thought were demonstrations, public meethings, and association forming. And it was things like Helsinki Watch
[a human rights organization established after the Helsinki agreements
of 1975] the presence of the European Community, the intervention of
the United States and so on, that made these forms possible. But
looked at closely they will turn out not to be a lot like the Greens in
Germany, they will turn out to be one third like them and two thirds
like network politics in the Soviet Union before 1985. My intuition at
present is that the assimilation of Polish, or Czech, or Bulgarian
politics to the green politics or feminist politics of Germany or the
Netherlands is a serious error.

Recent Developments in Social Movements and Statemaking

The recent revolutions in Eastern Europe seem to challenge many of
the standard ideas about revolutions. The ruling elite consciously
initiated reforms that diminished its own power over society, the Soviet
Union voluntarily gave up its control over the internal affairs of the
East European countries, and except in Rumania the elite hardly
resisted its overthrowal and as a result violence was remarkably absent
from the East European revolutions. Do the East European events
really constitute a new type of revolution, or do they resemble earlier
revolutions more then we would think?

Well, I think the answer is both. Of course, they constitute a new type
of revolution in the sense that major transfers in power over the state
occurred simultaneously in a whole series of countries related to
another major power with relatively little violence. That’s an unusual
circumstance - I can’t think of any other historical circumstance in
which that happened. But, in some sense, it goes back to what we were
talking about earlier. That is, there are many properties in common at
the level of causes, between what happened in the Soviet Union and
what happened in the Ottoman empire. You as closer observers than I
are certainly aware of the enormous importance of the presence of
Europeans who were not involved. Two things happened simultaneous-
ly: The European Community (not only the technical EC, but the Western European community in general) watched and the Soviet Union itself deliberately moved away from a stance of intervention in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact states.

Probably the most important single dynamic is the one in which Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union was no longer going to intervene forcibly to support its agents in the Warsaw Pact states, and for that matter even in the Soviet republics. This is extraordinary. My own story is one of stalemate in Afghanistan. To give it as a cartoon, the army is humiliated, they are breaking their budget over their military expenditure, and it doesn't look as if they are ever going to be able to get out. The Politburo is desperate to find a way out of this because they are beginning to get consumer complaints about the fact that a very large proportion of the total budget is going into military expenditure, with no glory resulting from it. There are all kinds of signs of dissidence, not only in Poland and Czechoslovakia, but also in Georgia, in Armenia, in Kazakhstan, and elsewhere. They have a very serious political problem and they solve it by bringing in a guy who has already made noises about diminishing the military effort and shifting the political balance within the Soviet Union toward civilian expenditure and consumers.

On the other side we have the Europeans broadly written (in this case the Europeans include the Americans) who are quite prepared to endorse claims for national independence on the part of states who were previously part of this bloc. They have had a campaign to do something like that for a long period of time, and they are prepared to intervene in some way, although it is very unclear, as we can see now in Bosnia, how far they would intervene. But nonetheless it seems likely that they will readily recognize the independence of a whole series of states.

This situation is unique and yet every single element of it has something to do with the way states came loose from the Ottoman Empire, the way states came loose from the Austro-Hungarian Empire during World War I, the way empires have disintegrated over a very long period of time. The part you most have to explain is the absence of military intervention by adjacent powers. That is the most surprising feature of it, but it is not the only time it has happened. Actually, in the formation of Belgium, there was military (British and French)
intervention but it was relatively limited because there were a whole series of other balance of power problems that constrained the Europeans. So, if we want to make analogies, let’s look at Belgium, let’s look at the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, let’s look more generally at war settlements, and let’s think of the way Europeans have ended wars over the last 400 years roughly, since the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. I am not claiming that it is the same as these, that’s the whole point of my previous argument, but there are pieces of it that are already there in the European experience.

But how can the events in Eastern Europe be reconciled with the model of the polity you have developed in ‘From Mobilization to Revolution’ (1978a)? In that book you draw a rather dichotomous picture of the polity, which distinguishes between members, who have power and try to cling to it, and challengers, who would like to get in. That model doesn’t really seem to hold in the East European case, because there we have members who are consciously trying to co-opt challengers, to give away some of their power, to relinquish control over Eastern Europe. The dichotomy, then, seems very fluid in this case.

Fair enough. I can attack this on the upslope and on the downslope. The upslope, my defensive action as I fight my way to your position, would be to say two things about From Mobilization to Revolution. The first is that the book has two halves, and the second half is much more subtle on such things than the first half. In the first half, what I was trying to do was deliberately to simplify the problem, and the polity model was one of the simplifications that I employed. The second thing to say is that within that polity model what I did was to draw lines as if there were a state, and then there are members of the polity; non-members or challengers; and people who are completely outside. Now if you look in the finer print of From Mobilization to Revolution you will find I say that this is in fact an approximation of what in fact is a continuum from no power at all to great power, and so on, but it is convenient to draw a line somewhere.

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16 This treaty of 1559 temporarily ended warfare between the Habsburgs and the kings of France.
So much for the positive defense. The downhill part is to say I don’t think that the premises that I adopted at that point are adequate to account for the variation among polities that I have since come to think is really the essence of political analysis. What’s wrong with the first half of *From Mobilization to Revolution* is that it *does* assume that there is a only one model, it really does provide a singular model of politics. It says all politics operates like this, all collective action operates like this, and all social movements operate like this. Again let me retreat to the defense, since it is my own work, and I love my children, including my intellectual children. The Finnish political scientist Risto Alapuro\(^\text{17}\) said to me one day: ‘I read that book several times and I really couldn’t understand it. I liked a lot of things about it but there was something peculiar about it, and then I finally realized that what it is, is a set of instructions to your research assistants, or: How to organize the world so you can do your work.’ And he is exactly right, that’s what the book is. It literally came into being as a consolidation of memoranda that I had written to my research group in Ann Arbor as a way of organizing the work we were doing. It involves a deliberate simplification and fixing of the world as any research project does. But as a set of statements about the world its fixation denies the variability in political processes that most of my work since that time has concentrated on. I think Sid Tarrow’s book in progress will displace it. In a sense I regret it: in its time it was a good book, but either I would have to rewrite the book, or he will do the job - and his book is great.\(^\text{18}\)

*Another question on recent developments: In one of your working papers for the ‘New School for Social Research’, referring to the resistance against the EC that occurred in Denmark, Britain, France, etc., you define this in terms of ‘last gasps of nationalism’ (1992a, 4). However, it seems probable that if referenda were held in more coun-

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tries, one would continue to find only these very small majorities in favour of the Community - nobody really being very enthusiastic about the EC. And then, consider the explosion of 'ethnic' nationalist claims everywhere. Can one in the light of this truly speak of 'last gasps'?

You may or may not be happy to know that this is the same challenge that Stanley Hoffmann has offered to what I have to say. Several well-informed people tell me that we are actually witnessing the full flowering of nationalism. I think there is a case to be made for that - I am not absolutely sure I am right. Nevertheless, there are a few things. First of all, the demand for national independence and self-determination is likely to be what you could call a 'theatre-fire phenomenon'. When there is a fire in the theatre, everybody rushes for the exit, and a lot of people get killed because not everybody reaches the exit. Actually, if people formed a queue, many more would be saved, but some would die - and that is the theatre-fire dilemma, that only a limited number of people gets through the exit. Now here, one could say that we are dealing with the closing of the exit: This is the last chance for a 150 bidders and no more than twenty will win their bids. That is exactly the situation in which all of the 150 will bid desperately.

There are whole series of things happening in the world which, by my analysis, make it unlikely that people can sustain nationalist claims much longer. This depends on a sense of history that lots of people would disagree with. My sense is that nationalism as a set of demands around the idea that a nation should correspond to a state and a state to a nation, flourishes when some group of people - linguistic entrepreneurs, bourgeoisie, a threatened minority - can profit from control of their own state and that that situation depends on the capacity of states to control the stocks and flows of resources within a delimited territory. That is about the essence of my theory. Now, that theory could easily be wrong - it could be wrong because the propositions are wrong, it could be wrong because there are other factors involved - but that's my theory. And then I look at the contemporary world and I say that the capacity of states throughout the world to control the stocks and flows within a delimited territory is rapidly declining. The capacity of any state in the world to limit the flow of persons across its borders is declining. Well, maybe not in China, or in Tibet. But, on the whole,
as Ari Zolberg and other people have documented\textsuperscript{19}, the flows of people across national frontiers - impelled by state action, drawn by opportunities for economic advancement, connected by kinship - are increasing very rapidly, in ways that states themselves are losing the capacity to monitor.

Second, flows of capital even more so. The capacity of the people who control capital to move it from one state jurisdiction to another is enormously increasing. Flows of technology, of communication from state to state are increasing. In fact, if you think of all the things that states fixed in place and monitored and bounded after 1750 or 1800, you recognize two things. One, that it was the capacity of states to fix these in place that enhanced their simultaneous capacity to define one language, one religion, one civic history, one collective memory, one definition of who people were, as the dominant identity, the dominant cultural form for that territory, and, second, that all those capacities are declining in the contemporary world. Now my reasoning is that, since those capacities are declining, the advantage of controlling a state is also declining; and that hence, in the longer run, the attractiveness of controlling your own state (with all the obvious costs this entails) is also declining and that, therefore, we are dealing with a temporary surge due to the closing door of opportunity to establish independent states. It looks to me as though this is the hope of all those states around the Eastern European periphery, every one of them begging that it can be the one that ties to the EC. So there they are, lined up - Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia - those perimeter states, each one hoping that it can demand some kind of ratification and preferential treatment. What is really astonishing in country after country is the hope - partially sustained by the European Community, partially sustained by the Americans - that aid from the West will be their solution and that they will become the new South Korea, the tie to the European market, to the American market, or something like that. That is alas a powerful incentive to become an independent state, so you do not have to drag along all the others with

you and to be first in the queue. But it looks to me to be illusory. They can’t all be first in the queue.

So this way of understanding the world leads me to think that we are dealing with a temporary phenomenon. However, I have to give lots of credit to the Stanley Hoffmann riposte which is: ‘Yes, that’s a nice theory but look at what’s happening!’ (laughs) I also think the complaint that people make against my colleague Eric Hobsbawm20 could equally apply to what I am saying, that is: You underestimate the intrinsic appeal of having your own state, of expressing yourself at a national level. Obviously there is another line, an essentialist line. I am not at all sure I am right on this. I certainly think there is something to what I say in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and so on: The hope of each of them that they would get a preferential relationship to the Western powers - as independent states, because a state is the price of admission. That is the point: it has been true for a hundred years or more that the way to acquire separate treatment as an economic entity and as a political entity is to have your own state and the decolonization that followed World War Two certainly confirmed this notion. So my analysis is a peculiar one, particularly for me as an empiricist, in that it says, yes, a lot of these things have been happening, but the structural condition for their continuing to happen are changing in such a way that I cannot expect them to happen much more than twenty more years. That is what I rest on.

We would like to make two short objections against your theory of closing opportunities. First, this surge of nationalism and ethnic movements is not just something of the last few years; you cite the work of Ted Robert Gurr who shows that this has been going on at least since the Second World War. Secondly, your theory about the declining advantage of having your own state is about absolute advantages; and what political entrepreneurs and political elites are interested in are often relative advantages. Having your own state can represent a relative advantage for political elites vis-à-vis their citizens or vis-à-vis central authorities - elites in Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan or wherever.

First of all, the frequency of what Ted Robert Gurr\textsuperscript{21} calls politicide and genocide has actually been rising in the world over this period since 1945. So it is not a constant since that time. This is a minor objection though; it certainly is true that people have been struggling over their own states very widely since 1945 which is one reason why the membership in the United Nations has risen from something like 45 in 1945 to a 170 or so today.

The notion of relative advantage is very important here. Nonetheless, relative advantage ultimately depends on absolute advantage. It ultimately depends on whether there is any advantage at all to create your own state; because, to put it in crudely economic terms, it costs something - if it were zero cost, then the relativists would always be right. But, in fact, it takes a large effort and there are two parts to the cost at least: one of them is the transition to a state, which entails organizing, getting rid of other factions, and these costs are very large. The second thing is that once you are there, the costs are also large. Note how ridiculous it is that there be a thousand national armies in the world. Not only because of the likelihood that a thousand armies would find reasons to fight each other, but also because to expend on a thousand armies would enrich the arms merchants of the world more then it would enrich the ordinary people. And yet in the world of our own time, it is likely that any state that becomes independent establishes its own army first thing - although Costa Rica, and, partially, Germany and Japan, are exceptions. I think that is a waste of energy and expenditure. To the extent that it occupies 25\% of national budgets and 5 to 10\% of GNP - more, in some countries: 22\% in Iraq today - that is a major drain on the welfare of citizens. The multiplication of states is likely to increase both the competition and the absolute levels of that expenditure. That is the most salient example and the one that I probably care about the most, but it is only one case in point of the entry costs of establishing your own state. It is not a costless activity.

Not costless to the citizens; but what about the political elites involved? They themselves would probably argue that while it might not be a good idea in the long run, it’s ‘après moi le déluge’ as far as they themselves are concerned. Especially since in many cases the leaders of current nationalist movements are threatened elites with very much to lose if they do not do anything.

Absolutely. I am not claiming that it is an utterly irrational process from the point of view of the leaders in such processes. They have a lot to lose and something to gain from being leaders of - God help us - something like Kosovo or Macedonia or even Bosnia, Transdniestria.

There is a moral side to my argument as well. I have a piece coming out in the American journal Daedalus, called ‘National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us’ (1993b). In fact I am in the same issue with Stanley Hoffmann. Stanley’s piece says, nationalism is rampant; and I am saying, national self-determination is a terrible principle. There is a kind of moral sense. I would greatly prefer a world in which we detached the principle of cultural variation from the principle of national power. I guess when it comes down to it I would rather see that the principle of national power be less important.

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