Problems of Historical Causation in Emotions Research

Growing interest by historians and sociologists in dealing with emotional standards and their impact has produced corresponding interest in the question of change. It is now abundantly clear that basic emotional norms can and do change, and with this important aspects of emotional experience and social reactions. Because of different cultures, American soldiers during the Civil War tended to present their experience in terms of tales of courage (or to be silent), whereas in contrast their counterparts a hundred years later, in the 1960s, felt authorized to describe vivid fears (Stearns & Haggerty 1991; Wouters 1991). Because of different emotional cultures, American courts during the 1860s allowed the possibility that intense jealousy might be a legitimate excuse for a man to murder his wife’s lover, whereas, again a hundred years later, American courts had specifically banned such a legal defense (Stearns 1989a). Change occurs, in sum, and it matters. We are far from knowing all that we should about the phenomenon of change, even in modern American and West European history, but the subject has become inescapable in any systematic social research on emotion and it is beginning to have some impact on psychological research as well.

The need to examine causation

Change brings with it inevitable questions about causation, and here analysis has lagged somewhat. It is both understandable and correct that descriptions of change must precede focused attention on causation. We are beginning to move to a point, however, where enough historical cases exist to offer some general observations about causation. Historians quickly argue, of course, that each case of change presents important unique features. Some emotions research will doubtless proceed in the rather informal fashion popu-
lar among historians, where general discussions of context provide a sense of correlative factors such that shifts in emotional standards relate, though not too precisely, to broader social patterns. Precisely because the history of emotions is an interdisciplinary endeavor, discussion of some general feature of causation is warranted -not to preempt the nuanced case-by-case analysis but to provide some avenues toward more systematic statements.

Formal discussion of causes of change in emotions is desirable, further, on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. The theoretical framework for a focus on change is part of the larger constructionist argument that looks to social and cultural context rather than invariant biology in discussing what emotions are in real life, and what functions they serve. The constructionist idea that emotions are (at least in part) designed to fit particular social settings places great importance on emotionology, or standards, as the intermediary between that setting and actual emotional experience; standards, tailored to the setting, in turn affect the incidence and cognitive perception of experience. The same constructionist tenet also must assume both that this experience changes - because social needs change - and that it is important to explore the reasons for change as part of the constructionist demonstration. Attention to causation is virtually built into the constructionist framework. Constructionist definitions, however, have frequently been distressingly vague about the kinds of social needs whose changes reconstruct emotional standards. There are far more assertions that functions prompt change, in the abstract, than illustrations of how this process occurs (Armon-Jones 1986). Further, again in the constructionist theoretical literature, there is an implicit debate about the nature of functionalism. James Averill and many constructionist sociologists speak of functional causation in fairly general terms, but with a strong bias toward economic factors broadly construed (Averill 1980). When a society’s economic emphases change, its emotional standards will shift accordingly. This is the guiding theme in Arlie Hochschild’s work on attempts to manipulate emotions in the American workplace in the later 20th century (Hochschild 1983). Constructionists in anthropology, however, tend to emphasize the role of culture in shaping emotional patterns; their picture of functionalism is far broader than some of the structural functionalists (Lutz 1986, 1988). But most anthropologists have used cultural causation rather statically. Focusing on distinctive emotional standards in particular, usually hunting-and-gathering settings, they have
assumed that the culture that caused the standards emerged in a remote past and has remained fairly constant over recent time. They do not provide models of cultural causation of change, even as they clearly spell out the role of cultural causation in generating variety. In sum, constructionism can be accused of vagueness and abstraction in moving from general functionalist statements to illustrations of why emotional standards change in major historical cases, and a gap between structural and cultural functionalism has not been very explicitly addressed. Because historical research on emotions must be at least partially constructionist, in arguing that emotions are by no means constant over time, the gaps in the constructionist analysis constitute weaknesses that should be addressed.

Finally, there are pragmatic problems with existing causation analyses whenever a specific historical case is addressed. Because so much attention in this new field has been paid to establishing the nature of change, explanation has frequently been somewhat off-hand and correspondingly simplistic. There has been a pronounced tendency to seek a single basic cause, and while monocausal analysis may certainly prove correct it is not usually valid - that is, most established historical analysis in other fields urges a multicausal approach to any serious social change - and it also generates blinders that preclude more systematic assessments. The fairest way to illustrate this problem comes from my own work. Focusing on increasing anxiety about anger in the 20th century, Carol Stearns and I used a largely structural explanation (Stearns & Stearns 1986). Earlier anger formulas, that had urged the importance of the emotion in motivating economic and political action, were reassessed in the United States from the 1920s onward because of the growth of management bureaucracies. Industrial psychologists helped business leaders devise new strategies to defuse anger in the workplace, and this quickly spilled over into larger hostility to anger, even in the socialization of children. Additional specific factors contributed to this process - for example, revulsion against Nazi aggression that seemed to demonstrate how important it was to curb anger on all fronts - but the basic motivation followed from the new demands of complex corporate organization. This fairly strictly functional analysis worked well enough for anger, but proved quite limited when attention turned to other emotional changes in the United States that occurred at about the same time and had some otherwise similar characteristics. Fear, for example, also began to be reassessed in the 1920s (Stearns & Haggerty
1991). Victorian culture had emphasized the glory (though only for men) in encountering fear and mastering it through courage; boys’ stories filled with examples of this process. In the 1920s however prescriptive literature began to warn that fear was too dangerous to treat in this fashion. Urging courage might produce damaging traumas. Parents should help boys as well as girls avoid frightening situations, and where fear did nevertheless develop they should use emotional reassurance and manipulative strategies - like placing candy in a darkened room to help a child overcome night terrors - instead of prompting toward courage. This was a significant shift, that set in motion the larger cultural change that would legitimate new kinds of admissions of fears even by adults. The change occurred not only at the same time as the reevaluation of anger, but it had a similar thrust in arguing for avoidance of problematic emotions and emotional intensity. But it proved impossible to argue that the reevaluation of fear stemmed from the rise of corporate management. A more eclectic approach to causation, that would include cultural as well as structural change, was essential, for the new approach to fear stemmed from growing anxieties about health and declining religious certainty - points spelled out in greater detail below. This discovery led not only to reassessment of my only earlier reliance on a narrower kind of functionalism, but to questions about other historical explanations of emotions change that had relied on single basic causes.

For theoretical and practical reasons, then, some new thinking about how to explain emotional change seems imperative. Three instances of emotionological change have by now been explored fairly extensively: the late 17th-18th centuries, when new kinds of impulse restraint (the ‘civilizing process’) (Elias 1978) and new attention to family intimacy reshaped emotional culture (Trumbach 1978); the mid-19th century, when a distinctive Victorian emotional style emerged; and the mid-20th century, when the Victorian style was itself revisited in favor of what Cas Wouters has called a new ‘informalization’ (Wouters 1987). Three cases are not abundant, and their diversity warns against any simple causation schema that would claim to be valid for all time. But there are a few basic lessons to be derived from the cases, that can usefully guide analysis in these time periods and, potentially, in other instances of historical change as well. The focus on emotionology provides the clearest instance of change, but the resultant standards demonstrably affect ‘real’ emotional experience as well, which means that causa-
tion determines more than culture alone. New standards legitimate or deny certain emotional expression, and while experience changes less uniformly (and less rapidly) than standards, both incidence of emotion and self-perceptions change as a consequence of cultural shifts.

The Victorian Case

We can begin by briefly canvassing the principal reasons that Victorian emotional culture moved away from the patterns established in the previous century, using this case as an entry to more general causation issues. In the United States, Victorian innovation began to be quite visible beginning about the 1840s, after several decades in which advice-writers tried to adapt the previous standards to a new environment without fundamental reassessment. Victorian emotional culture is quite familiar in many respects, but it has not actually been systematically explored with an eye to causation. A causation framework can however be identified, which will in turn clarify some of the patterns involved in other instances of historical change.

Victorian innovations in emotional culture involved several key points, when compared with late 18th– early 19th-century patterns. A marked gender distinction developed, with men and women held to have different emotional attributes and obligations (Stearns 1992). Relatedly, a novel differentiation between public and familial emotions gained emphasis, this bearing particularly on men who were assigned quite different emotional rules depending on locale. A complex combination of emotional control and emotional intensity was urged on both men and women (though in different specific forms depending on gender). Women were supposed to assure intense love, but to keep it under some control, particularly in their maternal functions, in order to prevent overwhelming impact (Lewis 1989). Men were told to avoid anger in a host of situations but also not to lose this emotional capacity, for a man without the spark of anger was a mere shell. Overall, a mixture of careful targeting along with a high valuation of intensity describes the emotional style that emerged in the prescriptive literature, at least for the middle class in the United States, after the 1830s; and the major features persisted into the early 20th century.

Three concurrent functional pressures help explain the Victorian
emotional culture. Increasing industrialization and urbanization heightened social class anxieties, a particularly important change in the relatively democratic social climate of the new United States. Concerns about lower-class and immigrant groups gave the American middle class growing reason to insist on emotional rules, so that they would be able to identify respectable strangers and label impulsive behavior unacceptable, a reason for withdrawal of sympathy (Kasson 1990). The same processes weakened the ability to rely on community enforcement of emotional sanctions, contributing to growing emphasis on introducing guilt into the childrearing process and into public punishments as well (Demos 1988). Industrialization also, however, created new concerns about appropriate motivations. Men, as the principal workers in the world, needed to have the emotional spur to drive them to competitive economic behavior and to morally-committed political action. Here was a chief reason that growing attention was paid to preserving though also channeling emotional impulses like anger and also the capacity to meet and surmount fear (Stearns & Stearns 1986). The complicated dictates of an increasing commercial, industrial economy thus explain much of the Victorian amalgam of regulation and intensification - both served functional ends in a socially-stratified but also daunting economic environment.

The third new functional emphasis followed from middle-class birth control needs. With child mortality rates declining in the middle class, as early as the 1790s in the United States, and with growing concern about the possibility of loss of property and attendant downward mobility, restriction of birth rates became a pressing issue. As late as the 1890s, as an important survey of middle class sexuality revealed (the Mosher report), middle-class couples had to rely on sexual abstinence during times when avoiding of conception seemed absolutely imperative. Victorian standards did not attack sexuality entirely, as a number of recent studies have shown, but they did seek an emotional culture that would help couples avoid premature or excessive sexuality in light of birth control requirements (Seidman 1991). The resultant pattern showed particularly in middle-class emphasis on an intense but spiritualized love, in which sexual expression would play a subordinate role (Lystra 1989). But attempts to sublimate sexual drives may also have contributed to the more general emphasis on emotional intensity, as a means of encouraging outlets for energy that were both constructive and distracting. When advice writers
and school authorities, for example, urged boys to commit themselves to sports like boxing as an excellent means of retaining the capacity for anger while channeling it away from personal discord, they were also implicitly suggesting satisfactions in physical expressions of intense emotion that derived from the sexual.

Victorian innovations in emotional culture followed, then, from several new or heightened needs that in turn resulted from the new economic, social and demographic context. They were clearly functional, even if most prescriptive literature clothed them in moralistic garb. But Victorian emotionology also resulted from two kinds of cultural change, that must be added to functionalism in the narrower sense if the actual range of emotional goals is to be properly explained.

First, the shifts in emotional norms closely intertwined with adjustments in mainstream Protestantism after about 1830. Growing insistence on a benign God helped promote new, if selective, concern about anger. New beliefs about heaven set an unusual context for the experience of grief. Increasingly, heaven was portrayed as a gigantic family reunion, in which relatives would be reunited in eternal love. This grief, propagated in hosts of sermons as well as advice tracts, helps explain the Victorian fascination with grief as a bittersweet experience (Rosenblatt 1983). Traditional uses of fear came under new attack, as religion shifted from theological emphasis to a more upbeat, emotionally positive religion. Middle-class Americans explicitly condemned pastors who tried to inspire religious loyalty through fear - many churches split and many ministers were expelled over this very issue - and at the same time a new attack on the deliberate use of fear in child-rearing brought the point home in emotional culture. A standard argument from the 1830s onward held that children would have no reason to develop fears 'unless it was put into their heads'. Adults who scared children to keep them in line risked 'embittering the whole existence' of the offspring. Love, not fear, should be the emotional lodestar for parents, now that fear and piety were contradictory rather than complementary. A key focus of the new campaign against fear in childrearing involved the presentation of death. American Calvinists had used the terror of death to intimidate children and impress them with God's majesty; unrepentant children were 'not too little to die', 'not too little to go to hell'. But the Victorian view was that children were innocent and
God loving, which meant that death must be cast in different fashion. Advice writers tuned their message with new precision: ‘Great care is required that children do not imbibe terrific and gloomy ideas of death; nor should they incautiously be taken to funerals, or allowed to see a corpse. It is desirable to dwell on the joys of the righteous in the presence of their heavenly Father, freed from every pain and sorrow...’. Death must be seen as a serene and joyous release. Thus a child might be told about the death of a playmate: ‘she would like to live but she was ready to go ... she had a happy life in this world but felt sure that a still happier one awaited her in the next’ (Stannard 1975).

Clearly, major changes in traditional religion found faithful echo in equally significant shifts in emotional advice. But the connections had another facet as well, less obvious but equally important. Victorian fascination with intense love owed much not simply to increasing emphasis on a loving deity, but to a sense that human emotion must supply some of the spirituality that formal religion no longer emphasized, at least in mainstream Protestantism (Lewis 1989; Lystra 1989). Many middle-class Americans began to question their own religious commitment, aware that the theology of their forebears was being watered down. Some no doubt became less religiously active, but others felt something of a void. Here, emotional intensity could be sought as a direct equivalent to a religious experience that was otherwise slipping away. This meant that old debates about the competition between worldly emotions and religious duties, though still present, were recast, with arguments that emotional experience provided directly religious satisfactions.

The emotion-as-religion theme showed up most explicitly in discussions of maternal and romantic love (Lewis 1989). Mother-love took on Christ-like overtones: its focus was consuming, it expressed itself in self-sacrifice, it served as a beacon through life even when mother herself had passed from the scene. Actual mothers could comment, with a mixture of pride and concern, about the ways in which their love provided them and their children with religious equivalence. Ideals of romantic love picked up the same theme: in intense, spiritualized passion, couples hoped to find some of the same balm to the soul that religion had once, as they dimly perceived, provided. Not only sexual abstinence but religious change thus shaped the distinctive Victorian spirituality in love. Byron Calwell Smith put it this way, in love letters in the
1870s: ‘I feel somehow that the Holy power which sustains and moves the ancient universe (...) reveals itself to me as love. To love you (...) and to sink my life in the Divine life through you, seem to me the supreme end of my existence (...) Love is a cult and our love shall be our religion. (...) To each other we shall reveal only the divine attributes of tenderness and patience.’ While men may have particularly emphasized love as a religious surrogate, women could respond in kind. Angelina Grimke’s love letters argued that ‘our Father has enjoined us together, he has given us to each other (...) True love (...) is the seeking of the spirit after spiritual communion (...) the union of heart and mind and soul’ (Seidman 1991).

Victorian emotional culture owed much, then, to the unusual configuration of middle-class religion, in which doctrinal changes required shifts in emotional signals and in which declining spirituality gave new functions to certain emotions as well. Religious causation is essential in explaining distinctive Victorian formulations concerning grief, love and fear; a more narrowly functionalist approach does not suffice.

A second kind of cultural ingredient, however, flowed from emotionology itself. Emotional standards, gradually introduced, helped trigger additional shifts in overall emotional culture. In the Victorian period, this worked in two ways. First, Victorian popularizers amplified certain emotionological themes that had been taking shape in the 18th century. Their apotheosis of family love was no mere reaction to the stresses of urban, industrial society, though it included this element. It built on the growing focus on family intensity that had been part of the emotional trends of the previous period. The results were novel: 19th-century doctrines of mother-love and grief had not existed during the 18th century. But the idea of using family to provide emotional solace stemmed in part from previous developments. At the same time, Victorian values themselves supported additional innovations. With growing emphasis on family love, for example, the cultural basis was set for increasing reliance on guilt as an emotional enforcement in childrearing (Demos 1988). Victorians unquestionably jettisoned earlier childrearing practices, that had stressed shame, in favor of inculcation of guilt. A favorite device was to send an errant child to his room, where he could dwell upon his faults until ready to apologize. This technique clearly depended on acute reactions to isolation from the loving family circle and then a functional use of
avowals of guilt to restore membership in this same circle. Grow­
ing reliance on guilt had, to be sure, a functional base, in the decline of tight communities as reliable enforcers of suitable behavior. But it also followed from other elements of the dominant emotionology. Emotion, in this sense, helped cause emotion, as the Victorians constructed a new, interlocking set of standards.

Patterns of Causation: The Need for Multiple Factors

The lessons from this brief assessment of the principal lines of causation for Victorian emotional culture are simple but clear. First, no single factor seems adequate to explain either the range of emotional standards or the underlying style. Relevant changes in societal structure were themselves diverse: while motivational emotions like courage and channeled anger responded to new needs in work and public life, the larger emotional culture also flowed from shifts in demography and in community life. The mixture of causes is not random; there is no need to adduce every development in 19th-century American history to explain emotional norms. But the temptation to some monocausal explanation, that might for example stress only the impact of industrialization and its attendant social tensions, is unquestionably misleading. The emotional flavor of Victorianism flowed from the combination of several different developments. Emotional norms sought to respond to a mixture of new social, cultural and familial needs.

Second, the causation mixture includes both structural and cultural ingredients. The changes in structure, undercutting traditional community control and highlighting the importance of emotional goads for business competition, explain much of the timing and direction of innovations in emotionology. But culture enters in strongly as well. It would be a bold researcher who would seek to explain the odd Victorian language of love by functionalism alone, or even primarily. Prior emotionological developments and, above all, the religious shifts were crucial. Yet love was in many ways the linchpin of the whole Victorian emotional structure, particularly in explaining how the two genders, otherwise emotionally so different, could join in successful family life (Lystra 1989). Cultural change not only directed much of the shift in emotional norms, it is also particularly open to demonstration. Arguments about the role of economic or demographic change
in producing a new emotionology rarely find abundant demonstration in the actual historical sources. Popular advice writers talked, to be sure, about the importance of preparing boys emotionally for work in the world and of readying girls for their domestic tasks; but they did not explicitly connect their messages with the new economics of industrialization. The historian is speculating, though very plausibly, in connecting structural change with emotionological result. Cultural change, as we have seen, figured very directly in the prescriptive literature and in private diaries and letters that indicate how this literature was internalized. Victorians wrote quite self-consciously about how their emotional standards related to their religious values and religious uncertainties. These demonstrable connections do not elevate culture above structural change in explaining emotional norms, but they certainly support the inclusion of a strong cultural component in any causation analysis.

Multi-factored causation and a mixture of structural and cultural components can be brought to bear not only on Victorian emotional culture, but on the two other emotionological transitions that have been extensively explored. The result is not the construction of any tidy model of explaining emotional change, but a set of guidelines or leading questions in approaching the whole task of analysis.

Most obviously, a major shift in economic structure is involved in all three cases. Several of the new trends highlighted in the emotional culture of the late 17th and 18th century follow in substantial part from the expansion of a commercial economy; even the growing emphasis on family may relate in part to a desire for an emotional alternative to commercial competition, and certainly themes of self-control and explicit character assessment relate to the commercialization of the Western economy (Leites 1985). The addition of the strong industrialization component has already been discussed for the 19th century. Beginning in the 1920s, at least in the United States, the expansion of corporate organization and the rise of the service sector helped prompt a reconsideration of Victorian emotional rules, with new emphasis on group cohesion and reduction of potential emotional friction (de Swaan 1981).

Two of the three change points also involve alterations in family and demographic structure. The importance of new birth control needs in generating the Victorian emotional style has already been emphasized, along with a new separation between family and community. In the 1920s, extremely small average family size altered
relationships between children and parents, producing more concern about sibling rivalry for example, while the declining child death rate inevitably prompted a reconsideration of basic grief norms. A comparable demographic shift cannot at this point be posited for the 17th-18th century transition, which reminds us that no single causational formula can be expected across time. But the factor warrants inquiry, even if the results vary with the case.

Religious change operates in all three cases. The importance of Protestantism in encouraging, by the 17th century, new attention to positive family emotions has been well established. Jean Flandrin makes a similar argument for changes within French Catholicism, while religious change began to affect the treatment of fear in both Protestant and Catholic cultures by the 18th century (Flandrin 1979). Victorian religion built on some of these trends but, as we have seen, added some other distinctive ingredients. In the 20th century, a further decline in religious certainty affected emotional formulations. One of the several reasons for new anxiety about grief, for example, was a waning confidence in the inevitability of a blissful afterlife.

Finally, the interconnections among facets of emotional culture, predictably enough, operate in each major case. Growing emphasis on positive family emotions in the early modern centuries helped generate a new attack on anger within the family, as contradictory to love and to the more egalitarian emotional relationships that were gaining approval (Trumbach 1978). This motivation joined pressures from the larger ‘civilizing process’, deriving from economic and political basis for curbing impulse, to produce a more sweeping assessment of anger’s place in a successful personality. During the 1920s and 1930s in the United States, growing concern about sibling rivalry and romantic jealousy contributed to skepticism about the healthiness of the kind of intense love that Victorians had advocated (Stearns & Knapp 1993). Cautions about love’s intensity, in turn, helped deflate the 19th-century emphasis on guilt; because peer relationships began to rival or supplant family ties, embarrassed shame proved a more suitable enforcing device than guilt alone (Stearns 1989b). Revealingly, in the United States, punishments of middle-class children ultimately shifted away from the focus on disruptions of love to forced interruptions of contacts with peers and peer-based social life. ‘You’re grounded’ - that is, prevented from peer exchange - gained the place once reserved for ‘go to your room’.
The suggestion of a causation formula that will combine structural and cultural ingredients - the latter, in turn, blending changes in emotional formulations with shifts in wider value systems such as religion - in explaining major emotional change is, obviously, a very general one. It derives from only three historical cases, and ideally would need to be tested in other potential instances of change, in earlier periods of Western history or in other societies. The formula suggests a process that cannot occur very frequently. The kind of multi-factor blend, including substantial shifts in economic structure, outlined above is not an every-few-decades phenomenon. Indeed, it is probable that the frequency of significant shifts in the past three centuries is highly unusual, the function of the rapidity of structural changes and cultural adjustments thereto. Emotional change will occur more commonly within established frameworks, gradually modifying trends rather than overturning them. Even in the modern period, the combinations necessary to generate substantial new directions have been fairly widely spaced. Understanding the complexity of significant causation helps explain this pattern of timing. Here, the general formula usefully controls a recurrent impulse, at least among American researchers, to seek serious change every decade or so, with every passing consumer trend or childrearing fad.

Methods of Analysis and Verification

The formula, useful as it is in providing a perspective on the timing of change and in guiding analysis, inevitably invites a finergrained assessment. In any given case of emotional change, the search for multiple causation must join with insistence of evidence that potential explanations really connect with the shifts that can be described. Multiple causation does not mean that every development is relevant or that correlation - simultaneous occurrence in time - can replace a demonstration of real linkage in the explanatory process. Cultural factors, as noted above, usually can be directly traced. When new anxiety about grief developed among popularizers in the 1920s, soon to be followed by measurable shifts in actual grief and mourning rituals in the American middle class, a link with new religious uncertainty was directly stated. Parents’ Magazine stipulated in 1933, in warning against ‘conjuring up a heaven of angels and harp playing’, ‘Inevitably the small girl or
boy will discover that mother and father are not certain about the afterlife. Such a discovery augments the fear of death. And as a result: new warnings about keeping children from intense grief while assuaging fears that did emerge. Causes stemming from structural changes are harder to pinpoint, not because the structure is obscure but because the linkage may be implicit. Linking shifts in household structure to the rise of concern with sibling jealousy, for example, is very difficult in terms of direct, connective evidence. Only more recent findings about the impact of small family size on jealousy helps cut through the morass, in suggesting that sibling pressures’ correlation with smaller families and more direct parent-child contact is causal as well as correlative in time (Stearns 1989a). Other structural changes, however, show up more directly. Childrearing manuals, in shifting to a new style of anger management in the United States in the 1940s, directly used job examples drawn from the world of management and sales, in explaining why an anger-free personality is so important; in contrast, earlier anger-channeling recommendations (in some cases, by the same authors a decade or so before), seized on typical industrial-era occupations like entrepreneur. At the same time, survey evidence that white collar families led in adopting new childrearing strategies, compared to older sectors of the middle class, complete a high-probability causation linkage (Stearns & Stearns 1985). Admittedly, evidence from recent history is sometimes richer in its potential to convert correlation to causation - relevant survey data do not exist before the 1930s - but the basic challenge to test empirically must supplement any formula in explaining emotional change.

Causation balance also shifts over time, which usefully complicates the general multi-factor formula from another direction. Relevant structural changes do not always emanate from the same basic sources, as we have seen concerning shifts in family size. Cultural factors, though probably always germane, may emanate from different quarters depending on the time period. The rise of literacy played a role in the 17th century, helping people reconsider the range of emotion as they reconsidered the structures of knowledge, but a comparable factor is not involved for the 19th century middle-class, or for the 20th century (Ong 1982). Religious changes, vital in the 17th and again in the 19th centuries, are simply less significant in shaping mainstream emotional culture by the 20th century. On the other hand, new anxieties about health
and the body, of limited salience in the 19th century, begin to
loom very large. The 19th-century middle class had worried greatly
about health, but mainly in terms of outside contagions; there was
little impact on emotions save in the area of disgust. After 1900,
despite the popularization of the germ theory, focus increasingly
shifted toward unseen agents within the body. The outside
environment became less worrisome than did microbes and organic
change within the body. This is a change in focus already
hypothesized by the French historian of emotion Jean Delumeau,
though not amplified (Delumeau 1978). It finds confirmation in
specific connections between a new American popular culture of
the body, and growing concern about emotional excess. Thus
popularized understanding of high blood pressure, at a time around
1920 when blood pressure tests became standard checkup items, led
to a new and abundant spate of references in American magazines:
‘under fear’s sway the heart beats quickly and violently, and (...) the
heart’s action becomes disturbed’. Anger, similarly, involved
now ‘the heart bounding or beating rapidly, and several cases of
death due to cardiac lesion are ascribed to anger’. ‘Worry is
always a waste, always a disease (...) traceable in drawn features,
short breathing, tense bearing’. Grief ‘corrodes’ bodily organs. This
drumbeat of concern about the relationship between intense emotion
and nerves, on the one hand, and body pressure contributed greatly
not just to specific warnings about fear or anger - warnings that
later would enter job training, as Arlie Hochschild discovered in
the case of flight attendants warned that anger harmed cardiovas-
cular health (Hochschild 1983). The pressure also helped shape an
overall emotional style that contrasted with its Victorian predeces-
sor in it’s general hostility to emotional intensity of any sort. Here,
then, is a causation pattern that fits the general formula - changes
in belief associated with shifts in economic structure to produce a
new emotionology - but with a different list of specific items from
that applicable to the 19th century. Again, a formula stressing
multiple causation and structural-cultural combinations does not
predict what particular elements will be found, only how the search
should be cast. There is no avoiding the need to examine each case
in its own right.

The multiple causation formula does, finally, run against a
particular version of monocausation that has done admirable work
in the emotions field. The idea of a dominant ‘civilizing process’,
launched in the 17th century and continuing amid new complexities
to the present day, offers a substantial alternative to the much looser and more multifaceted model sketched in this article. The factors incorporated in Norbert Elias' analysis predominate in causation for the shift in emotionology during the 17th-18th centuries, though even here the attendant emphasis on family intensity, resulting from religious and commercial change, must be appended. Whether state formation plays a leading role in this causation mix, or whether a more general process of class differentiation and response to commercialization suffice, warrants continued debate. Europeans stress the state; American analysts dealing with this period, where similar trends can be noted but where the role of the state is much more subdued, may downplay the factor. But even a broadening of the structural changes to include politics does not obscure the real possibility of utilizing the striking insights of the civilizing process in the larger explanatory formula.

Important links with the civilizing process persist into the Victorian period, as one of the connections between innovation and prior emotionological trends. But whether the structural and cultural factors that shaped more decisive innovations in emotional style in the 20th century maintain significant contact with the pattern of causation embodied in the civilizing process seems doubtful. Obviously, emotional restraints can still be found; in many subtle ways, they increase. But unless the civilizing process becomes so general as to include all constraint patterns, or unless the phenomenon is abstracted beyond recognition, its fit with the kind of multicausal analysis applicable to 20th-century developments is highly questionable. The causal formula sketched in this article suggests viewing the civilizing process as itself an instance of multi-factor change, with some undeniable momentum even into the Victorian period. It does not easily comport with an elevation of the same civilizing process to a category of latter-day Supercause. Here, clearly, is ground for debate, in the necessary process of testing any approach to causation, beyond very precise single-case studies, through further analysis.

From Causation to Synthesis

The insistence on multiple strands of causation lacks great drama; it provides a commonsense injunction, and at best a preliminary
guide to the real task of explanation. It does have the merit, however, of joining known historical cases to broader, often abstract or a historical debates in the constructionist camp, and it suggests answers to some of the questions the constructionists have raised. It has merit also in providing an alternative - though surely not an uncontested alternative - to the way the civilizing process schema has been forced into all-purpose analytical service. But the real advantages of the formula, general as it is, lie in the links to the other analytical tasks of historical emotions research.

For attention to multiple causation underlies appreciation of the range of emotions available in any given culture - a range that no historical work has yet fully canvassed. Too many social studies of emotion, even those that purport to deal with overall emotional styles, focus on limited categories. A recent civilizing process study of Victorian etiquette in the United States, for example, correctly detailed the many ways in which Victorians sought to curtail emotional expression in certain circumstances, but it failed to capture the vital corollary, of Victorian dependence on intense emotional outlets in appropriate settings (Kasson 1990). Love, grief, and exuberant encounters with fear and anger, though equally part of overall Victorian emotionology, did not enter in. Only a full exploration of the variety of factors that shape emotional culture helps prepare adequate inquiry into the often highly nuanced and varied relationships among basic ingredients. Structural functionalism, as we have seen, simply does not point to all the observable changes in 20th-century emotionology. A full emotional culture responds to a number of needs, and appropriate, multi-faceted causation analysis alone can provide the relevant framework.

Subtle attention to causation must also be part of addressing a substantial analytical challenge within the historical emotions field, the challenge of comparison. Most scholars have assumed that basic changes, in the three cases thus far explored, extended throughout Western Europe and the United States. Some use evidence drawn impressionistically from all areas, using this assumption but not testing it. American research suggests that European trends in the 17th-18th century, and particularly the civilizing process, may have affected the United States a bit later than was true in Europe (Isaac 1982; Kasson 1990). But outright comparisons have yet to be ventured. Causation analysis is essential to determine more precisely whether trends in various areas flowed in fact from the same causes and whether these causes produced a
common timing. A strong possibility exists for example that factors operating by the 1920s in the United States developed in Europe only by the 1960s - a difference in chronology that suggests also that the causation mixture, even if overlapping, would be somewhat different as well. The multiple causation framework is essential for this kind of comparative assessment.

Finally, causation analysis, open to multiple factors and to the mixture of structural and cultural requirements, prepares what is ultimately the leading task of those who deal with emotional change: the determination of results. Shifts in emotionology affect a range of behaviors, if the shifts themselves are at all significant. They alter institutional responses. In the United States, for example, laws have changed as a result of new emotional standards, in such areas as divorce, justifiable homicide, and suits for damages. School activities, such as sports, have reflected shifting emotional standards at least to some extent. Emotional culture also affects the ways that individuals describe and evaluate their own emotions, and through this some aspects of emotional experience itself. In addition, emotional culture helps determine reactions to the emotions of others. Willingness to experience jealousy or grief on the part of another declined, for example, as Victorian emotional culture gave way to the more individualistic, less intense emotionology of the mid-20th century in the United States. Tracing the three kinds of effects of emotional culture: institutional use, individual perception, and response to others, may begin with the emotional culture itself. Thus new attacks on jealousy, part of the set of emotionological changes taking shape in the United States in the 1920s, showed up in legal changes that disallowed jealousy as a motivation for justifiable homicide and in increasing intolerance for expressions of sexual jealousy by one’s partner. If, however, the causes for the new attacks on jealousy are understood, in terms of wider anxieties about emotional intensity resulting from new views of the body, new functional requirements for interpersonal emotional control (that also produced growing concern about overt jealousy in the workplace), and some changes in family dynamics, the impacts of jealousy can be more successfully as well as more broadly interpreted. Emotional culture becomes an intermediary between various new social and cultural needs, and ultimate results in altering the social and personal uses of emotion.

Approaching the causation of emotional change through a combination of open-ended flexibility but also some general
guidelines that rise above a purely case-by-case approach can improve the level of inevitable debate about why fundamental changes occur, a debate that is itself one of the central facets of any constructionist approach. Utilization of general guidelines, focused on multiple factors and a structural-cultural package, may assist in expanding the range of cases that can be coherently explored. It also feeds into the other analytical challenges posed by emotional change, from the complexity of any given emotional combination to the process of sorting out the ramifications of change over the longer term.

Literature


Lutz, Catherine (1988), Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Microne-