The organizational role of the military in the modernization-processes

Rachmat Subur

Introduction
This paper deals with the role of the military, more specifically the army, in the modernization processes of the new emerging countries and in particular of Indonesia. There has been in the past a lack of serious knowledge on the role of the army in the new states, due to a dearth of research as a consequence, inter alia, of an often excessively influenced attitude by disguised ideological considerations, either the military were seen as a foe of liberal values or as an ally against the communists. Only recently we note a focus in research on the role of armies in the process of modernizations, though this attention is still limited and directed mainly to their potential political role.

Beside the political role of the military in the modernization processes, we are here also interested in the organizational role of the army, viz. from an economic and bureaucratic as well as a social and cultural point of view. As mentioned above, most writings and researches in the past scrutinized the pros and cons of army's involvements in the political affairs of a country. The big question remains how far ideological, not to speak of emotional, considerations have played a role in these sorts of analyses and expositions. For this reason, we feel it more secure and conducive to our knowledge, and therefore possibly less controversial, to concentrate on those objective aspects of military involvements as their potentialities, capacities, and the results so far demonstrated. That armies at this very moment are meddling in civil matters in many new countries, we unconditionally accept as a fact regardless we agree or not.

Our concern then is that we are eager to measure as objectively and as precisely as possible, the attitudes, sentiments, values, promises, ideologies, and behavior or conduct of those men, who share with or take over power from civilians, notably

4) Janowitz, M., The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, 1964, seems to be the first to tackle this sort of approach.
the officers' corps and in particular the senior officers. In this way, we hope not only to evade unconscious ideological biases and attitudes of being for or against military meddlings in civil affairs, but, what is more important, it will also be possible to question how far the military in deeds or thought have been or have not been conducive to modernization processes 5).

To achieve this aim we hold it to be very useful and informative to work with models. Normative concepts and attitudes or orientations, also respectively named "Rational model" and "Natural model", are weighed against behavior, conduct or activity, sometimes called "Working model" 6). In other words, values, attitudes and orientations, will be tested via such relevant factors as social background, career experiences, education, etc., against the role-performances of the leading actors, that is the military elite.

Our ultimate aim of writing this paper is to construct a research proposal and -design conducive to future researches on the problem of the organizational role embarked by the military in emerging countries on various fields of modernizing processes. We hope, the design will be helpful in finding relevant factors in military organizational behavior and by this more clearness and preciseness may also be achieved.

I. The Background of Military Involvements in Politics

Janowitz' civil-military models

Janowitz has classified the fifty-one or so new nations he investigated into five civil-military models: 1. democratic-competitive, such as India, Israel, Philippines, Ceylon, Malaya, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, etc.; 2. authoritarian-mass party, such as Mali and Guinea; 3. authoritarian-personal control, such as Nepal, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Saudi-Arabia, Ethiopia, Somali, Liberia, and Libya;; 4. civil-military coalition, such as in Indonesia, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey; and 5. military oligarchy: South-Korea, South-Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jemen, Sudan and lately Algeria, Congo Leopoldville, Ghana, Nigeria, etc.

In the democratic-competitive system, the military is usually limited in its functions because of the relative strength of competitive democratic institutions and civil control; in the authoritarian-mass party nations, the civil political regimes seem also to possess an organizational capacity to rule and to keep the military relatively confined in its political and social roles; in civil-military coalitions the military serves as an active political bloc in its active or passive support of civilian parties and other bureaucratic power groups 7).

Now, what facilitates the involvement of the military in civilian matters? The decisive step of military entanglement in civilian affairs is usually to start with its meddling in the political field. For comparative purposes, we can divide the background factors of its involvements into: the external factors, that is the opportunity to intervene as a consequence of the socio-political structure, the economy, the

5) Janowitz, M. ibid. 1964, p. 102.
7) Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, p. 6, 7, 103.
size of the army, etc.; and the *internal* factors, such as the organizational format, personnel, career, skill, education, recruitment and ideology which dispose the military to intervene *8*).

**Janowitz' external factors**

According to Janowitz, it is possible to speak of four different origins of the armies in the new independent countries: 1. ex-colonial, 2. national-liberation, 3. post-liberation, and 4. non-colonial armies. After comparing among the new nations these factors of origin or the history of the armed forces with their involvement in politics, Janowitz discloses that: "Military formations born in the struggle for national-liberation have maintained wide political involvements, as for instance in Indonesia, Burma and Algeria ... (However,) ex-colonial origin hardly ensures that the military restricts itself to military affairs, such as in Pakistan" *9*). This seems also true for the post liberation and non-colonial armies. Janowitz, therefore, concludes that: "In most countries, the military has been drawn into domestic politics because of the weakness of civilian institutions..." *10*). He came to this revealing conclusion after introducing the time factor. He observes some link between the political role of the military and the time gone by since independence was proclaimed. He notices that ten years are the minimal time required for the civilian administrators to prove themselves capable of managing the polity, the economy, and the socio-cultural order of their societies *11*).

Demographically, Janowitz finds that there exists some relation between the size of the population and the size of its military establishment, as f.i. in India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, as against that of Ceylon, Malaya, or Cyprus. No relationship, however, was discovered between the per capita gross national product and the size of the military establishment! The military expenditures are relatively fixed, and furthermore, the costs of a military establishment are, in proportion to per capita income, high for a new nation. Thus, nations with larger populations seem to be required to have also relatively larger armies... and they are forced to allocate resources regardless of their economic positions... *12*).

Finally, Janowitz refutes the relationship between economic development and the political role demonstrated by the military. Some writers like Lipset, Coleman and Finer propose that high economic development is one of the essential prerequisites for a political-competitive system and non-military intervention. Janowitz uncovered the crude and artificial categories used by some of these writers in describing political systems *13*). Using a more refined model of five types of civil-military relations (see above), Janowitz has found no basis for correlations between the economic development and political systems. In other words, with high economic development the outcome is *as likely as not* military oligarchy or intervention! There-

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8) Finer, S. E., op. cit. 1962, chaps. 4, 5, 6.
9) Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, p. 15.
10) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 16.
11) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 86.
13) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 22.
fore, the level of economic development is relatively low to make a democratic-competitive system possible\(^{14}\).

To conclude this section about the possible relationship between some relevant external factors and military interventions in politics, Janowitz concludes: “Thus, factors such as natural history of origin, time since independence (size of population and army), or level of economic development supply at best, a limited point of entrance for understanding differences in the political role of the military in the new nations”\(^{15}\). We can say, therefore, that as partially-explaining factors these external factors are at best *sufficient but not necessary* conditions. Moreover, another, real or imaginary, condition to add besides domestic mechanics is foreign policy\(^{16}\).

**Janowitz’ internal factors**

Next, Janowitz undertakes to investigate the internal factors in military organizational format, personnel, and values which could dispose the officers’ corps to intervene in politics. He breaks-up the internal factors into some possibly relevant elements, whereafter he puts forward hypotheses which are comparatively tested against empirical data. These are his findings: 1. *The Organizational Format.* This factor explains the greater initial political capacity of the military in comparison with civilians in new nations, by a) their control of an “instrument of violence”, b) their ethos of public service and national identification, and c) their skill structure, which combines managerial ability with heroic posture\(^{17}\). The military is also one of the first institutions which introduces change into traditional societies. Furthermore, because the prototype of the new nation’s military organization is the infantry battalion, they have the maximum potential for involvements in domestic politics\(^{18}\). And finally, as for the relation between operational experience of new nation armies and their internal cohesion, it is somewhat varied, although successful operational activity appears to contribute to cohesion as in India, Pakistan, Sudan and Burma\(^{19}\). 2. *Skill structure and Career lines.* The officers’ corps in the new nations have important limitations in producing leadership skills in bargaining and political communication. These limitations include the absence of a tradition for dealing with clients outside of the military\(^{20}\). One way to analyse the skill structure of the military is in terms of its internal division of labor: a) the heroic leader, b) the military manager, and c) the military technologist."...It is the increase in number and importance of military managers that produces the greater capacity in the profession for involvements in domestic politics!"\(^{21}\) One observer has sought to identify the rank of colonel as the crucial point at which the highly political cadres among the officers’ corps tend to emerge\(^{22}\). Instead of selecting any specific rank as the point at which

\(^{14}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 18-22.

\(^{15}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 23.

\(^{16}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 100.

\(^{17}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 27-28.

\(^{18}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 33, 34.

\(^{19}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 33, 34.

\(^{20}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 28.

\(^{21}\) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, pp. 41-44.

political capacities emerge, Janowitz deems it more useful to examine the specialized career experiences which produce, or at least stimulate, the development of these political men. For this purpose it is possible to distinguish types of military careers, i.e. the "prescribed" versus the "adaptive careers". By the "prescribed career", Janowitz means the career of the officer who has followed the idealized professional pattern. On the contrary, the "adaptive career" officers have the essential elements of prescribed career, but they have additional and unusual experiences with the external society taken in a wider sense. Therefore, because of its definite contacts, orientations and commitment with a society-wide public, the "adaptive career" type of the officer tends to meddle in civil matters. 3. Social Recruitment and Education. These two elements mainly help to account for the differences between "army and society" in the new nations and industrialized ones. The military in new nations does not have strong allegiances to feudal domination nor does it have a pervasive conservative outlook, due to the fact that the military are recruited mostly from the "middle and lower-middle" classes of mainly rural areas and hinterlands. Besides, there tends to exist an unbiased selection from a wide base of social groups. Finally, military education in new nations contributes to an innovating and progressive outlook towards modernization. In analyzing and comparing the relation between social origin and behavior, Janowitz warns that there are many steps between the impact of social background and the political perspectives of a professional group as the military. The values of early socializations are refashioned by for example education, career experiences, or ideological indoctrinations. (These are the so-called "intervening variables!") 4. Professional and Political Ideology. The common ideological themes which help to explain the professional officers' political behavior are: a) a strong sense of nationalism, b) a puritanical outlook, c) acceptance of governmental control of social and economic change, and d) deep distrust of organized civilian politics. The anti-political orientation is an expression military technocratic thinking: as soldiers they tend to believe that any problem is amenable to a direct and simple solution. As in the case of social recruitment and education, the analysis of political ideology presents a proposition which contrasts the military of industrialized nations with those of new ones, in particular with respect to government control and civilian politics (ad. c and d). 5. Social Cohesion. This proposition relates to differences among the armed forces of the various new nations. Cohesion differs markedly because of: a) differences in training, b) indoctrination, c) operational experiences, and d) inter-generational cleavages. Armies with high internal cohesion will have greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics, as in Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, and Egypt. On the contrary, strong cleavages in Indonesia, South-Vietnam, Ceylon, Syria, Lebanon, 

24) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 28.
26) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 29.
27) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 66.
28) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 29.
29) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 68.
Ethiopia, etc. prevent the emergence of a unified political force\textsuperscript{30}). In the new nations' armies, moreover, cohesion and cleavages centre as much in the organizational and career experiences as in social composition or ethnic and religious background\textsuperscript{31}).

6. Political Intervention. As mentioned earlier when dealing with the external factors, the taking over of power by the military in new nations has generally followed the collapse of efforts to create democratic type institutions. After this taking over of power, the military regimes are faced with the task of supplying national political leadership and developing mass-support for its programs. Comparative analysis in the case of this proposition is designed to help to discover the conditions, under which the military must come to recognize the need of mass-political support and is able to develop it\textsuperscript{32}). We have seen, for example, in countries, where the military has completely taken over power and forms a political ruling group, i.e. a military oligarchy, the problem of requiring the necessary mass-support, as is the case in Burma, or the moral right and legitimacy to govern, as is the case in Thailand. In countries like Indonesia, where the military forms a political bloc together with other civilian parties, the so-called “civil-military coalitions”, the problem centres in seeking a proper internal balance or cohesion among factions within the armed forces. In short, military intervention into politics does not seem to secure yet a stable government. Moreover, the military has to prove itself more capable in solving the complex problems of modernization compared with civilians. Whether the prospects initiated by the military in this field are bright or dim, we try to examine next.

II. The Military Performances in various Fields of Modernization

The Polity

To start, on the societal level, with the Polity, most observers do not have too much illusion of the military capability, organizational ability, legitimacy, as well as their perspectives of the future, to the effect that they can govern more successfully than the civilians do\textsuperscript{33}). According to Janowitz, the political skill of the military is put to the test if it seeks to reverse the cycle of distrust of the civilian public. Thus, it is instructive to compare efforts in various new countries where the military has or has not sought to develop popular support. For example, a distinction can be drawn between the Egyptian and the Pakistan ruling groups. It appears that a military group which came into power through “designed militarism” (Egypt), as contrasted with “reactive militarism” (Pakistan), is more sensitive to the problems of developing mass political groups and organizations support\textsuperscript{34}). A partial explanation of the different responses to mobilizing mass support seems to rest in their prior political contacts and activity. To this category belongs the group of military officers called the “adaptive type” (see p. 314), whose extensive political interests and activity be-

\textsuperscript{30}) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 69.
\textsuperscript{31}) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 29, 70.
\textsuperscript{32}) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{34}) Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, pp. 88-89.
fore coming to power made them sensitive to the need for mass political support. Sensitivity to these problems, however, is no measure of ability to cope with them.\textsuperscript{35}

The next question, then, which interests us, arises: Is the military political activity an expression of its fundamental commitment to the emerging values of the society? At this point, Janowitz stated, some \textit{normative} concepts must be introduced, that is, the military needs to be committed to a basic format of a clear political system, so that it enables the military to act within the broad consensus of the polity. This basis on which the military broadens its political involvement becomes the central issue. It helps, also, to question the capability of existing political institutions and military behavior for the tasks of economic and social modernizations at hand.\textsuperscript{36} In the West, we know the principle of civil supremacy as against the professionalism of the military. Ideally and normatively, the logical consequence for the officer corps in a professionalism is to leave politics to the politicians. The officers’ own responsibility becomes increasingly confined to representing the requirements of the military to the civilian authorities, giving advice to them, and when so charged, executing their decisions.\textsuperscript{37} In the developing countries, because of various weaknesses of civilian administrations and many other transitional grievances, the military hardly could be expected to remain neutral. However, some countries experiencing intervention in civil matters by the military, in one or another form, make painstaking efforts to limit or set the borders clear of military involvements. In Indonesia, for example, we saw the state-ideology of “Pancha Sila” and “Manipol” (Political Manifesto) directed toward socialism and also taking the view of containing the power of the military.\textsuperscript{38} Based on this doctrine the officers’ corps in Indonesia deemed it necessary to launch and outline, time and again on several occasions and crises, a decree of a sort of “civic mission” for the military as the Djogja-charter”, “Operasi-Budhi”, “Operasi-Bakhti”. How far the Indonesian military gives some prospects to establishing acceptable and lasting civil-military relations, we will try to analyze later in this paper.

\textbf{The Economy}

Let us next examine comparatively in several new countries, the achievements of the military reached after having secured control at the institutional level of the Economy. As measured by overall economic development, the experience of military regimes in the economy is hardly impressive, as we have seen for example in Burma, Pakistan, South-Korea, and Egypt.\textsuperscript{39} By way of generalization, we could say that the wider the sphere of economic involvement, the less effective are the military performances. As centres of technical training and as a source of managerial personnel, and even as managers of specific installations, the military operate with reasonable effectiveness. But in tasks managing wide sectors of the economy, or

\textsuperscript{35} Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{36} Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 102.
\textsuperscript{37} Huntington, S. P. op. cit. 1957; Finer, S. E. op. cit. 1962, pp. 24-25.
\textsuperscript{38} President Sukarno’s MANIPOL, August 1959: see Pauker, G. J. in: Johnson, J. J. (ed.) op. cit. 1962, p. 229.
\textsuperscript{39} Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, p. 79.
supplying central economic direction, it suffers from both the limitations inherent in the profession and sheer deficits of personnel resources 40). It is easy to exaggerate the real efficiency and the superior organizational format of the military. However, if we consider the following points, we make some reservations, because: a) not often are the military actually tested for the performances of their ultimate function, that of warfare, b) the military are allowed to work in an atmosphere of discipline and secrecy which prevents effective scrutiny and measurement of their actual behavior, and c) the military perform a far narrower range of duties than does civilian administration 41). Thus, the armed forces' technical inability to administer any but the most primitive economy, added to the complex requirements of modern public welfare policy and the augmentations of unproductive military expenditures are not very conducive toward military success of involvements in the economy. Moreover, as Pye once has stated, "armies of the new emerging countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and tend to focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world". In consequences, they are often unaware of the difficulties inherent in modernizing other segments of their society. Within their tradition all problems can be overcome "if the right orders are given".

Of course, the military has something positive to contribute, too, to economic development, such as building roads, helping to erect communication systems and all kinds of small industries. More often than not, the military possesses the necessary skills and education for certain types of jobs. They have a rational type of organization; they can contribute to a stability of government; and as an agency of socialization they are capable of bringing about changes in traditional societies 42). Moreover, the army represents one of the most effective channels for upward social mobility... training in citizenship... and acquiring technological skills..." 43).

The Bureaucracy
As for the managerial level of the society, we are most concerned with the bureaucracy. Here, we can state, also, as above that the armed forces' technical ability to administer a more complex organization than the army is strictly limited. Modern public administration requires more skills and experience with outside clients than army organization usually is able to provide for. Some writers, like Daalder, Janowitz, and Pye, have noted that, moreover, the military mentality is generally not very conducive to easy relations between military administrators and civilian clients 44). They are more apt to resort to compulsion and violence, than to persuasion and service, accustomed as they are to the discipline and blind obedience of their inferiors. Last but not least, new nations suffer from over-bureaucratization and military intervention in administration can easily serve to complicate this pro-

40) Janowitz, M., ibid. 1964, p. 80.
41) Daalder, H., op. cit. 1962, p. 22.
blem\textsuperscript{45}). Despite their rationality, armies are relatively immune to pragmatic tests of efficiency on day-to-day basis. Armies always stand at some distance from their civilian societies and are even expected to have ways of their own\textsuperscript{46}). Apparently, the much praised superiority of the armed forces compared with the civilian institutions in the new states lies in its coherence and organizational features as its centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, "esprit de corps", and the corresponding isolations and self-sufficiency. Besides, the military virtues of bravery, discipline, obedience, self-abnegation, poverty, patriotism, etc. could be in the most pressing circumstances and crises conducive toward a coordinative and coherently purposeful behavior\textsuperscript{47}). However, these features still do not alter the fact that the army has a strictly confined organizational format with limited skills or capacities and a minimum of experience with nation-wide public.

Stratification of élites (Janowitz)

Let us turn now from the results achieved by the military in their external organizational efforts to the more purely internal organizational format. In so doing, we are factually interested in the relation between the various aspects of military internal organizational format and their prospects or potential capabilities in the field of external organizational behavior. While dealing with the military we tend to speak of the officers' corps. Obviously we are interested in the behavior of the so-called "military élite", but the term élite as a matter of fact is a very vague notion. In making the concept of élite operational it is a prerequisite to analyze the patterns of stratification of élites\textsuperscript{48)}:

1. While analyses of élite groups focus attention on those members of a skill or profession who have achieved leading hierarchical positions, the so-called "formal leaders", we need also identify those who wield influence without formal office, i.e. the "informal leaders" 2. The élite group itself is not completely homogeneous, rather it has an internal differentiation. It seems necessary at least to make a distinction between an élite "cadre" and an élite "nucleus" The cadre and the smaller élite nucleus may display markedly different social profile and career lines. Here, for example, is the difference between the effective regimental and divisional commanders and the politically oriented strategists. 3. The differentiation of one élite-group from another is a function of the division of labor. Because of rapid social change and the development of large-scale social organizations, the distinction between crucial élite-groups tends to be blurred. The movement of personnel between élite-groups has often been noted, as for example between the military, government-, business-, political, religious ones, etc. Overlap in affiliations ("reference group behavior"), personal cliques and factions cut across purely formal institutional lines. Thereby, élite-groups articulate themselves through primary groups. 4. The social stratification basis of the élite power can not be analyzed only in terms of their common social profiles (background, status, and prestige) and their career

\textsuperscript{45} Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, p. 75.  
\textsuperscript{46} Pye, L. W. in: Johnson, J. J. (ed.) op. cit. 1962, p. 79.  
\textsuperscript{47} Finer, S. E., op. cit., chap. 2.  
\textsuperscript{48} Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, Appendix, 107-10.
patterns (education and occupational backgrounds). Organized indoctrination and historical experience convert the constituent human beings into effective social groups. Thus, the uniformities of indoctrination and ideology as well as of self-conception and motivation (operating through primary-group structures) are concepts that need be considered in describing the mechanisms, by which élite-groups maintain themselves and their social stratification.

**Norms, Behavior, and Orientations**

After considering the stratification patterns of the military élite, we now can start to investigate their patterns of behavior, orientations, as well as the expected norms. We will analyze these three aspects, that is the norms, behavior, and orientations, in connection with the main elements of the internal military organizations such as the organizational format, skill-structure, career-lines, social origin, education, ideology, and cohesion. Though, as we have seen above, the military has generally failed to fulfill its promises in various fields of civil life, this is not a good reason to reject or ignore once for all military involvements in civil matters. For one thing military intervention is already a fact, if not becoming a usual practice in several new nations. For another reason, the military still can mobilize the necessary resources to become fit in the near future and to contribute more than it has so far been capable. Therefore, instead of negatively rejecting, on whatever grounds, or ignoring the role of the military in modernization-processes, it might be more instructive to set up a "developmental construct" through which we will be able to measure as objectively and precisely as possible the military performances in civil affairs among the new nations.

Almond once has stated that in "modern systems the secondary structures and relationships are far more differentiated and significant; and, second, the primary structures in modern systems tend to be affected or modernized by the secondary ones". He has characterized the "modern" solution of the problems of cultural dualism as a penetration of the "traditional" styles (Weber) of diffuseness, particularism, ascriptiveness, and affectivity (Parsons), by the "rational" styles (Weber) of specificity, universalism, achievement, and affective neutrality (Parsons). Thus, the original Parsonian "pattern variables"-concept, which has led to unfortunate theoretical polarizations, such as Universalism versus Particularism, etc., tends to exaggerate the differences between the western and non-western systems. As a matter of fact, Almond urged, all systems, that is the developed western ones as well as the less-developed non-western ones, are transitional systems, or systems, in which cultural and social changes are taking place. Therefore, Almond concluded, "we need dualistic models rather than monistic ones, and developmental as well as equilibrium


models, if we are to understand differences precisely and grapple effectively with the processes of ... change" 53).

Cross-tabulations of internal and external factors
Let us first consider the element of the Organizational Format of the military internal organizational structure. When we now cross-tabulate the normative aspects (the "Rational-model" of ideal civil-military relations or their "role-expectations"), the behavior ("Working-model" or the factual "role-performances" by the military), and the orientations (the "Natural-model" or the "role orientations" of the actor), with the respective external-organizational fields of the Polity, the Economy, and the "Bureaucracy", the results could come out as follows:

**THE ORGANIZATION FORMAT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field/Level:</th>
<th>Normative 'role-expectation' ——— Behavior ——— Natural 'role-orientation'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the Polity:</td>
<td>persuasive/seeking 'mass-support' ——— violence/applying oppressive methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Economy:</td>
<td>calculative and instrumental ——— spending/consummatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Bureaucracy:</td>
<td>objective-administrative ——— subjective-technological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let us now take as an illustration, from the scheme described above, the field of the Polity. We have seen earlier that the first problem the military has to face after having taken over power is to secure mass-support or to acquire legitimacy. However, as a military organizational instrument, the army and most of its officers are trained for violence and the use of oppressive methods in its internal structure. If we now take the two poles of the normative "role-expectations" on the broader societal level or the Polity, and the narrower natural "role-orientation" toward the military organizational format as a continuum, the problem for the military organizational behavior in the modernizing processes approaches the first pole as near as possible and leaves behind the latter pole as much as possible. The task of the researcher then is to locate as precisely as possible the position of the military at one moment and, if so disposed, to follow the developments through time. (Therefore, Lasswell has named this scheme a "developmental-construct". See also later in this paper the scheme at page 328.) By so doing, it will be possible to state whether there occurs, certain, progression toward the "Rational-model" of ideal-external behavior or a regression toward the "Natural-model" of particularistic internal-orientations in the armed forces role-performances, conduct, or behavior (= the "Working-model")!

Next, let us examine the Skill-structure and Career-lines of the military and connect them to broader civilian fields of the Polity, the Economy, and the Bureaucracy. We will get then this scheme of cross-tabulations:

As for the Skill-structure, take again as an illustration from our scheme the Political level. We have seen earlier that the "managerial-type" of a military is the professional with effective links to civil society. These contacts tend to produce greater capacity in the military profession for dealing with political public. The "heroic-type" of military leader, on the other hand, still embodies the traditional themes of martial spirit\(^{54}\).

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The "adaptive-type" of officers, as we have seen before, had the essential elements of the "prescribed" professional-career officer, but they had additional and unusual experiences with the external public and the broader society. These background traits not only tend to dispose the officer to meddle in civil affairs, but also make him understand, or at least eager to learn, the mechanisms of communication with and calculations of nation-wide public.

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54) Janowitz, M., op. cit. 1964, p. 41.
An objective nation-wide and unbiased selection for the recruitment of personnel tends to effect the new nations' military strongly nationalistic-loyalty in comparison to its regional or primordial allegiances. Therefore, it will also be more likely that they have a modernizing, that means in new countries usually socialistic, outlook and possibly rule out conservative or feudalistic leanings as we know it among the officers' corps in the west. Military education in new nations contributes to an innovating and progressive outlook toward modernization (see p. 314).

### Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field/Level</th>
<th>Norm</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the Polity</td>
<td>'civic-mission'/arbitration/professionalism 'new-style'</td>
<td>'militarism'/oligarch/professionalism 'old-style' = traditional archaic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Economy</td>
<td>'general-welfare'/socialism</td>
<td>particularistic-types of interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Bureaucracy</td>
<td>objective-instrumentalism</td>
<td>subjective-consummatory</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As among the military of industrialized nations in the west, the new nations' military share a strong sense of nationalism and a puritanical outlook. They somewhat differ, however, in the acceptance of governmental control of social and economic change and the distrust of organized civil politics.

### Cohesion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field/Level</th>
<th>Norm</th>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the Polity</td>
<td>consensus</td>
<td>self-interest/divisive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Economy</td>
<td>collectivistic</td>
<td>individualistic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Bureaucracy</td>
<td>coordinative</td>
<td>disruptive</td>
<td></td>
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In the new nations' armies cohesion and cleavages center as much in organizational (see p. 314-5), and career experiences as in social composition or ethnic and religious backgrounds.

**III. The Indonesian Case**

The Course of Events: Background of non-cohesion and uneasy balance⁵⁵). The Indonesian officers' corps comes from four different sources: 1) a small but influential minority was trained by the Dutch colonial army before 1942 (the KNIL), 2) a larger number were Japanese trained war-officers between 1943 and '45 (the PETA), 3) a substantial number began their careers during the struggle for independence as "national liberation- or revolutionary army"- officers between 1945 and '49, and 4) the corps of younger officers trained "professionally" in Indonesia as well as abroad.

The Indonesian army, so far, is mainly led by the group of "national liberation-

⁵⁵) This section is mainly drawn from Pauker, G. J., *in:* Johnson, J. J., op. cit. 1962.
army” officers. The Dutch never attempted to build up a large and solid Indonesian officers’ corps; and it was the Japanese who scarcely began to install a larger cadre of junior-officers. However, no Indonesians were trained for positions of field rank higher than Major either by the Dutch or by the Japanese.

This heterogeneous background of the officers’ corps in Indonesia did not suffice to acquire the ideological indoctrination needed to discipline and unify their actions. Their struggle took place in an atmosphere of continuous political controversy. The military clashed repeatedly on strategy with politicians, and, on the other hand, the politicians continuously tried to influence the military for their own divisive goals. Throughout its history the Indonesian officers’ corps seems to have ideological affinities with all kinds of political leanings outside the army, in spite of their revulsion against what they called “scheming politicians”.

Thus, the lack of strong civil control and a professional military ethic lead factions in the army to play important roles in politics. As early as the forties during the independence struggle senior officers meddled in politics while politicians used the army as an instrument for their particularistic goals. However, it became as late as 1952 with the, now becoming well-known, October 17-affair that the movement of the armed forces into politics led to a major conflict between the military and the politicians. A move to re-establish the unity of the army divided since the October 17-affair (the officers failed to achieve their purpose because of the lack of consensus and discipline among themselves) was attempted in February 1955 and produced the „Djogja-Charter”, which had to express the officers’ corps’ unity, professionalism, and political non-interference in military affairs. This effort has not been too successful. The second main conflict within the army occurred on June 27, 1955, when the army boycotted the installation of a new chief of staff on orders from the acting chief-of-staff. According to Pauker, the June 27 1955 affair can be considered to be the dividing line between the period when the army was mainly concerned with resisting political interference in its internal affairs and the period when it began to play an active role in politics.

From then on military involvements in politics became a practice rather than an exception. The first unsuccessful moves of some officers started in Java in the second half of 1956 against the cabinet. Several senior officers were arrested. Then the plotters’ effort shifted to Sumatra and Celebes, where between December 1956 and March 1957 senior officers formed several revolutionary councils. The conflict reached a climax in February 1958, when the PRRI-revolutionary government was proclaimed. In general, the role of the army in public and civil life increased since in March 1957 the martial-law was introduced in Indonesia. On July 5, 1959, president Sukarno re-enacted by decree the Constitution of 1945, which provided for a presidential form of government. In the new cabinet formed on July 9th, a substantial number of posts were occupied by members of the armed forces; and the newly appointed parliament of June 25th, 1960 included 15 army officers and 20 air-force, navy, and police officers.

Although the role of the military in civil life has increased considerably, the

Indonesian officers' corps never attempted to take over power completely. Pauker has this explanation: "The most plausible explanation of why the Indonesian officer' corps has not acted, until now, as a true reform-movement is probably found in its lack of self-confidence, generated by internal division..." 57). While the military became more involved and even shows signs of becoming dominant in civil affairs, it is open to doubt whether they have been harbingers of progress. Thus according to Pauker: "As they (the military) displace the civilian political élite who became discredited during the first decade of Indonesia's independent existence, the military appear less and less different from the politicians whose positions they now occupy ..." 58). The factual justification of this disenchanted situation must be sought, according to Pauker, in deep division among the officers' corps within the branches of the armed forces as well as among them, by personal jealousy, conflicting outlooks, and special interests. The once revolutionary and progressive young officers, are "now turning into middle-aged militarists, enjoying the prerequisites of office, symbols of status, and benefits of power" 59).

The Performances in various Fields of Modernization

Taking stock of the course of events, the performances of the military group in Indonesia in the various fields of modernization are not too encouraging, though its future capacities and prospects might still improve.

As for its internal organizational dynamics in relation to the broader societal or external organizational tasks and behavior, we are still observing the transformation of the Indonesian military organizational format from the "guerillatype" small heterogeneous bands into one homogeneous modern national army. Although they are reluctant to take over power completely, the military became more and more involved in civil matters, and it shows some signs now to seek mass-support or at least to be persuasive instead of oppressive. Its skill-structure, originally diverse and non-technical, is becoming more and more unitary, professional, and possibly in the near future also necessarily "managerial". As for its career-lines, once a liberation army it now not only becomes partially a professional army, but it suddenly faces the task to contribute also to the modernization processes. Recruited from various parts of the country with its multi-colored provincial, religious, cultural, rural-urban backgrounds, the military in Indonesia has to become universally or at least nationally oriented. Also, the education of the military nowadays is to become unified, to the effect that the various colonial and guerilla-types of instruction will fade away and less particularistic orientations will emerge. The professional and political ideology of the Indonesian military is to be considered in a transitional phase, still uneasily seeking, as it is now, its proper place and task in the modernization processes of the country. Finally, the most urgent and decisive factor of the armed forces in Indonesia until now and in future will be finding a sufficient cohesion, within their branches as well as among them, and seeking the necessary consensus with the nation-wide public. The history of the armed forces in Indonesia has shown

a lot of cleavages within the army. Whether the armed forces will somehow be conducive to and also be capable to contribute to modernization, much depends on the cohesion of the military's own organizational format.

As we have seen above, and as also has been noted frequently by various observers, the military in Indonesia has so far failed politically as a main consequence of its internal non-cohesiveness. Citing Feith' observations Janowitz noted: "It is relevant to note which efforts of the military have failed to bring about a successful seizure of power. In Indonesia, a military coup failed in October, 1952, because of unclear demands by military leaders and for lack of internal cohesion among different elements of the army."^60^ Failure has also been noticed in the field of the economy since the military has taken over the agricultural industry and trading concerns from the Dutch and since it controls the economic life after martial law was proclaimed. "In Indonesia, the army's effort in agriculture failed because of organizational inertia and shortage of capable personnel"^61^.

Finally, military involvements in administration or bureaucracy have caused in Indonesia more confusion than efficient and coordinative action. As we have seen earlier, military intervention only serves to create the problem of over-bureaucratization from which some new nations are already suffering as a consequence of various reasons. Since martial law was proclaimed and the constitution of 1945 has come into force again, the military in Indonesia has intervened in civilian government at all levels. Consequently, an effective decision-making, an efficient control over facilities, and a disciplineful execution of orders are hampered by unclear borders of authority, communication, and division of labor. An efficiently working relationship and sound coordination became difficult as there are too many captains on the ship and the most powerful master at that time tends to be inapt for the job^62^.

In conclusion we can say that in spite of its apparent failure as a major modernization agent in various fields of civilian enterprises, a variety of advantageous circumstances, in the past and at present, however, could make the Indonesian army capable, in the future, of helping to stabilize and develop its country. Pauker, for example, saw these favorable conditions in the past: "a) the experience to deal with civil bureaucracy since martial law gave the officers' corps vast responsibilities, b) control of economic life of the country at large gave the officers' corps additional responsibilities and the opportunity to acquire managerial experiences, c) the West-Irian issue provides the officers' corps with the task of organizing and directing a political mass-movement, d) the military campaign against the rebellion in Sumatra and Celebes strengthened the discipline of the army and improved the training of officers and troops, e) the habit in the last four years of joint examination of military, political, economic, and social problems and of policy-making by the senior officers, and finally, f) the return to the constitution of 1945 provided the institutional framework for a strong executive and eliminated the controlling influence of politicians ..."^63^.

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^62^ personal observation in a new nation.

of September 30th, 1965 by a group of dissident young officers, which strengthen the belief among inner officers'-corps circles of their "civic mission" to safeguard the unity and sovereignty of the nation. As mentioned above, however, all the conditions mentioned are only of value in so far as they are a basis for the military in order to contribute to modernization processes in future. On the contrary as we have seen earlier in this paper, these same conditions, unfortunately, have so far led in Indonesia to more confusion and regression of a sound civil life than to actual contribution to modernization. In other words, these conditions may be necessary, but not sufficient for sound contributions to modernization processes by the military.

Suggestions for further Investigations: A Research Design.

The Problem: Finally, as we have promised, the aim of writing this paper is to construct a research design. This design is based on some research done by the writer among the military in a new-emerging country and it should be conducive to further more penetrating investigations on this subject. Our problem can be concisely formulated as: "The what, how, and why of the organizational role of the military in modernization processes in Indonesia (or any other new nation)." Now, our first step is to break up or refine the main concepts of our problem-formulation into clear, concrete, and explicit operationable segments of data. To start with the concept of Organization. We mean here by Organization mainly the purposive or goal-directed formal organizations; such as Polity, Economy, and Bureaucracy 64). When saying the Military, we mean in the first instance the Military élite. This latter concept we try to operationalize, as we have shown earlier in this paper, by making a stratification of the élite-group or the officers' corps. (Janowitz). Not only formal leaders must be taken into account but also the informal leaders; furthermore, we have to make a distinction between the "cadre" and the "nucleus" of the leaders groups; transmovements among élite-groups, reference-groups behavior, clique and factions also must be considered; and, finally, ideological indoctrinations, education, and personal or idiosyncratic experiences operating through primary group structures are not the least important and therefore not to be neglected 65). By "Modern", we mean with Almond, Parsons, Shils, and Kluckhohn: "the preponderance of the rational and secondary structures over the traditional and primary ones" 66).

The Method

The Sample: As for the "Who" of the military élite we are interested to investigate, we refer to the stratification of the élite described above in the problem-formulation. Basing on this stratification of the officers' corps we thus desire to have some information about those persons or leaders: 1) who have played an important role in the past. These men mainly consist of senior officers, who had exercised decisive influences in political life of the country, 2) the formal leaders among the

65) Janowitz, M., op. cit., 1964 Appendix; and in this paper p. 318-9.
senior officers' corps at present in power, as well as those officers, who possess real
or potential influences as a consequence of their strategic positions or their forms
of informal leadership. 3) With the eyes to the future we, finally, are interested in
those "cadre" officers (as contrasted with the "nuclei" of the leading officers of
the present) who possibly could acquire power. We are thinking, among others, of
the young cadets of the military academies or the regimental/division-commanders
in the regions. As in 2), we also have to consider strong positions in the hierarchy
and active "pressure-" of interest-groups within the military structure as well as
outside.

The Procedure: We are anxious to get informations about the officers' corps men-
tioned above in the sample. These informations are connected with the officers' 1)
values or norms, 2) orientations, and 3) behavior or conduct\(^{67}\). The techniques we
will use to acquire informations are, simultaneously or alternatively: a) obtaining
their biographies as much as possible, b) interviews or enquêtes of the personalities
concerned, c) content analysis of written and/or spoken material, and d) observations
of behavior. These value-orientation and behavior factors we wish to connect with
the elements of the military internal organization\(^{68}\) as well as with its external
structure\(^{69}\) in order to be able to answer the question of "the what", "the how", 
(and if possible "the why") of military performances.

The Analysis: As mentioned above we intend to cross-tabulate the value-orientations
and behavior-factors in external organizations with the background-factors of the
internal organization of the military. To pin-point, as exactly as possible, the positions
of the concerning actors we deem it instructive to make use of a "developmental
construct" invented by Lasswell, and used fruitfully by the Cornell University team
under Holmberg in Peru\(^{70}\). To give an example of the "developmental construct",
or sometimes called "contextual mathics", we take the relevant elements of the
internal organizational structure of the military and relate these to the external
organizational tasks of modernization in the field of the Polity:

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\(^{67}\) see pp. 320-322 of this paper.

\(^{68}\) see pp. 313-5; pp. 320-3; and also p. 324-5 in this paper.

\(^{69}\) see pp. 312-4, pp. 315-18, and also p. 325 in this paper.

\(^{70}\) Lasswell, H. D. in: Lerner, D., (ed.) op. cit. 1959, pp. 89-113; and Holmberg, A., Class
instruction, Cornell University, 1960.
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<tr>
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<td>'ideal-type' (future) = the NORM = imaginary</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
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<tr>
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<th>THE POLITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization-Format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>100% 'persuasive'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>'oppressive'</td>
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