United Nations’ peace-keeping operations
as a politico-sociological problem

Some preliminary evaluations and hypotheses

J. Niezing, Military Academy of the Netherlands

I. Introduction

Much has already been written about the UN Peace Keeping Operations, and experts of various disciplines have engaged in treating the subject under discussion. Almost daily, fresh studies appear on international armies in past and present, on the potentialities of supranational police forces of today and of yesterday and especially on the background and development of UNO activities in this field. This is by no means strange, since the maintenance of peace has always been UNO’s main task, whatever specialized responsibilities may, in the course of time, have been added to its range of activity. To quote Murray, “continuing achievement in this vital role” is even imperative to UNO’s continued existence. On the other hand, the tenor and scope of this role has been influenced by the struggle for political power in the world and in the UN itself. This tendency has been thrown into relief particularly and spectacularly in the UN Peace Keeping Operations. Therefore, a relatively strong dysfunctional influence may be exercised by UN forces on the persistence of the UN-organisation. In other words: by their performance UN forces, intended as they are as conflict-reducing bodies, may contribute to the activation of existing political contrasts within the UNO, as ONUC experiences did show. For this reason, more and more scientific attention is being paid to the problem of the political control of UN forces. Moreover, a supranational police force is often regarded as an ultimate re-


Recently published studies on the problems of political control:
quirement in a generally and completely disarmed world and an imperative complementary element in disarmament processes. Both the recommendations of the USA and of the USSR dealt with such a force during the various phases of disarmament. For these reasons, whatever the differences between such a police force and the various peace-keeping forces may be, specialists on disarmament problems have become more and more interested in UN peace-keeping experiences. As a consequence, the governmental disarmament agencies as well as Pugwash are also interested in questions of political control of UN Peace Keeping forces 4).

So far two explanations for the great attention paid to UN forces. One tends to say: ample attention. It is particularly the experiences with ONUC which have made the world give serious thought to the rules of UNO activities. Moreover (and this was another factor) there was the fact of peaceful coexistence which made UNO's role in a possible disarmament agreement less illusory and, in turn, stimulated such consideration 5). Nevertheless, on closer examination, it soon becomes evident that, amongst all descriptive matter published so far, studies with a purely social-scientific point of departure are almost non-existent; even social-scientific studies concerning the so important problems of political control are as good as absent.

To be sure, apart from the official publications by governments and the reports issued by the Secretary-General of the UNO, we have detailed studies on the experiences with on or more UN forces, and their numbers are legion. The best known are the studies of Gabriella Rosner6), Burns and Heathcote7) and O'Brien8). Suchlike reports invariably contain facts concerning political and juridical problems, problems of organization and logistics, and many others, all of them relevant to the operation in question. They are “technical” studies from which a good deal of instruction may be derived, yet they do not furnish many starts to theoretical queries. Seen from this point of view, the rather summary generalizing observations by Betty Goetz Lall and by Fenna v. d. Burg9) lead us a step further: they set us on the track of some interesting politico-sociological problems by their endeavour to generalization. As such, Miss Van den Burg sums up five characteristics of UN operations since 1956: (a) the UN force has always been meant to be a “conflict-reducing peace force” and never as a “fighting force”; (b) all UN forces were composed of parts of the armies of the members who did not belong to

4) For instance, ACDA sponsored research in this field, and dedicated to these problems a special column in its bulletin: “Disarmament and Arms Control, Studies in Progress or Recently Completed”, Dept. of State, USA. Pugwash sponsored comparative research, to be done by I.P.R.A. (International Peace Research Association). The author participated in an International Summer School on Disarmament and Arms Control, organized by the Italian Pugwash Movement (12th-25th of June at Frascati, near Rome), where also attention had to be paid to the problems of the political control of UN Peace Keeping Operations.


the permanent members of the Security Council — moreover, when these forces were formed, more and more consideration was given to the individual wishes of the “host-country”; (c) the peace-keeping forces never began their task but with the permission of the host-country; (d) the peace-force abstained from intervention in the internal affairs of the host-country; (e) the role of the Secretary-General of the UNO grew more and more important.

A piece of theoretical dynamics lies in this enumeration. To be sure, what are called here “characteristics” are partly role-expectations which developed gradually (a-d), partly a certain amount of political power, institutionalized in a vacuum of conflicting goals (e). Proceeding, these role expectations have to a greater (b-c) or lesser (a-d) extent shown corresponding roles. More emphatically, one could ask whether or not these four “principles” (a-d) are at all compatible, and if so, with what type of operation. Such dynamics — we shall revert to this subject later on — do not find expression in Miss Van den Burg’s observations, which, when all is said and done, goes without saying in the framework of her article.

We also have quite a few sonorous reflections on the “Meaning” of a supra- or international armed force, and suggestions as to the improvement of the conditions under which such a force should function in the future. In Bloomfield’s well-known collective work10) we can find some of the often quoted observations in question. However intelligent, however “theoretical” these studies may be, they by no means form a social-scientific theory, nor do the above-mentioned group of studies for that matter.

And then there is a third category of studies in which the UN operations appear. It is right to stress the word “appear” in this case, since these operations do not feature as a focal point in the category referred to. They are studies in which reports are made of research on the opinion of a population (or the political elites of this population) on a number of “issues”. Disarmament often belongs to these issues, and the role played by the UN is often raised. In the simplest case the person or persons conducting the inquiry merely ask an opinion on the subject. A comparative research — comparative in respect of time and place — is much more satisfactory. But it is still better to study the results of inquiries which do not try to measure a person’s opinion, but to gauge attitudes, that is to say more social-psychologically oriented studies in which the attitude adopted towards the UN in general, and towards the UN operations in particular, is considered in relation to other attitudes. A comparative survey in this respect is that of Buchanan, Krugman and Van Wagenen11). More gratifying studies, from a social-psychological point of view, have been written by Lerner, in cooperation with Marguerite Kramer and with Morton Gordon12). Also the studies of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, i.e. by Jerome Laulicht, should be mentioned13).

However, none of these three types of studies are in compliance with our demands. The first two are not because they are lacking a sociological definition of the problems they deal with; the latter because it refers only indirectly to the object of our investigation. What we need is a sociological theory which, as far as its aims are concerned, relates the functioning of widely divergent types of UN forces to the political context in which this functioning takes place. It must be a theory, further, which possibly leads to a modest prediction in respect to the effectiveness of a UN force. When constructing such a theory one can “place” anew the materials of these three types of study and throw light on it from the viewpoint of politico-sociological theory.

II. Internal functioning

Any social system, and any organization as a special type of social system can be described in terms of internal and external functioning; there is a clear connection between the two, and attention to this fact has been paid by the sociological theory of organization.

The distinction made in plain speech between the “organizational” and “political aspects” of UN forces for the greater part runs parallel to the sociological distinction between its internal and external functioning. For the greater part — not wholly. In a sociological description of these “political aspects” we shall most certainly have to pay much attention to the relation of the organization and its environment, but this relation is influenced by the internal functioning of the organization, and vice versa. Moreover, political values also play a role in this internal functioning, both directly (politically divergent interpretation of purposes) and indirectly (anticipated political consequences lead to a specific pattern of institutionalization). Therefore, in this paper on the political aspects of UN forces, we will give much attention to the external functioning without, however, denying the mutual connection between internal and external functioning.

For all their differences in composition and purpose, the UN Peace Forces have always been organizations constituted by parts of various national armies, no more (supranational) no less (national). This sounds rather trivial, yet it is meaningful in order to “localize” some of the problems.

The supranational element in the UN forces is minute. In some respects we can hardly compare the personnel of such a peace force with that of the “real” UNO bodies. In all probability a certain measure of internalization of “UN standards” takes place among the members of the UN force, but this internalization will bear a different character form that shown by the members of the other UN bodies. Thus, for instance, when researching into this process of internalization among UN experts, Ingrid Galtung discovered a “fear to return problem”: the longer one was in the service of the UNO, the less one became au fait with the (material) conditions in the country of origin. In the first phase of this process of disorientation, the expert voices much ideal criticism side by side with his criticism of

defective UN organization. But after having reached the “point of no return”\(^{15}\) a strong identification with UN organization follows. So, ideal criticism vanishes and organizational criticism is directed differently\(^{16}\). As far as the members of the UN forces are concerned, this problem does not exist, and certainly not as long as the UN force is no supranational and more or less permanent body. On the contrary, participation in UN operations does not seldom lead to a re-appointment in a higher rank-level in the army of origin, and to individual status promotion by a certain amount of revaluation of the military profession in the home-country. In this context one might take the case of the Irish army as an example.

So, from an organizational-sociological point of view it would seem to be more meaningful to compare the internal functioning of UN force with that of other international forces than with that of other UN organizations, however remarkable this may sound when viewed in the light of actual politics. Thus, for instance, the following important problem presented itself during the ‘MLF experiments’: the dissimilarity on the rank-hierarchies of the participating naval forces, a consequence of which was that confusion arose in the command-structure. This problem actually makes various writers of experience with UN forces attach value to a majority of Commonwealth countries among the participants\(^{17}\).

But, on the other hand, the UNO force is more than a mere addition of national elements. Participation in UN operations means, to say the least of it, the addition of a new dimension to an occupational ideology. There is even an allusion to this in the recruitment campaign for the Canadian Army. Possibly, too, this new dimension might mean a psychic “outlet” for frustration among some of the officers. It is therefore meaningful to bestow attention on the motivation of the individual participants in UN operations. Not seldom will volunteers for UN forces be individuals who have kept themselves aloof from the community, also politically\(^{18}\). But aloofness, politically, may have two reasons. It may be that, disappointed with the abandonment of “traditional values” in the community, the individual seeks to realize these values in the framework of UNO. It is also possible that he hopes to find a new and more adequate political ideology in UNO by standing aloof from such traditional values. The type of officers who once applied for a commission in the Netherlands military unit in Korea is, politically speaking, probably quite another type than the volunteers who went to Kashmir in 1965. But both types were, probably, not representative for the dominant political values in the Dutch army. So it is not merely a question of divergent political interpretations (by the governments of the participating armies) of the aims and purposes of the UNO forces — always expressed in very general terms —, but we also have to contend

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\(^{15}\) This process might be described in terms of Festinger’s theory on cognitive dissonance. We tried to do so, in respect of the structure of ideologies of religious and political radicalism, in: “Onheilsprofeetie en radicalisme” (“Prophecies of Calamity and Radicalism”), Assen (Neth) 1966.

\(^{16}\) Conclusion by Galtung.


\(^{18}\) H. V. Dicks: “The International Soldier — a psychiatrist’s View”, in Int. Organization and in Bloomfield.

with the problem of the divergence between the political aims of the individuals participating, and those of their respective governments.

Will this divergence increase in the course of time? If so, with whom and in what situation?

From a politico-sociological point of view one might, in this respect anyway, discover the most interesting parallels between the process of internalization among the members of the UN forces and that of the members of the "real" UN bodies.

III. Conceptualization

"Peace Keeping" by UN forces always means intervention in a political situation, or viewed sociologically, a contribution to a political process. This is manifest in the case of a "Fighting force" but also "pure". Peace Keeping forces have a political history and their operations have political consequences.

From a formal-juridical point of view one could probably designate this intervention with terms such as restoring the status quo ante or maintaining the status quo, as the case may be, with at the back of our minds something like a period of cooling off, or freezing conflicts. The words "peace" and "security" as they appear in the Charter, are explicitly connected with a prevention of outbursts of violence in conflictsituations. But that does not mean that "Peace Keeping" is therefore synonymous with "Peace Making", as Terwisscha van Scheltinga rightly points out. The UN forces will not only be unable to change the fundamental causes of the conflict, nay, a (protracted) presence of the UN forces will even be able to encumbrance the solution of the conflict19).

Here the sociologist would even like to go one step further. For him, politics is an omnipresent blend of endeavours of individuals and groups constantly changing in structure. By means of limiting the alternatives of behaviour in competing individuals and groups, such aims are directed to aligning the decision-making of a system of authority with their own purposes. The degree in which such purposes are realized is an indication of the amount of power the group in question possesses in this respect. The sociologist is interested in the whole of these power relations (political structure) and the fundamental changes to be observed (political process).

As, for instance, matter can be more or less radio-active, thus the performance of the UN force can be more or less "politico-active". Whether or not it is meant to be so, whether anticipated or not, the UN force will always be a factor in this political structure. Logically, the rate of this "politico-activity" will depend on the situation in which the UN performance takes place, and on the type of action. Sociologically, there is a mutual connection between "the situation" and "the nature" of these actions. Political structures determine the measure and the manner in which the UN-Force behaves; it can in turn, therefore, become a factor in political processes.

Such a "dynamic" outlook would appear rather chaotic. But it is the task of the social sciences to seek a certain measure of regularity in this seeming chaos, and to explain these regularities. The prime requisite is to make a few relevant classifi-

cations of political processes and of characteristics of UN operations.

Theoretically, political processes can be distinguished according to their scope: there are changes in local political power-structures, intercommunal ones etc. up to changes in the power-structure of the world (mondial political processes). Political processes can also be distinguished according to their dynamics. It is true that power-structures are always changing, but the rate of change can differ widely. There are countries where power-structures alter quickly, as is the case in most of the new nations, where we find a rapid transition from traditional to new political elites. There are also countries where these structures have crystallized, hence showing a much slower change. Of both types of structures of power — the "dynamic" and the "static" type — we find a special form: the equilibrium phase, in which the groupings involved in the intercursive struggle for power possess almost equal positions. Logically, a dynamic equilibrium is a phase that is no more than a dot on a line. Psychologically and sociologically, it can be a very dramatic phase, ending in the monopolizing of power by a new political elite. On the other hand, a static equilibrium looks more or less like a pair of scales, on both sides of which the weights are changed simultaneously.

It is of importance to know that dynamic structures show a different political behaviour as compared with static structures. There is a link between the measure of political stability and, for instance, the degree up to which a "Verantwortungspolitik" is carried out by those playing an active political role (diplomacy included). The greater the stability, the more careful one will endeavour to calculate one's political strategy, and anticipate the political effects of certain measures (such as a UN force).

This classification of political processes (local, intercommunal, mondial; "static" versus "dynamic" whether or not in their equilibrium phase) is of special importance if one wishes to analyze the relation of political processes to characteristics of UN performances vice versa. In the following paragraph we shall go into this matter in both ways.

IV. External functioning

a) Political process and UN force: Institutionalization. From a formal point of view, the UN force has the politically neutral task of "peace keeping". It proceeds from the principle of non-intervention; its composition is in conformity with the wishes of the "host"-country; its activities are subjected to the consent of this host-country, etc. These, however, are merely formal principles, and they actually hide political reality. Even non-intervention may have politically important consequences. The wishes and permission of the host-country — in themselves the dominating part of the power structure in casu — are usually drawn up after the necessary pressure has been exerted, pressure from the side of a prominent group of countries, or a group of prominent countries in the UNO.

From a sociological point of view it might be more useful to note that, apart from the formal tasks of UN forces, up to new preference was given to an "observer-role" (as associated with political neutrality of the UN force) over a more politically active "constabulary-role". Both these roles are here to be seen "idealtypisch".
they are to be considered as abstractions, as never-existing extreme situations, between which social reality could be located. Such an observer role of the UN force might be considered to be in line with an executive role of the Secretary-General; and a constabulary role with a policy-making role of the Secretary-General.

UNO is an international organization. The Security Council and General Assembly reflect in their decision-making predominantly mondial political processes. The political power of the Secretary-General (as a supra-national institution) in respect of a certain domain of power, such as the political control of the UN forces, depends on the measure in which countries in the UNO power structure who are in position to accomplish an imperative distribution of values, wish to or must tolerate this political power. The smaller the political power of the S.-G., the more he will stress the "observer role" of the UN force. The greater his power is, the more he will stress the "constabulary role".

Given a certain power position, the measure in which the S.-G. will associate "peace keeping" with a "constabulary role" depends on the measure in which the political process in the "host-country" can be connected with those of the (group of) countries dominant in the UNO power structure. Should the latter preponderantly be the case, then in a situation of equilibrium there can be no question whatever of any UNO operation; in a dynamic situation, UNO decisions will leave no room for a position of political power of a UN secretariat20) and a UN command21).

Hence we can sum up the following alternative situations:

(1) There is no immediate connection between the local political process of which the conflict is an expression, and the mondial political process. In this case the UN-force will possess a strong supranational character, and the tendency of the S.-G.'s translating "Peace Keeping" in terms of a "constabulary role" will be strong. An effective intervention by UNO is functional to its persistence as an international organization, and functional to supranational elements of the UNO organization.

(2) There certainly is a connection between the local and the mondial political process. Generally speaking, the UN operation, if possible, will be dysfunctional in respect to UNO. Owing to changes in the mondial power structure, and because the power structure within UNO not fully reflects this political process, a number of variants appear:

(2a) Within the UNO there is a static equilibrium. UN operations are not tolerated (Cf. Hungary).

(2b) Within the UNO there is a dynamic equilibrium, owing to which an "anticipatory attitude" in political action is not yet present in the same measure as in static situations. Temporarily, special constellations of power relations and vacua of power may make their appearance, owing to which it will be possible to decide unto a UN operation. Here, however, a UN operation is strongly dysfunctional with re-


21) Many remarks could be made on the politically very important question of the relation between S-G, UNO staffmembers and UN command. However, such would be beyond the scope of this rather condensed survey.
spect to the persistence of the UNO as a international or supranational body. Ac-
cording to the S.-G.'s possible interpretation of the latter situation, this can be sub-
divided into:

(2b, 1) A country or group of countries cannot affect an imperative distribution of
values, in consequence of which a UN operation will be necessary to restore the
balance (formally: "depolitization"). The S.-G. can make appropriate a certain
amount of political power, but he will exercise this power as little as possible (Cf.
Congo).

(2b, 2) A country or group of countries cannot effect an imperative distribution of
values, in consequence of which a UN force will be added to the political power
position of the opposite parties, to restore ultimately the balance. The S.-G. will not
acquire political power of any importance (Cf. Korea).

The rapidly developing struggle for power between "East" and "West" has been
putting an equally rapid end to the original conception of an international police
force with a permanent staff committee. In consequence, the supranational political
power of the S.-G. was minimized and with it the possibility of an institutionalized
"policy-making role". True that, according to Röling22), owing to the expanding
preparatory and informative task of the Secretariat, some of these tasks are beginning
to show aspects of a supranational organization, but the results cannot be more than
a small and latent position of power for the S.-G. The gradual transition to a static
equilibrium made situations as described in 1. become less frequent, and also minim-
ized the chance of the S.-G.'s policy-making role. Hence, it was a shifting from 1
to 2a. However, the strategy of peaceful coexistence, as developed since 1956, made
it possible for the S.-G. to play a modest role in situations where it was in the interest
of both parties to avoid conflict. This means a slight counter-tendency from 2a to 1;
nevertheless, the political power of the S.-G. remains very limited.

The position of the "new nations" within the UNO political structure strongly in-
creased, especially after the "package deal" of 1955. In respect of the UN forces
the foundation of this position had already been laid by the "Uniting for Peace
Resolution", which, although undoubtedly not meant to do so23), in a later phase
certainly contributed to this "small power revolt". But owing to an increasing po-
litical struggle among these new nations, which was partly due to a reflection of the
contrasts between East and West, most divergent motives may lie hidden behind the
majority resolutions of the Assembly, which recommended the S.-G. to organize an
UN operation in one guise or another. Hence, a shifting from 1. to 2b. Possibly, also
to a certain degree from 2a. to 2b.

On the one hand, a modest form of institutionalization of a supranational UN force
has been accomplished in the form of "technical provisions". In this respect we
might refer to the communication centres at the S.-G.'s disposal in some countries.
Nor should we forget the small nucleus of military advisers to the S.-G., and in par-
ticular the UNTSO, of whose experiences since 1948 he has often made good
use24). Also, mainly because of the contrasts behind the majority resolutions of the

23) Murray, op. cit.
Assembly, the S.-G. himself was forced to take the initiative in interpreting politically the recommendations made. On the other hand, this will lead other countries, including the new ones, to make the UN force a minimally small one, and it also tends to make such countries suspicious of any propositions for further institutionalization of this force. The greater the UN force, the less it will restrict itself to playing the "observer role". The greater the institutionalization of the supranational character of the Secretariat, the freer the Secretary-General's interpretation will be. Under the present conditions (situation 2a. and 2b), this would be strongly dysfunctional to the UNO. Accordingly, we do not only hear of arguments for keeping down UN forces from the side of dominant groups in UNO's power structure, but also from authors like Schelling and others, who concern themselves with the fate of UNO, and, it goes without saying, from the Secretary-General himself. Given the political structure, the S.-G., on the one hand, is forced to go on playing a "political role as a vital element in the United Nations Peace Keeping process". But it is just this role that makes his propositions suspicious beforehand, and dooms to premature failure even the most modest endeavours to attain institutionalization, such as was the case with Hamarskjöld.

Experience with ONUC, where "the temptation to interfere from the outside was extreme", according to Murray, and, to quote Kotani, "the tendency to skip over the framework of the United Nations was readily apparent", has rendered a better understanding of all this and has shown the problem of the "political control" of UN force as something of the greatest importance. The escalation from Peace Keeping Forces to Fighting Forces was actually a symptom of the tension we can expect if situation 1. develops into situation 2. during the operations. Tensions between all parties concerned, between these and the S.-G., and last but not least between the S.-G., staff, and UN command might develop.

b. UN force and Political Process: purpose, role-expectations and effectiveness. It seems clear from all this, that tendencies in political structures have their influence on the measure and manner in which the UN force will operate. But also the contrary is true: the UN force influences the political structures in a certain measure and in a certain way.

From what we have already seen — the slight amount of institutionalization of a

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27) Lecture, delivered by Oe Thant, Harvard University, 1963.
30) Murray, op. cit.
supranational UN force — follows that, under the present circumstances, the influence on the mondial political processes remains modest. Thus, “politico-activity” refers mainly to local and intercommunal political processes. Hypothetically speaking, is it possible systematically to reduce this “politico-activity” to a number of regularities recognizable in the external functioning of UN forces?

The nature of politico-activity, given a certain political process, is dependent on the purposes which the UN forces dictate to themselves. The “recommendations” put to the Secretary-General are to be “translated” into more concrete purposes by him and his commanders. One of the questions that presents itself when laying down these purposes is whether or not the UN force is to endeavour to isolate the conflict from the outside world, or to separate the conflicting parties (interposition). Both purposes mentioned here are thought as “idealtypisch”. In reality, there is a difference in accent. Both purposes always appear combined. Successful isolation usually leads to the necessity of interposition, and interposition is meaningful only when the conflict can be limited in scope.

Isolation of the conflict always means: isolation in any measure of the struggle for political power lying at the root of the conflict. Endeavours to isolate, therefore, merely have a serious chance of succeeding if the local political process in question does not (yet) form part of intercommunal political processes, or that the parties concerned with such intercommunal political processes are not (yet) in a position to influence the purpose of the UN force.

One could say that there is a certain arrangement of work between the Secretary-General and the UN force. Should isolation of the conflict situation come first, then the S.-G. will develop great diplomatic activity, and the UN force will perform additional operations. Should interposition come first, then the centre of gravity will be found in the UN forces, and the Secretary-General will put forth additional diplomatic activity.

Generally speaking, the conflicts with which the UNO has to cope are dynamic political processes (sometimes also in the equilibrium phase) which have come to a violent outburst. Here, interposition is of the greatest importance, seen from a politico-sociological point of view. We should like to restrict ourselves to the two following hypotheses:

1) interposition in the case of a local dynamic political process leads to a local dynamic equilibrium;
2) interposition in the case of a local dynamic equilibrium leads to a local static equilibrium.

Needless to say that one could add more hypotheses to the above-mentioned on the basis of other classifications of purposes and/or with regard to intercommunal political processes.

Given certain purposes, the measure of “politico-activity” can vary enormously, dependent upon the political process and the effectiveness of the UN force. The measure in which the UN force assigns itself a “constabulary role” instead of an “observer role” may be considered as an indication of the strength of the factor.

32) Of course, also other classifications of purposes are possible. See, for instance, Knut Midgaard: “Preparations for future contingencies”, “Oslo papers” p. 64-79.
that UN performances mean to local political structure. A “constabulary role”
points to the inclination to intervene in local conflicts, hence in the local intercursive
power relations. An “observer role”, on the contrary, points to the disposition to
limit oneself to only, registering conflicts, thereby leaving their solution (that is to
say: intervention in intercursive power relations) to other bodies. In this respect we
come to the following hypotheses:

(3) interposition in the case of a local or intercommunal dynamic political process
accentuates the “constabulary role”;

(4) interposition in the case of a local or intercommunal dynamic equilibrium ac­
centuates the “observer role”.

These two roles should always be regarded as “idealtypisch”, as we suggested in
the foregoing paragraph. They always appear in combination. In a dynamic political
process, however, both roles exclude each other to a considerable extent. Moreover,
given the purposes, the chances are great that in such a situation an “observer role”
will rapidly change into a “constabulary role”. In other words: limiting oneself
to observation in the case of interposition and especially in the case of isolation of
dynamically developing political structures, is actually a “testimonium paupertatis”
of UN forces. This brings us to the last hypotheses:

(5) the greater the effectiveness of the UN force, the stronger relatively its “con­
stabulary role” will be accentuated;

(6) the lesser the effectiveness of the UN force, the stronger relatively its “observer role” will be accentuated.

“Effectiveness”, according to Etzioni33), is determined by the degree in which an
organization realizes its goals. An “effective” organization of the UN force will (be
considered as to) offer more possibilities for intervention in the local political
process, that lies at the root of the conflict situation. Moreover, the members of an
effective organization will be sooner inclined to “positive reactions”. One should
in this case think of manpower, material provisions, and of the morale of the staff
members34) as conditions of effectiveness.

Much of what has been advanced here as hypotheses will be recognized intuitively
in the practice of political behaviour. And this also holds good for further refine­
ments which one can introduce into any of these hypotheses. In equilibrium situa­
tions, especially, situations in which the disposition to anticipate is great, one will
actually take these mechanisms into consideration. But it is a good thing to approach
them in a more precise and less intuitive manner. Our capacity to prediction should
be of the best. Situations in which the chances of failures of the UN force are great
should be recognized as clearly and as soon as possible, since such a failure embodies
considerable consequences for the United Nations Organization as a whole, and
hence for world peace.

34) Much about these problems of morale can be learned from the story by Phillip Fores: