Politieke sociologie

Patterns of rioting in Israel *
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Speaking of collective violent behaviour in Israel, the most striking feature to be emphasized is the fact that during all the years of its existence there were but few cases of rioting, and except for one special category, none of them was of the severe type as to duration and casualties. The fact that only one fatal casualty is on record is persuasive enough to support the above statement.

If nonetheless, in spite of the small magnitude of the riots it seems worthwhile to analyze these occurrences, the reason therefore is the very distinctive character of the particular collective-violent outbursts in their positive as well as negative features (1). Thus, the particularity of the various types of riots may enable us to draw conclusions about the social dynamics, values and prejudices in Israeli society.

The main types and distinctive features of the riots are summarized in the following scheme and a few comments will suffice.

Before noting our comments, a few remarks concerning the attitude toward violence (2) and its legitimacy in Israel are appropriate.

One can say that despite some highly contradictory attitudinal ingredients, the basic stance towards collective violence is negative and condemning. In the past, when during the struggle for independence part of the Yishuv, the dissidents (being considered by the official Zionist circles as apostates and „beyond” legitimacy) chose the way of political terrorism, only a minority supported their ideology and practice (the myth of the „purity of our arms” was upheld in a most naive manner), and thereafter the official historiography was highly unfair in passing in silence over the role of the

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERPETUATED BY</td>
<td>Teenagers of various communities</td>
<td>Low class young male, partly criminal Oriental communities</td>
<td>Young males (seldom also older and women) Ashkenazi</td>
<td>Young males, sometimes also women Oriental communities</td>
<td>Various &quot;outcast&quot; groups</td>
<td>Sometimes the whole clan, inclusive women</td>
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<td>MAGNITUDE</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Various, sometimes severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTED AGAINST</td>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Persons, seldom property</td>
<td>Property and/or persons</td>
<td>Property, persons. Symbols of authority (Police, Buildings of the establishment)</td>
<td>&quot;Sacred cows&quot; of the regime</td>
<td>Traditional or actual enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLACE OF OCCURRENCE</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Mostly mixed small towns</td>
<td>Various, often border of orthodox quarters</td>
<td>Often start in slums of Oriental immigr. (in few cases Oriental Moshavim)</td>
<td>Relatively often Jerusalem (Knesset)</td>
<td>Arab and Druze villages</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIME OF OCCURRENCE</td>
<td>Various, mostly summer</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>VARIOUS PRE-ELECTION WEEKS</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERVENTION OF POLICE</td>
<td>Halfhearted</td>
<td>Very firm and efficient</td>
<td>Reluctant, often inefficient</td>
<td>Efficient, in few cases brutal</td>
<td>Sometimes very brutal</td>
<td>Efficient; intervention at final stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITIES</td>
<td>Tendency to disregard</td>
<td>Sharply condemning</td>
<td>Tendency to disregard, reserved</td>
<td>Condemning</td>
<td>Sharply, &quot;hysterically&quot; condemning</td>
<td>Disregard or condemning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION OF NARROWER COMMUNITY OF THE ATTACKERS</td>
<td>Partial approval and disapproval</td>
<td>Partial approval and disapproval</td>
<td>Endorsed; tacit support of religious establishment</td>
<td>Comprehension for motives, violence rejected</td>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARGE, CONVICTION</td>
<td>Light (before 1967)</td>
<td>Light (before 1967)</td>
<td>Light, if at all</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Severe in case of homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light (after 1967)</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Light-medium</td>
<td>Severe in case of homicide</td>
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dissidents in the struggle for statehood and even discriminated against the fighters of those units (pension, etc.) during more than a decade.

Even concerning the more remote past, though fights of the first settlers (Hashomer, Trumpeldor, etc.) played an important role in historiography and myth, they were presented as purely defensive and there was nothing in the history of Palestinian pioneering which resembles American pioneering accompanied with vigilant movements, lynch justice, etc., etc.

In everyday Israeli prose, although official ideals of cooperation and social justice coexist with out-throat competition, aggressiveness, lack of courtesy and so on, physical violence is condemned. News about arbitrary police brutality during an arrest will evoke stormy protests and many a movie with scenes of violence played the world over will be interdicted by local censorship. This is all the more interesting since there exists a cult of toughness and he-manship as signs of „healthy peoplehood”; aggressiveness of children and youth are endorsed on the same ground, and the glorification of the Army is a tenet of near scaredness.

During the mid-sixties when „beleaguered peace” still reigned, when commenting on the high-grade militarism of Israel youth, we stated that military service is seen not through glasses of belligerence, but a kind of „rite de passage” towards manhood through tough drill and a kind of armed safari. POLITICO-military activism is certainly in line with the national mythology of the fearless fighter and the despise of too much deliberation as a sign of fear; however, this has but little influence on attitudes towards collective violence in non-military frames.

The fact that the rightwing formations and parties formerly advocating terrorism were near outcasts explains why they could not organize politically violent groups (except in the context of this study some small-scale episodes between 1951-1953). On the other hand, it is highly interesting that the only place where serious institutionalized political gangsterism (of the left, the strongmen of the Mapai bosses) existed, Haifa, was also the most liberal in Jewish-Arab relations and in the religious domain. Only for a few immigrant groups (individual) violence (3) was an accepted way to resolve issues in their former homeland, and here again in Israel, being the underdogs they learned the fact of life that it does sometimes help when nothing else moves the reluctant bureaucrats.

The following observations and conclusions can be added to the details illustrated in our scheme:
1. It is almost superfluous to emphasize that in all kinds of rioting behaviour the "hooliganistic" element may be, at least in part of the participants, stronger than the "official" motivation. When, for instance, in the same slum-area where for weeks on every Sabbath Eve wild car races with stolen cars took place, on Yom Kippur the truck of the municipality, carrying workers doing essential maintenance work, is stoned, the "religious fervor" of the attackers is not very convincing. The same holds true in some cases of ethnic riots (especially in Beer Sheva where no provocation, like prior arrest of relatives, etc., occurred). A similar "displacement" of motivation can be found also in cases where the instigator to violence had old personal accounts to settle with his victim, as for instance when the premises of a Jewish cafe-owner employing Arabs was demolished by the rioting mob during an anti-Arab riot in Tel Aviv.

2. The distinct difference between the ethnic identification of low-class youngsters (teenagers and those in the early twenties, many with a criminal record) from "Oriental" communities participating in collective violence against Arabs (4), (versus the East-European background of those perpetuating religious terrorism) confirms once more our observation that extreme religious (and ideological) fanaticism is the speciality of people raised in the Shtetls (5) and of their sons. These religious fanatics are rather indifferent towards the Arabs, upholding segregation towards them like towards all kinds of "Goyim" (including Jewish secularists), while for reasons analyzed elsewhere the extreme anti-Arab attitudes are characteristic of sons of immigrants from Arab countries (especially in the lower strata and in those hailing from countries where persecutions were frequent). In these same Oriental groups on the other hand, traditionalist as they may be, or violent in other walks of everyday life, high-grade tolerance concerning religious observance or non-observance of other persons is the rule (6).

True, even a not too sophisticated Orthodox person would immediately retort that since he is commanded to impose observance of the sacred law in the public realm (the "parhesia") every infringement of religious interdictions on the streets, etc., is an offensive act against him — but if aggression is defined according to common sense (i.e. not by theologians or experts in international law) such an argument can hardly be sustained.

3. The striking absence of a more serious or more direct economic rivalry as a motivation of anti-Arab violence (in contrast to Jewish-ethnic riots, where it plays a prominent role) can be easily explained by the objective
situations characterizing the prevailing employment- and unemployment-patterns. It is highly exceptional, that in times of recession Arab minority workers would continue to hold their jobs where Jews lost their workplaces; or that Arabs should be bosses (foremen, etc.) of Jews, or again, that any serious economic competition exists between Jewish and Arab "enterprises". Occasionally at some places Jewish workers refuse to work with Arabs, explaining this by mistrust as to their loyalty, but not by a feeling of threat to their own jobs; security reasons or the fear that they may seduce Jewish girls are a common explanation. To put it shortly: Prolonged economic rivalry is non-existent (7).

4. The unexpected finding that various types of riots occurred in pre-election weeks could easily lead to an erroneous interpretation, namely, that the content of propaganda of some of the parties, or outright incitement, played a role in the outbursts. Nothing like that is the case. Nobody connected any type of riot with outright influence of political activists; the actions of the religious zealots were perpetuated at least partly by circles who boycott the State and the elections in particular (although they enjoy the support, if arrested, also of the more moderate Orthodox politicians). The fact that none of the "ad-hoc-political" riots (Group V) occurred during pre-election time is significant.

What characterizes the pre-election weeks in Israel, and what probably can be considered as a precipitating factor of outbursts of collective violence too, is a general, somewhat carnival-like laxity of the atmosphere, partly of an amorphous "everything is permitted" style (including buying of votes), and partly of an irresponsible courting of the electorate with unfounded promises (which according to the prevailing rules of the game, the government is free to retract or otherwise to "undo" thereafter) (8).

In our opinion it is this atmosphere of general laxity and "suspension of order" which may explain why a significant number of riots occurred at that specific period.

5. The Jewish ethnic riots can be divided into 1) violent clashes among groups or clans of different Oriental communities in some moshavim (9); 2) episodic demonstrations of the socially deprived which at some stage of the agitation get an ethnic complaint coloration; 3) the big riots of 1959 (Vaadi Salib in Haifa, Migdal Emek, Beer Sheva) and some smaller ones in 1963 and 1965 (Beer Sheva, Ashdod) which had from the beginning the character of protest against alleged ethnic discriminations and where the
social motif (inadequate housing, insufficient employment hours at relief work, etc.) played a dominant role.

The first category is of small significance, mostly it centered around fights for power and privileges held by clans in moshavim (that of the treasurer, of the grocery-holder, etc.) and clashes occurred between clans of the same community as well as on an inter-ethnic level.

The small-scale riots of the second type (which at the beginning of the protest demonstrations may be unconnected with any ethnic motif) are already illustrative of the basic features of all the ethnic riots:

a. A fundamental intermingling of complaints of ethnic and economic discrimination. The non-“class-consciousness”-character of the protests is striking, as very seldom articulate political or socio-economic demands are put forward. This indicates the non-existence of a genuine local leadership and also the failure of left-wing parties to gain audience and to develop class-conscious attitudes at this rather chauvinistic lumpenproletariat. To put it more exactly: the officially left-wing parties (nominally labor-movements) are the establishment, and the local “professional Sepharadim” their docile executives.

b. The riots occur exclusively on the part of the “Oriental” communities (never against them, nor did ever a clash between Oriental and non-Oriental communities take place) protesting discrimination (“dofkim et ha Sepharadim”); the slogan “Awaken Sepharadim” appears. But even if curses against Ashkenazim may be professed, the attack is never directed against any concrete “Ashkenazi” target (political leader, specific sub-group, etc.). The address of the attack is clearly the establishment (or very seldom rich quarters), and in the big riots of 1959, simultaneously with voicing the ethnic complaint, the attacks were directed against the State, the police, Mapai and the Histadruth.

The 1959 riots were more unambiguous as to their origins, but not much more articulate concerning the demands; though more and equally distributed work and better housing was a recurrent theme, as well as the complaint of being discriminated in this field by the Jewish Agency and the Histadruth in favor of the Rumanian and Polish immigrants (10). That at least part of these complaints were fully justified is an undeniable fact, as well as the generally arrogant attitude of a sizeable part of the “Ashkenazi population” (11).

It is difficult to ascertain what was exactly the role of the example of the
local strongmen in the configuration of elements which led just Haifa to the first mass-outburst on an ethnic basis, which probably served as an example for other places. It is sociologically interesting, however, that during the eleven years which have passed since those events, nobody even mentioned the possibility that the legalized gangsterism of the Hapoel-commandos (in the service of Mapai) could have served as an example for the illegal violence perpetuated by the underdogs.

The Jewish ethnic riots, especially Vaadi Salib, were felt as a deep shock by the public at large, as well as by the authorities. Though the ruling party did its best to present the riot in Vaadi Salib solely as an act of misled young hotheads incited by irresponsible inimical elements, and attempted to prevent discussion about ethnic discrimination and the policy of immigration absorption, an Inquiry Committee was set up, one scientific paper (12) undertook to outline the sociological characteristics of Moroccan Jewry before and after their immigration (disproving some of the ingrained preconceived ideas about this community, but refraining from analyzing the riots themselves), the newspapers dwelt on this subject for many weeks, and serious actions were undertaken to improve the lot of the underprivileged, especially in the field of housing and social care.

6. No doubt, once a riot is set into motion, it is the behaviour of the police which is perhaps the most important single factor determining its subsequent development and outcome. (The extensive American literature about riots is unambiguous on this). The degree of professional competence or incompetence (in the sense of neither „overcontrol” nor „undercontrol”) which of course beyond purely technical competence depends also on the directives of the political authorities, will be crucial for the relatively quick termination of the outbursts or their possible degeneration into bloody massacres (13).

Similar to the action of the police was also the categorically condemnatory attitude of all the authorities, including the highest echelons, and of the press (though according to particular ideological orientation the reasons forwarded as an explanation for the occurrences and the severity of condemnation varied considerably). Thus the rioting youngsters, many of them belonging to the underworld, could by no means indulge in the feeling of having tacit approval nor to feel as „heroes” defending the „true” group norms.

The firmly condemning attitude of the authorities (and of the press) mirrors not only a pragmatic approach on the part of the political decision-
makers, anxious to prevent degradation in a field which could become highly explosive, but is also sincerely in line with the value system of the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population at large. Anti-Arab as it may be in its sentiments, preferring practical segregation to any contact, physical maltreatment of the minority goes against all its norms and ideals . . . and against its official self-image as a democratic society.

On the whole results prove that police did handle technically adequately (no „over” and no „undercontrol”) the big riots: The suggestion of some younger officers „to use a heavy hand against the Orientals, who understand only force”, which evoked a furor in wide Oriental circles, was rejected by the responsible echelons. Although a relatively large number of people (demonstrators and police) were wounded and many arrested no fatal casualties occurred. and only exceptionally were cases of police brutality reported.

In contrast to the unanimous condemnation of the anti-Arab attacks, reactions to the ethnic riots were different. Though no open endorsement of the outbursts was voiced, at least verbally, scanning readers’ letters one can on the one hand perceive not only comprehension but also symptoms of widespread feelings of being hurt and discriminated against, existing in large segments of the non-Ashkenazi population; on the other hand again some of the letters mirror gross prejudices against „the primitives who misuse democratic liberties.”

Taking into consideration the efficient intervention, revealing high professional competence, of the police in the previous cases, the more striking becomes its under-control, lack of efficiency and often manifest bias (as to the treatment of protestors against religious coercion) when dealing with violence of Orthodox fanatics and especially if the mob attack is not directed against Christian institutions . . . when diplomatic complications may ensue.

The directives of the political establishment to the police, one can safely infer, reveal, primo, the attitude of the secular rulers (who in their coali­tionary dealings so easily sold out civil rights to the Orthodox) not to anger the coalition partners, and secundo, that even the moderate circles of the religious establishment, who do not openly endorse the attacks (or do so only halfheartedly) would raise hell if Jewish police should „maltreat” believers who obey the command of their precepts to impose respect of religious law, or are engaged in their even more sacred duty to fight the „danger of missionarism”.

The majority of secular officials and also of the press tend to underplay or outrightly to disregard the collective violence of the zealots; and if the religious establishment does not openly encourage religious terrorism and
only pleads for understanding, the more radical segments of Orthodoxy (also those holding official posts) and their press do (14).

The rather halfhearted intervention of police in cases of hooliganistic attacks of groups of youngsters, can possibly be explained by the persistence of tenets of local mythology, considering aggressiveness and lack of discipline of youngsters as an embodiment of „uninhibited, healthy peoplehood”, refusing to see therein signs of waywardness and criminality, thus reluctant to intervene strongly with manifestations which seem to express joy of life of free youth in their free land (15).

This brings into an even sharper light the attitude of the police and those who give the directions, concerning the rather heterogenous fifth category, which faute de mieux we named violence on an ad hoc political background. (Ad hoc — since it is centered around an isolated motif, sometimes unconnected with the general political line, and sometimes also one deals with ad hoc groups). Apart from the brutality of the police intervention, which is in some cases what lends the violent element to the manifestations, like the heavyhanded dealing with the zealot conspirators (16) and the mob protesting against the reparations agreement with Germany, or of striking Communist-led sailors, of Jerusalem students voicing protest against Adenauer’s visit to their campus, of Haolam Haze marchers near Netanya, expressing solidarity with attacked Arabs of the nearby villages, of anti-Histadruth First of May demonstrators in Ashdod or anti-annexationist demonstrations in Jerusalem and its surroundings — the common element characterizing these groups is precisely that one deals with extremely heterogeneous, often ad hoc formations, which are all of them somehow outcasts of the national body, offending some of the „sacred cows” of the establishment, which represents the majority of the „honest Israelis”. This includes here an attitude of the ruling stratum: to criticize the government’s wisdom in those matters is to question the very fundamentals of the State, or to state that the Histadruth-bureaucracy is not an honest and exclusive representative of the workers is worst sacrilege.

The endorsement or even encouragement of police brutality towards the „out-casts” (rights or left groups who reject some of the fundamentals of the Zionist establishment and the prevailing rules of games of legitimacy) expresses an attitude of the establishment and the public, considering those „out-casts” to be outside the category of „honest citizens” and beyond the measure of acceptable opposition to which democrats have to suscribe. It reflects an attitude identifying tolerance (which is not a value in itself) with „limited pluralism” (17) out of necessity to make compromises, but no
obligation of tolerance exists towards „illegitimate” groups who reject some of the fundamentals (18). Striking is the discrepancy between the energetic and efficient intervention of the police in crushing the anti-Arab mobs and the very lenient punishment of only a few of the participants, while others were freed on the same day or the day after without being charged. There seems to be one apparent reason for this, and another which is less evident.

Given the high standard of Israeli judiciary, one can assume that the rioters would get much heavier sentences if they would appear before the judge according to other paragraphs. This however does not depend on the court but on the political authorities (Ministry of Justice, police, etc.).

There seems to be a clear enough tendency, after demonstrating the mighty fist to the mob and making it understood that every attempt on their part to take the law into their own hands will be prevented, to appease the transgressors (and/or their community) and to forget the whole episode as soon as possible. Thus, only few among the most violent will be accused with relatively insignificant charges (it even happened that the victims were induced to plead for their liberation, as a „gesture of goodwill”) — and demands to nominate a parliamentary inquiry committee to investigate the sources, put forward by the press and MKs, were disregarded.

The reason for the attitude of the authorities seems to be overdetermined. While on the one hand a deep shock is felt following the pogromistic outbursts, the establishment seems to be reluctant to anger an unstable social stratum which anyhow feels frustrated and discriminated. However, the tendency to let things be forgotten as quickly as possible converges with a much more generalized pattern of the establishment and its rules of the game, when facing unpleasant phenomena . . . simply to suppress evidence by concealing the findings which would point to the truth — contrary to official theses and illusions. The readiness to conceal the unpleasant report is almost a reflex, regardless of whether one deals with a scientific finding proving that, contrary to official statements, wide segments of the population live below the poverty line, or a report disclosing the incompetence and malpractice in a Histadruth enterprise or again relating to explosive ethnic problems.

This is the reason why in cases of most types of riots charges are relatively light, excepting some cases of the ad hoc political category and vendettas in Arab and Druse villages if homicidal acts were committed. Given the small magnitude of the riots, in short term policy this tendency to avoid facing problems does work. From a longsighted viewpoint, however, this approach may prove a dangerous fallacy.
Notes

1. There is, for instance, a clear-cut communal background to the attackers in most cases (which justifies the inclusion of this survey in our text) and equally characteristic is the absence of the "fashionable" student riots (the only case where students were involved was different indeed); the non-existence of any direct economic motivation in the anti-Arab attacks as well as the fact that none of the last mentioned cases degenerated into severe type rioting (which already suggests efficient police intervention).


4. We refer here primarily to anti-Arab attacks prior to 1967. As to the characteristics of the aggressors there is no substantial difference before and after the Six Day War, but at least in some cases there is a considerable difference as to the objective provocation (though not necessarily by those later attacked) like the El-Fatah terrorist acts; sometimes the attacked are not Israeli Arabs (East Jerusalemites, etc.) and also in the post 1967 cases the charges against the rioters brought before court are according to much "heavier paragraphs", including attempted murder.

5. Jewish parts of small towns (Städtl) in Eastern Europe.

6. This attitude of tolerance is even more emphasized if one has in mind the relative propensity to violence of this group, which reads in Israel (i.e. violent crimes) 1) Afro-Asians, 2) Israelis, 3) European-Americans.

7. In one case of anti-Arab riot (in Ramle) there existed longstanding tension between Jewish and Arab taxi-drivers — accusation of supposedly voluntary homicide perpetrated through the cover-up of a traffic accident was the immediate motive and justification for the attack; and we mentioned elsewhere the words of the mayor of Dimona, that he will himself head demonstrations if Arab workers continue to come from their villages while there are unemployed Jews in his town.

8. Amnesty is granted to some prisoners in order to buy the votes of their clan. One closes the eyes to irregularities and a two-way blackmailing takes place; illegal pressure of public representatives on employees on the one hand, and reactions like "If you don't arrange for my son to be admitted to that school, I will not vote for your party", so that many of the precepts of orderly and lawly behaviour are somewhat temporarily suspended.


10. Incomparably more arbitrariness, corruption and nepotism characterizes the institutions of the Histadruth (which previously owned also the Labor Exchange Bureau) and of the Jewish Agency (on whom the immigrants depend almost for almost everything) than the governmental services supervised by the State Comptroller and subject to the intervention of the High Court of Justice.

11. On the theme of Ashkenazi arrogance (in the context of Vaadi Salib) see U. Avneri in an editorial in "Haolam Haze", and some years later relating to the problem in a general way, E. Elyachir: "Danger: Jewish Racialism".

12. Cf. R. Bar Yosef: "The Moroccans" (Molad, July, 1959 - Hebrew text) and numerous articles
of A. Nesher in Haarez the following years dealing with the rehabilitation of slum-dwellers.

13. More or less as a curiosity, illustrating the extreme sensibility of rioters interpreting (rightly or wrongly) police behaviour, we should mention the words of a participant in the riot following the first El Fatah attack on the Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv: „The fact that the police intervened without using sticks meant that we are permitted to beat up the Arabs, only not to cause severe injury or use weapons”.


15. (We do not think that there is much ground in the explanation sometimes forwarded, stressing the „Oriental” descent of both, the majority of the rank and file of the police forces and of the rioting youngsters of the peripheries and street-corner gangs).

16. Though the acts of the zealot-underground were in essence not dissimilar from those characterizing Group III, here one deals with outright political violence, since they were part of a conspiracy, when an underground organization attempted to establish by way of terror a theocratic rule. One can discern nuclei of CLEROFASCIST organizations, for instance already in the Orthodox branch of the LHI, in the undergrounds of 1951 and 1953, and actually in a segment of the Greater Israel Movement.

17. Concerning this „to every legitimate body its share” and „no rights to the illegitimate” type of tolerance and pluralistic democracy, see Robert P. Wolff: „Beyond Tolerance” in „A Critic of Pure Tolerance”, Beacon Press, Boston.

18. In Israel they are the groups rejecting the rules of the games of the „organized Yishuv”, established decades ago when the present establishment took over the control of the funds in pre-State days, by a coalitionary agreement, while „honest people” and acceptable degree of opposition means in this context: those Zionists who are at least potentially possible partners of a coalition. Shortly after the establishment of the State the non-Zionist (even anti-Zionist in its large segments) Orthodoxy was coopted to the legitimate body, but it was only in 1967 when also the geruth heretics became acceptable. More complicated is the attitude towards the Communists. The unambiguously demonological image preceding the sixties (the before mentioned sailors’ strike was crushed with the help of strike-breakers belonging to Hashomer Hazair kibbutzim) was, following the split of the Communist Party, replaced with that of the „good” (pro-Israeli) and „bad” (supporting Arab chauvinism) Communists.