An interest in the causes, forms and consequences of the division of labour in industrial societies was a central pre-occupation of the classical sociologists from Comte onwards. Durkheim indeed dealt with it in his first major work. The breakdown of traditional societies is portrayed in terms of increasing population pressure and the growth of social contacts. It suggested to him a situation of intensified competition between men. And the peaceful solution to such competition was the division of labour in and through which men would become more and more dependent upon each other and live by a morality which recognized mutual obligation based upon the fair exchange of services. Durkheim postulates the concept of an organic society to describe a situation in which the division of labour is the source of the effective regulation of the various spheres of social life, economic, political and so on, and at the same time the means of integrating the individual into society. However such an organic society, he concedes, "is nowhere observable in its absolute purity". (Division of Labour, p. 190)

Because such organic solidarity was only imperfectly realised Durkheim proceeds to discuss abnormal forms of the division of labour which may in practise be widely found. Two of these abnormal forms are particularly well worked out. The first is the anomic division of labour. In structural terms Durkheim is here referring to the failure of a traditional society to adjust adequately to the conditions of modern economic life and which commercial and industrial crises, conflicts between capital and labour (and within the ranks of labour) in certain of their aspects may be regarded as expressing. The increasing physical separation of the producer from the consumer is regarded as of particular significance.

"The producer can no longer embrace the market in a glance, or even in
thought. He can no longer see its limits, since it is, so to speak, limitless. Accordingly production becomes unbridled and unregulated. It can only trust to chance and in the course of these gropings it is inevitable that proportions will be abused, as much in one direction as in another. From this come the crises which periodically disturb economic functions.” (Ibid. p. 370)

The factory system with its emphasis on machines and manufacturing is closely linked to changes in market relations — and is seen by Durkheim to alter the relations between employers and employees and to separate the worker from his family (as opposed, say, to agricultural or domestic systems of production). It is in the context of this form of abnormality that the effects of the division of labour on the worker are spelled out:

„The division of labour has often been accused of degrading the individual by making him a machine. And truly, if he does not know whether the operations he performs are tending, if he relates them to no end, he can only continue to work through routine. Every day he repeats the same movements with monotonous regularity, but without being interested in them or without understanding them . . . . He is no longer anything but an inert piece of machinery, only an external force set going which always moves in the same direction and in the same way. Surely, no matter how one may represent the moral ideal, one cannot remain indifferent to such a debasement of human nature”. (Ibid. p. 371)

The stress here is on the subjective sense of the meaninglessness of work arising from the fact that the new form of organic solidarity has not yet been fully developed to meet changed economic conditions. By arguing in this form, Durkheim is making clear that it is not the division of labour as such that is the cause of social ills.

It is, however, of great importance to recall that Durkheim refers also to the forced division of labour as another abnormal form. While conflicts of interest between employers and employees could be partly interpreted as a product of an anomic situation, which in time could be reconciled into a working equilibrium, that was not all. They were also partly a product of „the still very great inequality of the external conditions of the struggle”. (Ibid. p. 370) What is meant by this? The division of labour only produces the solidarity that it is capable of when each individual does the task to which he is fitted. If there is a mis-match between the aptitude of individuals and their
actual activities then „only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is possible” (Ibid. p. 376) The crux of Durkheim’s argument is in the following passage:

„... we may say that the division of labour produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous .... But by spontaneity we must understand not simply the absence of all express violence, but also of everything that can even indirectly shackle the free unfolding of the social force that each carries in himself. It supposes, not only that individuals are not regulated to determine functions by force, but also that no obstacle, of whatever nature, prevents them from occupying the place in the social framework which is compatible with their faculties. In short, labour is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities. But, for that, it is necessary and sufficient that the latter be neither enhanced nor lowered by some external cause. Perfect spontaneity is, then, only the consequence of another form of this other fact — absolute equality in the external conditions of conflict”. (Ibid. p. 377)

Durkheim recognises that a society characterised by perfect spontaneity does not exist in any complete sense, and draws attention to the hereditary transmission of wealth as a very important factor promoting inequality in the external conditions of conflict. This he sees has applications not only for individuals but also groups: the point which he develops in his discussion of contractual relations. A formally free contract between parties is not sufficient to provide the basis of organic solidarity. Durkheim notes the possibility of exploitation if a class has to take any price for its services in order to live and argues in particular that „there cannot be rich and poor at birth without there being unjust contracts”. (Ibid. p. 384) Durkheim’s discussion of the forced division of labour enables him to draw a distinction between regulation based upon constraint — a feature of the forced division of labour and regulations as an aspect of „true” organic solidarity. If the first is the enemy of freedom, the second is the basis of it — for only through such regulation can external conditions promoting inequality be diminished.

So far then the matter comes to this: the spontaneous character of the division of labour tends to be blemished in conditions of anomie represented by an absence of social regulation or, minimally, inadequate regulation of social life; and/or by a situation in which force keeps a social order together imposed externally, so to speak, upon the division of labour.
Anomic character
absence of regulation
moral anarchy
unlimited desires
meaninglessness

Organic solidarity
Spontaneous character
moral regulation
just society
system integration

Forced character
coercive regulation
repressive society
resentment
fatalism
(revolutionary potential)

What emerges from this is that any task of social reconstruction has to recognize these two analytically distinct sources of social unrest. If anomic situation breed unbridled conflict, coercive situations attempt to abolish conflict. Both inject a precarious element into organic societies. Durkheim maintains that "it is neither necessary nor even possible for social life to be without conflicts. The role of solidarity is not to suppress competition but to moderate it". (Ibid. p. 365)

However it is also relevant to recognize that from the moral anarchy of the anomic division of labour two separate consequences are implied: one is that the absence of regulation can lead to continually unspecified desires, and the other is that for the individual specialist worker, work itself can lose its meaning. Likewise in the case of the forced division of labour there are two possible consequences: one is a resentment of exploitation and an attempt to meet force with force, the other is a fatalistic acceptance of domination. One can readily see how, in a society with the anomic and forced division of labour co-existing, the unlimited desires/resentment and meaninglessness/fatalism pairs might reinforce each other, which helps to explain why anomic and alienation have some times been confused as social categories. While they may be derived from different structural arrangements, (absence of regulation on the one hand and coercive regulation on the other) the symptoms may have certain common elements.

We may recall here that in his later study *Suicide* the two symptoms we have noted under anomic character from the *Division of Labour*, namely "unlimited desires" and "meaninglessness" receive separate treatment. When he writes of anomic suicide, Durkheim has in mind the impact of social crises on the lives of men, at which point society is unable to exercise moral regulations. He is thinking of both sudden disaster and abrupt growth in
power and wealth, but it is the latter which fascinates him and with his development of the significance of „unlimited desires”, reveals his profoundly anti-utilitarian convictions,

„... truly, as the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can no longer remain the same .... The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised .... The limits are unknown between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently there is no restraint upon aspirations .... Some particular class especially favoured by the crisis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on the other hand, the example of its great good fortune arouses all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion become disoriented, no longer recognise the limits proper to them .... With increased prosperity desire increases. At the very moment when traditional rules have lost their authority, the richer prizes offered these appetites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The state of deregulation or anomie is further heightened by passions being less disciplin­ed, precisely when they need more disciplining.” (Suicide, pp. 252-3)

And it is in the sphere of economic life which Durkheim, writing about nineteenth century industrial Europe, diagnoses as being in a state of acute anomie.

We should recognise that Durkheim concedes that mild anomie must be regarded as endemic to industrial societies. The very notion of „progress” whether interpreted in system terms of economic growth or in individual terms of increased opportunities and wider aspirations implies a sense of dissatisfaction with the status quo: „As soon as men are inoculated with the precept, that their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them accept resignation: and the number of the malcontent and disquietude is bound to increase”. (Ibid. p. 364) His proposals for social reconstruction are, so to speak, measures to control the disease not to eliminate it.

Certainly, however, a policy of laissez-faire in which behaviour in the economic sphere is left to market forces was no solution since power inequality was built into the system and undermined the principle of fair exchange in the market. The development of contract law could have some protective force for the weaker party. More particularly Durkheim advocated a pluralist solution to the problem of anomie.
"A nation can only be maintained if between the State and the individual there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individual to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and draw them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life." (Division of Labour, p. 28)

In order that such secondary groups do not themselves become tyrannical, mould the wills and monopolises the lives of their members, Durkheim argued that they must flourish in a context in which they are all ultimately subject to an authority (the State) which provides a rule of law for all and which serves to remind each group that they are an interdependent part of a larger whole. Durkheim argues, for example, that the State served to free the child from family despotism, the citizen from feudal domination and the craftsman from guild tyranny, and as such must be considered as essential to the emancipation (social integration) of the individual. A key passage on this occurs in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals:

"The State . . . . in holding its constituents' society in check . . . . prevents them from exerting the repressive influences over the individual that they would otherwise exert. So there is nothing inherently tyrannical about State intervention in the different fields of collective life; on the contrary, it has the object and the effect of alleviating tyrannies that do exist. It will be argued, might not the State in turn become despotic? Undoubtedly, provided there were nothing to counter that trend. In that case as the sole existing collective force, it produces the effects that any collective force not neutralised by any counter force of the same kind would have on individuals . . . . The inference to be drawn from this comment, however, is simply that if that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other collective forces, that is by those secondary groups we shall discuss later on." (Op. cit. pp. 62-3)

European industrial societies are then portrayed by Durkheim as being in a state of moral crisis. What is required is an institutional order which would provide a new basis of social cohesion and hence the framework in which individuals would be bound by ties of interests, ideas and feelings. What Durkheim seems to be assuming, as Gouldner has pointed out (see his editorial introduction to Socialism, p. 26) is that social interaction provides the basis for moral beliefs to develop spontaneously. In this new system of
regulation he envisages employers and employees represented on the governing body (and possibly elected separately given the conflicts of interests between them on many questions) and concerned with such matters as wages, details of the labour contract, working conditions and the regulations of industrial disputes. It is the creation of such a framework of rules which Durkheim sees as the priority. However, such a reconstruction would also have implications for the system of property ownership. As the owners of the means of production died out Durkheim envisages new forms of association taking over. The institutions of inherited wealth would be eroded: the professional groups would become in the economic sphere, the heirs of the family, so to speak. Only through such a process can one move towards an approximation of the just contract. In this sense certainly Durkheim is a radical:

"As things are, the primary distribution of property is according to birth (institution of inheritance). The next stage is, that property originally distributed in this way is exchanged by contracts. But it is by contract which, inevitably, are in part unjust as a result of an inherent state of inequality in the contracting parties, because of the institution of inheritance. This fundamental injustice in the right of property can only be eliminated as and when the sole economic inequalities dividing men are those resulting from the inequality of their services. That is why the development of the contractual right entails a whole recasting of the morals of property". (*Professional Ethics*, p. 215)

I should like now to discuss two approaches which have drawn upon Durkheim in discussing the problem of anomie with explicit reference to industrial life. The first is that of Elton Mayo whose writings explicitly reflect an interest in solving the problem of anomie in an industrial society and who, in terms of his own immediate experience, was clearly much influenced by the "melting pot" Chicago of the 1920s and '30s. One overriding conceptual distinction in his writings relates to his classification of societies into established and adaptive. With engaging simplicity he denotes all pre-industrial societies as established — having set customs, rituals and moral rules. Each member of the established society knows his place and in that knowledge obtains a sense of personal security and emotional well-being. An established society was above all an ordered society in which each member collaborated spontaneously to ensure its maintenance. Such societies were obliterated by the industrial revolution. The adaptive society was
essentially characterised by continual technological change. The technical skills, which the growth of science and industry represented, were not in Mayo's view matched by a growth in social skills, hence rapid social change to date has spelt disorder and social disintegration. This was notably reflected, he maintained, in the break up of primary group life. What then could be done? First, we should recall that man is a social animal and finds important sources of personal and emotional satisfaction in the membership of small groups. In an industrial society this obviously included the work group. With this in mind Mayo wrote forcibly against the "rabble hypothesis": the view that society is composed of individuals each logically acting out of self preservation or self interest. The essence of society is co-operation between men, and where there is no co-operation there is individual isolation, rootlessness and disorder. In industry, for example, this could be reflected in high absenteeism and sickness rates, high labour turnover and, in general, a lowering of efficiency arising from a weak commitment to work. What one should do, therefore, is to recognize the reality of primary group life in the work place and do everything possible to sustain and develop it.

But to what end? On this Mayo appeared to have no doubts. A persistent problem of management was to organise sustained co-operation of its employment force in the face of continual change. By recognizing the work group as a social context in which employees can fulfil their desire for co-operative activity one fostered team work (for example, by showing approval of work done, by showing individuals how their work fitted into the whole, by allowing individuals some freedom of choice over who they worked with) in the service of management objectives. It is the manager, then, assisted by the consultant social scientist who must exhibit the social skills necessary to promote such social integration.

We may recall that in the Hawthorne investigations, following the Relay Assembly Test Room studies Roethlisberger and Dickson observed:

"What impressed management most . . . were the stores of latent energy and productive co-operation which clearly could be obtained from its working force under the right conditions. And among the factors making for these conditions the attitudes of the employees stood out as being of predominant importance". (Management and the Worker, Wiley, 1964, p. 185)

We are dealing then, in principle, with a managerially induced form of cooperation. However, even though this was a case of a work group conforming
quite closely to management's expectations, it appeared not to have been established without the use of sanctions. In the seventh period of the Relay Assembly Test Room experiment two of the five assemblers were held to constitute a "personnel problem". "It had been apparent for quite a while that these operators were not displaying that "wholehearted co-operation" desired by the investigators". (Op. cit. p. 53). This was manifested in what the supervisors felt to be excessive talking. The two girls displayed hostile attitudes towards authority and reduced their output and this led directly to them being replaced by two others who proved to be more co-operative. Roethlisberger and Dickson appear to be slightly apologetic about this in reviewing the incident, arguing that the investigators wrongly tried to hold "the spirit of co-operation" as a constant in the experiment. Rather, they should have looked at the causes of the lack of co-operation, the implication being that they should have sought for ways of promoting the appropriate change in the deviant employees' attitudes.

It might be thought that, given this experience together with the evidence of output restriction in the Mica Splitting group and the Bank Wiring group that the integration of the individual into the work group was at the expense of managements' interests. Mayo, however, tended to treat such differences as a challenge to management to develop their social skills. "For the larger and more complex the institution the more dependent is it upon the wholehearted co-operation of every member of the group". (The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization, p. 62). Better human relations through effective communication was to become the slogan for this approach to social integration.

Mayo, like Durkheim, argued that in an industrial society the state could not of itself serve as integrating institution, but there we may suggest, most of the similarity between the two ends. There is, for example, no general discussion of the role of other secondary organisations. And, as many critics have pointed out, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that social integration is defined in terms of employee manipulation by a managerial elite in the company. Because the overall goal of managerially defined efficiency is taken as a guiding light, conflicts of interest are treated as pathological, whereas in Durkheim it was clearly recognized that conflict could not be eliminated from social life and one should, therefore, focus attention on conflict regulations. Indeed attempts to abolish conflict were treated by Durkheim as repressive. The essence of social reconstruction for Mayo, however, involved curing the disease of conflict:
"The administrator of the future must be able to understand the human and social facts for what they are, unfettered by his own emotion and prejudice. He cannot achieve this ability except by careful training that must include knowledge of relevant technical skills, of the systematic ordering of operations, and of the organisation of co-operation". (Op. cit. p. 43)

The most well known expression of the therapeutic approach to induce collaboration was the counselling programme at Western Electric. Skilled interviewers were provided to help employees talk through problems and difficulties, so that they might find satisfaction in their work life, and, of course, improve their commitment to work, perhaps aided by a better understanding of company policies.

This approach to social integration through the development of plant harmony has been castigated by its critics as "managerial sociology". Daniel Bell, for example, maintains:

"The gravest charge that can be levelled against these researchers is that they uncritically accept industry's own conception of workers as a means to be manipulated or adjusted to impersonal ends. The belief in man as an end in himself has been ground under by the machine, and the social science of the factory researchers is not a science of man but a cow sociology." (Work and its Discontents)

Certainly the union as an alternative source of worker integration is not stressed. As a cure for worker isolation unions were a poor second best. If management was doing its job properly in fostering loyal collaboration through improved communications, developing welfare policies and the like, union membership was unnecessary. And a union which was organised to combat managerial policies was treated as a source of disorder.

The plant society is therefore treated as the primary context of social integration and a company as an organisation acts as a buffer against the anomic tendencies of city life. However, in Roethlisberger and Dickson's account of the Hawthorne investigations, there are traces of another perspective which Mayo himself seems to have ignored. In their discussion of supervisors' job satisfaction they offer the following generalisations:

"The more impoverished the social reality for the supervisor the greater are his feelings of insecurity and the greater are his demands for recog-
nition and security. For some supervisors the company is father, mother, society and state all rolled into one, and strivings for success are a compensation for lack of normal and adequate personal interrelations. Such supervisors as those are attempting to substitute the company for the wider social reality”. (*Management and the Worker*, op. cit. p. 372)

And they go on to make the interesting observation that the supervisors who seemed most contented were those with active political and social affiliations and foreign born supervisors having residential ties with their ethnic groups. All this of course would suggest a different model of social integration which could not ignore life outside the company and indeed has pluralist implications which, we would suggest, are more Durkheimian in character than Mayo's own position. But it is not a question which is systematically pursued.

There is, of course, in Mayo no discussion of inequalities in the external conditions of the struggles as in Durkheim and in consequence no attention is paid to the existing system of property relations and the distribution of wealth as subjects requiring attention. In this sense Mayo is concerned with shoring up the existing system rather than reconstructing it. In this important respects his proclaimed allegiance to the Durkheimian tradition is somewhat misleading. And we may further recognize that there is nothing really approximating the occupational association which figures so crucially as a regulating group in Durkheim's analysis. Such an association could presumably recognize the usefulness of mobility of labour between firms both for economic reasons and also to enable a person to reach a higher level of responsibility and attainment. In Mayo great emphasis is laid on reducing labour turnover. Certainly one can well understand how high labour turnover might constitute a managerial problem. At the same time, in Durkheim's terms to reduce it by managerial techniques might prevent individuals from occupying a place in the social framework compatible with their faculties, notwithstanding an employee development programme within the company. Finally, we may note that there is in Mayo no discussion of system integration in the sense of modes of regulating production and consumption to smooth out the imbalance which promote inflationary or deflationary movements in economic life. Rather, for Mayo, it is a question of managers deploying social skills to ensure the adaptation and survival of the primary group in the face of change. A macro theory of the causes of change or a discussion of the institutional mechanisms whereby it may be regulated is not propounded. And, in particular, there is no discussion of the institutio-
nal framework of industrial relations and collective bargaining. It is the industrial relations level of analysis that I now wish to pursue in the contemporary British context.

One of the most explicit attempts to analyse industrial relations in a Durkheimian perspective is to be found in Fox and Flanders' recent essay The Reform of Collective Bargaining: from Donovan to Durkheim. (In the British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. VIII, 1969. Reprinted in A. Flanders, Management and the Unions: the Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations, Faber. 1970). As the title of the paper implies, their analysis is related to the contemporary British industrial relations scene. We will attempt here to review the substance and, as we see it, the implications of their argument. Industrial relations is portrayed as being essentially concerned with the making and administration of rules regulating employment relations and collective bargaining is seen as the principle norm creating institution in industrial relations. It is "the principle method evolved in industrial societies for the creation of viable and adaptive normative systems to keep manifest conflict in employment relations within socially tolerable bounds. This it has done because the rules it produces, as expressed in collective agreements and in unwritten understandings, are supported by a sufficiently high degree of consensus among those whose interests are most affected by their application". (Ibid. p. 160). Nevertheless, for various reasons, collective bargaining may not always prove to be an adequate mode of conflict regulation. Where this is so a state of disorder or anomie is postulated. The two key questions posed by Fox and Flanders are first, what causes a break down in the system of regulative norms and second, what is to be done when such a break down is diagnosed?

The response to the first question rests on a fairly complex analysis of the kinds of interaction which may exist between the normative aspirations of a group and the existing system of normative regulation. Four major sources of disorder are postulated:

i. when a group against the resistance of another attempts to change procedural norms on which industrial relations are based.

ii. when a group likewise attempts to change substantive norms. These essentially relate to wages and conditions of employment.

iii. when one or more groups has normative aspirations in areas where no normative regulations exist. Conflicts of interests and values take place without any frame of reference to which conduct might be related.

iv. where a progressive fragmentation and break down of existing regulative systems occurs.
When disorder of the second and third variants occurs more frequently and extensively in the industrial relations sphere Fox and Flanders suggest that this created the conditions in which the fourth variant may appear. We are here presented with an amplification thesis of disorder with the fourth variation being first produced by other structural deficiencies and then spawning its own disintegration. The powerful impose their own norms and create their own solutions, those without power experience the frustrations of unsatisfied aspirations. And it is the fourth source of disorder which is treated as a phenomenon of „special gravity and intractability“:

„The other three demand concessions and compromise on the part of resisting groups, possibly on issues which they have regarded as matters of principle, but order can be re-established by a re-adjustment or extension of existing normative systems. But when the progressive and arbitrary fragmentation of the systems has passed a certain point, nothing short of their wholesale reconstruction can remove the source of disorder. In general it can be argued that the more relatively numerous the normative systems regulating employment relations, the greater the problems of social order, since the task of finding the requisite measure of integration among the various systems becomes increasingly difficult to solve”. (Ibid. p. 162)

The „profound and serious consequences” which this can have for the whole social order are then indicated:

„The proliferation of norm creating groups and the resulting multiplicity of normative systems may produce a degree of disorder which is felt to impede and imperil vital functions of social life and government. In industrial relations the economic consequences are not confined to strikes and other dislocations of productive process. The loss of integration and predictability is also expressed in such things as chaotic pay differentials and uncontrolled movements of earnings and labour costs. And the political consequences are decidedly no less important. Growing disorder may threaten the government's ability to govern and starts to generate strong popular demands for authoritarian State intervention to restore order.” (Ibid. pp. 162-3)

Since this is a situation which Fox and Flanders broadly believe characterises the British industrial relations scene at the present time much of their analysis is centred on this. However, the attempt is also made to look at the
situation in historical perspective, in an attempt to account for the process of normative disintegration. What is there suggested in fact is that two forms of fragmentation may effect the system of normative regulation: deflationary and inflationary. The first appeared in periods of high unemployment and the second in periods of low unemployment.

The historical thesis propounded is that just prior to the First World War Britain was moving into a position of inflationary fragmentation which in institutional terms was never solved. The First World War intervened, the inter war years exemplified the fact that the unsolved problems of constructing a mutually acceptable system of industrial relations lead to disorder — either in overt management — union conflict or, as the depression deepened, in imposed settlements by employers on workers which they were powerless to resist but which left a legacy of great bitterness. The Second World War stood as something of a truce period although clearly there was a recovery of trade union influence, but the post war period reaped the harvest of the unsolved problems arising from inflationary fragmentation. The aspirations of workers in this period are seen as revived, extended and imposed by virtue of the reality of shop floor power on individual employers. The picture drawn is of inflation creating further inflation as a result of a process of unrestrained competition. It is reflected in a number of mutually interacting forces: a great stress on wage relativities and other conditions as a basis for making claims against the employer when one’s group is held to have „fallen behind”; unions outbidding each other as they seek to make changes in the norms regulating their members’ wages and working conditions, and employers bidding up earnings over agreed rates as they compete for scarce labour. The whole adds up to the familiar leep-frogging image with the impression that the game is being played at a faster and faster pace. Disorder breeds disorder.

What Flanders and Fox dwell upon in their proposals for the reconstruction of the normative order is what we would term approaches to system integration. The central issue for them is „whether the whole normative framework governing the production and distribution of wealth becomes further fragmented and splintered in a manner which threatens further disorder, or whether we are still capable of reconstructing larger areas of agreement upon which larger units of regulation can rest”. (Ibid. p. 174)

The solution, if it is to be found, they see as multi-faceted and must be implemented at different but interrelated levels of economic life. The enterprise is viewed as an important source of normative integration for the diversity of work groups which it encompasses and, to that end, comprehensively productivity agreements and job evaluation schemes are commended.
Industry-wide regulation is seen as complementary to this with the employers' associations and relevant trade unions seeking to provide guidelines for action:

"The aim here could be the long term pursuit of normative agreement within the industry on ways of measuring and rewarding different kinds of work, on methods of relating changes in rewards to changes in productive techniques, on the criteria which companies should apply when concerned with general wage or salary increases, on standards of labour utilisation and definitions of work roles, on career structures and promotion criteria, on the handling of disciplinary and redundancy issues, and other matters of normative contention". (Ibid. pp. 176-7)

There remains the question of inter-industry normative regulation. The potential role of public bodies like the National Board for Prices and Incomes or the Commission on Industrial Relations is here indicated. Such agencies would seek to find or suggest areas of normative agreement and attempt to establish regulative norms: reviewing and encouraging the development of procedural norms and, where necessary, testing claims of a substantive kind. The public scrutiny involved would serve not only to articulate and, if necessary, clarify the basis of normative regulation but could also be regarded as a countervailing pressure against the processes of fragmentation.

In turning now to comment on this analysis it is first of all necessary to recognize that the diagnosis and solution preferred is in terms of promoting a pluralist society. Since this is the context in which the whole argument is placed one could wish for a fuller delineation of the pluralist model. However, reference is made to the existence of a wide variety of relatively autonomous but interacting groups and agencies which create their own norms. They are, so to speak, expressions of voluntary action and serve to sustain and encourage freedom of contract and association, ideas and ideologies. The model is contrasted on the one side with a coercive authoritarian state in which order is imposed and conflicts suppressed and on the other side with anarchy in which social order is shattered by the excessive fragmentation of normative regulation discussed earlier. Since Fox and Flanders allow that a pluralist society has some degree of disorder within it, then a movement towards anarchy is a built in risk. Their thesis, however, is that if a society starts to move rapidly in that direction, then the authoritarian solution may be sought. Government attempts in the U.K. to restrict wage movements and intervene in collective bargaining together with the continuing discussion of the role of law in creating order in the industrial relations'
sphere are cited as indications of a drift towards the authoritarian solution. In their rejection of legal compulsion as a means of inducing industrial relations order Fox and Flanders follow the view of the Donovan Commission. (The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-68: Report Cmnd. 3623). The Commission maintained, for example, in commenting on "unconstitutional actions" by employees that "as long as no effective method for the settlement of grievances exists no one can expect a threat of legal sanctions to restrain men from using the advantage they feel able to derive from sudden action in order to obtain a remedy for grievances which cannot be dealt with in an orderly fashion. Self help has always been the response to the absence of "law and order". In industrial relations, "law and order" can be created only by adequate bargaining arrangements." (Op. cit. 136)

But the question we may now raise is whether the controversy over the use of law in British industrial relations finally gets to the crux of the matter so far as the anomie of economic life is concerned. We have already seen in our discussion of Durkheim that an adequate social policy to respond to the problem of anomie had to concern itself with remedying inequality in the external conditions of the struggle. And it is precisely on this point that Goldthorpe has queried the solution which Fox and Flander propound. (See J. H. Goldthorpe, Social Inequality and Social Integration in Modern Britain, Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science: Sociology Section. 1969). It is a solution (and this point we may note applies likewise to the Donovan Commission) which may grant a greater degree of formal rationality to the industrial relations sphere but will not provide stability because it does not of itself provide a moral basis to economic life. If there are marked inequalities of educational and occupational opportunity in a society, as is the case in the U.K., then a Durkheimian perspective would suggest that these must be attacked if a social and industrial order which necessarily implies inequalities of condition is to achieve any moral stability. "One need not assume that rank and file industrial employees resent the inferior life chances they have been accorded as keenly as the facts might warrant in order to claim that few will feel morally bound by the normative codes which govern their working lives". (Op. cit. pp. 13-14) Accordingly, an incomes policy (whether framed in voluntary or statutory terms) might in reality have the opposite to the intended effect of inducing stability if the wider structural inequalities continue to operate. It might serve in practice to widen the reference groups that are utilised when pay claims are made:
What are sometimes called the "educative" functions of incomes policy may well have the effect of undermining the viability of such policy. To the extent that evaluations of income and other economic differences do become less confused and obscure, there is little reason to suppose that what will emerge will be greater consensus from one group or stratum to another: the far more likely outcome, given the prevailing degree of inequality, is that conflicts will become more clearly defined and more widely recognized — that the anomic state of economic life will be made increasingly manifest". (Ibid. p. 18)

The difference between Fox and Flanders' position on the one hand and Goldthorpe's on the other is certainly of some importance in terms of policy implications. Both positions diagnose a state of anomic in the economic sphere and both are clearly opposed to authoritarian solutions. But the implication of Goldthorpe's argument is that Fox and Flanders offer a faulty diagnosis and hence a suspect cure because they ignore the wider structural aspects which, while in some senses external to necessarily impinge upon economic life. Further, a policy of rationalising the economic order in procedural and substantive terms might exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problems. And this might, indeed, in its turn lead to a move in the direction of an authoritarian solution — the very thing Fox and Flanders wished to avoid. Goldthorpe's own approach to a solution is more radical, namely that to counteract anomic tendencies in economic life the entire structure of power and advantage in society must become more capable of rational and moral justification. It must become more "principled" and hence a more widely acceptable and legitimate social order. However, he is not sanguine about the likelihood of such a development in terms of the political realities of the British situation and predicts rather the persistence of "marked inequality and thus of chronic unrest and of general economic infighting between interest groups under the rules mainly of "catch as catch can". Such a forecast is indicated by the fact that the egalitarian restructuring of our society, which could only be achieved as a work of political will, expertise and force, does not appear to be on the agenda of any major political party." (Ibid. p. 25)

The conclusion of the matter is not that sociological analysis demands that the political value of promoting social equality be espoused. But it is to suggest that what are popularly described as the problems of industrial life cannot be understood without appreciating the character of political activity
and its influence on the wider social structure. Such activity in short may seek coercive solutions — the approach of an administration which seeks to repress rather than regulate conflict in the economic sphere. Such a solution may be described in shorthand terms as alienating in its consequences. Alternatively, a non-interventionist "free society" approach may be advocated which if our analysis is correct will intensify the anomic unregulated character of industrial life. The solution which Durkheim propounded works on the basis of a pincer movement: the reduction of coercion by egalitarian social policies plus the creation of an acceptable pluralist system of voluntary regulation.