Professionalization, Politicization and Civil-Military Relations

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The two major vehicles of approach to the perennial problem of civil-military relations in the twentieth century have been professionalization and politicization. It is the primary aim of this paper to clarify the dynamics of the political dimension of civil-military relations in the modern nation state. This exercise involves three tasks:

1. An elucidation of the several dimensions of civil-military relations;
2. An examination of the nature of professionalization and its relation to these dimensions;
3. An examination of the nature of politicization, its relation to professionalization, and its relation to the dimensions of civil-military relations.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Since we shall be interested in the political aspects of civil-military relations, it has proved useful to delineate three major dimensions to define such relations: the means of control or restraint on military political activity, the mode or level of such activity, and the motivational orientation of that activity.

1) The discussion of professionalization has developed primarily from Huntington's classical work (c.f. S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard U.P., 1964). However, the discussion of professionalization has atrophied somewhat given an active political role on the part of the military. Furthermore, politicization has been used rather as a catch-all concept to salvage any case of a military organization not conforming either to professionalization or to harmonious civil-military relations, and as such has been devoid of rigorous analytic content.

2) It must be pointed out that, in the broadest sense, civil-military relations include that complex of behaviour in which civilian and military interaction takes place and, as such, may encompass political, economic or cultural interaction. The general discussion of the political dimension of civil-military relations has generally been inhibited through being cast in terms of civilian control of the military. Such an approach has been derived from the Western liberal-democratic tradition (being based on ideological grounds rather than on empirical investigation). As we shall show, civil-military relations have connotations beyond the simple notion of control.
**The Means of Control**

The means of control or restraint of military political activity fall into three main categories.

The first category is composed of both formal and informal controls. The formal may include military prescriptive specifications on the role and sphere of military political activities, and of punishments, e.g. loss of rank, expulsion etc., for any deviation. The informal controls are more important and relate to the internalization and socialization of nonpolitical values by the military. The acquisition of such a set of values may be precipitated either on account of the development of a specific normative code of conduct, or on account of occupational specialization and the division of labour. The normative code of conduct would lead the military to eschew spontaneously certain forms of action. The division of labour means that occupational specialization has reached such a stage that only one range of activities can be adequately satisfied at any one time, and that to engage in a broader sphere could only lead to the debilitation of the major activity.

As opposed to these voluntary restraints, the second type of control, i.e. civilian imposed controls, embraces two very distinct types: insulation and infiltration. The process of insulation involves specific action by the civilian polity to isolate or insulate the military from the polity. This may include attempts to disperse military training centres and bases, and to locate them away from centres of political power; or to forbid the military from joining political parties or voting or standing as candidates; or of a more indirect but nonetheless effective nature to control the size of the military budget.

Infiltration must in turn be divided into two distinct forms: implicit and explicit. The former relates to the situation where the civilian polity can maintain control of the military by virtue of the coincidence of interests based on the overlap of personnel in the top military and civilian political ranks. The coincidence of interests must be a more positive bond than the simple division of labour as found in internalization, and is usually based on common class or ideological base. The explicit type relates to the formal attempts by the polity to penetrate army ranks to ensure loyalty. This may include the use of commissars, control of training and education, the development of a control mechanism parallel to the army hierarchy or of rival forces, such as specialized branches, police or peoples militia.

The third situation relates to the condition where both military and civilian controls fail. The most exaggerated form was found in the caudillo tradition in Latin America, where small armed groups could unite around a local leader and usurp government by force. Although such complete erosion of both civilian and military controls is not a feature of the nation state, the category is included and has relevance in that at varying times civilian and/or military controls have waned to a low ebb. The Tanzanian Mutiny represents a dual failure, whereas the French army Algerian crisis represents a partial breakdown in military controls.

These forms of control are not mutually exclusive and any one case of control may combine elements from each major type.
The Mode or Level of Military Political Behaviour

The second dimension of civil-military relations, the mode or level of military political activity, may be represented in terms of a continuum, on which three major points may be located. The first relates to a pressure group role. In this capacity, the military engages in political activity in a lobbying capacity in an attempt to influence the policy formation of the major governmental bodies. The second level may be termed conjunction. At this level the military exceeds the pressure group role in that it actively participates in governmental policy decision making in conjunction or coordination with the civilian polity. For such a role to be identifiable, it is necessary that the range of decisions exceeds the norm of the military’s immediate sphere of occupational competence. The degree of conjunction may range from a more limited position, i.e. including fringe areas of military concern in a situation where civilian forces are clearly dominant, to a more inclusive level, in which the scope of military policy decision making expands and the dominance of the civilian element concomitantly declines. The third level is total intervention. This involves the explicit assumption and direction of major governmental offices by the military and the expulsion of the civilian occupants of these posts. At its lower level, total intervention merges with a high level of conjunction, while in its most marked form it entails the occupation of all top civil governmental posts by the military. Total intervention may be said to persist so long as the military occupies top political office (P.M. or President), the major governmental posts if not actually occupied by the military are held by military appointees, and that major governmental functions remain under military direction.

The Factors Motivating the Military’s Orientation to Political Action

The third dimension of civil-military relations involves the factors which motivate the military’s political action. The first complex may be designated as personal or individual. In this context the military resources would be mobilized for the furtherance of the interests of only a limited number of persons. The second complex is organizational. This means that the military’s orientation to political action is derived in terms of the interests of the organization as a whole. At a point which approximates the personal complex, such an orientation may be for a simple pay increase, i.e. having relevance only for the personal benefit of those within the military organization. At a broader level, the motivation for political action may be oriented towards influencing policy decisions which, though having immediate

8) A corollary to the level at which the military may act involves the manner in which such activity takes place. Again, a continuum may be established ranging from peaceful constitutional action, to the threat of withdrawal of services, to the threat of the use of the means of violence, to actual deployment of the means of violence. Pressure group activity normally involves a peaceful means of action but may involve the threat of withdrawal of services, i.e. equivalent to strike action. The conjunctive role may involve any of the four manners. Total intervention invariably involves the deployment of the means of violence, although the deployment may be a bloodless one.

4) The best examples are found, outside our immediate frame of reference, in caudillismo. Nonetheless, a strong personal element lay behind the first Dahomeyan coup.
relevance for the military, do have repercussions for groups or interests outside the military. Thus, for example, the campaign for a certain type of defence system has immediate reference to the military but also broader consequences for national security.

The third and fourth types of motivational complex, the national and national sectional, are not as easily defined. Of the many definitional features of the nation state, one is of particular import for our purposes, namely the rise of a national authority structure based on mass popular resources and supports and acting with reference to mass popular demands. If a military motivational orientation is national, two ingredients are essential: first, the object and end of the activity must lie outside the military's own occupational sphere of reference, and second, this activity must be in consonance with the interests and demands of the mass populace. National sectional activity differs in that although the orientation is towards actions having direct relevance for the total populace, those deriving immediate benefit from such action are only a small sectional group of the population, such as a class, a region, or a tribe. National or national sectional motivation necessitates a willingness on the part of the military to enter politics at least at the level of conjunction, for to play such a role the military must affect policy beyond its own sphere of competence.

We may now turn to examine two of the major approaches to civil-military relations and to analyse how they bear on the three main dimensions of these relations.

PROFESSIONALIZATION

Although consensus on a definition of professionalization has not been established, a sufficient number of dimensions constantly reappear to make such a consensus a near likelihood. We shall employ five main dimensions.

The first criterion of professionalization relates to the development of a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge based on a complex of intellectual advancements. Furthermore, this expert body of knowledge must encompass formalized means for technical training including methods of validating both the level of training and the means of training. This dimension may be assessed in terms of the type of training and the level of technical knowledge.

The second dimension relates to the development of institutional autonomy. As an occupational organization becomes a profession, it is necessary that it develops a high degree of autonomy within its own sphere of activity or competence. Furthermore, this autonomy must be accompanied by permanence and continuity of occupation, and by formal institutional means validating this autonomy. This dimension

5) Latin America represents the best examples of national sectional political activity. After the decline of caudillismo and the military dictator, a common pattern to emerge was the national sectional coup. Nation state developments were under-way, and then national sectional activity represented the activity of the military to prop up the ruling oligarchy. In the more advanced nations, the sectional bias has been increasingly less evident and the national more prominent, e.g. Argentine, whereas in the central American states the sectional bias still outweighs the national one.
is manifested and may be examined in terms of the development of formal demarcation, i.e. formal legal documents specifying the nature of the profession and its sphere of competence, in terms of the non-infringement of this sphere of competence, and in terms of the formalization of tenure of employment and of payment. The third dimension is corporateness. This involves the development of a collective sense of unity and the collective recognition of the clear differentiation of that body from other organizations. Corporateness is manifested and may be measured in terms of the loyalty of the members of the profession to each other, the development of egalitarian means of interaction, and the absence of any conflicts and cleavages. The fourth dimension refers to the development of internal controls and internal affective neutrality. The development of internal controls entails the development of self-controls of behaviour, which become internalized in the process of training or occupational socialization. The emergence of affective neutrality relates to the impartial application of the major norms of the organization whether these apply to recruitment, promotion, modes of conduct and interaction. These features may be assessed in terms of the establishment of a body of rules governing controls and punishments, the consolidation of achievement norms for recruitment and promotion, and the impartial application of such controls and norms. The final dimension relates to the development of a professional social ethic and of affective external neutrality. It is evident that the high development of a branch of technical knowledge and skill provides those possessing such knowledge with powerful tools for the control of nature or society. This final dimension of professionalization requires that this body of knowledge be applied and harnessed to socially responsible uses. Thus, the orientation of the application of this knowledge must be to community rather than personal, group or organizational interests. It is the social responsibility which distinguishes the professional man from other experts. External affective neutrality simply means the impartial external orientation of the profession, i.e. toward societal goals and organizations as opposed to their own more specific ones. This dimension may be assessed in terms of the non-personal activity and societal orientation of responsibility of that organization in the field within which it is an expert.

_The Relation of Professionalization to Civil-Military Relations_

The major problem now is to examine the relation of professionalization to the three dimensions of civil-military relations.

The most obvious result of professionalization for the means of control is the development of spontaneous internal controls. Thus, the development of technical expertise means that military functions become a full-time occupation and the military man occupies the position of an expert. The development of institutional autonomy and corporateness means that the military is clearly demarcated and differentiated from the major complex of political roles, and is willing to act only within its own sphere of competence and expertise. Finally, the development of a professional ethic and social responsibility means that the military sees its own
task as insuring national security, and to the extent that the major locus of popular demands and authority lies within the polity and that the major body for the formulation of national goals and policies is the polity, then the military must accept the directives of the polity. Therefore, both the organizational, i.e. the division of labour and expertise, and attitudinal, i.e. the professional ethic, drives of professionalization lead the military to develop its own internalized loyalty and subservience to the polity.

The development of internalized professionalization by the military is the most effective way of minimizing civil-military conflict. It is most effective in that a clear division of labour between the polity and the military emerges, and in that the polity does not have to employ elaborate or expensive means to ensure the loyalty and achieve control of the military.

It has frequently been assumed that the spontaneous developments of military controls mean that the military completely withdraws itself from politics. However, this assumption is largely fallacious, for not only does professionalization not exclude a political role but it may also precipitate such a role.

The first level at which the military may act is the pressure group. All professions are composed of individuals and all professions have a particular location in society, and may be expected to hold and express political views concerning their nature and place in society. The major areas of military pressure group activity concern the size of the armed forces and the size of the budgetary allocation and the nature of the defence system. Not only is it perfectly legitimate for the military to play a pressure group role (note many professions have become fully unionized) but it is also in an excellent position to do so (by virtue of access to Defence Ministry). Several factors are of interest with respect to potential strife with the polity at this level. In the first place, any conflict is limited and constrained, and due to security reasons often concealed. In the second place, two factors derived from the professional complex have consequences for the polity. Thus the military tends to favour unity and efficiency and derides the conflict and fragmentation among politicians and particularly oscillations in the policies between various governments. Further, the focus of the military on national security leads it to develop a more conservative outlook and a greater degree of sympathy with such a type of government.

The second level of political action by a professional military is balance or conjunction. Such activity is in consonance with military professionalism in conditions of national crisis or war. Given that guardianship of national security is the primary function of the military, whenever such security is in jeopardy either from internal or external sources, the military is legitimately obliged to take action. Where the security threat is sufficiently grave, corrective action may involve not only the utilization of physical force but also the mobilization and deployment of other domestic resources to enable a more optimal use of force, i.e. conscription, rationing, control and direction of economic production, distribution of economic resources. At this level the military is clearly involved in policy making, which, though of relevance to its activities, lies outside the direct sphere of military competence. Nevertheless, to the extent that the military is acting with reference to its major
function, such political activity is quite in consonance with professionalization. It follows that the more localized or the less enduring the threat, the less salient the military political role.

It is at this level that several interesting points emerge. In the first place, given the proposition that the greater the security threat the more dominant the military conjunctive role, here seems to be a wide range of variation. Thus, Bismarck never permitted his generals even to play a role in treaty making, whereas after World War II the American generals not only played a major role in treaty making but also in the subsequent rehabilitation programme, c.f. the Marshall Plan, and indeed in American politics generally. Within the frame of this proposition, the main factors which determine the relative balance of power between the military and the polity seem to be the calculation of the strength of the two sides in terms of personalities, unity and the immediate availability of resources.

In the second place, the ambiguity in the definition of national security threat by the military and by the civilian polity becomes of great importance. The major points of conflict centre in a situation of crisis on the object of corrective action, its duration, the proposed outcome and on the attempts to calibrate military and political victories; in a situation of pre- or post-crisis, the major conflict usually centres on the division of labour with respect to the identification and estimation of security threat and the extent of necessary preventive action.6)

In the third place, although the military generally favours the expansion of military operations as a security guarantee, the position can be reversed. The most common occurrence is the juxtaposition of a professional military and an expansionist polity, e.g. there was some opposition from Hitler’s troops to his expansion of the War or, again, the Egyptian army opposed the commitment to war with Israel by Farouk. The third level of possible military political action involves the complete take-over of government by the military. Two conditions exist when even this dramatic type of political action is consonant with military professionalism.

The first relates to the situation where the civilian polity infringes the professionalization of the military. Such infringement may involve the use of the military as an internal police-force, attempts to interfere with military training, attempts to control recruitment and promotion, attempts to interfere with military organization and the execution of its duties. To the extent that any of these actions infringe the military’s professionalism and are therefore perceived by the military as being a threat to its efficiency and therefore to the security of the national defence, it is quite legitimate to take the necessary corrective action.

The second condition for professional take-over relates to the situation where the civilian polity is unable to constitute the source of social responsibility for the military’s professional allegiance. This category is more important than the first, by which it is frequently accompanied. It is derived from the situation where it is difficult to identify what exactly constitutes the centre of nation state authority. This situation may be summarized under political instability. Political instability

6) Numerous examples may be cited: the Truman-MacArthur struggle, or the amount of resources to be mobilized for Vietnam, or, in the less sophisticated but nonetheless professional armies, the resentment of the Pakistani army at the cessation of hostilities by Liaquat Ali Khan.
represents that condition where the polity for a wide variety of reasons is unable to satisfy its major functions. This decline may be due to four main factors. First, there may be an obstruction or stagnation of the decision making process which results in the polity being unable to achieve one of its major goals, namely policy formation. Secondly, the polity may develop a high degree of corruption and patronage and may deviate from its own constitutional code of conduct. Thirdly, the polity may lose support, but be unwilling to transfer power. Finally, the polity may prove simply incapable of dealing with the demands and loads made upon it. Political instability may vary from a high degree of conflict where opposing groups are polarized, to a situation of stagnation where there is a simple loss of resource and capacity for action. However, in either case the end result is the same, namely that no responsible central authority exists, and to this extent national security may be endangered and the military may legitimately intervene.

The third dimension of civil-military relations relates to the complex of factors which motivate military political performance. Professionalization inhibits any personal political action as this is quite clearly contrary to the development of social responsibility. However, the professional military may act politically on an organizational basis to the extent that it plays a pressure group role. Any activity beyond this level, i.e. more direct influence on policy decisions motivated purely for organizational benefits, represents a contradiction in professionalization. Furthermore the professional military may not act in terms of national sectional interests as again the sectional element represents a contradiction in the development of a national social ethic. Finally, the national motivation is in consonance with professional military political activity at the conjunction and take-over levels.

**POLITICIZATION**

Although the rise of professionalization represents the dominant organizational and attitudinal form of the military in the nation state, not all armies have developed all the indices and dimensions to the same degree. The most important summary concept covering a degree of variation from professionalization for civil-military relations is politicization. Politicization is the process involving either the inculcation of values and opinions or the expression of action towards the polity based on such values, which lies outside the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of

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7) We may illustrate with some of many possible examples. Thus in 1960 the Turkish army made a coup in keeping with professionalization. The government under Menderes was increasingly deviating from constitutional norms in its actions against the main opposition party, while at the same time attempting to use the military as an internal police force to further its own political ends. Or again in 1959 the Pakistan political system had become completely bankrupt. No advance was being made on major political policies, and the polity itself was increasingly racked with open strife. Further, the military was being increasingly used to put down riots. Or again, in Egypt it was the very development of professionalization after 1936 which led the military to look to the international context and realize the backward position of the polity. All these cases have in common the fact that it was the military's professionalism which precipitated the extreme level of intervention.
competence of any organization. Politicization is of two very different types: induced and overt. Overt politicization represents the deliberate or overt drive by the polity to inculcate extra-military political values into the armed forces.\textsuperscript{8}) Induced politicization has the same end product as overt, i.e. the acquisition of an enlarged sphere of political reference, but differs in the process of the acquisition of the political values. Thus, as opposed to being deliberately imposed by the polity, they are acquired or induced more spontaneously through the general process of interaction between the military and polity. These types vary to such a degree that it is necessary to consider individually their repercussions for civil-military relations.

\textit{Overt Politicization}

Overt politicization is primarily the product of the rise of the one party state. The essential features of this type of state are first that only one party is legitimate, and second that the function of the party extends beyond simple support mobilization and the recruitment of leaders to include major governmental and control functions, i.e. party and state authority merge. Overt politicization is partly an ideological phenomenon in that in the one party system all organizations in society are seen as part of an organic whole and must belong to the main-stream of that whole (i.e. the party), and partly the consequence of the development of the control function. Not only are one party states generally committed to enforced growth and development engendering increased centralization and direction, but any opposition to the one party is regarded as anathema and a threat to its existence — a powerful military is one obvious source of opposition.\textsuperscript{9})

Overt politicization is manifested in several manners. First, recruitments and promotions may be made in terms of party affiliation. Thus the achievement norm of professionalization either becomes eroded or supplemented by party loyalty as the dimension for the evaluation of personnel. Secondly, the party can attempt to recruit or distribute party cards among the military in order to build up a core of loyalty. Thirdly, the polity may delegate government posts to top military leaders thereby involving the army in the general policy making process. Fourthly, the party may utilize political commissars both to encourage the military to become party members and also to propagate and supervise. Finally, the polity can engage in political education and indoctrination through special ideological schools. In general, these last two factors indicate a higher degree of politicization. Armies may vary widely in their degree of politicization, for example the Tanzanian military after 1961 began a mild

\textsuperscript{8}) The overt inculcation of extra-military political values by the polity must be clearly differentiated from the simple infusion of political values. To some degree all polities attempt to infuse various values of patriotism or national loyalty in varying degrees. In this respect, Israel represents a more overt case than Britain. However, this type of inculcation of political values differs radically from politicization in that it concerns only political values related to national security and which are therefore consonant with the role of the military; politicization involves the inculcation of values on a much broader front.

\textsuperscript{9}) Overt politicization, though mainly the product of the actions of the polity, may also be stimulated to some extent by the army itself. This is usually found where a national hierarchical army develops from a former guerilla army, c.f. China.
programme of politicization, whereas the Chinese military manifests a much higher level.

The Relation of Overt Politicization to Professionalization

It is necessary to note that overt politicization is not antithetical to the development of professionalization. Although it does represent some points of conflict, it does not constitute a complete negation. Thus, we noted that the major indices of professionalization were a technical body of knowledge and the development of social responsibility. To the extent that a one party state constitutes the nation state authority and to the extent that it is publically accepted as such, then there is no reason why politicization should affect social responsibility. (For example, there is no reason to suggest that Soviet or Algerian military are any the less socially responsible than the British.) Unless politicization has any marked effect on promotion and training, it need have no adverse bearing on technical knowledge. The Soviet armed force is highly sophisticated and manifests a higher skill level than several professional armies. (It may be recalled that immediately prior to World War II, however, the Stalin purges in the army severely hampered its capabilities.) Although politicization does not represent a negation of professionalization, it obviously does represent some deviation. The major dimension of variation is the development of institutional autonomy. It may be noted by way of qualification that all major professions in the nation state are never completely autonomous and could never be unless existing in a vacuum. Thus many are subject to government inspection, or are tied to the government through salaries, or have government defined spheres of autonomy. Overt politicization represents a direct attack on institutional autonomy in order to prevent the military from developing its own independent resources and orientations. The polity clearly invades the minimum or unambiguous sphere of competence of the military.10)

The Relation of Overt Politicization to Civil-Military Relations

With respect to the means of control, the development of overt politicization has direct relevance to the establishment of infiltration. Indeed one of the primary motivating factors for politicization on the part of the polity is precisely to establish control over the military both in terms of supervising the military and in terms of integrating it into the party mechanism. In this respect, it will be recalled that many one party regimes arise from conflict situations and are geared to rapid development. The development of a high degree of politicization as evidenced in Communist countries has proved a most effective insurance against an internal military coup. In no Communist country has there been an internal domestic coup and, although other

10) It may be noted that some degree of politicization is found even in many professional armies but usually only in the most minor form, i.e. a certain degree of nepotism or political favouritism in promotions. In fact, this may be openly sanctioned by the polity in such forms as the civilian executive control over the appointment of generals.
one party states have experienced coups, the rate is lower than for otherwise similar two- or multi-party states. However, where the one party system is not strong, the attempt to politicize the army may well prove to have deleterious effects. This is because politicization heightens the military’s political sensitivity, increases its awareness of the weaknesses of the polity, induces party conflicts and cleavages into the army and embroils the army in party politics (especially salient since many formal institutional mechanisms, such as transfer of power, are lacking). There have been indications of such problems in Communist countries (see for example the role of the army in Kruschev’s succession struggle), but these are much more likely to prove problematic in the weaker non-Communist one party states.

Finally, it is interesting to note the conflict between politicization and professionalization as a means of control. All Communist states have embarked upon a programme of overt politicization, but in all cases a professional hierarchical army has begun to emerge. Some resistance from the army has been manifest against a high degree of politicization. This has been evidenced in the USSR in a contained fashion, and in a more open manner in China.¹¹) Furthermore, overt politicization can lead to a higher degree of conflict when it is introduced into an army which is already developing along professional lines. One of the reasons for the Ghanaian coup of 1966 was the army’s resentment of Nkrumah’s attempts at politicization. The primary effect of politicization on the level of military political activity is either to involve the army in some kind of conjunctive role, with the army in a clearly subordinate position, or to give the army a pressure group role. In general terms a conjunctive role is more likely when politicization leads to implicit infiltration, for in this situation the military and political interests merge to a higher degree on account of the interchange of personnel. For example, a significant percentage of the Chinese cabinet is composed of army leaders, whereas in the USSR where implicit infiltration is not as evident military leaders are not so salient. It is important to note that the conjunctive role of the politicized military is much more permanent than the conjunctive role of the professional military, as it is not contingent on the incidence of a national crisis. Where take-over does occur there follows only a minor change in the political structure involving usually a change in personnel and a modified change of policy. Thus the Algerian coup led to only a small number of cabinet changes and a slight modification of policy.

Concerning the motivational complex, the development of overt politicization inhibits the army from acting on a personal basis. Furthermore, to the extent that overt politicization involves implicit infiltration, a clear-cut organizational orientation for a pressure group role does not emerge. As overt politicization involves moderate explicit infiltration, then a more clearly defined organizational orientation may crystallize. Any national sectional activity is clearly excluded. National motivation is manifest to the extent that the military plays a conjunctive or take-over role.

Induced Politicization

As opposed to the specific inculcation of political values and roles of overt politicization, the induced variety is the more spontaneous product of the dual natures of the military and the polity and their interaction. As such, the conditions under which induced politicization develop are much more complex than the unilateral action of a one party system. In general terms this type of politicization may be the product of three main classes of factors: those pertaining to the nature of the military organization, to the type of polity, and to the nature of the interaction, between the military and the polity. These factors are too extensive to be covered fully in the scope of this paper, but examples of each category may be given.

One of the precipitating factors of induced politicization, related to the internal organization of the military, concerns the degree to which the military reflects the social structure of the society of which it is a part. To the extent that all armies are part of a social system, they obviously must manifest some reflection of the social structure of that system. One of the primary features of professionalization is that such reflection becomes minimized, i.e. the professional military man sees himself primarily as a military representative rather than a product of that part of the social structure from which he is drawn. Given a society in which there exists a marked degree of cleavage conflict, e.g. class, tribal or regional conflict, and given a situation where the army reflects this cleavage strife in some manner and still identifies with the sectional groups from which it is recruited, then politicization is a likely consequence. Thus in several Latin American nations where class differences are very salient and the military is drawn from one specific class, it is likely to act in the interests of that class. Or again, in Nigeria the army became a reflection of the tribal division within Nigeria itself. The first military coup was a partly abortive attempt by the military officers of the East to rectify their grievances, while the second was largely a Northern response to this.

The main factor, related to the polity, which tends to precipitate induced politicization is a mild version of the overt form. It involves the attempt by the polity to induce military members to join or back certain government groups, or the attempt to effect a number of political promotions, or to distribute a number of political rewards to the military. This is clearly differentiated from overt politicization by virtue of being considerably less organized or pervasive and being considerably more conciliatory. Such attempts by the polity to induce politicization usually arise where there exists a weak polity which is unable to rely on the loyalty of the army, or where, lacking a popular base, it seeks to maintain itself in power by relying on the tacit support of the army. Indonesia represents a good example of an army which largely resisted such attempts at politicization, whereas Syria represents the opposite case.

Two examples of the nature of military political interaction as precipitants of politicization may be given. The first relates to the role which the military plays in the achievement of independence. Where independence is not a constitutional transfer and the military becomes involved in an armed struggle, the military is pushed into a central political role. The best examples may be seen in Latin America. The second and more important precipitant of politicization relates to the past role of the military
in assuming total governmental controls. The assumption of total government power by the military is likely to lead to politicization on a number of grounds. First, the military is actively obliged to make policy decisions and to cooperate with the major civilian political groups. Even though the military may unmistakably remain the executive, it is by necessity transformed into a political group. Secondly, the process of political rule by the military means that the top leaders are divorced from the army and this may lead over time to an internal cleavage. Thirdly, once the army has assumed power it becomes particularly prone to the development of divisions on how or on what policies ought to be executed. Even a professional army is subject to these strains: thus there is the problem of when to intervene and, second, the problem of when power ought to be returned to civilians and the conditions under which such a return may be effected. If military rule may threaten to politicize a professional army where the range of choice is relatively limited, the strains on a low professionalized or politicized military are considerably greater. Finally, even the process of transfer of power back to civilians is likely to lead to politicization, since the military are likely to take a number of actions to ensure that the conditions which led to its intervention are not likely to recur. This frequently takes the form of some supervisory allocation to the military.

The Relation of Induced Politicization to Professionalization

In considering the relation of induced politicization to professionalization, two factors must be taken into account: first the degree of politicization, and second the uniformity of politicized groups within the military, i.e. whether all the politicized members belong to the same political faction.

Two general points may be made. Firstly, it must be noted that, like overt politicization, the induced type does not represent a complete negation of professionalization. However, it does have negative consequences for dimensions of professionalization which differ from the ones affected by overt politicization. The direct repercussions of induced politicization on professionalization relate to the development of the affective neutrality both concerning internal controls and external responsibility. Political promotions and recruitment tend to erode the development of neutral achievement internal norms while the increased political sensitivity of the army inhibits neutral impartial external interaction. In the second place, although induced politicization only necessarily affects these two dimensions, it can generalize to other types more easily than the overt form.

Beyond these two general points, account must be taken of the variables mentioned above. Politicization can vary enormously in degree and it follows, of course, that the lower the degree the less serious the consequences for professionalization. In this context it must be noted that a very mild form of politicization is found in many professional armies. Of equal importance to the degree of politicization is the nature of its uniformity within the army. Where the army's politicization is uniform, there need be no major consequences either for the skill level, autonomy or corporateness. Where the army has two or more rival politicized groups within its ranks, the consequences for other dimensions of professionalization become very serious. Corpo-
rateness obviously becomes an impossibility, and skill level and efficiency equally suffer. The Syrian army represents a classic case of an army completely divided by rival socialist and conservative factions, although in recent years a degree of uniformity has been established by the general dominance of one particular political faction.

The Relation of Induced Politicization to Civil-Military Relations

In attempting to examine the relation of induced politicization to the main dimensions of civil-military relations, it is necessary to consider both the degree of unity of the politicized military and the strength of the polity.

The main consequence of politicization for the establishment of controls over military political activity is the fluidity and lack of development of such controls. The development of internal controls is uncommon, but is more likely to take place when politicization in the military is uniform and does not encompass rival political groups. The establishment of insulation is equally difficult to achieve as the level of political interest of the military is likely to lead to strong resistance to any attempts by the polity to divorce it from its source of political rewards. Insulation is more likely to be achieved when the polity can strengthen itself and rely on sources of support extraneous to the military, while the military remains divided. A more common form of control relates to implicit infiltration. This is possible to achieve when the political interests of the military and the politicians overlap, due to their common origin. A very moderate form of explicit infiltration as a means of control may be found, but this never approximates the level or intensity found in one party states.

Where the political interests of the military coincide with those of the political leaders, a considerable degree of harmony may develop between the military and the polity. Thus many Latin American nations have passed through periods of civil-military coalition due to the common class and therefore political background of the respective leaders. Where the civil polity was able to establish itself more strongly it could gradually begin to embark on a process of insulation, e.g. Chile or Uruguay. In other nations, diversification of the recruitment of military leaders (usually to include more middle class) has led both to increased politicization and to increased disharmony with the polity when its diversification has proved faster or slower than the polity's. In this context, Argentina after 1930 has an interesting sequence of alternating progressive and reactionary coups. The most heightened situations of conflict emerge either when politicization of the military is very much out of tune with the civilian polity yet the military wishes to continue its political role, e.g. the Spanish civil war, or when the factionalization of politicization within the military mirrors an equivalent factionalization in the polity, e.g. Nigeria.

Given our previous discussion of the growth of professionalization and its relation to the nation state, we may expect under continuous nation state development the gradual erosion of politicization. Indeed politicization is only found in those nations where the military has played a long political role, e.g. Latin America, or where the polity has
Persistently proved weak, as in Syria. As the polity begins to develop, there begins to emerge insulation (Turkey under Ataturk represents a good example), or as army recruitment, training, or international exposure change, then there begins to emerge internalized control, e.g. Indonesia or Peru.

The consequences of induced politicization for the level of military political behaviour are largely contingent on the discussion of the means of control. A politicized military is unlikely to content itself with a pressure group role but will most frequently be found playing a conjunctive role punctuated by periods of take-over. The relative weight of the military is directly dependent on the unity and strength of the polity, the unity of the military, and the degree to which the polity is manifesting the interests of the military. Much of the history of many of the more advanced Latin American nations from 1880 - 1950 (approximately) could be written in terms of such oscillations. The conjunctive role which the military may play, unlike the professional military role, is not limited of course to times of national crisis.

With reference to the occasions of total intervention, several factors are of interest. Firstly, where nation state development is low, the politicized military may easily make a coup. Secondly, where politicization leads to fragmentation, a bewildering series of military coups and counter-coups develops, c.f. post World War II history of Syria. Thirdly, unlike the professionalized military, the politicized one is under no obligation, having made a coup, to attempt to return power to civilians as soon as possible, nor to restrict itself to removing the causes of the coup. Fourthly, as nation state development advances, although the politicized military may continue to make coups, it must begin to prove willing to adapt itself to nation state demands. The main way in which this has been established is for the military to transform itself into a quasi political party. In this respect, it is interesting to note how willingly and easily the Latin American military has achieved this. Such a development has proved the transition whereby the military has legitimized itself as a quasi civilian political force. The guardian role of the military in some of the more advanced Latin American nations supports this. Finally, it is interesting to note that the joint civil-military coup is almost totally restricted to politicized coups and is rarely found in the more autonomous professionalized military.

With reference to the third dimension of civil-military relations, we find again a more fluid picture. The personal motivational complex is not generally found in the politicized military of the nation state, but is restricted to the caudilly-type of activity of pre- or threshold nation state societies. It is interesting to note that such activity was found in several central American states until recently. Organized motivation is of course found but, unlike organized motivation in the professional army, is not limited to the pressure group level of political activity but may prove the motivating factor for conjunction or take-over. The most common motivational complex (particularly under nation state development) is the national sectional. In Latin America the most common sectional bond has been that of class and, to a lesser
degree, region, whereas outside Latin America the ethnic group or regional bonds have been more common. National motivation is consonant with political action by a politicized army at the conjunctive level in times of national crisis, but otherwise is incompatible with the political action of the politicized military.

It would be redundant in conclusion to reiterate the many specific observations concerning the relation between professionalization, politicization and civil-military relations. Rather it is hoped that this paper has made some contribution to clarifying the dynamics of the political dimension of civil-military relations in the modern nation state.