Outline of a Theory of Occupational Associations*)

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Review articles by C. J. Lammers and A. L. Mokⁱ) stimulated this author to make more explicit some notions of an approach to the study of occupational associations which he has published elsewhere²). Lammers distinguishes between a system-model and a party-model for the analysis or organizations of all kinds, and Mok mentions two approaches to the study of occupational associations, one stresses the occupation, the other the organization. It seems to this writer that the occupational association more than any other type of organization, e.g. the business firm, calls for an integration of the above-mentioned approaches, if the researcher attempts to analyze it in the framework of a theory of occupational action and if he wishes to meet the criticism against consensus theory, especially in its Parsonian version³). In what follows, an attempt is made to outline an “exchange” theory of occupational associations. In the first section, problems related to the functions of the occupational associations for its members are discussed; in the second section, the structural problems of this type of organizations are dealt with.

*) Revised version of a lecture delivered April 2, 1968, at the University of Leiden, Institute of Sociology.


E. Gross\(^4\) suggests a distinction between the "work" group and the "colleague" group, the rationale of which is that usually the former is made up of incumbents of different, the latter of incumbents of the same kind of occupational positions. Borrowing from T. Parsons and N. J. Smelser\(^5\) "occupational position" means here a fulltime job, incorporated in a work organization, and occupied by an individual to earn a living. Gross' distinction seems useful as the basis for defining the formal occupational association: Incumbents of the same or of kindred occupational positions unite to an occupational association to pursue goals or interests related to their occupational position. Whether these associations are voluntary or compulsory organizations seems to be of minor importance; though this discussion focuses on voluntary associations, it seems, by and large, pertinent also to compulsory organizations.

The considerations on the goals people jointly pursue in these associations start with the fact that people exchange their performance of occupational roles for certain material and immaterial rewards. As most of the occupational roles are incorporated in work organizations, e.g. a business firm, it is this organization which is the typical sanctioning partner; only the self-employed directly exchange performance and sanctions with the customer. The relationship between the exchange partners can be described in terms of P. M. Blau's exchange model\(^6\): Each party attempts within certain normatively defined limits to maximize its advantages, i.e. to receive a maximum of performance at a minimum of rewards. An equilibrium in the exchange will be formed when each party has more advantages by continuing than by dissolving the relationship. If one party perceives the performance of the other as no longer meeting his expectations, the other party loses prestige and, in the long run, power: This party has to accept a deterioration of its reward situation if it continues, for some reason, the exchange. It seems to this author that occupational relationships (between "employer" and "employee") are, on the whole, best approached by a conflict model than by a consensus model: Though there are many types of motivation of occupational role performance, e.g. intrinsic rewards, collectivity orientation, a.s.o., the occupational relationship basically is one of exchange, because people have to make a living by performing their occupational role and because people need approval, more or less generalized, for their psychic wellbeing.

Occupational associations, now, are formed by incumbents of occupational positions with similar exchange problems. The main goal of the association is to facilitate for the individual member a "profitable" exchange of performance for rewards. The members can direct their joint efforts to two subgoals: First, assisting each member in acquiring resp. improving the cognitive and normative orientation which allows him to perform the expected role, i.e. procuring and transmitting to each member the requir-

ed technical knowledge and, to a certain degree at least, articulating the more general norms of role performance. Second, acting collectively toward the exchange partners and other relevant segments of the social environment to maximize the rewards, e.g. money and prestige, for the individual member. Exchange partners are work organizations, associations of work organizations, single clients, organized clients, and the political organization of society which provides a legal framework for the exchange relationship; all of them make up the social environment of the occupational association.

With regard to the goal or the function occupational associations have for their members they may be classified on a continuum from organizations whose predominant goal is the improvement of their member's occupational qualification to organizations which predominantly function to augment the material rewards for their member's occupational role performance. The extremes of this continuum or organizational types are, of course, G. Millerson's study association7) and Th. Caplow's expansive union8). In between are occupational associations like the professional association, the white collar union, and the craft union. In every association both subgoals are pursued, but the emphasis is always on one of them, sometimes leading to a neglect of the other.

With the exception of the pure type of the study association which makes no efforts whatsoever to act toward the social environment in order to improve the reward situation of its members, the vast bulk of the occupational associations acts directly vis-à-vis associations of work organizations, organized clients or the state. In this case the incumbents of certain occupational positions collectively offer certain performances which some parts of the environment are in need of and collectively ask for certain rewards. Thus, on the level of the association the same fundamental conflict of interests appears which can be observed on the level of the individual incumbent of an occupational position. If the exchange partner gets the impression that the incumbents of a certain occupational position do not perform as expected, e.g. because their qualification does not keep up with the change of their tasks, the incumbents collectively loose prestige with the exchange partner. The immaterial rewards decrease as the criticism of the exchange party becomes publicly known. If the lack of efficient performance is regarded by the exchange party as very grave, the power equilibrium is disturbed: The other side refuses to grant the rewards as before or to increase the rewards as usual, and it depends mainly on the possibility to replace the incumbents of the occupational position and their willingness to put effectively pressure on the exchange partner at what point the new equilibrium in the exchange relationship will develop. The loss of power, manifested in reduced success of the occupational association, has secondary consequences, as some of its members are no longer willing to participate in the organizational activities. This, in turn, further weakens the power in the ex-

change relationship on the collective level. An interesting example is provided by the agricultural engineers (Diplomlandwirte) in Western Germany in the 1950th.

The question arises under what conditions incumbents of certain occupational positions organize an association of one or the other type. This seems to depend on the particular type of occupational position these people occupy. Considerations on a classification may start with the increasing rationalization of work which can be observed in all advanced industrial societies. Natural and social sciences are to a growing extent applied to the processes of work; the division of labor differentiates more and more, and this means that the amount of systematized special knowledge required for role performance seems to be by far more important than the norms regulating social relations in the world of work. Even if there are some occupational positions, e.g. the crafts or the medical profession where the normative aspects of occupational role performance predominate or are at least of considerable importance, by and large it seems useful to classify the occupational position in modern society according to the extent of systematized special knowledge which is required for effective role performance. An illustration of this classification is the scale of required formal training: There are occupational positions which do not require their incumbents to possess for effective role performance any formal training at all; and there are other positions the incumbents of which need a university training completed with a doctorate. In between are those positions which require an apprenticeship or the attendance of a technical school.

Now one of the basic propositions of a theory of occupational association may be stated: The higher the qualification required, the more likely are the incumbents of an occupational position to form resp. to join an occupational association of the study association type and the less they are interested in an association of the union type and vice versa. This hypothesis has not been tested as yet but it seems plausible: For the incumbent of a position which requires for appropriate role performance a high qualification, the support of the colleagues is more needed to improve the qualification than to control the working conditions especially with respect to compensation. The incumbents of such a position know that their claim to the rewards, they think fair regarding to their role performance, can only be maintained if the quality of their performance is appropriate. Thus the association they first build up or join will be

9) The agricultural engineers in Western Germany have traditionally been trained more in the natural sciences than in economics. In the 1950th the state agricultural administration needed a lot of people with a training in business administration. New positions were filled not with agricultural engineers but with business administrators. The (professional) association of the agricultural engineers made considerable efforts to secure the new positions for its members, especially as there was, following World War II, a surplus of trained agricultural engineers. It succeeded only partially because the power of the public administration had been strengthened by the surplus and by the lack of training of the engineers in the required skills. In the 1950th the profession of the agricultural engineers lost a good deal of its former prestige and, then, of its power vis-à-vis the employers. The improvement of the power equilibrium in favour of the association began only when early in the 1960th a shortage of trained agricultural engineers developed and the curricula had been revised.

one which offers assistance to the individual in his effort to maintain a high level of occupational performance. As in modern society more and more organizations mediate between the incumbent of the occupational position and his customer with regard to remuneration, the former will establish resp. join one or more organizations of the union type. Thus it can be observed that incumbents of an occupational position which requires a high degree of systematized special knowledge are members of two, and sometimes even more, occupational associations of different types. An example are again the agricultural engineers in Western Germany).

According to H. L. Wilensky a fusion between the professional association and the union is to be expected. This might well be the case, if the white collars in general acquire a more positive orientation to unionism and no longer think it "unprofessional" to quarrel over payment and to go on strike. But to the opinion of this writer it is highly questionable whether there will be fusion between the study association and Wilensky's new professional union. With the increasing complexity of the technology of production and administration, it seems more likely that the task of assisting incumbents of occupational positions which require a high qualification in their efforts to constantly improve their knowledge, can only be fulfilled by an association of the study association type. On lower levels of occupational qualification it may, however, well be that occupational associations of the union type begin to assume or to stress more strongly the task of improving their members occupational skills.

II.

Thus far, types of occupational associations have been developed, and the notion of exchange between the association, as the collectivity of the incumbents of an occupational position, and the social environment has been explained. Now, organizational processes and related structures shall be considered and it should, thereby, become clear how the above-mentioned different approaches to the study of occupational associations can be usefully combined.

The present author holds the opinion that the Four-Functions-Model by T. Parsons and N. J. Smelser, an "organizational"-approach, in its most simple version, can be taken as a basis of the analysis, if it is stripped of the organismic overtones. It seems that the experiments on small group problem-solving have proven that a small group may usefully be conceived as having to cope with four "problems" if it is to attain its goals, and it might, therefore, be useful to try that model on the macro-level, too.

11) The agricultural engineers in Western Germany join the Verband Deutscher Diplomlandwirte (VDL) as their professional association which is concerned with professional matters. They join e.g. the Deutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft (DLG) as one of the relevant study associations. And they join e.g. the Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft (DAG) as a union which is concerned almost exclusively with remuneration.
Every organization which is to attain its goals in relation to the different segments of the social environment has to solve four problems: a. The "political" problem of deciding on the goals and the rank order of the goals which are to be pursued in the interaction with the environment, and of implementing the goal-attainment. b. The "economic" problem of procuring the appropriate means and of allocating them to the goals. c. The "motivational" problem of inducing its members to perform their respective roles conscientiously. d. The "control" problem of securing the minimum solidarity among the members necessary for collective action; this means putting pressure on the members to act out their conflicts only to such an extent which does not prevent collective action.

Applied to occupational associations the model can be interpreted as follows. The "political" problem refers to two interactive processes: First, the process of the members deciding on "official" and "operational" goals\(^\text{15}\), that is, on the weight accorded to the goal of collective maximization of rewards in relation to the weight accorded to that of improving the performance of the members; and further, on various resulting subgoals. Second, it refers to the process of goals implementation, that is the setting up of a social structure and of the manipulation of the various kinds of means. The "economic" problem refers to interaction of the members which is to develop the means to attain the goals; there are mainly two classes of means, first, those apt to influence the environment in favour of the group goals and to putting pressure on the environment to attain the expected rewards, and, second, mechanisms of acquiring knowledge in the relevant fields and of transmitting technical knowledge as well as norms and values to the members. The "motivational" problem refers to the process of inducing the members to participate in the processes of decision-making and goal-attainment at least to the extent which seems necessary to attain the goals, which implies the maintainance of the moral of the environment. The "control" problem refers to the process of applying pressure on the individual member to perform its occupational and its associational role conscientiously, so that the exchange relations to the environment are not impaired.

The question, now, is how the attempted solutions to the problems vary according to the type of occupational association. This is, at the present writer thinks, the combination of the "occupational" and the "organizational" perspective mentioned above. It will, furthermore, result in a few more basic propositions of a theory of occupational associations.

**Problems of goal-definition and goal-attainment**

Two aspects of the decision-making process shall be dealt with here: first, the dynamics of deciding on the official and operational goals of the association, and, second, the chances of the members to participate in the decision-making. The discussion of the former aspect provides, to this author's opinion, an opportunity to get rid of

concensual bias implied in the Parsonian approach to organizational analysis by accounting for the contribution of conflict to organizational change.

The discussion of the dynamics of goal-definition starts with a conception developed by W. J. Goode\(^{16}\) and, especially, by R. Bucher and A. L. Strauss\(^{17}\) analyzing the structure of professions. According to Goode only the hard core of a profession may be regarded as a "community" based on consensus of its members with respect to goals and means. And Bucher and Strauss conceive a profession as consisting of various "segment" each of which as its own "mission". It seems that this conception can be usefully applied also to organized incumbents of occupational positions which are not professionalized. Thus differentiation of the associations' membership with regard to the organizational goals cannot be found only in the process of professionalization, as among insurance agents in the US\(^{18}\), but also in the process of goal-definition in industrial unions, as demonstrated by the conflict between socialists and christian-democrats in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) during the 1950th. And concerning the application of traditional and modern techniques in performing the occupational role, differentiation of the membership can be found among physicians as well as among artisans, e.g. opticians in Western Germany. It can be assumed that the differentiation of the membership results in the formation of an "in-group" or dominant category of members, and various more or less marginal categories. The latter are the source of the dynamics of organized occupational life: They constitute movements within an occupational association which attempt innovations with regard to the organizational goals to make their "mission" the primary goal of the association and, thereby, to change the social structure so as to become an ingroup, too. This clash between dominant and marginal membergroups is not always a conflict between oldtimers and newcomers which has been described e.g. by L. Kriesberg\(^{19}\); sometimes the conflict arises when the occupational avantgarde has succeeded to dominate the decision-making process and the other members defend their vested interests. This latter case has been discussed e.g. by H. L. Smith\(^{20}\).

As for the rise and the intensity of such internal conflicts on the association's goals, it can be proposed that frequency and intensity are the less, the more the occupational association approaches the study association type, and that they are more frequent and more intense, the more the association is of the industrial union type. Comparative investigations are lacking, but the proposition seems to be plausible. Academic disputes

\(^{19}\) L. Kriesberg: Occupational Controls Among Steel Distributors. in: American Journal of Sociology, LXI:3, pp. 203-212.
de not, in general, cause conflict if the performing of an occupational role and, hence, the earning of a living is not at stake. If conflicts arise, and even if in the course of events some members form a new association, it does not seem likely that the conflicts are very intense. The contrary seems to be true for union-type organizations. Here conflicts often arise when one category of members fears that the goals which the dominant membership category has defined might bring about a deterioration of the exchange relations to the environment. And these conflicts are often very intense if the dominant group is of the opinion that conflicts over the association's goals cannot be tolerated, because they might cause a decrease of the striking power toward the environment.

Almost nothing is known about the means employed acting out the conflict. The conflicts in the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund e.g. seem to be fought and settled largely by using the rules of a democratic process of decision-making to exclude the opponents from the decisive bodies and, thereby, inducing them to form an association of their own. D. C. McElrath 21) has described a "defending perspective" of ideology, developed by the marginal members of an occupational association in their fighting the dominant category of members to justify their deviating goals and to modify the dominant ones.

The other problem, which shall be dealt with here, is the chance of the members to participate in the decision-making process compared to that of the officials. As occupational associations are in principle "voluntary" associations and as in modern Western societies the officials need a democratic legitimation for their acting toward the environment, the question of the members' participation in the decision-making seems to be of great importance. According to this perspective occupational associations can be classified on a continuum from decision-making reserved to officials alone to decision-making reserved to members alone. In terms of R. Mayntz 22) the extremes represent a "hierarchic" resp. a "democratic" authority structure. The structure of decision-making seems to be determined by the goal or the function of the association for its members on the one hand, and by the complexity of the social structure of the association which is dependent on the number of members and the age of the association on the other hand. Thus the following proposition may be stated: The more the occupational association come close to the union type and the more complex its structure, the less do the members have a say in the decision-making; their influence increases, the more the association approaches the study association type and the less its structural complexity.

At present no comparative investigations have been carried out on the decision-making of different types of occupational associations. Since R. Michels "Iron Law of Oligarchy" investigations have focused almost exclusively on unions, presumably

because there is much less power wielding involved in study associations. All that can be done here is to set forth some ideas which will make the proposition appear plausible. If an association stresses the improvement of working conditions and remuneration as its primary goal, decision-making must be structured in such a way that the association can react immediately on any move of the exchange partners. This requires the formation of a staff of full-time officials who have almost discretionary powers to direct the collective action in rapidly changing situations, and the members have to comply to the officials' demands if the organization is to act successfully. If, however, the association stresses the improvement of the occupational qualifications of its members as its primary goal, the situation is quite different: There is no environment toward which precise and immediate action is necessary; the acquisition and transmission of knowledge can be done by a rather small staff of unpaid officials; thus the meetings of the members can have much more importance for the decision-making. Considerations of this kind have been set forth e.g. by B. Barber and by Th. Caplow23) but only with regard to unions. The other point which must be made in this connection is that full-time officials show a tendency to remain in office, especially if their position implies upward career mobility and if they have to anticipate difficulties when returning to their former occupational position after some years of full-time service to the association. This pertains especially to workers' unions. The domination of the decision-making process by officials does not mean, as S. M. Lipset and M. Trow24) have shown, that the organization management does not act as to implement the goals of the rank-and-file member: When deciding on the organization's policy the officials consider these goals, but they also attempt to manipulate the members in this regard.

Problems of the means employed in goal-attainment
Stressing the goal of improving the occupational role performance of the association's members, the principal means is to procure the required technical knowledge and to transmit it to the members. Millerson25) has described the means which are employed by qualifying associations in Great Britain in some detail: In an extreme case, i.e. if the organizations of higher education are not concerned with a certain field of knowledge, the association stimulates and supports research in this field, and establishes a system of courses and examinations which the members have to take. Under ordinary conditions the activities of the association are organizing lectures and discussion meetings and editing publications of various kinds. With regard to the level of technical knowledge which the association is prepared to transmit to its members it can be proposed that this level rises, the more the occupational association approaches the study association type. Comparative investigations are lacking again but the hypothesis seems to be plausible, at least, if the proposition is true that the

higher the qualification required, the more the incumbents of an occupational position are likely to join an organization of the study association type, and the less they are interested in an organization of the industrial union type. Moreover, this author got the impression that the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund has many professionals among its members, but that they, contrary to skilled workers, do not expect this association to assist them in improving their occupational qualification, whereas the members of the Verband Deutscher Diplomlandwirte (VDL), which is a professional association, do expect that activity.

Stressing the goal of collectively improving the rewards, the main means is developing various ways of applying pressure on the exchange partners. This can be done by establishing public relations and government relations offices, by procuring money and preparing the procedures for a strike, a.s.o. It seems useful to classify the means which are employed by occupational associations with regard to the degree of aggressiveness involved. At one extreme are the more “peaceful” at the other are the more “violent” techniques of putting pressure on the relevant segments of the environment. In the first case, the members of the association think that they need only give the exchange partner certain informations to make him act reasonably; i.e., they do not regard the exchange relation basically as a power phenomenon. In the other case the incumbents of a certain occupational position are convinced that only a demonstration, or the application of their power can make the exchange partner comply with their expectations. In the former case memoranda are submitted, in the latter strikes and lock-outs are organized. Thus the following proposition may be stated: The more an occupational association comes close to the study organization type, the more likely it is to employ rather peaceful means in acting collectively toward the environment; and the more it approaches the industrial union type association, the more likely it is to use rather aggressive means to influence the exchange partner.

There are no comparative investigations which would test this hypothesis. But the study by Millerson on professional associations and that by G. Triesch on industrial unions seem to support the proposition. Millerson\(^{26}\) describes the rather inconspicuous means employed by “qualifying associations”: it is the already mentioned presentation of memoranda to government bodies and, especially, the mobilization of members who are in influential positions, e.g. as Members of Parliament. Millerson maintains that, on the whole, such activities are less numerous than people are inclined to assume. And B. Goldstein\(^{27}\) shows that the professionals’ and other white collars’ refrain from employing more violent means may be attributed to their middle class orientation. Triesch\(^{28}\) describes the means employed by the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund which range from trying to create a favourable image of the association in the larger public by influencing the mass media to carrying out a strike as the ultima ratio. Observations by Triesch and by other social scientists seem to indicate that even industrial unions attempt to attain their goals by employing as far as possible more

\(^{26}\) Millerson, op. cit., pp. 206.

\(^{27}\) B. Goldstein: The Perspectives of Unionized Professionals. in: Social Forces, 37:4, pp. 323-327.

peaceful means and using the more aggressive ones primarily as a threat. This corresponds to observations concerning the means employed by professional associations: Physicians e.g. no longer shy away from organizing a strike if the exchange partners do not comply with their demands. Thus there seems to develop a certain assimilation of the means which are employed by occupational associations of different types in pursuing the goals of improving the reward situation of their members. It might be that this assimilation is brought about by the gradual abolition of traditional norms and behaviour patterns in the course of the rationalization of work in modern society.

Problems of motivation to participation

This discussion of the factors motivating the members to participate in the organizational processes of the occupational association draws heavily on R. K. Merton and on J. G. March and H. A. Simon. It seems useful to distinguish between three types of reactions of the association’s member to the role expectations of participation: participation, apathy, and withdrawal. It is assumed that these types of reactions are caused by different combinations of three factors: the similarity between role expectations and the member’s orientation concerning participation; the chance to have the services of the association without participation or even without membership; and the pressure from reference groups or persons to participate. Now, three propositions can be stated. First, a member is willing to participate, if his orientation is favourable to participation, if there is no chance to get the services without participation, and if colleagues apply pressure on him to participate. Second, a member is apathetic, if his orientation is unfavourable to participation, if he has no chance to get the services without membership, and if the colleagues do not press him to participate. Third, a member leaves the association or refuses membership, if his orientation is unfavourable to participation, if he has a good chance to get the services without membership, and if the colleagues or the neighbourhood do not press him to be or to become a member. Taking the different types of occupational associations as indicators of different types of social and sociopsychological constellations, as outlined in the propositions, predictions on the extent of participation, apathy, and withdrawal are possible.

As for participation and apathy in different types of occupational associations, it is predicted that members are the more willing to participate, the more the association approaches the study association type; they are the more apathetic, the more the association comes close to the industrial union type of occupational organizations. Here, too, only a few considerations can be set forth in support of the prognosis. An incumbent of an occupational position which requires a good deal of up-to-date systematized technical knowledge is interested in the participation in his study association because this extends his knowledge and confers prestige among the colleagues. Exchange of knowledge with competent colleagues is one of the most

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efficient ways of improving one's occupational abilities. As participation confers prestige there is some pressure by the colleagues to participate. And, last not least, there are no fulltime officials who discourage participation by dominating the decision-making process. These considerations do not only apply to professionals but also to highly skilled workers. It might even be that the latter take increased interest in their union if it provides opportunities for improving occupational skills. As for participation and apathy in associations of the industrial union type, the willingness to participate seems in ordinary situations to be restricted to people who like the activities in voluntary associations as such and to those members who aspire to an unpaid or paid office in the association. Incumbents of occupational positions which require a high degree of technical knowledge are usually not willing to participate, because there is neither time nor energy if they want conscientiously fill their occupational and family positions, and because there is, in general, no real dissatisfaction with the reward situation. Incumbents of occupational positions not requiring a high degree of technical knowledge seem, by and large, to be more interested in leisure-activities other than participation in a union. This is not to say that associations of this type cannot activate its membership to collective action; this is always possible in exceptional situations as e.g. during a strike or in a critical phase of the process of professionalization or when a hitherto marginal member category becomes aware of its “mission”. In these situations even the apathetic members feel that there is something at stake for them. But in ordinary situations, only a few “Sozialaktive” (a term by R. Mayntz) are interested in participation in the organizational processes while the bulk of the members is more or less apathetic.

As for the reaction of withdrawal it may be predicted that members of an industrial union are more inclined to leave the association than are members of a study association. The following considerations seem to support this prognosis: Industrial unions are mainly interested in improving the reward situation. Many of its members would prefer to get the services of the association without paying membership dues. It seems that the difficulties the unions encounter in organizing white collar workers are mainly caused by the fact that nobody puts pressure on them to join the union; solidarity is a value of the working classes but, so far, not of the middle classes. And under the conditions of the “affluent society” even the unions of blue collar workers have to provide special incentives to make union membership attractive, as e.g. Caplow remarks

30) Caplow, op. cit., p. 197.

Problem of social control
The problem of control refers to occupational behaviour of the association’s members which is relevant to the exchange relations to the social environment. The exponents of the dominating category of members define certain norms of conduct for the organization members and attempt to apply sanctions in case of deviant behaviour. In general, it seems that the problem of social control is by far less important for occupational associations than it is for complex work organizations, especially because
it is very difficult for the officials of these associations to ascertain deviant behaviour. This holds even true for those associations whose members perform functions related to central values of the society, as health or justice, and whose occupational misconduct may, therefore, considerably worsen the collective exchange relationships.

The discussion of the norms of occupational behaviour focuses on the professions and the semi-professions. It is said that the incumbents of occupational positions of this kind have to convince their customers and the public at large that they are willing and able to render their service honestly and competently, to take up a phrase by A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson. With respect to this discussion a content analysis, which Millerson has done on the codes of ethics of some professions in Great Britain, is revealing. For it he demonstrates that the code is centered around the norm of solidarity among colleagues and not around the norm of protecting customers against exploitation because of lacking knowledge. As regards the occupational norms of non-professional people it seems that they are still less specific concerning the performance of the occupational role. Norms of occupational conduct of small businessmen, managers, and white collar workers appear to be nothing but articulations of middle class norms, while the norms which are to govern the occupational behaviour of blue collar workers seem to be mainly articulations of the solidarity norm of the lower classes.

As for the process of control it seems useful to distinguish between self-control of a member and the social pressure applied on a member by colleagues and officials. This distinction seems to be largely equivalent to that by Caplow between "control" and "coercion". Now, it can be proposed that the more the association comes close to the study association type, the more the association relies mainly on self-control; and the more the association approaches the industrial union type, the more control is exercised by social pressure. Investigations on the control process are almost entirely lacking because the management of most associations seems to hold the opinion that the publishing of exact data on deviant behaviour does damage to the organization's image. This holds true for professional associations as well as for industrial unions. Thus, Millerson found that professional associations only infrequently get officially informed about deviant behaviour of members and that probably only in a few cases the offenders are punished. And of his sample of qualifying associations in Great Britain only one association publishes a statistics on the different kinds of offenses and of punishment. The controls of occupational behaviour of professionals may be more tight in other countries, but on the whole Millerson seems right when maintaining that customers and the public can only hope that the incumbents of these occupational positions have been trained to behave like "gentlemen" and that, on the whole, they will in fact do so.

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33) Caplow, op. cit., p. 120.
Taeusch 35), thirty years ago, that the main function of codes of ethics is to constantly remind the members of that profession of their duties so that they eventually will internalize them. Thus, it seems that professions mainly rely on self-control of its members. What has been said about the enforcement of the norms for occupational behaviour in the professions seems to hold especially true for the articulations of middle class and lower class norms of the behaviour of non-professional people. Deviant behaviour with regard to these norms is sanctioned, if at all, not by the occupational association; compliant action of the rank-and-file members is rewarded mainly by small groups in the neighbourhood and the work organization. Only full-time officials are sometimes under tight control by the dominant group of top officials but this is more an example of social control in work organizations.

III.

To sum up: An attempt has been made to outline an exchange theory of occupational associations and, thereby, to demonstrate the usefulness of a combination of different approaches to the study of occupational associations. In particular it has been tried to develop a very simple Parsonian four-functions-model to meet the current criticism and to combine it with a typology of occupational associations. Basic variables of the theory are types of occupational positions and, dependent on them, types of occupational associations. Dependent variables refer to the four organizational problems: rise and intensity of conflicts about goal definition, the chance of the members to participate in decision-making, types of means used for goal-attainment, the motivation of members to participate, and types of social control.

Still lacking is a more detailed comparative analysis of the feedback process between association and environment, of the interaction processes involved in solving the four problems, and of the interdependency of the various interaction processes. Questions which as yet either have not been answered at all or only in part are e.g.: How do associations of different type react to changes in the environment? How are conflicts between subgroups of members on the association's goals acted out in different types of associations? What defending perspectives are developed in different types of associations and what types of symbols are manipulated? How does a conflict on the decision-making of different types of associations affect the processes of motivating and controlling the members and, thereby, of goal-attainment? How do officials of different types of associations communicate with the rank-and-file members? To answer these questions in full much more research is needed on the organizational processes among occupational association of different type. Based on the present body of findings propositions can be stated for further investigations.