Politieke sociologie

Peace Keeping Forces: public opinion, political attitudes and personality variables

A condensed survey of research findings and theoretical evidences *)

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In writing social scientifically of U.N.'s Peace Keeping Operations, one has roughly to distinguish between peace keeping as an organizational phenomenon and peace keeping as an idea. A suchlike distinction runs for the greater part parallel with the claims of the respective social sciences. As an organization, peace-keeping forces can be studied from the angle of sociology, dealing with structure, functions, social position, (military sub) cultures, etc. Furthermore, like any organization a peace-keeping force can be tackled, sociologically, by distinguishing between its internal en external functioning; and again, this distinction refers to different scientific approaches, this time within sociology itself, as I showed in a previous study 1). As an idea, peace keeping forces may be subject to social psychological explorations, dealing with attitudes, values, prejudices, personality variables, etc. Of course there exists a close interrelationship between both aspects: as an organization, a peace-keeping force ultimately depends from the action (or: inaction) of the respective governments, this kind of support being influenced by experience with already existing peace forces, by public opinion and by the manner in which both these experiences and public opinion are being perceived by political elites. Nevertheless, within the pale of a short contribution we have to restrict ourselves at best to one of both dimensions, our aims being to render a survey both short and as complete as possible.

This report deals with the idea of a peace force. It consists of three paragraphs, indicated here as “public opinion”, “political attitudes”, and “personality theory”. This sequence refers to levels of abstraction, since public opinion is rather low and “personality” an explanatory concept of a high level of abstraction. In other words: public opinion research is able to deliver some “hard facts” on how peace keeping is viewed in certain parts of a given society without being able to tell us a great

*) Lecture delivered at the Second International Summer School On Disarmament and Arms Control, Pavia, Italy, July 1968.

deal about the much more important "why and wherefore" of these facts; while personality theories, on the contrary, are able to sharpen our insight into the motivational dispositions of persons, being incapable of furnishing clear-cut exact predictions on this specific field. From the point of view of a middle-range policy planning the "attitudinal level of explanation" will perhaps prove to be the more fruitful, for it combines the advantages of a moderate level of abstraction with those of a moderate level of prediction.

I. On the structure of polled opinion: some relevant research findings 2)

As far as I know, up to now no research specially dedicated to opinions about peace keeping forces has been accomplished. On the other hand, there has been a rather large number of research findings more or less relevant to our problem. For instance, some famous studies of public opinion on international political relations, the U.N.O., peace and war, disarmament, rearmament, and so forth, included some questions on peace keeping practices, an international police force, the role of the U.N. in preventing war, etc. Taking all in all and classifying the respective research findings along lines of the main correlates, the following results must be mentioned:

(a) age composition. In general, no important significant relations between age and sympathy with U.N. peace keeping can be found. Most studies report an almost equal distribution of pro's of con's within each age category. In summary, age itself cannot be found as a relevant variable. When dividing the population in age categories, only a few slight differences occur, partly as a result of some intervening variables.

A. O. Hero, when dividing the American Public into three age categories (21-29 years, 30-49 years, 50 years up) reported a positive interest in a "U.N. Permanent Armed Force, including troops from the U.S." of resp. 58%, 52%, 51% (AIPO nr. 580, 13/3/1957, N = 1624). Later AIPO polls — again according to Hero's evaluation — showed the gradual disappearance of even these slight differences (AIPO nrs. 640, 689, 695; period 1961-1964). Scott and Whitey, in evaluating U.S. poll results of an earlier period (1945-1955) arrived at the same result.

Interest in U.N. peace-keeping practices may be considered as a part of a much broader "affective interest" in problems of organizing world peace. William Erbe, in evaluating responses to questions about interest in three types of (imaginary) peace organizations, found older people more sceptical in this respect.

(b) sex. The same holds good for another variable: sex. According to the same sources (Hero, Scott and Whitey) U.S. polls showed no U.N. opinion differences caused by sex. To quote Hero, "compared to men, women have been consistently less well informed and less apt to have opinions about virtually any U.N. issue, as well as about most other aspects of world affairs. But when we set aside all persons venturing no views, we do not find any consistent differences between the sexes in their general feeling toward the U.N.". However, Hero implicitly indicates an interesting phenomenon: when asked their opinion about some concrete political problem relevant to an UNPKF (for instance; the Middle East problem and UNTSO), men generally turn out to be more in favour of increasing U.N. peace-keeping capabilities than women. Differences disappear when exposed to questions of a more general nature; — all psychological interpretations being possible.

(c) social minorities. American poll figures show some differences between persons of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant denominations in respect of favourable attitudes to the idea of an UNPKF. At different polls the great majority of Jewish respondents were in favour of strengthening the U.N. and UNPKForces, Catholics somewhat less, and only a slight majority of the Protestants answered positively. About the same results appear when categorizing the answers into white-coloured dichotomies: Negro's are generally somewhat more in favour of the U.N. and UNPKF than white people are. In short, on various occasions (polls) and at different periods 3), but in the same country, minority groups showed a more favourable attitude towards international organizations, such as the U.N. and the UNPKF, than traditionals did.

(d) level of education. Many researchers have stressed the relevance of "education" to the nature of poll results. In general, the higher the level of education, the better informed about U.N. matters the people will be and the more convinced of the importance of the U.N. for maintaining peace, the more in favour of active membership and of strengthening the U.N. 4). Hero, in his aforesaid survey quotes the following results from AIPO- and from NORC-polls: 85% of college-level respondents were in favour of UNTSO, against 71% high school and 60% grade school; 65% of college level respondents were in favour of greater political power of the U.N. against 52% high school level and 48% grade school.

"Approval of the U.N." was among 86%, 80% and 66% of these respective categories, differences reversely running parallel to different percentages of "no opinion" (resp.

3) Elmo Roper (see note 2) reports 37% whites against 24% negroes being in favour of strengthening of U.N.O. However, when compared within categories of the same economic level, the negro respondents might be expected to be more in favour than the corresponding whites.

4) This being contradictory to the earlier evaluations by Buchanan, Krugman and Van Wagenen; see note 2).
People from all educational levels proved to be almost equally sceptical about U.N.'s peace keeping capability. However, scepticism may be based upon rather realistic insights or it may be part of a more psychologically based complex of feelings of pessimism, distrust, threat, etc. To the question: "If the U.N. had not existed, do you think there would likely have been another world war, or not?", (AIPO 712, 6/2/1965), 38% of college level people said "no" against 25% high school, and 18% grade-school-trained people. So, the almost equal amount of scepticism within the three categories may stem from different origins: insight versus a more general mood of pessimism. A. Boserup and C. Iversen, in analysing the participants of demonstrations for nuclear disarmaments in Great Britain, Denmark and Western Germany, arrived at suchlike results: the higher the level of education, the more people are inclined to feel actively involved in world-scale political affairs. One might say that there is some indication, from research findings as well as from theory, that a low level of education correlates with a general inability to place U.N. peace keeping in a broad, long-term perspective, this inability leading to relatively unfavourable attitudes to the idea of a peace force.

(e) Social status. Public opinion research, in categorizing the answers to questions, generally underlines the relevance of occupation to opinion formation. However, when analyzing poll results this rather axiomatic principle sometimes shows the implication of inner contradictions. In most societies occupational position is the main determinant of social status, this being so whether primarily associated with "income" or with "education". Belonging to a certain status category may cause some reference group behaviour which may make for inconsistencies in the patterns of response of the persons involved. In other words, certain strata of society cannot afford to be as clear and as "honest" as other strata are, this fact tending to increase chances upon some biased research findings. In short, chances of such inconsistencies are high if one of the alternative answers to a certain question belongs to the pattern of culture of a reference group. In particular, questions about (a) "the degree of interest" in (b) "idealistic" movements among (c) middle class and higher strata may result in a loss of clearness of research findings. Therefore, such vague statements about "degree of interest" must be checked via built in questions which render evidence about the respective degree of knowledge. Questions about positive or negative attitudes to a certain idea must be completed with questions about concrete situations — as concrete as possible. These general remarks must be kept in mind when evaluating some of the many research findings concerning the relation between occupation and the U.N. in general, and the UNPKF in particular. Thus, William Erbe found a significant positive correlation between "prestige of present occupation" and "interest in a peace organization", while Mari Holmboe Ruge found among members of peace movements 68% having

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5) Resp. AIPO 574, 11-7-1956, N = 1505; AIPO 580, 3-13-1957, N = 1627; AIPO 589, 9-17-'57. 6) AIPO 577, 1-15-1957, N = 1428. Question: "As things stand today, would you say the chances of the United Nations for keeping the peace in the world are good or poor?"


positive attitudes to the U.N., much more as was present within the population at large (45%) \(^9\). Nils Halle\(^2\), using a complex index of social position (composed of age, region, sex, income, education and occupation) reports a correlation between social position and knowledge about foreign policy matters, including the U.N., while Galtung\(^2\) stresses the relevance of social position — again, as measured by this complex index — to positive attitudes towards the idea of an international police force. Hero also finds some correspondence between prosperity and “support to expanded U.S. co-operation in the U.N.”. Laulight and Paul\(^2\) implicitly stressed the relation between occupational and political ideologies, Canadian big business being moderately against the idea of strengthening the U.N. peace keeping capabilities.

(f) conclusions. Any social scientist when invited to formulate some general conclusions on the basis of these poll findings will be very hesitant; and so are we. The poll results we have quoted referred to different questions, to different periods of recent history, to subsequently different (public) images of U.N. peace keeping practices\(^10\), and they dealt almost exclusively with public opinion within one specific country, the USA. This makes the basis for generalizations become rather treacherous ground. Nevertheless, the findings we have mentioned showed some uniformity in evidence. Even if confronted with non-specified questions, public opinion to the idea of an UNPKF proves to be a rather structured one:

1. in general, the higher strata of society show themselves more in favour of the idea of an international police force than the lower strata do,

2. in particular, the level of education corresponds positively with favourable opinion,

3. however, some important exceptions to these rules may be present even within the context of this formation: members of minority groups tend to be more in favour than lower traditionalists; while those persons who are in fear of loss of protection tend to be less in favour than other higher strata are.

Or, in terms of a somewhat higher level of abstraction:

(4. Adherence to the idea of an international police force, as UNPKFforces might be viewed\(^11\), stems from intellectual and emotional grounds. Opposition to such an idea stems from rational and emotional grounds.)

Ideologically, this adherence as well as this opposition will show itself as a mixture of both dimensions. On an attitudinal level of analysis, however, the relative interrelationship of both impulses within each ideology does not matter. As attitudes, adherence as

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\(^10\) Contradictory to Buchanan’s c.s. conclusion, we do not believe that “international police force” and “UNPKF” have to be separated carefully as items in an opinion research. In our opinion, the rather juridical distinction between international and supranational authority is a sociologically and socialpsychologically irrelevant one.
well as opposition, whatever their grounds, can be correlated with some other political attitudes and be more or less located within a broader ideological context. On a higher level of analysis — personality theory — both dimensions have to be identified carefully.

II. On the “nature of polled opinion”: “world mindedness”, “nationalism” and ”conservatism”

Pollled opinion is “surface opinion”. In this respect, the many rather unspecified poll questions do not meet the demands of any scientific enterprise. However, polled opinion may mostly unintentionally indicate a substratum of ideological views or even of total belief systems. In such a case, unspecified poll questions may meet the demands of some sociopsychological theory: for the answer to such questions, rather apodictic and rough as they are, may function as surface indicators of the existence of such psychologically based beliefs among some parts of the population. Thus, together with sociopsychological theory polled opinion may serve the construction of a number of “probabilistic” propositions about the “nature” of such poll results.

“Reactions to international events are derivates of interpersonal orientations which, in turn, are determined in part by one’s ideology concerning the nature of his fellow-man”12). Reactions to statements or to questions about an UNPKF may deal with notions on the role of force in the political relations between nations, with the idea of the inevitability of the use of violence, with nationalism versus internationalism, with optimism versus pessimism, with co-operative behaviour, conformism, level of information etc. As Buchanan c.s. once stated “it seems most probable that opinion on the question of an international police force is dictated by opinion within a larger framework but there is no definite proof of it”13). Now, about fifteen years later, we still find ourselves in the same situation: up to now, no important empirical research in this specific field has been undertaken. However, in exactly the same period, our knowledge about the psychological dimensions of nationalism, pessimism, the belief in the inevitability of violence etc, has largely improved. Though there is no direct — that is an empirically tested — link between the poll results we have mentioned and these psychological constructs, it is possible — more than it was fifteen years ago — to deliver some theoretical evidence about these “larger frameworks” of political attitudes (this paragraph) and their personality bases (next paragraph). In order to avoid the temptation to start a discussion about these theoretical insights themselves, we strictly confine ourselves to delivering a number of “suggestions”; from the bulk of these theoretical insights and research experiences we adopt some principles, some evidences that might be helpful — even if merely as cautionary devices — when interpreting expressed opinion in this field.

Psychologically, the reported relation between “level of education” and the support to the strengthening the U.N. is partly a somewhat mutilated version of the relation between “level of information” and a cluster of politically relevant attitudes. Of course,

13) p. 35.
one may expect a positive correlation between education and informational level. On the other hand, psychologically both qualities are not identical, just as a high I.Q. is not a guarantee for "social intellect", or as academic people are not the same as the intelligentsia. In short, "level of information" may be considered as a resultant of education and interest. So, taking "level of information" as an independent variable, according to Scott and others

5. a high level of information not only corresponds with a more adequate knowledge but also with a more "benign" perception of other nations,

and, according to Scott and Whitey 2),

6. a high level of information corresponds with a general willingness to international co-operation.

According to Eckhardt and Lentz 15), such benign perceptions and such a general willingness to international co-operation may be associated with feelings of personal security ("as measured by reported happiness, optimism, and lack of anxiety" 16). To put it in another way: from a higher level of abstraction — personality theory — the relative level of information as well as the relative willingness to co-operate may be considered as dependent variables. Or,

7. favourable attitudes to the idea of an UNPKF together with a relatively high level of information may be considered as (being part of a larger framework of attitudes sometimes indicated as "world mindedness", this larger framework) being a function of personality.

In our opinion, and in contradiction to Lentz's conclusions 17), even poll results themselves show some evidence about the relation between political affiliation and attitudes to an UNPKF. Hero 2), in comparing several poll results, reports a somewhat higher percentage of favourable opinions among democrats as compared with republicans. Some other poll results, however, indicate an almost equal % of pro's. On the contrary, the much more relevant % of con's during the whole period was about 1 1/2 time as high among republicans as among democrats. These and other results — for instance, Laulicht and Paul's 2) reported high interrelations between both response categories — may lead us to formulate this relation in negative terms:

8. opposition to the idea of an UNPKF correlates with political conservatism.

Terms like "world mindedness", "political liberalism" and "internationalism" are used here more or less separately. As indicators of certain clusters of political attitudes they are largely interrelated, and sometimes even used synonymously. As we shall see in our next paragraph, from the point of view of personality theory, all three indicators of "clusters of attitudes" may again be considered as rather mutilated versions of "syn-
dromes of personality variables”. Moreover, especially internationalism versus nationalism are rather confusing concepts18) even in their limited sense as indications of certain responses to certain questions. Nevertheless, many researchers report clear correspondence of an “internationalist orientation” to positive attitudes towards strengthening U.N.’s peacekeeping capabilities.

Now it is the time to deliver some of my cautionary devices, if I may say so. According to Eckhardt and Lentz (p. 39) in the U.S. “there is a general agreement about strengthening the U.N.”, however “a U.S. majority would favor enough U.N. strength to deal with small wars”, and “some other nations would presumably welcome a more strengthened U.N. with fewer strings attached”. Hero’s interpretation of an AIPO release of 3-5-1958, namely that “the idea of a U.N. Emergency Force has apparently been more popular in the U.S. than in most foreign countries19) is substantially in contradiction to Eckhardt and Lentz’s findings. Buchanan c.s. (AIPO and NORC polls) report within the context of a general support sharply different opinions about the relative size of an international army — relative to the size of the U.S. army. Lerner and Kramer2) found among the French political elites who where in favour of UNO’s general peace keeping role only partial appreciation of some concrete tasks of an UNPKF (66% supported the idea of a shock brigade, 44% the idea of a permanent police force, and only 31% were in favour of an U.N. control of disarmament agreements). On the other hand, as Buchanan c.s. state, “many extreme and moderate internationalists, as well informed as the proponents of an IPF would oppose such a force” (p. 9), “such a sweeping move as an IPF at the present stage in history” (p. 37).

Thus, rough answers to rough questions about the idea of an UNPKF suggest rather erroneously an almost general support;

9. only more specified questions are able to identify differences concerning the measure of “nationalist” — as well as of “internationalist” — rooted conditions to the support of an UNPKF.

This general cautionary remark must be completed with two special devices.

First, nationalism may politically take the shape of either (neo)isolationism of “imperialism”; and consequently

10. part of the support to international co-operation, such as an UNPKF might be understood as resulting from “nationalism”.

Most of the polls we have referred to are American in origin. When considering and

18) In short, “nationalism” as a sociological concept seems to lack any clarity (cf. Kenneth Minogue: “Nationalism: the Poverty of a Concept”, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, Paris, 1967, VIII, 2). “Nationalism” as a psychological “working concept”, to indicate some clusters of attitudes, might have some value in it, if codified and released from its often present “local” biases; “nationalism” as a psychological explanatory concept will prove to be nonsense, since nationalism may be viewed as part of a much larger syndrome of personality variables (Cf. C. Bay, I. Gullvåg, H. Ofstad, H. Tønnessen: “Nationalism: a Study of Identification with People and Power”, Oslo, Institute of Social Research, 1950).

evaluating such research findings the limits of this particular context must be taken into account. It is my impression that thusfar full enough attention has not always been paid to this rather simple demand. So, subjects and political leaders of smaller nations may be inclined to consider the framework of the U.N. as a place to gather a relatively high amount of political influence. Aid to an UNPKF, being a critical instrument to be used in critical situations, may serve as a guarantee for the persistence of such a relatively strong pattern of political influence. Another statement of Buchanan c.s., namely that “sophisticated proponents” (of an IPF) “are sure to be extreme internationalists” (p. 9) in this stage of history” (of the U.N.) no longer axiomatically holds true. And perhaps this statement has always been a biased one owing to its exclusively American empirical origins.

A climate of general support to the UN — whatever this means — may make for some acquiescence biases in a part of polled opinion in this field. This is especially so in the case of rather unspecified questions, as is rather usual in this region of public opinion research. This leads to a second amendment:

11. part of the polled support to international co-operation, such as an UNPKF may be understood as resulting from acquiescence; as a psychological variable this tendency to acquiescence may cause a pattern of social behaviour favourable to support of “nationalist” as well as “internationalist” political doctrines.

III. On the personality basis of polled opinion: authoritarianism, acquiescence and dogmatism as explanatory concepts

Thus, positive reactions to the idea of an UNPKF generally may be interpreted as correlates of world-minded, internationalist and liberal political attitudes, with some contradictory exceptions mainly stemming from nationalist sentiments of a specific nature and from some acquiescence bias. Any explanatory interpretation of some specific poll findings, any conclusion about the “nature” of its encompassing political values still remains a rather hazardous game to play, scientifically. This fundamental ambiguity-theoretical evidence on one hand and their very restricted explanatory power on the other- mainly deals with the contradictory nature of these evidences. This ambiguity, however, is perhaps all the more painfully existent on our third level of abstraction: personality theory. In this case, as an explanatory theory, it results not so much from some inner contradictions of our evidences as from the one-dimensionality of personality theory. Though on this level of analysis theoretical evidences generally are less subject to inner contradictions, they are more onesided in nature. In other words: what has been gained, in terms of explanatory power by the greater uniformity and consistency of theoretical insights, has been lost by the unidimensionality of this level of analysis. This makes the explanatory power of personality theory an essentially limited one, whatever the issues may be.

No study in the field of personality theory has received an attention and made a subsequent impact upon further research comparable to that of “The Authoritarian Personality” (1950) by a Berkeley group of social psychologists (Adorno, Frenkel-
Brunswik, Levinson, Sanford)\(^{20}\). In this study, authoritarianism is considered as indicated by a syndrome of personality traits\(^{21}\), being expressions of inner needs and impulses, and leading to a generally hostile and prejudiced perception of the individual's social surroundings. To Adorno c.s., authoritarian people suffer from deeply-rooted feelings of inner uncertainty, again mainly as a result of an authoritarian educational pattern. One of the main reasons of the perceived importance of this concept was its unifying and codifying power. Many already existing theories chiefly in the field of prejudice could be arranged within the framework of this broader concept. Another reason, without doubt\(^{22}\), was the close link between theory and research Adorno c.s. offered by presenting a scale, tentatively indicated as F(ascism)-scale, for the measuring of authoritarianism. High scores on this F-scale could be correlated with certain patterns of individual and social behaviour as well as with certain belief systems, etc. Thus, authoritarianism could be tested and be used as an independent variable (sometimes even as a dependent variable) in social research. Very soon after its introduction, Adorno's concept of authoritarianism found itself confronted with serious criticism\(^{23}\) as well as with a flood of applications\(^{24}\).

According to Kirscht and Dillehay, in their recently published brilliant evaluation of some 250 titles in this field\(^{25}\) "the more specific the dependent belief, the less likely existing measure of authoritarianism will yield a relationship. Specific beliefs arise from many different bases and through the contribution of many factors, even though an authoritarian outlook may represent a primary frame of reference"\(^{26}\). Thus, when trying to formulate some evidences of the personality basis of these political attitudes


\(^{21}\) Summed up as (1) Conventionalism, rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values, (2) Authoritarian submission, submissive, uncritical attitude towards idealized moral authorities of the in-group, (3) Authoritarian aggression, tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values, (4) Anti-intraception, opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded, (5) Superstition and stereotypy, belief in the mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories, (6) Power and Toughness, preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; exaggerated assertions of strength and toughness, (7) Destructiveness and Cynicism, generalized hostility, vilification of the human; (8) Projectivity, disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the outward projection of unconscious emotional impulses, (9) Sex, ego-alien sexuality; exaggerated concern with sexual "goings-on", and punitiveness toward violators of sex mores.

\(^{22}\) A more fundamental reason lies in the field of the sociology of knowledge. By nature, social sciences and authoritarianism are fundamentally opposed to each other; see, for instance: J. Nieszing: "Aufgaben und Funktionen der Soziologie", Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln und Opladen, 1967; spec. Ch. III.


\(^{26}\) Kirscht and Dillehay, p. 93.
to an UNPKF, especially when referring to certain recent studies of authoritarianism\(^{27}\), we must restrict ourselves once more to some modest statements of a probabilistic nature.

According to Levinson\(^{28}\), "nationalism", whether expressed in political beliefs of an "isolationist" or an "imperialist" character, may be considered as a facet of a broad ethnocentric orientation. When using a scale for measuring nationalist sentiments, Levinson found a rather moderate correlation of the scores on this scale with F-scale scores. Moreover, his and others' findings indicate a rather close relation between aggressive forms of nationalist sentiments and high F-scale scores. These, and other findings, summarized by Eckhardt and Lentz (p. 40-46) suggest that

12. Part of the polled opposition to the idea of an UNPKF, as far as this stems from feelings of vehement nationalism, might be considered as being a function of authoritarianism.

McKinnon and Centers found that U.S. subjects who scored high on the F-scale, less frequently than "equalitarians" showed themselves in need of information, and were more convinced of the correctness of their opinion\(^ {29}\). So, in addition to 6) and 7),

13. the relative level of information about world-political events may be considered as being (partly) a function of personality. In particular, a negative correlation between the relative level of information and authoritarianism (as measured by F-scale procedures) may be found.

The same holds good for "co-operation". For instance, authoritarian persons playing "prisoner-dilemma games" were reported to get relatively low scores for "co-operation"\(^ {30}\), (this being one of the alternative game strategies), owing to their feelings of distrust, hostility, etc. Other types of research, e.g. on the relation between authoritarianism and world-mindedness, indicate suchlike correspondences. Avoiding the many discussions about the rather complex relations between co-operation and other relevant variables, such as internationalism\(^ {31}\), about types of co-operation (individual, small group oriented versus international co-operation), about cognitive style versus cognitive mode\(^ {32}\), etc., a further — be it rather superficial — statement can be that

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\(^{30}\) J. Sawyer and H. Guetzkow: "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations" in Kelman (ed.) op. cit.


14. part of the polled opposition to the idea of an UNPKF, as far as this stems from general unwillingness to (international) co-operation, may be considered as a function of authoritarianism.

More detailed research in the field of the relation between personality and willingness to some specific form of co-operation, such as the UNPKForces, can avoid the research biases we have mentioned (10), by asking for motivations to answers. For instance, McKinnon and Centers (33) found a correlation between authoritarianism and negative attitudes to extension of trade in non-strategic goods with the S.U., among U.S. subjects. This correlation became the more a clear one when asking the positive respondents about their motives: part of these respondents — a part characterized by high F-scores — proved to be classified "internationalists" "co-operative" etc. by merely nationalist sentiments. Elmo Roper also has suchlike experiences, although not using F-scale procedures, when analyzing the motivations of favourable opinion of Americans to the wheat-trade with the USSR (34). So,

15. positive reactions to the idea of an UNPKF, as far as they result from nationalist sentiments (see 10) may generally be considered as functions of authoritarianism.

Also acquiescence (the other kind of response bias we had to pay attention to) has something to do with personality. "Although acquiescence may in actuality be related to authoritarianism, it may be regarded as an explanation outside the realm of what the available measures of authoritarianism purport to measure" (35). What makes the relation between both dimensions a rather obscure one is that the F-scale responses themselves necessarily suffer from a relatively high amount (36) of acquiescence biases, since they are supposed to measure opinions as well as a ("submissive") pattern of reactioning. In short, some researchers have come to distinguish between patterns of acquiescence (impulsiveness, susceptibility etc.) and of authoritarianism (rigidity, conventionalism) (37). This leads to the following preliminary proposition:

16. positive reactions to questions or statements about UNPKForces, as far as they result from acquiescence biases (see 11) may stem from an acquiescence pattern or from an authoritarian pattern of reactioning, this being mainly dependent on the way these questions or statements have been formulated.

In our opinion, in this case (poll questions about desirability of UNPKF) one might expect acquiescence being of more importance than authoritarianism. Furthermore, the idea of an UNPKF is a rather abstract one, this abstractness sometimes being stressed, especially within the context of some negative reaction to this idea. Research (38) has found a tendency for persons scoring high on a F-scale to be incapable of dealing with

35) Kirscht and Dillehay, p. 130.
36) F-scales consist of a number of tentatively and authoritatively formulated statements.
38) See Kirscht and Dillehay, p. 45
"abstract" matters, as well as of stressing the relative degree of "abstractness" of those matters. So,

17. part of negative reactions to the idea of an UNPKF may be explained as resulting from a cognitive incapability as well as from an emotional aversion to go about abstract matters, both being functions of authoritarianism.

The same holds good for "optimism" and "idealism". Strengthening U.N.'s peace-keeping capabilities is commonly associated with having a rather idealistic outlook on world-political relations, and with an "optimistic" interpretation of the nature of one's fellow-men. This association will sometimes be stressed within the context of a negative reaction to the idea of UNPeace-keeping tasks. Authoritarianism, as defined in social psychology, is basically related to pessimism, cynicism, anxiety, generalized hostility, etc. Thus,

18. part of negative reactions to the idea of an UNPKF may be explained as resulting from opposition to the optimistic and idealistic outlook with which this idea is sometimes associated; this kind of opposition as well as emphasizing these associations being functions of authoritarianism.

Attitudes like "internationalism" and "world-mindedness", being politically rather vague conceptions, are generally somewhat more distinctly related to personality variables than "conservatism" proves to be. "Political conservatism" especially may be expected to be relatively less exposed to psychologically oriented explanations. Furthermore, and more or less apart from this, the relation between political conservatism and authoritarianism is also a less clear one as compared with nationalism and lack of co-operation. Lentz and Eckhardt, in summarizing Eysenck's and Coulter's research findings, concluded that political conservatism is relatively independent of authoritarianism\(^3\). However, with some restrictions\(^4\), research findings apparently seem to indicate some relation between authoritarianism and strong feelings of political conservatism. Persons who strongly identify themselves with conservative ideologies tend to have relatively high scores on the F-scale. Thus, in addition to (8.),

19. opposition to the idea of an UNPKF, as part of a strong involvement in conservative ideology, will generally be of an authoritarian nature and origin.

This leads to a final — be it a rather important — remark. Authoritarianism as an explanatory concept has been associated with a whole range of individual and social characteristics.

However, any attempt to identify authoritarianism exclusively with one particular political ideology has failed thus far. When constructing the F-scale and interpreting its findings, the Berkeley group of researchers apparently identified authoritarianism and political rightism, and this appeared to become one of the main targets for scientific criticism.

The most impressive and promising follow-up to this criticism has been Rokeach's attempt to construct a scale for measuring "dogmatism". Dogmatism may be considered

\(^3\) Lentz and Eckhardt, p. 51.
\(^4\) See Kirsch and Dillehay, p. 60.
as a special cognitive style, indicated here as “closed-mindedness” 41), and this closed-mindedness turned out not to be exclusively aligned to one specific political ideology. An incapability to solve problems independently, to accept new visions, a disposition to reject “disbeliefs”, a need for “censorship” — to quote some of Rokeach’s items — may be associated with any political doctrine when interpreted in a closed-minded way. However, it must be said that, as a rule, rightist political beliefs will apparently felt to be more in line with this style of social cognition than others are 42). And so we come to our last conclusion, maybe a rather disappointing one to some part of my audience:

20. opposition to the idea of an UNPKF as well as uncritical support to such an idea may stem partly from a cognitive incapability to be on the look out for alternative solutions to world-political problems; this incapability belonging to a syndrome of personality traits to be labelled ad “dogmatism”.

A final note:
The above twenty statements must be viewed as resulting from plausibility reasoning, this being possible by the existence of a number of important theoretical insights. They may serve as directions for use when interpreting some surface findings as well as rules-of-thumb to be used when preparing a more solid social research in this field. However, in the absence of such a research, all conclusions of this report must be viewed merely as tentative and preliminary ones.


42) Of course, some political belief systems themselves are more attractive to this style of cognition than others are. According to Rokeach himself, political rightism generally correlated highly with dogmatism; but, reversely, among “dogmatism” also, although to a minor extent, “leftists” can be found. In our opinion, some special interpretations of leftist political beliefs will turn out to be attractive to and also an expression of dogmatism as a personality construct. See also the stimulating study by Irmgard Staebule: “Faschistoide und kritisch-autonome Haltung”, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 1968, 1, p. 38-61, in particular p. 48 ff.